INTERNATIONAL OUTSOURCING AND INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS

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International outsourcing to lower cost countries such as China and India can best be understood through the enrichment of trade models to include concepts from industrial organization and contract theory that explain the vertical organization of production. The combination of trade with the choice of organizational form represents an important new area for both theoretical and empirical research. This survey paper provides a perspective on this new literature so as to gain insights into the forces driving international outsourcing. The paper focuses on relationship-specific investment, incomplete contracts, and also search and matching, as fundamental concepts that explain outsourcing decisions.

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1. Introduction

The rising volume of imports from low wage countries, such as China and India, has fueled public concern in the United States and other high-wage countries that jobs will be lost and wages eroded.\(^1\) A growing segment of this trade, and in world trade more generally, has been in intermediate inputs, such as components and equipment. For example, from 1974 to 1993, imports as a share of total purchases of electrical equipment and machinery rose from 4.5% to 11.6% in the United States and 13.2% to 30.9% in Canada.\(^2\) As explained by Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) and Yi (2003), there has been a growth in the vertical fragmentation of production leading to a vertical supply chain stretching over more than one country. Intermediate inputs are exported to a country, processed and then re-exported perhaps for further processing in another country.

A common motive is to reduce costs through production in low wage countries.\(^3\) Figure 1 shows the enormous growth of manufacturing exports from China for the period 1988 to 2003.\(^4\) Manufacturing exports are categorized as either processing exports (the sum of the black and grey areas) or ordinary exports (the white area). Processing exports are goods that have been produced using imported inputs, such as raw materials or specialized parts supplied by a foreign manufacturer.

Manufacturing exports from China rose from \$39 billion to \$398 billion US, but processing exports

\(^{1}\)As reported by Amiti and Wei (2005), there were 2,634 articles in US newspapers on service outsourcing alone, just in the first five months of 2004. However, the outsourcing of business services is still quite small (about 0.4% of GDP in 1995).

\(^{2}\)See Campa and Goldberg (1997) and also Feenstra and Hanson (2001). Other evidence can be found in Yeats (2001), Feenstra (1998) and Yi (2003).

\(^{3}\)Particularly for developing countries, the share of processing exports to the US based on data from the “US Offshore Assembly Program” is sensitive to cost (Swenson, 2005).

\(^{4}\)I am grateful to Robert C. Feenstra for the data.
grew even more rapidly from 35% of manufacturing exports in 1988 to 57% in 2003. The black area of each bar in Figure 1 represents the value of processing exports due to FIE’s (Foreign Invested Enterprises), which are wholly foreign owned enterprises or equity joint ventures with at least 25% foreign ownership. The grey area represents processing exports that can be characterized as arising from outsourcing contracts between foreign buyers and independent Chinese firms.\(^5\)

![Figure 1: The Growth of Chinese Manufacturing Exports ($US), 1988-2003](image)

The growing importance of the international procurement of intermediate inputs either through outsourcing or within the firm, through foreign direct investment, cannot be explained by traditional trade theories that abstract from vertical fragmentation and contractual relationships between buyers and suppliers. Consequently, researchers have been motivated to enrich international

\(^5\)There are various, sometimes contradictory, definitions of outsourcing in the literature. The term is used here to indicate the procurement of inputs outside the firm (either through a contractual arrangement or a spot market) as opposed to vertically integrated production. The term encompasses both domestic and foreign purchases. The latter purchases are referred to as international outsourcing.
trade theory with concepts from industrial organization and contract theory that explain the organizational form of the firm. The combination of trade with the choice of organizational form represents an important new area for both theoretical and empirical research. The objective of this survey paper is to provide a perspective on this growing literature so as to gain insight into the forces driving international outsourcing.

6 Relationship-specific investment, incomplete contracts and also search and matching are fundamental concepts that help explain outsourcing decisions. In this context, an outsourcing contract is incomplete if a supplier undertakes relationship-specific investment so as to specialize production to the needs of a buyer or vice versa, but contracts cannot be written conditional on the level of investment. For example, if a Chinese supplier can sell its processed goods only to the particular buyer that provided the inputs, then the supplier’s investment in this production can be viewed as relationship-specific. If it is not possible to specify this level of investment in the contract, then the outsourcing contract is incomplete. The importance of search and matching arises from the idea that independent (non-integrated) final-good producers need to match with a suitable supplier of a specialized input for production to take place.

The literature mostly draws from various models of the boundary of the firm to explain the decision to contract out the provision of a specialized input rather than produce under vertical integration. A second branch of the literature assumes that the alternative to an outsourcing contract

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6 The literature also addresses other issues such as the formation of multinational firms. An important paper is Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2005). Globalization increases wage inequality in the South due to the formation of cross-country teams involving Northern managers and Southern workers (multinationals). See Feenstra and Hanson (2001) for a survey of the trade and wages literature.

7 Incomplete contracts can arise due to unforeseen contingencies, the excessive cost of specification of a large number of contingencies or the inability of the courts to enforce the contract.
Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1985) emphasize that when uncertainty and asset specificity are high, transaction costs are reduced by giving one party control over both sides of a transaction within a hierarchical firm rather than operating through the market. In the next section, I use these different modeling approaches to devise an overview and classification of the papers to be discussed. The organization and outline of the paper is provided at the end of the section.

2. Overview and Classification of papers

In classifying papers, I use four theories of the boundary of the firm: property rights, transaction costs, incentive systems, and delegation of authority. The property rights theory of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) defines a firm as a set of assets under common ownership or control. The theory emphasizes that regardless of ownership structure, relationship-specific investment is distorted due to the hold-up problem arising from the inability to fully reward investment under incomplete contracts. This applies to investment or effort by managers within the firm as well as outsourcing contracts. Ownership and control should be allocated so as to minimize the loss in surplus due to investment distortions.

Under the earlier transaction cost approach, the boundary of the firm is determined so as to minimize transaction costs. At the extreme, integration eliminates transaction costs leading to efficient levels of investment within the firm. In the context of international trade models, an important determinant of transactions costs is the thickness of the market. A thicker market increases

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the ease with which an independent final-good producer can match with a producer of a specialized input and hence reduces the advantage of vertical integration over outsourcing.\footnote{Details differ across papers, but for unintegrated final-good producers, the market is thicker if there is a greater chance of a match with a supplier that meets its technological requirements. Conversely, markets are thicker for suppliers if there are more potential buyers of their input.}

A further possibility is an incentive systems approach in which a principal designs optimal contracts to induce effort by managers under costly monitoring.\footnote{The fact that principal-agent contracts cannot be written conditional on unobserved effort levels suggests that the contracts are incomplete. However, Hart (1995, pp 20-23) argues that the contracts are “comprehensive”: the distortion in effort is due to the cost of observing variables rather than the inability to write contracts and there is no need for renegotiation since all future obligations are specified.} The greater ease of monitoring within the firm favors vertical integration over outsourcing. Finally, since formal delegation of authority by a principal to an agent can be interpreted as an outsourcing decision, the theory of delegation of authority due to Aghion and Tirole (1997) represents an extension of property rights theory that is relevant for the literature on trade and organizational form. However, since the efforts of the principal and agent are directed at obtaining information so as to decide between competing “projects”, this approach is valuable for understanding the roles of information and knowledge creation for vertical organizational form and power within the corporation rather than the best way to procure specialized intermediate inputs.

