

West Africa

Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo

Niyi Alabi

Overview

Anti-corruption laws and institutions are in place across much of West Africa, and in 2001–02 several more anti-corruption bodies were created, including in Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Togo. Nevertheless, the last year was marked by widespread criticism across the region of the ineffectiveness of such institutions. Critics perceive a wide gap between governments' anti-corruption rhetoric and the impunity enjoyed by public officials.

Part of the problem may lie in the fact that anti-corruption institutions are often established to appease international actors, while governments endeavour not to alienate political allies at home through anti-corruption crackdowns. West African countries are highly aid-dependent and anti-corruption requirements continued to be central aid conditionalities during the year. While aid conditionalities placed some constraints on executive actions, the flow of revenues from oil and diamonds continued to be the object of extensive grand corruption.

The consolidation of democratic reform continued in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Sierra Leone, which witnessed a further strengthening of national integrity systems. In contrast, governance is particularly weak in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Togo, with few effective controls on executive power. The leaders of most of the latter group of countries began as military dictators who transformed themselves into political leaders, despite poor credentials in transparency and accountability.

A central element of economic reform across the region is privatisation. Investigations during the last year revealed major flaws in recent privatisation processes that opened up opportunities for corruption. Ghana saw a wave of cases involving corrupt privatisations under the former regime, which was in power until January 2001.

While civil society is generally weak in West Africa, there were a few cases during the year, notably in Senegal, where civil society responses to corruption had a political impact. The proliferation of private media has helped expose cases of corruption and sustain pressure for government accountability. The region's record on freedom of expression and freedom of information is not strong, however. The media in several countries faced severe restrictions during the year, and two countries

where freedom of information legislation is likely to be introduced soon – Ghana and Nigeria – saw little progress in 2001–02.

International and regional

At a meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in June 2002, Nigeria's President Olusegun Obasanjo called for the active cooperation of Western governments in the growing campaign for the repatriation of misappropriated funds. 'It is not enough to accuse developing countries of corruption,' he said, 'the western world must demonstrate practical commitment to assist us by repatriating monies that have been stolen from our treasuries and hidden in their financial institutions.' At a meeting of civil society organisations in Addis Ababa shortly thereafter, he called for an international convention to facilitate this process.¹

Western governments continued to make aid to the region conditional on progress in the fight against corruption. The international community stepped up pressure on Burkina Faso in particular to improve its record. In response to UN allegations that the government had facilitated the trade in 'conflict' or 'blood' diamonds from Sierra Leone, Denmark severely cut its aid programme to the country. At the same time, the United Nations Development Programme representative in Burkina Faso criticised the lack of any system for monitoring public spending and the impunity of corrupt officials. He called for the government to 'translate its efforts into a real national anti-corruption policy'.²

In a speech in Sierra Leone, Britain's minister for international development, Clare Short, made clear that a key condition of the continuance of British aid to Sierra Leone was the government's commitment to fight corruption.³ The British government had given financial support to the creation of an anti-corruption commission in January 2001.

Meanwhile, the EU announced in February 2002 that it was resuming full cooperation with Côte d'Ivoire after a three-year freeze triggered by the embezzlement of US \$25 million in 1999. The EU used the announcement to call on the Ivorian government to strengthen its fight against corruption and improve public expenditure management.⁴

Nigeria was again cited on the Financial Action Task Force's blacklist of non-cooperating countries in the fight against money laundering. The United States agreed in November 2001 to increase support for Nigeria's law enforcement agencies in the fields of money laundering, corruption and narcotics trafficking. In return, the Nigerian government agreed to revise its anti-money laundering legislation, introduce legislation allowing for forfeiture of the proceeds of organised crime and increase resources allocated to the independent anti-corruption commission.⁵ In September 2001, the UN Office for Drugs Control and Prevention launched a US \$300,000 programme of support for Nigeria that included improved training and monitoring.⁶

