China’s Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy

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As the People’s Republic of China assumes greater prominence in world affairs, the question of how its government will approach key issues in international politics becomes increasingly critical. By examining the public statements of Chinese leaders, one can identify fundamental principles that guide Beijing’s policy. These principles are a robust approach to sovereignty, a determination to strengthen the ruling faction, and a continuing commitment to ideologic distinctiveness. China, in short, is determined to secure its own independence, and will seek power over all outside entities which could have power over it.

Will Beijing precipitate a war over Taiwan? Will Beijing hamper Western humanitarian interventions in the Balkans? Can America moderate Beijing’s international behavior with a policy of so-called engagement? Would a more aggressive policy produce more desirable results? As the People’s Republic of China assumes greater prominence in world affairs, the question of how its government will approach key issues in international politics becomes increasingly critical.

For these reasons, anyone with an interest in contemporary strategy and statecraft must study the drives that motivate the Chinese regime. One underused source of information on China’s guiding principles is the public statements of the Chinese leaders themselves. China’s high officials have articulated a coherent political stance concerning world affairs. Although Chinese politicians undoubtedly lie, disagree, and change their minds as often as those from any other country, this stance has proven itself to be enduring, in keeping with China’s cultural traditions, true to what outsiders might identify as the national interests of the Chinese state, and compatible with Beijing’s actual foreign policy. One can surmise that, on these subjects, China’s leaders are sincere.

This article investigates what China’s leaders have said on three general subjects, all of which are particularly relevant to statecraft and grand strategy. These are China’s approach to sovereignty, China’s approach to political power, and China’s post-Mao approach to political ideology. Although this article focuses on the writings of recent leaders, it notes that there is more continuity than commonly recognized between the thoughts of China’s current premier, Jiang Zemin; the thoughts of his predecessor, the reformer Deng Xiaoping; and the thoughts of China’s Mao-era revolutionaries. All have been determined to put China in a position to determine its own destiny, all have identified China’s independence with the material power of the ruling political organization, and all have considered China’s ideologic mindset instrumental to that goal. Although China has abandoned the flamboyant ideological fanaticism of earlier years, its leaders have not discarded the idea that political thought is itself a tool of political power.
A Chinese Invictus

China never suffered from direct European colonization on any large scale. Nevertheless, the Chinese look back to the 200 years preceding World War II as a time of national weakness, when Western countries humiliated them by forcing them to accept a wide variety of treaties on unequal terms. Since then, China’s leaders have worked to ensure that their state will be able to determine its own destiny. As General Li Jijun of the People’s Liberation Army said in an address at the U.S. Army War College in 1997:

Before 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was established, more than 1000 treaties and agreements, most of which were unequal in their terms, were forced upon China by the Western powers. As many as 1.8 million square kilometers were also taken away from Chinese territory. This was a period of humiliation that the Chinese can never forget. This is why the people of China show such strong emotions in matters concerning our national independence, unity, integrity of territory and sovereignty. This is also why the Chinese are so determined to safeguard them under any circumstances and at all costs [1].

Every nation values its self-determination, but the Chinese cherish this principle with a passion that often seems to have faded in America and Western Europe. The Chinese understand sovereignty as a tangible thing. To them, the theoretical recognition of a state’s independence is meaningless unless its government actually has the ability to act as it sees fit. Because, as political scientists so often observe, all nations are locked into a state of so-called complex interdependence with the rest of the world, this means that Beijing has accepted a formidable challenge. To achieve the kind of independence they desire, China’s leaders must find a way to influence whatever has the potential to influence them.

This means that China needs an exceptionally vigorous and far-reaching foreign policy. Everywhere that Chinese interests are at stake—and in an interdependent world, that means everywhere—China must assert its presence. In contemporary management jargon, the PRC must be proactive. This concept is a staple of traditional Chinese strategic thought [2]. Not only must China have a robust enough economy to supply its needs and a powerful enough military to resist outside pressure, China must work to rear an international system that favors its internal political order.