The papers selected for detailed consideration are classified in Table 1 into a number of boxes according to various options for procurement as determined by organizational form and theoretical approach (columns) and the geographic source of intermediate inputs or components (rows). As shown in the Legend of Table 1, the papers are organized into five groups, which are discussed in detail below. Each paper is denoted by the initials of the last names of their authors followed by a two digit specification of the year in brackets and can appear in multiple categories.
Papers identified with an asterix include empirical analysis.

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**Legend:**
- **Group 1:** Antràs (2003, 2005), Antràs & Helpman (2004), Grossman & Helpman (2004), Feenstra and Hanson (2003b), denoted by A(03)*, A(05), AH(04), GH(04) and FH(03b)*.
- **Group 2:** McLaren (2000), Grossman & Helpman (2002, 2005), denoted by M(00) and GH(02,05).
- **Group 3:** Spencer & Qiu (2001), Qiu & Spencer (2002), Head, Ries & Spencer (2004), Feenstra & Spencer (2005), denoted by SQ(01), QS(02), HRS(04)* and FS(05)*.
- **Group 4:** Levchenko (2004), Nunn (2005), denoted by L(04)* and N(05)*.
- **Group 5:** Puga and Trefler (2002), Marin and Verdier (2002, 2003, 2005), denoted by PT(02) and MV(02,03,05). An asterix denotes empirical analysis.

As shown by the columns of Table 1, an intermediate input or component can be produced within a vertically integrated firm or can be purchased through outsourcing. Vertical integration is split into two categories depending on the underlying theory. Papers in column 1 take a property rights, transaction costs or incentive systems approach to vertical integration. Papers based on the theory of delegation of authority are listed separately in column 2, because of their different focus.
The table also shows two categories of outsourcing: a spot market transaction for a generic version of an intermediate input in column 3 or a contract for a specialized intermediate input in column 4.

The rows of Table 1 specify the location of input production as domestic (row A), in an integrated world economy where factor costs, such as wages, are equalized across countries (row B) or as foreign at lower cost (row C). Although aggregate international outsourcing may be determinate for papers in row B, individual firms may be indifferent, making it indeterminate as to whether any particular firm outsources abroad. Identifying boxes in the table by the row letter followed by the column number, papers in box C1 involve FDI (foreign direct investment) since they combine vertical integration with foreign production.

For ease of discussion, the papers are organized into five groups, roughly categorized as to topic. The five papers in the first group, Antràs (2003, 2005), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Grossman and Helpman (2004) and Feenstra and Hanson (2003b), all address the choice between vertical integration (column 1) and the purchase of a specialized input through contractual outsourcing (column 4). A(03*, 05) and AH(04) take a property rights approach which they embed into general equilibrium models of trade. Comparison is made with the incentive systems approach taken by GH(04). Using export processing data from China, FH(03b)* contrasts both these approaches. A(05), AH(04) and GH(04) are listed in the four boxes, A1, A4, C1, C4, indicating that firms can choose between vertical integration and contractual outsourcing and also between domestic and foreign production. A(03)* includes empirical analysis (as shown by the asterix) and appears in B1 and B4 due to its modeling of an integrated world economy. Since FH(03b)* abstracts from the possibility of domestic production of the input, it is listed in boxes, C1 and C4.

The papers in the second group, namely McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman
There is also a literature concerning international outsourcing under imperfect competition, but incomplete contracts are not considered. See for example, Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992), Ishikawa and Spencer (1999), and Chen, Ishikawa and Yu (2004). Friedman and Fung (1996) examine the effects of trade on the prevalence of US type and Japanese type firms.

(2002,2005), all examine the outsourcing of specialized input taking into account general equilibrium effects arising from the thickness of the market. These papers take a transactions cost approach in which vertical integration removes distortions in managerial effort. Outsourcing contracts are incomplete in GH(02) and GH(05) (column 4), whereas the outsourcing in M(00) involves bidding rather than contracting. Both GH(02) and M(00) consider the tradeoff with vertical integration (column1). GH(02) is listed in boxes, A1 and A4 due to its purely domestic context, but since M(00) considers the integration of multiple markets, it is listed in A1 and B1. By contrast, GH(05) models domestic versus international contractual outsourcing, but not vertical integration and appears in boxes A4 and C4.

Prior to consideration of incomplete contracts, arms length international outsourcing between unrelated parties mostly assumed perfectly competitive markets.11 Spencer and Qiu (2001), Qiu and Spencer (2002), Head, Ries and Spencer (2004) and Feenstra and Spencer (2005), represent a third group of papers that bridges these two literatures by endogenizing the choice between specialized components produced under incomplete contracts (column 4) and generic components purchased from a spot market (column 3). The papers take a partial equilibrium approach in which a final-good firm procures a continuum of parts or components. All parts are outsourced, but since it is the suppliers that invest in specializing the components, not the final-good firm, the property rights approach would suggest outsourcing rather than vertical integration. All four papers, SQ(01), QS(02), HRS(04)* and FS(05)*, are listed in boxes A4 and C3 due to analysis of domestic contractual outsourcing and the import of lower-cost generic inputs. Since a range of generic parts

11There is also a literature concerning international outsourcing under imperfect competition, but incomplete contracts are not considered. See for example, Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992), Ishikawa and Spencer (1999), and Chen, Ishikawa and Yu (2004). Friedman and Fung (1996) examine the effects of trade on the prevalence of US type and Japanese type firms.
is produced domestically, SQ(01) also appears in A3. Since FS(05)* extends the theory to international contractual outsourcing and FDI by component suppliers, it is listed in C1 and C4.

Levchenko (2004) and Nunn (2005), denoted by L(04)* and N(05)* respectively, are discussed in a fourth group of papers concerned with country-specific institutional differences that affect the quality of contract enforcement and hence the pattern of trade in contract intensive goods. Since L(04)* and N(05)* both assume an integrated world economy and do not address the choice between vertical integration and outsourcing, they are listed only in B4.

Finally, Puga and Trefler (2002) and Marin and Verdier (2002, 2003, 2005), form a fifth group that draws on the theory of delegation of authority to consider the choice between control by a principal and outsourcing. However, since the papers are not concerned with contracts for an intermediate good, they are included only in column 2. Analysis of an integrated world economy leads MV(03) to be listed in boxes A2 and B2. MV(02, 05*) address international integration, but do not explicitly model trade.

Papers in groups 1 to 5 are discussed in separate sections. Section 3 concerns the choice between vertical integration under the property rights or incentive systems approach (column 1) and contractual outsourcing (column 4). Section 4 concerns the implications of the thickness of the market. Before moving to the more applied papers in sections 6 and 7, section 5 discusses the practical requirements for customs and payment on delivery. Section 6 focuses on the choice between generic and contractual outsourcing (columns 3 and 4), whereas section 7 involves the role of institutions and contract enforcement (column 4). Discussion of the theory of delegation of authority (column 2) is deferred to section 8. Finally, section 9 concludes by discussing “where are we now and where should we go?”.
3. Vertical integration versus outsourcing: Property rights/incentive systems

The five papers in group 1 are considered in two subsections. Antràs (2003, 2005) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) are considered in 3.1, which focuses on the tradeoff between vertical integration and international outsourcing under the property rights approach. Section 3.2 provides a comparison with the incentive systems approach based on Grossman and Helpman (2004) and Feenstra and Hanson (2003b).