The criteria for debt relief under the initiative for 'heavily indebted poor countries' (the HIPC initiative) can include good governance, accountability for public funds and the adoption of a national anti-corruption strategy. Nigeria is the only state in West Africa not covered by the initiative. Participation in HIPC is no guarantee of progress, however: an International Monetary Fund mission to Guinea-Bissau in mid-2002 – 18 months after the country received approval for debt relief – was highly critical of public expenditure management. 'Immediately after approval,' their report maintained, 'the programme was found to be substantially off-track. Fund missions in early 2001 found a loss of budgetary control during 2000, with large unauthorised expenditures ... These problems continued during the first part of 2001, albeit less dramatically.' The report noted that there had been some improvement in financial administration during 2001, but that 'substantial problems remain'.⁷

The one regional initiative that saw substantive progress during 2001–02 was the protocol against corruption adopted by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Building on the May 2001 Accra Declaration on Collaborating against Corruption, the protocol calls for the harmonisation of anti-corruption rules and regulations among member states.⁸ The heads of government of ECOWAS states finally adopted the protocol at their Dakar meeting in December 2001.

National

Anti-corruption campaigns in West African countries are often cosmetic and rarely address fundamental problems. Launched with great fanfare in the media and often accompanied by the dismissal of a handful of government officials, campaigns typically remain rhetorical.

President Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal, for example, claims to be resolutely committed to fighting corruption, but his government has taken few concrete or consistent steps since coming to power two years ago. Wade did launch a programme of forensic audits of state-owned enterprises that revealed the diversion of public funds, over-invoicing and payments to fictitious companies; however, while some officials were imprisoned following audit findings, others were not, leading to accusations by civil society groups and the media that they had been let off the hook because they had joined the party in power.⁹

Civil society organisations in Senegal also criticised the fact that President Wade refused to repeal Decree No. 97-632 in spite of repeated challenges from Forum Civil (Transparency International's national chapter in Senegal) and his own party's condemnation of the decree while in opposition. The 1997 decree allows public construction contracts to be awarded without going to tender; these contracts may have a maximum value of 100 million CFA francs (US \$150,000) for consultancies and equipment and 150 million CFA francs (US \$225,000) for construction work. The decree was widely seen as a means of developing a political

Corruption and distrust in the Ivorian police: a deep-rooted problem

The man from Abidjan who refused to pull over when ordered to do so by a police officer became a statistic – another taxi driver shot dead by the police. The driver's reluctance was hardly surprising as the police in Côte d'Ivoire routinely stop cars to extract bribes, and drivers just as routinely refuse to stop when the police flag them down. The murder of the Abidjan taxi driver on 14 March 2002 was another in a string of shootings of bus and taxi drivers who have lost their trust in the police.

Police corruption has become a serious political issue in Côte d'Ivoire. Taxi and truck drivers have gone on strike several times to protest against police extortion and extrajudicial shootings. President Laurent Gbagbo has publicly condemned police extortion on roads linking the country with neighbouring states. Fear of extortion, he said in a speech on 7 January 2002, was driving traders away from Côte d'Ivoire's ports, to the advantage of ports in other countries.

In a bid to reduce police corruption and restore public trust, the government took steps in 2002 to improve police working conditions and living standards. Police officers were provided with new vehicles,

radio equipment and firearms. Most importantly, they received a 25 per cent wage increase on 26 January.

The police reaction to the new offer was hardly promising. Because the salary increase was not uniformly applied, non-commissioned officers immediately complained they had been given too little compared to the better-paid gendarmes. There were widespread police protests in the days following, and many officers went on strike. One chief police officer was held against his will, while policemen beat up journalists who reported the incident. On 29 January, police fired their guns in the air in protest.

The immediate crisis was brought to an end by the intervention of the prime minister, who established a joint committee with the police to address reform. But corruption by the police and the public's mounting fear of police extortion are deep-rooted. However well crafted, one wage increase cannot solve these problems overnight. The death of the Abidjan taxi driver, barely two months after the reform effort was launched, offered ample proof of that.

Charles Diplo

constituency. The media also noted the tendency of higher-value public procurement contracts not to go to tender.¹⁰ A new public procurement code published in July 2002 appeared to override the decree, but there was no official declaration to this effect.