These ideas appear early in Communist Chinese political thought. During the 1930s, many Chinese revolutionaries were concerned about the tension between China’s aspirations for independence and communist principles of internationalism. Mao Zedong made it clear that independence took precedence:

Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, be at the same time a patriot? We hold that he not only can be but ought to be one. There is the “patriotism” of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler, and there is our own patriotism. Communists must resolutely oppose the so-called “patriotism” of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler. The Communists in Japan and Germany are all defeatists in the wars of their respective countries. It suits the interests of the Japanese and German people to ensure by every means that the Japanese aggressors and Hitler are defeated in their wars, and the more complete the defeat, the better. The Japanese and German Communists should do this, and they are doing this. For the wars launched by the Japanese aggressors and Hitler are, besides doing harm to the people of the world, doing
harm to their own people as well. China’s case is different because she is a victim of aggression. For us, defeatism is a crime, and to win the War of Resistance is a duty that we cannot shirk. For only by fighting in defence of the motherland can we defeat the aggressors and achieve national liberation. And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and the toiling masses to achieve their own liberation. The victory of China and the defeat of the imperialists invading China will also be a help to the people of foreign countries. Thus, patriotism is simply an application of internationalism in the war of national liberation [3].

This passage is revealing, not only because of what Mao says about the immediate nature of the Chinese independence movement, but because of what he says about the overall nature of communist internationalism. Mao hoped to bring about a new international order in which China’s interests and the interests of other ascending regimes throughout the world have become the same. No doubt Mao sincerely believed that this society would fulfil the utopian promises of communism. Nevertheless, he intended to do so by advancing his own country first, and he expected success to rebound to his own nation’s advantage. Mao defined China’s interests broadly and intended to pursue them around the globe.

Over the next three decades, China continued to insist on its own independence more strongly than ever, and its leaders remained committed to the idea that their own sovereignty depended on the overall structure of world politics. Radicals reiterated Mao’s points and called for China to continue its revolution on a global scale. Lin Biao, for instance, exhorted his countrymen to “hold aloft the national banner,” even as he urged them to carry the communist struggle beyond China’s borders [4]. Lin Biao justified global revolution as a way of creating a world order that would support China’s regime [5].

Less militant Chinese thinkers used similar principles to criticize both traditional and Soviet concepts of international law. Chinese legal scholars attacked existing views of statehood as props for Russian and Western hegemony but insisted on the importance of absolute state sovereignty because of its utility to their own country [6]. The Chinese cited their 1954 trade agreement with India as a model for a more just system of law, based on the five principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in other nations’ internal affairs, equality, and peaceful coexistence [7].

During the 1990s, Chinese military thinkers also criticized conventional views of sovereignty. Although noting that American and Japanese definitions of military threat do not include sovereignty as an explicit concern, they assured outsiders that theirs does [8]. Like Mao and Lin Biao, recent Chinese thinkers have defined the defense of Chinese sovereignty to include defense of an international order that supports China’s political system. Writers in China’s army newspaper Jiefangjun bao states that a threat might arise not merely from directly hostile acts, but from “fundamental contradictions or interest conflicts, such as opposing social systems and ideologies as well as disputes in economic interests, territorial and ocean rights” [9].

Despite its insistence on independence, China has not adhered to any short-sighted principle of autarky. Ever since the Chinese Communist Party’s alliance with the Kuomintang in the war against Japan, the PRC has proven itself willing to augment its native resources by working with outsiders. Mao’s rapprochement with the Nixon administration in America provides yet another example of this point. China’s leaders have been eager to cooperate with outside powers as long as they favor the terms under which such cooperation takes place.
“To open to the world is a fundamental policy for China,” Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping noted [10]. Deng and his successor Jiang Zemin have reiterated their commitment to their country’s independence, and to an international system that supports their national aims [11]. Chinese officials and thinkers have argued for their principles of international relations during major events in world politics. The 1999 campaign to force Serbia to stop persecuting ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, for instance, prompted Chinese officials to repeat their commitment to the principle of unlimited sovereignty in the most vehement terms. “Peace loving countries and peoples the world over,” China’s Army newspaper editorialized,

must be highly vigilant against [“hegemonist” threats to the concept of sovereignty], resolutely oppose the absurd theory that “human rights transcend sovereignty,” and strive to defend their state sovereignty and build a fair and rational world political and economic order [12].