3.1. Vertical integration versus international outsourcing: property rights

Under the property rights approach, relationship-specific investments are distorted because enforceable agreements take place only ex-post or after investment is sunk. The surplus or economic rent created by the relationship is distributed through ex-post Nash bargaining\(^{12}\). The ownership of assets is fundamental for each party’s incentive to invest, since it determines the residual rights of control and hence the “outside option” or “threat point” of each party. Grossman and Hart (1986) emphasize that ownership and control should be allocated so as to minimize the loss in surplus due to investment distortions. Thus if two agents each make an investment relevant to a different dimension of the business, ownership should be given to just one of the agents (vertical integration), or the two dimensions of the business should be separated (non-integration or outsourcing), depending on which arrangement minimizes the loss in surplus. Generally the agent that is most important in raising surplus should gain ownership rather than operate as a manager.

\(^{12}\)Suppose parties A and B with bargaining powers, \(\alpha \geq 0\) and \(1-\alpha \geq 0\) respectively bargain over the value of \(x\), which could represent a lump-sum payment or a price per unit. Letting \(\pi^i(x)\) and \(\pi^0\) represent party i’s utility from agreement and threat point (utility from no agreement) respectively, the generalized Nash bargaining solution is obtained by choosing \(x\) to maximize the product \((\pi^A(x) - \pi^{A0})^{\alpha}(\pi^B(x) - \pi^{B0})^{1-\alpha}\), where \(\pi^i(x) - \pi^0\) is party i’s surplus from agreement. The solution satisfies a number of axioms such as independence from the scale in which utility is measured. Under ordinary Nash bargaining, the parties share equally (\(\alpha = \beta = \frac{1}{2}\)). As shown by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinski (1986), this solution has a foundation in non-cooperative bargaining theory.
Hart and Moore (1990) add the idea that workers, as well as management, contribute to the productivity of an asset and that a key right provided by ownership is the ability to exclude people from the use of assets. Under integration or ownership, workers can be selectively fired, whereas if an outsourcing contract breaks down, unintegrated firms lose the entire benefit from the assets owned by the other party. The incentive for a principal to choose vertical integration is increased by the more favorable outside option.

A major achievement of the new literature has been to embed contracting models into the standard general equilibrium models that explain trade based on differences in endowments of factors across countries and monopolistic competition arising from consumer demand for variety. Antràs (2003) develops a property-rights model of the boundaries of the firm and embeds it into a general equilibrium monopolistic competition model of trade in which countries differ in their endowments of labor and capital. Antràs and Helpman (2004) introduce heterogeneity or dispersion in the productivity of final-good firms as pioneered by Melitz (2003), but abstract from differences in factor proportions. Antràs (2005) combines incomplete international outsourcing contracts with a dynamic general equilibrium of trade so as to explain the development of product cycles in which new goods are initially designed and produced in the North, with later production moving to the South. These contributions are explored in more detail in the rest of the section.

Antràs (2003) provides evidence that capital-intensive intermediate goods, such as chemical products, tend to be imported into the US within the boundaries of multinational firms, while labor-intensive goods, such as textiles, are imported from unaffiliated parties. Also, the share of intrafirm imports by multinationals as a proportion of total U.S. imports is higher, the higher the capital-labor ratio in the exporting country. Thus U.S. imports from capital abundant countries, such as
Switzerland, tend to involve multinationals, whereas imports from capital scarce countries, such as Egypt, occur mostly at arms length. To explain these results, Antràs (2003) assumes a continuum of varieties of final goods in each of two sectors, which differ by capital intensity due to a requirement for a specialized intermediate input produced with both capital and labor. The opening of trade leads to an integrated world economy in which factor prices are equalized as in Helpman and Krugman (1985), but since final-goods are assumed to be non-tradeable, the entire volume of world trade is in intermediate inputs.

The costs of production of specialized inputs are non contractible and hence are sunk prior to ex-post Nash bargaining as to each party’s share in the relationship. Vertical integration and capital intensity are linked by assuming that final-good producers can alleviate the hold-up problem by contributing capital up-front so as to aid in the production of the specialized input. Such cost sharing could involve the provision of specialized tools and equipment and pre-financing of capital expenses. If cost-sharing is large enough, then it is efficient to assign the residual rights of control to the final-good producer leading to vertical integration. Conversely, the model predicts outsourcing if the contribution of the final-good producer is relatively minor. Cost sharing and the attractiveness of vertical integration is shown to be increasing in the capital intensity of intermediate-good production with the result that final-goods in the capital intensive sector are produced under vertical integration, whereas those in the labor-intensive sector are outsourced. The model predicts that for any pair of countries, the share of a country’s intrafirm imports is an increasing function of the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country.

In Antràs and Helpman (2004), final-good firms make a random draw as to their productivity level and decide whether to produce only after paying a fixed cost of entry. Unlike Antràs (2003),
wages are lower in the South than the North and labor is the only factor of production. Final goods are produced in the North using headquarter services from the North as well as manufactured components, which can be produced in the North or the South.

Since all production costs are assumed to be relationship-specific, following the property rights approach to the firm, the revenues from sale of the final-good are allocated to final-good firms and manufacturers of components (whether or not they are vertically integrated) on the basis of ex-post Nash bargaining after all costs of production are sunk. In accordance with Hart and Moore (1990), final-good producers have a better outside option and hence a larger share of revenue under vertical integration than outsourcing due to the ability to fire the manufacturer and seize some fraction of components. However, aggregate revenue is reduced by the weaker incentive for component production within the firm. The choice of organizational form depends on the importance of headquarter services, which varies by sector. In sectors with high headquarter’s intensity, the property rights approach suggests vertical integration so as to motivate final-good firms to supply these services. Otherwise, outsourcing is the preferred organizational form since it increases the incentive for component production.

In addition to the fixed cost of entry, final-good producers incur fixed organizational costs that vary with organizational form. Fixed costs are higher in the South than in the North, potentially offsetting the lower marginal costs in the South. Also, within any country, vertical integration involves higher fixed costs than outsourcing. Since greater productivity increases the benefit from low cost production, it is the more productive firms within the sector that choose to pay the higher fixed cost of production in the South. Also, since higher productivity is associated with increased revenue, more productive firms are also willing to pay the higher fixed cost of vertical integration
Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) develop a related model in which the fixed organizational cost of integration is less than the fixed cost of outsourcing. The most productive firms vertically integrate and produce via FDI in the South, the next most productive outsource in the South, lower productivity firms vertically integrate in the North, even lower productivity firms outsource in the North and the least productive exit. The ranking from highest to lowest productivity corresponds to the ranking from highest to lowest fixed cost.13

Figure 2 illustrates the four organizational forms that arise if headquarter intensity is sufficient to induce vertical integration. As shown in the column under AH(04), the most productive firms vertically integrate and produce via FDI in the South, the next most productive outsource in the South, lower productivity firms vertically integrate in the North, even lower productivity firms outsource in the North and the least productive exit. The ranking from highest to lowest productivity corresponds to the ranking from highest to lowest fixed cost.13

![Figure 2: Organizational form and Productivity Rank](image)

The prevalence of each type of organizational form is shown to depend on a number of parameters, such as headquarter’s intensity and the degree of productivity dispersion across firms. In particular, a reduction in transport costs or a lower Southern wage causes some of the lower productivity firms to outsource instead of vertically integrate.

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13 Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) develop a related model in which the fixed organizational cost of integration is less than the fixed cost of outsourcing. The most productive firms outsource in the South and the least productive vertically integrate in the North. The paper identifies conditions under which outsourcing and foreign sourcing are positively correlated.
productivity firms that previously produced through vertical integration in the North to switch to outsourcing contracts in the South. This result is particularly interesting in the light of the argument, often presented in the media, that outsourcing has increased due to a reduction in the cost of doing business in the South.