Despite strong statements by Mali's former president Alpha Oumar Konare regarding his determination to combat corruption, his efforts were criticised because so few senior figures were brought to account. In apparent reaction, the president announced in November 2001 that the war on corruption would henceforth be 'all-embracing'.¹¹ In April 2002, however, Konare's anti-corruption record was dealt a blow by a World Bank report that described the systemic nature of corruption in Mali, widespread clientelism and vote buying, weak management of public finances, an ineffectual judicial system and impunity of corrupt officials. It

noted a mixed record in attempts to reduce corruption, though it welcomed the anti-corruption measures taken since 1999.¹²

Konare stood down at the end of his second term in May 2002, in accordance with the constitution. The transition to a new government following the 2002 presidential elections was a milestone in the consolidation of Mali's 10-year-old democracy, although the first round of the elections was marred by allegations of fraud against all parties. The constitutional court nullified more than 500,000 votes.¹³

Benin's President Mathieu Kérékou reaffirmed his commitment to the fight against public sector corruption in his state of the nation address in January 2002, stressing the damage that it does to development.¹⁴ Even by official figures, Benin is losing FCFA 50 billion (US \$75 million) a year through corruption.¹⁵ The government prepared a 'strategic plan' to combat corruption, but its efforts to pursue SONACOP (the privatised petrol-marketing monopoly) through the courts – a high-profile case – have still not succeeded. SONACOP was under investigation on charges of financial improprieties during privatisation and extensive arrears in customs duties and dividends.¹⁶

Anti-corruption campaigns involve the drafting of new legislation and the creation of new institutions, but the central problem in most West African countries is weak enforcement. Burkina Faso called two new anti-corruption bodies into existence in 2001. In October 2001 President Blaise Compaoré named the members of a National Ethics Committee, charged with suggesting measures to 'moralise' public life. Two months later the president issued a decree establishing a High Authority for Coordinating the Fight against Corruption. In May 2002, however, the anti-corruption NGO REN-LAC issued a report detailing the range of existing laws and institutions that already touch on corruption, remarking that the mere existence of anti-corruption laws was not enough – they must be applied. According to Dieudonné Yaméogo, REN-LAC's general secretary, Burkina Faso's anti-corruption laws are largely ignored.¹⁷

In June 2002, Sierra Leone's deputy anti-corruption commissioner criticised the attorney-general for rendering the anti-corruption commission ineffective by not acting on its recommendations. Of the 57 cases submitted to the attorney-general's office since the commission was established in January 2001, three-quarters had not yet been acted upon. The most prominent was that of former minister of transport and communications Momoh Pujeh, who, following an investigation by the commission, was arrested in November 2001 for illicit mining and the possession of conflict diamonds. Corruption charges were not brought against him until August 2002.¹⁸

Cape Verde's government dissolved the Supreme Authority against Corruption in September 2001, arguing it had achieved little since its formation in the 1990s. Its responsibilities were transferred to the public prosecutor's office, which was promised additional resources.¹⁹

Nigeria's federal anti-corruption commission was criticised for failing to bring a single case against a senior government official since it was founded in September

2000. A major obstacle to the commission's effectiveness was removed in June 2002 when the supreme court overruled objections from several states that the body was unconstitutional.²⁰ The central government took a number of steps to accelerate its anti-corruption campaign during the year. In August 2001 the Federal Executive Council approved an amendment to civil service rules that allows the president to dismiss corrupt civil servants. In the following month the council approved the establishment of anti-corruption units in all federal ministries with powers to investigate cases and examine all government documents. The anti-corruption commission will take over funding of the new units in 2003.²¹

President Olusegun Obasanjo's anti-corruption campaign became the focus of a continuing power struggle between the government and the Nigerian parliament. In March 2002, the president accused parliamentarians of being corrupt, and demanded an audit of the National Assembly's accounts.²² In June 2002, however, a report by the public accounts committee of the senate claimed there had been a 'virtual slide into financial anarchy' in public spending.²³

Since coming to office, the Obasanjo administration has tried to negotiate a restitution agreement with the relatives of former dictator Sani Abacha. In April 2002, the government agreed to a deal that involved the return of US \$1.2 billion in state funds, but permitted the Abacha family to retain US \$100 million and involved the dropping of theft and money laundering charges against Abacha's son and a former associate.²⁴