What the Chinese consider “fair and rational” may seem otherwise from the perspective of the countries they have classified as hegemons. This suggestion goes beyond routine skepticism. Officials in Deng-era China stated that, although the Chinese government considered the rule of law quite important, it reserved the right to apply that law differently to different cases. As a socialist state with a dictatorship of the proletariat, China sees law as a “tool” of that dictatorship [13]. “For the people, it means democracy, but for the enemy, dictatorship” [14]. This philosophy is, to say the least, at odds with the Western concept of equality before the law. China’s regime appears to see questions of international “fairness” in much the same way.

**Power to the State**

The Chinese traditionally have favored the institution over the individual and the state over all other institutions. Today’s regime is no exception to that rule. Just as the China’s leaders take a ruthlessly practical approach to the concept of sovereignty, they are inclined to be hardheaded about the issue of government power. The state is not an abstract concept in Chinese political culture. People identify it with particular organizations and measure its effectiveness in terms of those organizations’ ability not merely to maintain social order, but to mobilize the nation on behalf of their own political agendas.

Mao captured the essence of this principle in his oft-quoted saying, “‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.’ Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the party” [15]. The message here goes beyond the truism that armed force makes one powerful. Mao is telling us about who should control armed force, and what they should do with their power. The great revolutionary places the gun in the hands of the Party—in other words, the organization responsible for developing and propagating the regime’s partisan political program.

The fact that Mao was a zealot may have inspired him to be blunt about this issue, but China’s current regime follows the same philosophy. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping committed China to the “four cardinal principles” of the Socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism–Mao Zedong thought [16]. Deng, Jiang Zemin, and editorialists in the Chinese press have continued to stress these principles ever since [17]. As China expert Peter Moody has observed, the key principle was and remains party leadership [18]. The other three function to enforce or legitimize party rule [19].
The declarations of Jiang, Deng, and Mao correspond to traditional principles of Chinese political thought. China’s 1972 and 1973 campaigns to venerate the Legalist philosophies of the Qin dynasty indicate not only the continuity in Chinese attitudes toward state power, but the fact that China’s current rulers understand and use traditional ideas at a conscious level. Legalism is a living political theory, and although that means that its concepts evolve over time, it also means that its original precepts continue to influence contemporary ideas [20]. Legalism always has had more vitality in the political realm than Confucianism. (Legalism is also compatible with other prominent Chinese traditions.) The most influential pro-Qin movements took place in the early 1970s and appear to be subtle criticisms of the Cultural Revolution radicals [21]. In other words, the early pro-Qin movement reflected the thought of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and the other pragmatists who have dominated the Chinese government from the death of Mao onward.

Shang Yang, the first great writer in the Legalist tradition, taught that war and agriculture were the primary occupations of the state [22]. Moral and other sentiments are dangerous distractions, because according to the Legalists the wealth and military power of the central government precede all other political ends [23]. Shang and his followers had great respect for the value of technical and administrative innovations that helped states achieve those ends [24]. The Legalists waged many of their fiercest rhetoric battles against those who opposed effective measures on grounds of tradition or principle [25].

The Legalists wrote caustically about those who conceived of politics in terms of abstractions, and Shang Yang explained exactly who was supposed to wield the state’s wealth and power [26]. The laws, he said, were to be administered by the prince and his ministers, but the “right standard” is fixed by the prince alone [27]. Li Si, the Legalist thinker who masterminded the government of the Qin empire, reiterated this advice in a memorial to China’s first emperor, drawing upon the writings of the prominent Legalists Shen Buhai and Han Feizi to advocate a legal system by which “the ruler will, by himself control the empire, and will not be controlled by anyone” [28].

Unlike the Communists, the Legalists never claimed to want a government of the people. The only benefits they promised the masses were those of living in a well-ordered state. Nevertheless, they sought to involve every individual in their system of government, so that the ruler could draw upon the strength of the entire population. Shang Yang depicted the people as a stream of water that always follows the easiest course, and advocated material rewards and punishments to channel people’s energies in useful directions [29]. In order for the ruler to control the empire directly, his administrative system had to be both centralized and efficient [30].