Antràs (2005) develops a dynamic general equilibrium Ricardian model of North-South trade in which the incompleteness of international contracts leads to the emergence of product cycles. Northern firms produce goods by combining a hi-tech input or R&D from the North with a low-tech input, capturing simple assembly or manufacturing. The low-tech input can be produced either through vertically integration or outsourcing, with production taking place either in the North or the South. An important role is played by the proximity of production of the two inputs. If both inputs are produced in the North, the organizational form (whether vertical integration or outsourcing) is made irrelevant due to the assumption that quality-contingent contracts can be enforced ex-post. By contrast, if production is split between the North and the South, quality-contingent contracts are not enforceable and the party’s bargain over the surplus on the basis of an incomplete contracting model that is similar to Antràs (2003).

Product cycles arise from the incomplete nature of international contracts in the South and from a decline in the importance (reduction in output elasticity) of the high-tech input with the age or maturity of the good. Since incomplete contracts reduce product development, goods are initially manufactured in the North where contracting is efficient. Manufacture of the low-tech input is later shifted to the South to take advantage of the lower wage. Conditions are specified under which this shift to the South occurs first within the boundaries of the firm through FDI and, at a later stage, through outsourcing to independent firms in the South. The general equilibrium model demonstrates
that incomplete contracting in the South leads to an equilibrium wage that is higher in the North than the South.

In the three papers discussed in this subsection, a final-good producer controls the choice of organizational form and also provides an input (capital in Antràs, 2003, headquarter services in Antràs and Helpman, 2004 and a hi-tech input in Antràs, 2005). Production also requires a second, intermediate input or component that can be manufactured by a manager under vertical integration or outsourced to an independent firm. Because the full cost of production of the intermediate input is assumed to be relationship specific and non-contractible, the intermediate-good producer (whether a manager or a firm) determines the quantity supplied. Output of the final good is then jointly determined by the quantities of inputs supplied by the two parties based on various formulations of production functions (mostly Cobb Douglas). This is a useful and elegantly simple way to specify the contributions of both parties. However, since the two parties contribute so as to jointly determine output and are compensated through lump-sum payment of a share of the revenue as in the above papers, this model of outsourcing may better describe a joint venture rather than an arm’s length relationship. In typical arm’s length contracts, transactions occur at a positive price and the buyer has an opportunity to order more components as desired.

3.2. Incentive systems versus property rights

Rather than ex-post bargaining after investment has been sunk, an incentive systems approach involves optimal incentive contracts designed by a principal to induce investment or effort by managers. The first best level of effort is typically not achieved due to the inability to observe effort and imperfect monitoring. Since vertical integration is assumed to reduce the cost of monitoring, it is possible that vertical integration is preferred to arm’s length contracting even if the property rights
approach would suggest outsourcing due to the importance of the agent’s effort to overall surplus.

Grossman and Helpman (2004) take an incentive systems approach to explore the tradeoff between vertical integration and international outsourcing. A principal can manufacture a given quantity of a final good if she can obtain the necessary intermediate good from an agent. Delivery requires that the agent be successful in multiple tasks, where the probability of delivery is increasing in the effort of the agent as in Holstrom and Milgrom (1991). The effort of the agent can be perfectly monitored for some fraction of the many tasks (ensuring success is those tasks) within a vertically integrated firm, but cannot be monitored if the agent is an independent contractor.\(^\text{14}\) However, independent contractors, but not internal managers, are responsible for the up-front cost of inputs and are out-of-pocket in the event production is not successful. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between greater monitoring under vertical integration and higher-powered incentives for effort under outsourcing.

There are two countries, North and South. Differentiated final-goods are produced only in the North, but the intermediate good can be produced in both countries. The principal has a greater ability to monitor managerial effort under vertical integration in the North than through FDI in the South, but there is an advantage from production in the South due to exogenously lower costs. As in Melitz (2003), productivity varies across final-good producers with the more productive firms earning higher revenues. The ranking of organizational forms from highest to lowest productivity is illustrated Figure 2 (above) in the column under AH(04).\(^\text{15}\) At the highest productivity levels, production is outsourced to the South because the principal is willing to pay so as to make success a certainty, but

\(^{14}\)In both cases, the contract involves an up-front payment plus a bonus on successful delivery.

\(^{15}\)The ordering is not determined by the size of fixed costs (as in Antràs and Helpman, 2004) because the effort of the agent varies depending on who is responsible for the fixed costs.
pays less under outsourcing because the up-front costs of production are shifted to the independent contractor. As productivity decreases, the preferred organizational form becomes vertical integration in the North, then FDI and again outsourcing in the South. At low productivity levels, the lower cost in the South and higher level of effort made by independent contractors is needed to make production viable. It is never profitable to outsource in the North. Since the ordering of organizational forms in terms of final-good productivity in Grossman and Helpman (2004) differs substantially from Antràs and Helpman (2004), it would seem that, like a number of results that draw from models of industrial organization, the outcome is highly sensitive to the model.

The final paper in this group, Feenstra and Hanson (2003b), contrasts the implications of both the property rights and incentive systems approaches for the ownership and control structure of firms engaged in the export processing trade from China. Production can involve pure-assembly in which a foreign buyer of the processed good both owns and supplies the inputs required for processing or import and assembly in which the processing plant is responsible for finding and purchasing the imported inputs. The processing plant itself can be foreign or locally owned. Under a range of parameter values, the property rights version of the model predicts that ownership and control should be split, by giving the local manager control rights over the input so as to increase his effort. By contrast, if managerial rewards can be tailored to effort through monitoring as in the incentive systems model, then it is more efficient to allocate both ownership and control the foreign firm. Based on four-digit SITC product data for the years 1997 - 1999 for processing exports from China and detailed data as to firm type, the paper provides support for the property rights approach by showing that the most common organizational form is to combine at least partial foreign ownership with the purchase of inputs controlled by the factory management.
4. The thickness of the market and the outsourcing decision

This section discusses the three papers, McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005), that emphasize the importance of the “thick-ness of the market” in determining the probability that final-good firms and suppliers of specialized inputs find an appropriate match so that investment and production can take place. In keeping with simple transaction cost models, there are fixed costs of vertical integration and, in Grossman and Helpman (2002), higher marginal costs, but otherwise the internal operation of firm is left as an efficient black box. The choice between vertical integration and domestic outsourcing is considered in 4.1, whereas 4.2 focuses on the choice between domestic and international outsourcing.

4.1. Vertical integration versus domestic outsourcing

In McLaren (2000), final-good firms can obtain a specialized, indivisible input either through the market based on a bidding model or through “integrated” procurement in which the firm merges with a supplier.16 Since the disadvantage from merger is simply a fixed cost, the model follows the “transaction cost” approach to the theory of the firm. Unintegrated suppliers face a hold-up problem since the inability to observe quality ex ante implies that bidding takes place only after suppliers have sunk their costs.17

For independent suppliers, the probability of an attractive outside buyer is increasing in the “thick-ness of the market” as determined by the number of unintegrated final-good producers. Since

16McLaren (1999) considers incomplete contracts in a similar setting and discusses the potential effects of differences in contracting across countries, but trade is not modeled.