A common form of public sector corruption in West Africa is the appearance of 'ghost names' on the civil service payroll. In Ghana, the deputy auditor-general disclosed in March 2002 that more than US \$20 million had been paid to about 2,000 ghost names in the previous two years.²⁵ In response, the finance minister ordered a headcount of civil servants; however, Ghana's government faced growing criticism of its failure to address corruption within the civil service. In his inaugural address President John Kufuor promised to establish an 'office of accountability' under the direct supervision of the presidency that would oversee a code of conduct for public servants. Neither the office nor the code of conduct has yet been established.

Police officers and customs officials are seen as particularly corrupt in many countries in the region (see boxes on Côte d'Ivoire and Benin on pp. 218 and 221). In April 2002, a 555-strong 'anti-corruption squad' was established within the Nigerian police to root out corruption in the force; by the end of June, it had arrested 243 officers on corruption charges.²⁶ In Sierra Leone, a crackdown on police extorting bribes from drivers at road check-points led to the arrest of 41 police officers in November 2001.²⁷ In Burkina Faso, a corruption survey identified the police as the most corrupt institution in the country (see the civil society section below), and a survey carried out by Forum Civil in Senegal identified the traffic police, customs officials and police as the most corrupt institutions (see p. 269).

Formal and informal customs in Benin

Nearly every customs officer in Benin has at least one *klébé* working for him. *Klébés*, or 'banknote rippers' in the swindlers' jargon of southern Benin, help customs officers 'control fraud' – and take a 10 per cent commission on seizures as they do so. They also extort an illegal toll on anyone wanting to move goods through customs, a toll from which the customs officers in turn take their own cut. There are about 400 *klébés* in Kraké, on the border with Nigeria, four times as many as the number of official customs agents. The *klébés* function as middlemen, acting as screens between the givers and takers of bribes, who do not want to be identified. In the port of Cotonou, *klébés* have even replaced customs officers at several points of control.

But *klébés* are not the only informal agents at work around Benin's ports and border crossings. Informal *transitaires ambulants*, or transit agents, help importers clear a way through the maze of different controls. Their expertise is knowing the topography of corruption and the short cuts through it that only the bribe or secret fee can reveal. Clearing an imported, second-hand vehicle out of the port of Cotonou requires the payment of 17 separate bribes, 10 in the customs house alone. Clearing a container entails the same tortuous process, although the fees are much higher.

The *transitaires ambulants* have carved out a special niche because they work exclusively in cash, which is especially favoured by corrupt customs officers. There are, of course, official brokers who are happy – for a fee – to subcontract their business to the informal agents; in this way, their work becomes semi-official although their income does not appear in the official brokers' taxed turnover. While the business of the *transitaires ambulants* is rooted in corruption, they have managed to form trade unions and associations that are recognised by the ministry of the interior.

There is a specific logic to the corruption in Benin that keeps it thriving. Official procedures are bureaucratic and delays are costly for entrepreneurs. Importers are under constant economic pressure from what are known as 'normal extras' – charges for storage in customs, penalty fees for delays – and it is a race against the clock for most. Normal extras wipe out profits, so importers or their agents prefer to pay 'abnormal extras', or bribes. Those involved say government inefficiency 'justifies' corrupt practices.

Many similar accounts emerged from a major research project on petty corruption in West Africa conducted by the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Marseilles, France, between 1999 and 2001.¹ A team of socio-anthropologists, directed by Giorgio Blundo and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, examined the reality of everyday corruption in Benin, Niger and Senegal through a combination of personal interviews and analysis of newspaper articles and local court records. The study looked at a number of spheres of public administration, including transport, customs, justice and healthcare.

One striking finding was that the administrations in all three countries call on a multitude of volunteer and temporary middlemen, like Benin's *klébés* and *transitaires ambulants*, owing to a shortage of human and material resources. These temporary agents and go-betweens, channelling bribes from citizens to public officials, make it increasingly difficult to distinguish where the state ends and petty business begins.

Nassirou Bako Arifari

1 G. Blundo and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, eds., 'La corruption au quotidien', *Politique Africaine* 83 (October 2001).