After the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, many Chinese thinkers found the pragmatism and iconoclasm of the Legalists salutary. Scholars wrote about Qin dynasty history because they perceived such discourse to be a relatively safe way to voice ideas about the importance of social order, the advantages of centralized administration, the value of technical expertise, and the necessity of shielding the government from destructive criticism by ideologues [31]. The fact that they chose the Qin dynasty as their model, however, indicates that they had sympathy with Legalist arguments as well as Legalist conclusions. China’s history is replete with other unifiers and pragmatists that they might have selected.

One must consider the purposes of China’s economic and political reforms in this light. Since the late 1970s, China’s regime has instituted policies that would have seemed unthinkable under Mao. Although it would be a mistake to underestimate these changes, it also would be a mistake to see them as a complete break with the past. Throughout
the ages, Chinese governments have instituted novel social, economic, and engineering projects freely, often with profound consequences for the population. The building of the Great Wall, the building of the Grand Canal, the Sung dynasty agricultural reforms, and the Ming dynasty decision to abolish shipping come to mind. The Mao-era Communists and the Qin-era Legalists were both notable for their exceptional readiness to introduce dramatic change. The fact that today’s Chinese regime has adopted measures that appear radical by the standards of its predecessors does not necessarily mean that it has abandoned its goals. The idea that one may experiment with dramatically different policies as long as one remains faithful to one’s overall objectives has traditionally been an article of faith in Chinese Communism [32].

Although the Chinese government currently permits a limited market economy, its leaders seem to value private enterprise primarily for the benefits it can bring the state. Shang Yang, who advised rulers to structure the economy so as to encourage enterprises that strengthened the government, might well have approved [33]. In 1995, Jiang Zemin spoke before the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in an address that Western analysts see as the “agenda-setting” speech for his administration. On that occasion, Jiang paired China’s goal of economic development with the goal of “enhancing state capabilities” [34].

On other occasions, Jiang has been even more explicit.

The Four Cardinal Principles are the foundation of the nation, whereas reform and opening to the outside world are means of strengthening the nation [35].

Li Peng, meanwhile, has admonished the people of China’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to use their greater levels of economic freedom in this spirit.

These zones must uphold the four basic principles and put great effort into developing socialist spiritual civilization. They engage in foreign intercourse. At the same time that they earnestly study advanced foreign technology and management, in politics they must maintain clear heads. They must strengthen party building and develop the function of the party as a protective fortress [36].

China’s leaders are aware that experiments with free trade and private industry may endanger the state’s power to regulate and exploit China’s economy, but they hope the more fundamental instruments of control in their hands. As Deng Xiaoping reflected in 1992:

As long as we keep ourselves sober-minded, there is nothing to be feared. We still hold superiority, because we have large and medium state-owned enterprises and township and town enterprises. More importantly, we hold the state power in our hands [37].

Whenever necessary, Deng implies, gun barrels can still be a source of power.

The Chinese regime also retains day-to-day control over much of China’s putatively private enterprise. During the 1990s, the Chinese government announced that it had privatized 10,000 state-run firms [38]. Of these newly independent firms, however, only 300 have been publicly listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen [39]. Banks continue to lend to these firms as if they expected the state to cover their debts [40]. Perhaps most significant of all, the management of the privatized industries remains unchanged [41]. China’s industrialists, China’s intelligence officials, China’s military officers, and China’s political leaders tend to be closely related by blood, when they are not actually the same individuals [42].
Similar observations apply to China’s political reforms. Government officials, as well as student demonstrators, have called for more democracy in China [43]. Although this movement is by no means influential, it plays a role in Chinese politics. One would be mistaken, however, to assume that the Chinese concept of democracy is identical to the Western ideal.

Some Chinese thinkers certainly admire European and American political models. For many, however, the goals of democracy are not to give citizens greater freedom but to reduce the role of individual (and thus potentially idiosyncratic) leaders in policy making and to unite the people more solidly behind government programs. These officials argue that collective government is more scientific (kexue) than oligarchy, and that “the process will lead to more correct policy, which all people could be educated to embrace and support” [44].