17In bidding models, price is determined by the value of the good in its most attractive alternative use, which implies a zero price for a fully specialized input. Thus in McLaren (2000), unintegrated suppliers choose to use a “flexible technology” that is of less value to the primary buyer, but increases the probability of an outside buyer. By contrast, Nash bargaining would allow a firm supplying a fully specialized input to receive a share of the rents created by the relationship.
vertical integration reduces the number of unintegrated firms, there is a negative externality from vertical integration that makes arm’s-length arrangements less attractive. Multiple equilibria are possible. Since the opening of countries to trade increases the number of available unintegrated firms, trade serves to thicken the market and raise welfare. Also procurement systems across countries tend to converge as transport costs fall. McLaren (2000) provides a rich formulation of the role of the thickness of markets, but since countries differ only in their numbers of integrated and unintegrated producers and the choice of organizational form matters only for fixed costs, the paper abstracts from effects on final-good output and also from features of general equilibrium trade models such as differences in factor endowments.

Grossman and Helpman (2002) builds on the ideas in McLaren (2000), but the choice between vertical integration and outsourcing is developed in a general equilibrium, monopolistic competitive framework in which final-good industries differ in the degree of product differentiation. However, the closed economy setting precludes consideration of international outsourcing. The costs from search for a partner under outsourcing are counterbalanced by higher fixed and marginal costs under vertical integration. Similar to McLaren (2000), the benefit of a “thicker” market makes outsourcing more viable in large economies or large industries. Also, equilibrium involves either vertical integration by all producers or outsourcing by all producers. Arm’s length sales are made through incomplete contracts rather than bidding. As a result, the cost of production of the specialized (or partially specialized) component is sunk prior to bargaining. Since payment takes the form of a share of the profits, components are purchased at zero marginal cost. Final-good output is limited by the
An interesting question is the role of the intensity of competition in shaping organizational form. Although the effects of variation in the degree of substitutability between final products are complex, for the case in which consumer products are highly substitutable, outsourcing occurs only if specialized producers have a large per-unit cost advantage.

4.2. Domestic versus international outsourcing

Grossman and Helpman (2005) develops the choice between domestic and international outsourcing under incomplete contracts in a general equilibrium setting of monopolistic competition and trade. Differentiated final goods are designed and produced only in the North, but for production to take place, each final-good firm must find an independent supplier in the North or the South willing to customize and produce a specialized component. Vertical integration is not considered. Labor is the only factor of production and the South is favored by a lower wage. Consistency with general equilibrium wage determination and balanced trade is maintained by assuming that a homogeneous final good is produced only in the South.

Final-good producers are represented as being located symmetrically around a unit circle in terms of the specialized component that they require, whereas suppliers are located on the circle based on their particular expertise. Final-good firms incur a fixed cost of search, but since component suppliers incur higher fixed costs of entry and investment, there are fewer firms producing components than final goods in both the North and the South. As a result, each supplier generally provides components for more than one final-good producer and the “thickness of the market” is

\[ \text{Number of components that intermediate good producers choose to supply}^{18} \]

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defined by the number of component producers.

Unlike Grossman and Helpman (2002) where final-good producers had to customize components to make them fit, in Grossman and Helpman (2005), suppliers invest so as to develop a prototype component that is an exact fit. The required relationship-specific investment is increasing in the distance between the supplier’s expertise and the final producer’s input needs. There is a positive feedback between entry by component producers, which thickens the market, and the extent of search by final-good producers, but increases in the wage limit the extent of entry. Multiple equilibria with different patterns of outsourcing are a possibility. As might be expected, economies with a greater endowment of labor tend to have thicker markets (more component producers), which favors outsourcing in those markets. However, other results driven by complex general equilibrium responses affecting wages and the numbers of each type of firm are not obvious. In particular, increasing returns in outsourcing are sufficiently strong that an expansion in Southern labor supply actually reduces the wage gap between the North and the South. Also, an improvement in a country’s legal environment (which makes a larger fraction of relationship-specific investment contractible) increases the country’s share of outsourcing holding the wage and number of firms fixed; but general equilibrium responses to a global improvement favor outsourcing in the North.

Due to an inability to write contracts on the full amount of investment, suppliers are compensated through a share of profits, which are assumed to be disbursed as lump-sum payments. Components are purchased at marginal cost through an efficient order contract. These assumptions simplify the analysis by abstracting from any direct connection between relationship-specific investment and the output of each final-good firm. Also, as explained in the next section, real world requirements for the international delivery of goods make such pricing schemes hard to implement.
5. Practical requirements for customs and payment on delivery

Simply crossing borders complicates the nature of transactions. First there is the significant problem of guaranteeing payment across national borders. Typically the seller first issues a pro forma invoice, which contains information such as quantity or volume as well as price, insurance and shipping costs. The buyer then uses the invoice to arrange for funds, usually through a letter of credit, which is an undertaking by the buyer’s bank to pay the seller’s bank only after documents have been presented certifying that the specified goods have been delivered. The actual transaction is governed by a commercial invoice or contract. The information concerning price, quantity and value cannot deviate very much from the information in the letter of credit. For insurance and customs purposes, it is also important that the value of the goods as stated on the commercial invoice represents the full value of the goods.

The papers in groups 1 and 2 (sections 3 and 4) all assume that components produced under incomplete contracts are purchased through a single lump-sum payment or a combination of a lump-sum payment and a price set at marginal-cost. Such contracts have useful efficiency properties, but are not typical of arm’s length contracts within a country and seem particularly unrealistic in an international trading context. As mentioned above, the total payment for the good, including any fixed payment, needs to be listed on the commercial invoice or letter of credit for insurance and customs purposes. Customs officials would view shipments listed as having zero value (with a lump sum paid through other means) as particularly suspicious. Full disclosure of the terms of the contract also facilitates payment to the supplier on delivery and, if that fails, a better prospect of a successful

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19 This two part pricing scheme could be implemented through the use of a schedule of prices in which the fixed payment is included in the price of the first unit or spread over other inframarginal units. However, rather than a schedule in which different units have different prices, quantity discounting typically involves a reduction in the price per unit with the purchase of a larger quantity.
appeal to the courts. In addition, the specification of a price protects the buyer from having to pay the full amount for incomplete shipments.

Contracts where intermediate goods are priced at marginal cost are efficient in that they avoid the loss in output arising from “double-marginalization”, which arises when the mark-up of the intermediate-good producer is included in price and hence in the marginal cost of the final-good producer. Such contracts are also convenient for modeling purposes since they can justify output levels that are independent of organizational form. However, the practical difficulties discussed above suggest that the inefficiency stemming from “double marginalization” should be viewed as a normal consequence of arm’s length international outsourcing that would not apply to transactions within vertically integrated firms.20

6. Contractual versus generic outsourcing

The third group of papers, namely, Spencer and Qiu (2001), Qiu and Spencer (2002), Head, Ries and Spencer (2004) and Feenstra and Spencer (2005), involve a tradeoff between the purchase of specialized components or parts under incomplete contracts and the purchase of standard or generic parts from a spot market. This tradeoff is built into the contracting process: in bargaining with a supplier that has invested so as to specialize an input, the outside option of the final-good producer is to purchase a generic part.