Access to information in West Africa

Constitutions guarantee the right to information and freedom of expression in almost every country in West Africa, even the less open ones, but not a single country has passed legislation to put freedom of information into practice. Ghana and Nigeria have drafted freedom of information laws, but progress has been slow. Nigeria's bill is pending before the Federal House of Representatives, and Ghana's bill, developed by civil society organisations, is being redrafted by the attorney-general's office.

The legislative constraints on access to information – particularly information on grand corruption – are exacerbated in many West African countries by laws that prohibit insulting the head of state or other senior members of government. In July 2001, however, the Ghanaian parliament repealed the criminal libel and sedition laws under which many journalists had previously been jailed. The NGO Article 19 declared that 'The repeal of criminal libel law puts Ghana at the forefront of African countries when it comes to meeting international standards on free expression.'¹

In many former British colonies, such as the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the old Official Secrets Act is still in place, impeding public access to information by preventing civil servants from passing information to journalists or other members of society.

In a report released in July 2002, Article 19 condemned the 'culture of secrecy' in Burkina Faso.² The report argued that civil society and the media are routinely denied access to official information and called for freedom of information legislation conforming to international norms. At Transparency International's Integrity Awards ceremony in October 2001, a posthumous tribute was paid to Norbert Zongo, former editor of the journal *L'Indépendant* in Burkina Faso.³ Zongo had established a reputation

for uncovering corruption and speaking out against the government before his assassination in December 1998.

In Mauritania, the seizure of newspapers, closure of radio stations and threats against journalists are a common feature of the media landscape. Article 11 of the Press Act is often used to punish media houses that report on sensitive issues such as corruption; the article allows the interior minister to ban newspapers 'that undermine the principles of Islam or the credibility of the state, harm the general interest or disturb public order and security'.

In Guinea, where the government has a monopoly on the broadcast media and owns the country's only daily newspaper, criticism is limited to a small number of weeklies, all subject to restrictive laws. In Guinea-Bissau, two journalists from the newspaper *Diario* were arrested in June 2001 for articles alleging corruption in the government of President Kumba Yala.⁴ Liberian journalists also suffer harassment; press censorship was further tightened in 2001 when the government announced that reports relating to the country's civil war first had to be cleared by the information minister.⁵

There is little independent journalism in Togo and the opposition press is frequently subjected to intimidation. A 2001 report by the Committee to Protect Journalists found that 'reporting on Togo's rampant official corruption landed several journalists in jail and resulted in more newspaper seizures'.⁶

1 Afrol News, 1 August 2001.

2 Article 19, *Burkina Faso: the Right to Access Information* (London: Article 19, 2002).

3 www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2001/2001.10.04.i_awards.html.

4 PANA, 19 June 2001.

5 Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2002*.

6 Committee to Protect Journalists, *Attacks on the Press in 2001* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), available at www.cpj.org/attacks01/pages_att01/attacks01.html.

Governance is particularly weak in some countries of the region, where the effectiveness of official anti-corruption campaigns is limited by the extreme weakness of political checks and balances and institutions of accountability.

In Guinea-Bissau, former members of the supreme court were arrested in November 2001 after an audit report pointed to the embezzlement of US \$100,000. Opposition groups condemned the arrests, arguing they were the latest stage in a confrontation between President Kumba Yala and the judiciary, and that they indicated a shift towards dictatorship. In September 2001, magistrates had gone on a 30-day strike to protest against the president's decision to dismiss the supreme court after it ruled an action of his to be illegal. When they returned from the strike, they found the government had sealed their offices to carry out the audit.²⁸

Togo's President Gnassingbe Eyadema celebrated 35 years in power in January 2002. In his anniversary message, he welcomed the establishment in 2001 of the National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Economic Sabotage. After its first eight months of activity, the commission claimed to have recovered 1.5 billion CFA francs (US \$2 million) from corrupt individuals and organisations.²⁹ Concerns about the state of Togo's democracy and level of corruption, however, were reinforced by a confrontation between President Eyadema and former prime minister Agbeyome Kodjo in June 2002. The president dismissed Kodjo, supposedly as part of his preparations for the elections, which had been postponed since April 2000. Kodjo issued a statement accusing Eyadema and his allies of corruption and human rights abuses, and of running the country 'in a permanent state of emergency, ensuring he has the control of executive, legislative and judicial powers'.³⁰