Mao Zedong argued for democracy on much the same grounds. To him, democratic life was a way to call forth “activeness” from the people [45]. This, he hoped, would stimulate creativity, inspire people to work with greater energy, and provoke useful criticism of Party policies [46]. During his struggle for power in the 1940s, he advocated democracy quite actively. Nevertheless, Mao wished to moderate democratic institutions with centralist ones that would prevent individuals from indulging in “licence of action” [47]. In his view, democracy “is meant to strengthen discipline and raise fighting capacity, not to weaken them” [48]. Discipline and fighting capacity, not license, characterized the political system that Mao imposed once he actually took power.

Deng Xiaoping held similar views. In 1962, he described democracy as a necessary tool for making the Communist Party more “centralized and unified,” but he portrayed it as a means to that goal, not an end in itself [49]. The China expert Murray Scot Tanner has suggested that China’s advocates of democracy fail to appreciate the point that there are always irreconcilable differences of opinion in a democracy [50]. Furthermore, when Chinese officials discuss democracy, one must always keep in mind that they may mean something quite different from democracy as people understand it in more liberal countries. When Deng praised democracy, for instance, he was referring to internal democracy within the party, not universal suffrage throughout the nation [51].

Jiang Zemin, likewise, has lauded “socialist democracy” and a “socialist legal system” on the grounds that they promote “China’s long-term order and stability” but hastened to add, “We must draw a clear line of demarcation between socialist democracy and capitalist democracy” [52].

People’s democracy and the dictatorship over hostile elements and antisocialist elements are closely linked and in unity with each other. As long as class struggle remains within a certain scope, the function of this dictatorship cannot be weakened [53].

China’s regime seeks economic growth, industrial development, and even greater levels of political participation for its citizens. Nevertheless, its leaders do not see these things as their ultimate goals. Rather, they see them as ways to increase the power of the regime. They not only wish to enjoy national prosperity, they wish to have it at their disposal. The Chinese government may continue to liberalize its policies, but there is no sign that its deeper priorities will change.

The Chinese leadership’s attitude toward state power reinforces its commitment to a robust definition of sovereignty. Even if the Chinese people can benefit from integration into the capitalist global markets, and even if the existing balance of power can guarantee the safety of such markets, the Chinese regime will be unsatisfied with that balance. As long as China depends on other powers to protect its sources of wealth, it will have to use that wealth with circumspection. Therefore, China’s leaders will wish to secure their
interests by means of their own arms. Even if they never actually challenge the existing world order by force, they will want the potential to do so. The facts that their policies may demand sacrifices from the Chinese people and may even detract from some broader definition of China’s national interest will not alter their outlook.

**The Role of Ideology**

The proposition that China has abandoned Communism in favor of some presumably more benign philosophy of semicapitalistic paternalism has become common wisdom. Recent expansion of foreign trade and private enterprise lends credibility to this idea. In 1985, the newspaper *People’s Daily* went so far as to publish an article suggesting that it was unrealistic to expect the works of Marx and Lenin, written in the 19th century, “to solve today’s problems” [54]. A few days later, in a rare retraction, the editors of *People’s Daily* wrote that they had not meant to criticize Marxism at such a general level and claimed that the original statement should have read merely that it was a mistake to assume that 19th century communist writings could solve all of today’s problems [55].

China’s leaders maintain that they are as committed to the ideas of Marx, Lenin, and Mao as ever. Premier Jiang Zemin praises Mao Zedong and the reformer Deng Xiaoping side-by-side, saying that Mao developed the theory of revolutionary socialism and Deng developed the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics [56]. Officials of China’s State Education Commission summarized this position in a report that stated that China’s economic reforms are not social democratism but “a self-improvement of socialism” [57]. In Chinese rhetoric, communism remains a goal to be sought and “bourgeois liberalization” remains a threat to be guarded against [58]. The Sixth Plenum of the Communist Party’s Central Committee designated the early 21st century as the period in which China must begin to augment its economic growth by “promoting socialist ethical and cultural progress” in order to build a new “socialist spiritual civilization” [59].

The ideas of the communist movement are powerful, and the ideals of the Communist movement appear noble. One need not doubt that many Chinese people find them as persuasive as ever. In 1994, when an American expert on communist thought asked Mo Xiusong, a Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, whether his party still aimed to achieve world communism, the Vice Chairman replied, “Yes, of course. That is the reason we exist” [60].