Rather than requiring just one customized component, the final-good is assembled using a variety or range of parts in fixed proportion. Relationship-specific investment or RSI by a supplier

20The difficulty in enforcing payments across borders also suggests the importance of the trust generated by business and social networks. See Rauch (2001) for a survey.
reduces the marginal cost of assembly by improving the fit of the particular part with the other parts used in production. Since it is not possible to contract on the level of RSI, each supplier shares in the economic rent from the relationship through Nash bargaining after investment is sunk. As a result, suppliers undertake too little RSI and too many parts are purchased as generics. Since the parties bargain over price and lump sum transfers are ruled out, the price of each part includes a mark-up to cover the supplier’s share of profits. As a result, “double marginalization” reduces final-good output relative to an efficient contract in which price is set at marginal cost and profit is transferred through lump-sum payments. However price contracts may better reflect practical realities as discussed in Section 5. The final-good producer determines whether to bargain with a supplier, the quantity of parts to order and the output of the final good.

Parts are ordered on a continuum based on increasing productivity of relationship-specific investment. Since there is an endogenously determined cut-off in the productivity of investment below which parts are produced as generics, the size of the network of suppliers undertaking RSI is determined endogenously. Also, a greater scale of final-good production increases investment by suppliers, which, in turn, feeds back to reduce the marginal cost of final-good production and raise output. The theory abstracts from general equilibrium effects working through factor prices and consumer demand for variety, but the simpler partial equilibrium formulation facilitates consideration of a number of policy issues.

Figure 3 illustrates various options for contractual outsourcing by a Northern final-good producer as well as the possibility of buying a generic version from a spot market. Spencer and Qiu
(2001) and Qiu and Spencer (2002) consider only two of the options in Figure 3: contractual outsourcing to a Northern firm that undertakes RSI and production in the North and the import of generic parts from the South. Proximity of suppliers to the final-good producer is important for RSI due to the need for information. Parts with a higher productivity of investment (those involving a higher proportion of the cost of the final-good) are produced at home and the less important parts are imported as generics. Head, Ries and Spencer (2004) add the possibility (not shown in the Figure) that final-good firms producing abroad through FDI differentially source components from their home network of suppliers.

**Figure 3: Forms of contractual and generic outsourcing**

In Feenstra and Spencer (2005), the final-good firm in the North chooses between all four organizational forms shown in Figure 3. Northern suppliers can take advantage of proximity by undertaking RSI in the North, but can produce more cheaply in the South by incurring a fixed cost for FDI. The Northern final-good firm can also directly contract with suppliers in the South, who
undertake RSI. The ranking of the four outsourcing options from high to low productivity of RSI is shown in Figure 3. At the highest productivity levels, both RSI and production takes place in the North. As productivity decreases, Northern suppliers shift production, but not RSI, to the South; then Southern suppliers undertake both RSI and production in the South; finally parts are imported as generics from a spot market in the South. The ordering of organizational forms is again different from the orderings based on final-good productivity as illustrated in Figure 2.

Spencer and Qiu (2001) and Qiu and Spencer (2002) consider the role of vertical keiretsu (Japanese vertical corporate groups) for trade with Japan. The papers focus on the auto industry, where the limited value and range of parts imported by keiretsu, such as Toyota and Nissan, led to claims by the US and other countries in the mid 1990s of an “unfair” trade barrier arising from Japanese business practices. Spencer and Qiu (2001) argues that Japanese business practices involving outsourcing to keiretsu suppliers under incomplete contracts could create the impression of a trade barrier, even when none exists. For example, the benefits of RSI could make it profitable for a range of parts to be procured locally in Japan even though these parts are produced at a marginal cost that exceeds the import price. Qiu and Spencer (2002) consider the effects of policies aimed at opening the Japanese markets for intermediate goods, either through requiring that Japan increase the market share of imported components, such as auto parts, through a VIE (voluntary import expansion) or limit its exports of final-goods, such as autos, through a VER (voluntary export restraint). Although both policies would cause Japan to import a wider range of parts, the associated fall in keiretsu investment and output could actually reduce the total value of Japanese imports.

Head, Ries and Spencer (2004) develops an empirical specification of Spencer and Qiu (2001) to investigate the role of vertical networks in international trade by examining the pattern of US auto
parts exports to 26 countries from 1989-1994. The paper develops a number of proxies for network strength at the auto-parts level (for 53 parts classifications) so as to identify the parts likely to be produced within the network and those likely to be outsourced as generic versions. The most interesting proxy measures the intensity of *keiretsu* involvement in the production of each part based on the fraction of *keiretsu* suppliers used for each part by each Japanese automaker. As predicted by the model, US exports to Japan tend to be lower for parts with a greater intensity of *keiretsu* involvement. Although differences in *keiretsu* strength are significant for the composition of Japanese parts imports, after controlling for automaker scale and other country characteristics, such as distance from the US, the paper finds that Japan’s aggregate import levels are not outliers.

Other results also underscore the importance of vertical networks in trade. Countries with a greater output per automaker import fewer parts per car, which fits with the model’s prediction that a greater scale of production increases the incentive for RSI by local suppliers. Also, the hypothesis that the Big 3 US automakers (General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, now Daimler Chrysler) operate with networks of US based suppliers is supported by the finding that countries with a larger Big 3 presence tend to import more parts from the US for each car produced. In addition, countries whose foreign affiliates employ more automotive sector workers in the US, tend to import more US auto parts per car, presumably from these affiliates.

Feenstra and Spencer (2005) argue that a reduction in the marginal costs of production and transport should increase the range or variety of intermediate goods exported from the South through FDI by shifting production away from suppliers in the North. Such a reduction in cost should have no effect on the goods that are exported based on outsourcing contracts or spot market purchases. The paper examines this hypothesis using data from Chinese provinces to a large number of export
destinations for the period 1988-2000. Transportation costs are proxied by two measures of distance: the *internal distance* from the province to the nearest shipping port or major border crossing and then the *external distance* from that port/border crossing to the destination country. Based on a gravity equation specification in which the extensive margin, representing the range of goods, is used as the dependent variable, the impact of *external distance* is insignificant in most cases, but *internal distance* tends to have a greater impact in reducing the variety of processing exports by foreign owned enterprises than domestically owned firms.

Chen and Feenstra (2005) is also concerned with the correspondence between variety in intermediate goods and the vertical structure of international trade. However, since relationship-specific investments are made by buyers rather than the suppliers, the property rights approach suggests vertical integration rather than contractual outsourcing. Buyers that do not make a specific investment to match with a particular supplier, purchase the input at a price determined by Bertrand competition between the two closest suppliers.\(^{22}\) Multiple equilibria in the variety of intermediate goods is a possibility. Thus the observation in Feenstra, Yang and Hamilton (1999) that South Korea exports a limited variety of goods compared with Taiwan could be an example of this phenomena. Based on data for a broad sample of countries, the paper finds moderate support for its prediction that industries with fewer suppliers and hence less variety in intermediate goods are associated with more vertical integration and more intrafirm trade.

\(^{22}\)There is a continuum of buyers each with a preferred specification for an input represented by a point on a circle, but only a finite number of suppliers choose to enter the industry. Buyers can reduce price under outsourcing by investing so as to increase the flexibility of their input requirements.
7. Institutions and enforcement of contracts.

There is a growing literature attesting to the importance of the quality of a country’s institutions for comparative advantage and the volume of trade. For example, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) finds that economic predation at the border due to corrupt institutions acts as a hidden tax on trade. Costinot (2004) develops an appealing model in which firms producing more complex goods (defined as the number of elementary tasks that must be performed to produce one unit) are larger due to greater gains from the division of labor, but are also more dependent on the ability of a country’s institutions to enforce labor contracts within the firm. A higher quality of institutions increases the size of firms and also leads to specialization in more complex goods with the opening of trade. The papers, Levchenko (2004) and Nunn (2005), both involve incomplete contracts for specialized inputs.