Togo also witnessed the imprisonment of Amousouvi Akakpo, former mayor of Lomé, in October 2001, for alleged embezzlement of more than US \$2 million belonging to Lomé city hall. Though the anti-corruption commission claimed that he was involved in massive fraud, some critics alleged that he had been framed because he was a member of the opposition party Union des Forces de Changement.³¹

The conflict in Liberia continues to create an enabling environment for corruption. The latest insurgents, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Development, are fighting to unseat President Charles Taylor, providing him with a pretext for assuming emergency powers.³² According to Human Rights Watch, 'President Taylor's government functioned without accountability, independent of an ineffective judiciary and legislature that operated in fear of the executive.'³³

Private sector

The economic reform agenda in every country in the region includes privatisation, although the process of privatisation has in many cases been the object of corruption.

Ghana's Divestiture Implementation Committee, formed under former president Jerry Rawlings, became synonymous with corruption, and since January 2001 the new government has attempted to address some of the consequences. In February

2002, the government discontinued the sale of Ghana Telecom to Telecom Malaysia on corruption grounds: members of the former government had allegedly been given shares free of charge.³⁴ Ghana's cabinet also decided to take Sabat Motors back into public ownership after former employees petitioned the minister of trade and industry, complaining that the new owners had not paid for the company. In another case, a number of Rawlings' former associates face corruption charges for allegedly receiving up to US \$1 million in kickbacks from the French company Société Internationale de Plantations d'Hévéas, which sought to buy the Ghana Rubber Estate Ltd when it was up for privatisation.³⁵

There was public outcry in Nigeria over allegations that Investors International London Ltd enjoyed preferential treatment in its bid for a 51 per cent share of NITEL, the Nigerian Telecommunications Company. Nasir El-Rufai, the director general of the Bureau for Public Enterprises, confessed to a committee investigating the partial privatisation of NITEL that the rules for selecting the preferred bidder had been bent.³⁶

Civil society

Linking with the efforts of Nigeria's president Obasanjo, mentioned above, civil society groups pushed forward the campaign for the repatriation of misappropriated funds. At a meeting in Accra, Ghana, in April 2002, 28 national chapters of Transparency International in Africa drew up an action plan for a global coalition to pursue repatriation.

Although civil society is generally weak across West Africa and faces an oppressive environment in some countries, it has made its presence felt in the fight against corruption. In Côte d'Ivoire, public anger at police corruption led to a 48-hour strike in the Adjame district of the capital, Abidjan, in June 2002. The strike, which was sparked by thefts and raids on shops by police, followed earlier protests by bus and taxi drivers against police extortion and shootings (see box on p. 218).

The sensitivity of Senegal's new government to challenges from civil society was indicated by its reaction to a corruption survey published in May 2002 by Forum Civil, Transparency International's national chapter in Senegal. Almost 90 per cent of those surveyed stated that corruption is widespread, particularly in the public sector and among politicians, while a majority believed that vote buying is common. Of company executives surveyed, 40 per cent considered bribery necessary to obtain a public contract. The survey elicited a strong response from Senegal's president Wade, who questioned the survey's credibility, rejected its conclusions and accused Forum Civil of being 'closet politicians who do not have the courage to accept their responsibilities'. This defensive response was surprising given Wade's public commitment to fighting corruption and his acknowledgement in a speech to Swiss investors only a few months earlier of the disturbing level of corruption in Senegal.³⁷

In 2001, REN-LAC published its second annual report on corruption in Burkina Faso, which identified the police as the most corrupt institution.³⁸ The NGO followed up the publication with a meeting in November 2001 at which senior police officers discussed corruption in the police and the best means to combat it. REN-LAC praised the officers' courage in responding to the NGO initiative.³⁹