There is, however, a second reason why China’s leaders stand behind their ideology, at least in rhetoric. Beliefs are means as well as ends in politics, and Maoism helps China to maintain its independence from potentially hostile global institutions. Communist political theory also provides principles that allow China’s government to shield people from outside influences and organize them on behalf of the Chinese state. “If China does not uphold socialism,” Deng Xiaoping stated after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, “It will be turned into an appendage of the capitalist countries” [61]. Jiang Zemin has echoed the same argument [62].

China’s leaders accuse the West of deliberately propagating the idea that their communism is reforming itself out of existence in order to achieve that end. “The entire imperialist Western world plans to make all socialist countries discard the socialist road and then bring them under the control of international monopoly capital,” Deng stated [63]. Jiang Zemin has stated the same principle in equally ringing terms.

International hostile forces will never stop using peaceful evolution against us for a single day. Bourgeois liberalization is an internal matching force which they use to carry out peaceful evolution. These kinds of hostile activities
constitute a real threat to China’s independence, sovereignty, development and reform. In other words, peaceful evolution and bourgeois liberalization are aimed not only at overthrowing our socialist system but, fundamentally, at depriving us of our national independence and state sovereignty [64].

China’s leaders see maintaining their distinct political ideology as being integral to maintaining their distinct political identity. Although “socialism with Chinese characteristics” may have evolved into something quite different from the communism Mao envisioned, China’s rulers have no desire to conform to the liberal political order that dominates much of the world today, much less to allow that order to change their regime. If China’s current regime has rejected revolutionary internationalism of the sort preached by Lin Biao as unfeasible, it has hardly embraced the global status quo.

Conclusion

China’s leaders have tangible reasons to take these positions on sovereignty, power, and ideology. Furthermore, their policies indicate that they mean what they say. The fact that Western pundits have shown such enthusiasm for the idea that their countries can modify China’s system government by “engaging” it and luring it into “interdependence” indicates that there is a core of objective reality to China’s position that its national freedom depends on military and ideological separateness [65]. China’s government has taken innumerable steps to build its independence, power, and ideologic purity during recent years, ranging from programs to strengthen its armed forces to crackdowns on religious sects. The Beijing regime is likely to stand fast on these issues as long as it aspires to maintain its dictatorship within China, which means, in effect, for as long as it can remain in power.

Those outside the Beijing circle of power must be cautious about predicting how China’s leaders might apply these principles in specific cases. Nevertheless, one should remain aware that the Chinese have such principles and are not likely to abandon them lightly. As one Chinese proverb goes, “It takes more than one cold day for the river to freeze three feet deep” [66]. The fact that China’s leaders are determined to maintain a political system that goes against the Western grain means that Westerners must guard their own power, interests, and independence as vigilantly as the Chinese. Western countries also must remain ready to support their allies in Asia.

One should not, however, confuse a policy of defending Western countries and their Asian allies with a policy of being anti-China. In certain ways, the opposite is the case. China’s leaders have been openly bitter about the arrogance of Westerners who believe that they can cozen the People’s Republic into giving up its ambitions through a program of peaceful evolution. To recognize China’s aspirations for what they are is a gesture not only of prudence, but of respect.

Notes

2. As an example of proactive thinking, one might consider the following excerpt from Sunzi: “When I wish to give battle, my enemy, even though protected by high walls and deep moats, cannot help but engage me, for I attack a position he must relieve. When I wish to avoid battle, I may defend myself simply by drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be unable to attack me because I divert him from going where he wishes” (Sun Tzu, Sun Tzu’s Art of War:


5. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


14. Ibid.


18. Li Peng, “Speech at a Reception Celebrating the 41st Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC Held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing,” in Moody, ed, China Documents, p. 18.

19. Ibid.


23. Ibid., p. 139.


25. Ibid.

26. Han Feizi said “to refer to anything that one cannot be certain of is self-deceptive” (ibid., p. 125).

34. Fewsmith, “Reaction, Resurgence and Succession,” p. 521.
36. Li Peng, “Li Peng Points Out At the National Work Conference on Special Economic Zones: The Special Economic Zones Must Serve as Windows and as Base Areas,” in Moody, ed, *China Documents*, p. 120.