Levchenko (2004) argues that it matters for the gains from trade whether institutional differences between countries are reflected in differences in the quality of contract enforcement or, as is usually assumed, in differences in productivity. There are “good jobs” in contract intensive sectors, since the property rights approach implies that workers earn rents from ex-post bargaining with the owners of capital. If contract enforcement is better in the North than the South, then the “good jobs” will shift to the North with the opening of trade. As a result, the South tends to gain less than the North from trade and may actually be worse off. By contrast, if the workers in the Northern institutionally dependent sector are simply more productive, closing down this sector enhances the Southern gains from trade. Using data on 1998 US imports classified by industry and country of

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23Following Cabellero and Hammour (1998), two goods are produced with labor or capital alone and a third mixed good, M, uses capital and labor in fixed proportion. Incomplete contracts lead to too little capital investment in M, but workers share in the rents arising from the restriction in output. Higher quality institutions reduce the fraction of capital subject to incomplete contracts.
origin, Levchenko (2004) supports this analysis with evidence that better institutional quality tends to increase the extent to which a country exports goods in industries that are contract intensive.

Nunn (2005) provides additional theory and evidence that countries with a better ability to enforce contracts have a comparative advantage in the production of goods that are contract-intensive. Final goods, which are produced with both customized and standardized inputs in fixed proportion, are ordered on a continuum in terms of increasing importance of the customized input, which requires relationship-specific investment. The proportion of contracts that are enforced depends on the quality of the legal system. Using 1997 export data for 146 countries disaggregated into 223 industries, differences in judicial quality prove significant in explaining differences across country pairs in the value of exports of contract-intensive goods.

8. The theory of delegation of authority

Aghion and Tirole (1997) develops the conditions under which formal authority over the choice between a number of competing projects will be delegated to an agent (A-formal authority), or retained by the principal (P-formal authority). Each party can increase the probability that they privately learn the payoffs from the projects by exerting effort. Delegation of authority fosters the agent’s incentive to acquire information, but it also involves a potentially costly loss of control for the principal since an informed agent will choose a project partly based on private benefits (perks). If neither party becomes informed, both parties are worse off since no project is implemented. Formal authority (the right to decide) is distinguished from real authority (effective control). If the principal is not informed (perhaps due to little effort) but retains formal authority, she gives up real authority by rubber stamping the agent’s proposal. Unlike models involving monitoring of an agent’s effort,
greater effort by the principal tends to reduce effort by the agent.

Puga and Trefler (2002) is concerned with the implications for organizational form of the tension between creating incremental improvements in knowledge and controlling the implementation of those improvements. Similar to Aghion and Tirole (1997), the allocation of control to an agent (outsourcing) acts as an incentive device to induce effort, but it also imposes a cost on the principal due to a conflict as to the appropriate blueprint. Since an innovation in one component requires adaptation in other components, the principal prefers a blueprint that shifts the costs of adaptation onto the agent and vice versa. The non-appropriability of knowledge is also important: if an agent creates knowledge, there is some probability that a court will award all the profits to the agent. An appealing feature of the paper is its use of real world illustrations, such as Sony’s decision to become more integrated so as to retain control over the adaptation of television components to fit with flat screen displays.

Marin and Verdier (2002, 2003, 2005) are interested in explaining the recent trend towards a “flatter hierarchy” in which power is delegated to lower level management. Both papers model delegation as in Aghion and Tirole (1977), but the competing “projects” are given a specific interpretation as reflecting different methods of production, where the method preferred by the agent (manager) confers private benefits at the expense of a higher marginal cost. There are three organizational forms: centralized control by the principal (P-organization or integration), delegation to the agent (A-organization or outsourcing), and the single managed firm (O-organization) with no

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24If the costs of adaptation are low, then the innovative efforts of the principal and agent are highly “substitutable” and control is delegated to the agent. At lower levels of substitutability, the principal retains control over implementation, but it is possible that the agent makes no innovative effort.
internal hierarchy, since the agent exerts minimal effort.\textsuperscript{25} To examine the effects of competition, Marin and Verdier (2002) embed their model of the firm into a general equilibrium monopolistic competition framework in which labor is the only factor of production. At intermediate levels of competition, as modeled by the degree of substitutability of goods, there is a tendency to move to a flatter hierarchy (from P to A) so as to increase the effort of the agent. Multiple equilibria arise in general equilibrium from the dependence of the organizational decision of any one firm on the organizational forms of other firms. Thus two otherwise identical countries might have different corporate cultures in the absence of trade (either an A or a P). Due to convergence of organizational form, the move to an integrated world economy can lead to waves of outsourcing, but the outcome is indeterminate since market size per se has no effect on the organization of the firm. With the introduction of profit mark-ups that vary with market competition, Marin and Verdier (2005) show that very large and very small countries will have integrated corporate organizations, while countries of middle size will outsource.\textsuperscript{26} Toughness of competition eventually leads to outsourcing. It is interesting that an increase in competition also leads to outsourcing in the different context of Bertrand competition between two manufacturers located at each end of a Hotelling line (de Bettignies, 2004).\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25}If the principal’s benefit from successful production is low, she chooses P as she makes only a low effort that does not stifle the initiative (effort) of the agent. At intermediate benefit levels, the principal chooses A to increase the agent’s initiative. At high benefit levels, the principal’s effort is sufficiently high to stifle the effort by the agent, even under delegation of power, and O is the outcome.

\textsuperscript{26}Marin and Verdier (2005) show that firms in Austria (the smaller country) have greater centralization in internal decision making than do firms in Germany.

\textsuperscript{27}Assuming independent retailers (or alternatively producers of an input) are more efficient in creating quality than the manufacturer, de Bettignies (2004) uses a property rights approach to show that outsourcing is the response to greater substitutability of goods as consumer travel costs fall. Firms choose the same organizational form if competition is high or low, but not at intermediate levels of competition.
Marin and Verdier (2003) extend the analysis to a two-sector, two-factor model in which two countries, the North and the South, differ in the skill intensity of their workers. As the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor increases, the organizational form tends to move from P to A and then to O. If firms in the skill-rich North choose P and firms in the skill-poor South choose O prior to the opening of trade, then a move to the integrated world economy can result in a wave of outsourcing as firms shift to the intermediate A organization, involving delegation of power. Since a flatter hierarchy is associated with a greater demand for skill, there is an associated “war for talent”.

9. Where are we now and where should we go?

In examining where we are now, it is useful to first summarize the role of the different underlying theories in driving the choice between outsourcing and vertical integration. Under the property rights approach, relationship-specific investments are distorted regardless of organizational form. The incentive to outsource is increased if component suppliers are more important in creating surplus than final-good producers. The models of Antràs (2003, 2005), Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Feenstra and Hanson (2003b) illustrate this theme in different contexts. Investment or effort levels are also distorted under the incentive systems approach, but the distortion is lower inside the firm than under arm’s length relationships due to better monitoring. The advantage from vertical integration is potentially offset by higher powered incentives under outsourcing (Grossman and Helpman, 2004). The theory of delegation of authority involves a tradeoff for the principal between maintaining control under vertical integration and increasing the agent’s effort under outsourcing. Moderate levels of competition or moderate skill intensity of the workforce leads to a flatter hierarchy (Marin and Verdier, 2002, 2003, 2005). Finally, under the transaction-cost approach taken by papers
concerned with the “thickness of markets”, matching between independent firms is costly, but vertical integration has higher fixed (and possibly variable) costs (McLaren, 2000 and Grossman and Helpman, 2002). The fact that the various theories differ significantly means that there is no overarching explanation for outsourcing.