A new anti-corruption NGO in Sierra Leone, the National Accountability Group, was formally launched in June 2002 with the goals of raising public awareness of corruption and promoting dialogue with other civil society groups and the official anti-corruption commission.⁴⁰

The media increased civil society's impact in the fight against corruption in several countries. In Ghana, a former national insurance commissioner, Samuel Appiah-Ampofo, was found guilty of accepting a US \$96,500 bribe from a broker working for a subsidiary of Aon, the U.S.-based insurance company. The Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice had investigated the kickback following reports in a newspaper, *The Crusading Guide*.⁴¹ Niger's Association for the Fight against Corruption broadcast a series of television sketches in 2001 about the problem of corruption to raise awareness of the issue.

While noting the importance of investigative journalism in exposing corruption, at a workshop in April 2002 the Network of Malian Journalists against Corruption and Poverty expressed their dissatisfaction at the slow pace of prosecution once wrongdoers had been exposed.⁴²

- 1 *Business Day* (South Africa), 14 June 2002.
- 2 Agence France-Presse, 27 February 2002.
- 3 Panafrican News Agency (PANA), 28 February 2002.
- 4 *Jeune Afrique* (France), 20 February 2002.
- 5 PANA, 14 November 2001.
- 6 *Vanguard* (Nigeria), 6 September 2001.
- 7 International Monetary Fund (IMF), *Guinea-Bissau: Staff Report for the 2002 Article IV Consultation* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 11 June 2002).
- 8 The 15 members of ECOWAS are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
- 9 Déclaration de la Coalition Nationale pour la Transparence et Contre la Corruption, 24 July 2002; *Wal Fadjri* (Senegal), 9 April 2002; *Nouvel Horizon* (Senegal), 12 September 2002.
- 10 *Sud Quotidien* (Senegal), 7 May 2002.
- 11 *Les Echos* (Mali), 27 November 2001.
- 12 World Bank, *Recommandations visant à renforcer le programme anti-corruption* (Bamako: World Bank, 2002), available at www.banquemondiale.org/ml/Anti-corruption/index.html.
- 13 BBC News, 12 May 2002.
- 14 Agence France-Presse, 11 January 2002.
- 15 PANA, 1 November 2001.
- 16 IMF, *Benin: 2002 Article IV Consultation*, IMF Country Report no. 02/158, August 2002.
- 17 *L'Hebdomadaire du Burkina*, no.165, 17–23 May 2002.
- 18 www.sierra-leone.org/slnews0602.html.
- 19 PANA, 1 August and 7 September 2001.
- 20 The states had argued that the commission was contrary to the principle of federalism. *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), 11 June 2002.
- 21 *Vanguard* (Nigeria), 20 September 2001; PANA, 15 August 2001.
- 22 Presidential Retreat: Mobilising Nigerian Christians against Corruption, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria, March 2002.

- 23 *Financial Times* (Britain), 19 June 2002.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 18 April 2002.
- 25 *Business and Financial Times* (Ghana), 12 March 2002.
- 26 *Nigerian Guardian*, 23 April 2002; *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), 25 June 2002.
- 27 PANA, 7 November 2001.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 15 November 2001.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 19 November 2001.
- 30 SABC News (South Africa), 29 June 2002.
- 31 *Crocodile* (Togo), no. 575, 7–13 March 2002; BBC News, 5 October 2001.
- 32 *West Africa* (Britain), no. 4219, 1–7 April 2002.
- 33 Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2002*.
- 34 *Daily Graphic* (Ghana), 23 February 2002.
- 35 *Business and Financial Times* (Ghana), no. 485, 1–7 April 2002.
- 36 *Guardian* (Nigeria) 8, no. 2491, 16 February 2002.
- 37 Transparency International press release, 10 June 2002,
www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2002/2002.06.10.senegal.html.
- 38 REN-LAC, *Etat de la Corruption au Burkina Faso, 2001* (Ouagadougou: REN-LAC).
- 39 *Sidwaya* (Burkina Faso), 7 November 2001.
- 40 SierraLeoneLive.com, 18 June 2002.
- 41 *Crusading Guide* (Ghana), 14 April 2002.
- 42 *Les Echos* (Mali), 8 April 2002.