There are three primary explanations for a reliance on international outsourcing to procure specialized inputs, rather than domestic production through outsourcing or vertical integration: (1) lower costs of foreign production; (2) improvements in foreign institutions or international communications; (3) reduced costs of international transactions, which is associated with globalization or greater integration in world markets.

Lower costs of foreign production as in (1) are highly important empirically as emphasized in the business press and, as can be seen from Table 1 in section 2, also drive much of the theory. In particular, if the theory incorporates a higher cost for international transactions, some offsetting benefit from foreign production is needed to induce international outsourcing. The main source of lower costs is lower wages, but the effect of physical distance is also important. A low cost country should export a greater variety of intermediate goods to physically closer countries (Feenstra and Spencer, 2005). As for (2), the quality of foreign enforcement of contracts is important (Antràs, 2005, Grossman and Helpman, 2005, Levchenko, 2004 and Nunn, 2005). However, factors that reduce the size of any informational disadvantage in investment from the location of a supplier in a different country from the buyer also play a role (better communication technology in Feenstra and Spencer, 2005, networks of suppliers in Head, Ries and Spencer, 2004).

The literature identifies a variety of reasons for a reduction in the cost of international transactions and hence greater international outsourcing under (3). These include (i) a reduction in
trade barriers such as tariffs and (ii) reduced costs of international search and matching leading to entry by suppliers and thicker markets (Grossman and Helpman, 2005). At the extreme, the costs of international transactions may be reduced to zero leading to a fully integrated world economy as in standard models of international trade. Global integration per se, interpreted as a move from autarchy to an integrated world economy, leads to further reasons for outsourcing under (3): (iii) thicker markets due to the combining of economies (McLaren, 2000); (iv) the convergence of organizational form to outsourcing when multiple equilibria are possible (Marin and Verdier, 2002, 2003) and (v) differences in factor endowments across countries (capital intensity in Antràs, 2003, skill intensity in Marin and Verdier, 2003, and a greater labor endowment, which raises the thickness of the market in Grossman and Helpman, 2005).

Since many of the just described conditions driving international outsourcing would also enhance the profitability of foreign direct investment, it is important to identify features that distinguish these two organizational forms. Features that favor international outsourcing relative to FDI include: (1) higher fixed costs of FDI (Antràs and Helpman, 2004, Feenstra and Spencer, 2005); (2) shift of up-front costs of production from final-good firms to component suppliers (Grossman and Helpman, 2004); (3) differences in productivity of final-good firms (moderate productivity firms outsource and the highest productivity firms engage in FDI in Antràs and Helpman, 2004, but both the lowest and highest productivity firms outsource in Grossman and Helpman, 2004); (3) low productivity of relationship-specific investment by component suppliers (contractual outsourcing at the upper end of the range and import of generics at the bottom in Feenstra and Spencer, 2005); (4) lower capital intensity in intermediate-good production (Antràs, 2003); (5) a greater geographic distance (reduces FDI, but not contractual outsourcing or generic outsourcing in Feenstra and
Spencer, 2005).

In exploring the conditions leading to international outsourcing under incomplete contracts, a major achievement has been to embed contracting models into the standard general equilibrium models that explain trade based on differences in endowments of factors across countries and monopolistic competition arising from consumer demand for variety. In particular, it is a very nice contribution to use differences in factor proportions across countries to explain not only the factor intensity of a country’s exports, but also the organizational form of production (Antràs, 2003). Papers that explore the role of the thickness of markets already have a general equilibrium character due to the feedback between the ease of search as affected by the thickness of the market and decisions by individual firms as to organizational form. The extension to monopolistic competition and a general equilibrium model of trade adds significant complexity. Given the need to model the thickness in both a domestic and foreign market taking into account general equilibrium changes in the wage, it is not surprising that Grossman and Helpman (2004) sacrificed consideration of vertical integration. Also, although relationship-specific investment is distorted by incomplete contracts, the international order contracts for the components themselves are assumed to involve efficient purchase at marginal cost. Indeed, much of the literature takes a highly simplified approach to the modeling of incomplete contracts by assuming that specialized components are purchased at a zero price with payment through lump-sum distributions of profit.

In looking to the future, I would suggest that greater attention be paid to the types of transaction costs observed in international arm’s length contracts, including the costs of ensuring payment across international borders, which can vary based on the quality of institutions. Recognition that outsourcing contracts typically involve a strictly positive price that exceeds marginal cost,
whereas internal transactions within vertically integrated firms do not, would help to further distinguish these organizational forms. However, the use of a price-markup to compensate for relationship-specific investment provides a link between the level of investment and final-good output, which can add significantly to the complexity of the model.

Adding complexity to the model of incomplete contracts through the inclusion of price effects may require some sacrifice elsewhere, such as the omission of a general equilibrium determination of the wage, but, in any case, I would expect to see more consideration of partial equilibrium models so as to focus on the policy implications of international outsourcing. One issue is the policies that a country may take to reduce the ability of its firms to outsource internationally. For example, during the 2004 US election campaign, when fears of international outsourcing reached fever pitch, there were suggestions that the US should tighten visa restrictions so as to reduce the ability of companies to train foreign software engineers in preparation for international outsourcing.28 Presumably policies in developing countries towards multinational firms would also influence the relative importance of FDI and international contractual outsourcing.

Another promising direction for research is to recognize that many of the firms involved in international contractual outsourcing, such as IBM and General Electric, are extremely large and have some market power.29 This suggests a need to understand the strategic motives of oligopolistic firms that engage in international contractual outsourcing. One potentially important issue is the ability of firms to protect proprietary information from their rivals. There is also the more general issue of ensuring data security and protection of information when firms outsource in locations such as China


29See Solomon et al. (2004) for the sale by General Electric of its global business-processing operations in India to independent firms in an effort to cut costs and streamline its business.
that are known for producing cheap imitations of branded goods.\(^{30}\)

I would suggest two main lines for further empirical research. First, thicker markets and better institutions for the enforcement of contracts in foreign countries are both appealing explanations for greater international outsourcing. There is already some empirical support for the importance of country-specific differences in the quality of enforcement of contracts (Levchenko, 2004 and Nunn, 2005). However, since better institutions can also increase the thickness of markets, there is a need to exploit predictions that distinguish between the two theories. To establish the role of search and matching, one possibility is to relate the thickness of markets to the size of a country’s skilled workforce, or even better, a direct measure of the number of independent suppliers of a particular intermediate good.

Second, there are likely payoffs from further empirical analysis of the relationship between the range or variety of traded intermediate goods and the choice of organizational form. The new theories of trade and organizational form emphasize the prevalence or range of firms choosing each organizational form, rather than the value or volume of trade that was the focus of traditional trade models. Feenstra and Spencer (2005) makes a start by examining whether a gravity type model can explain the variety of intermediate goods that are produced under contractual outsourcing, rather than through FDI or ordinary trade. However, the predictions of Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2004) that relate the range of products produced under each organizational forms to firm level productivity have yet to be tested. Since both the theory and empirical work is in its infancy, we can expect very rich further developments.

\(^{30}\)See Solomon (2004) for proposed legislation to regulate the processing of sensitive financial and medical information in countries such as India.
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