Performance measurement provides decision makers with information that can be used for monitoring of results, program performance improvement, as well as serves as the rationale for allocation of resources and budget justifications. Performance measurement information can also be used for transparency and accountability purposes. As stated by a local government employee in an interview, “performance measures allow managers and elected officials to think carefully about programs and help to open people’s eyes as to where you are and where you would like to be” (de Lancer Julnes, 2002).

Performance measurement is also an important component of strategic planning efforts. In the context of strategic planning, according to Hatry (1999, p. 175) performance measurement has at least three specific purposes:

- To provide baseline values for each of the plan’s performance indicators and thus establish the extent of action needed.
- To provide historical data on each indicator so that outcomes can be projected for each of the options examined
- To provide data on key outcome indicators that can be used in regular reports on progress toward meeting strategic plan objectives.

There are several types of performance measures or indicators that can be used for these purposes. They include: a) Inputs- resources used to produce outputs such as dollar costs, staff and staff time, materials, and other resources; b) Outputs- are the final product or service delivered that ultimately, it is hoped, will lead to a desired outcome. Number of teachers attending a workshop on curriculum improvement is an example of an output; c) Outcomes- are the consequences of outputs and are often more complex to measure and can be measured as intermediate outcomes (an outcome that is expected to lead to a desired end but is not an end in itself. An illustration following the example above would be teachers actually improving the curriculum used in their classrooms after completing the curriculum improvement workshop) and end outcomes (the end result that is sought-- such as the number of students mastering a subject); d) Efficiency measures- indicate the ratio of output to input or outcome to input. This is also call unit-cost ratio. Experts have also suggested that explanatory measures be included so that details can be provided as to why, for example, a particular program did not achieve what it intended to achieve.

Traditionally, output and input indicators are the ones most often utilized by government entities (Governmental accounting standards board, 1997; de Lancer Julnes and Holzer, 2001). Part of the reason is that such indicators are not as complex as outcome and efficiency, data are often readily available, and, in general, assessment of government’s program performance has often been reduced to reporting of inputs and outputs. However, those types of indicators are not sufficient for properly making decisions. They say nothing about the consequences or results of

---

1 This research was supported in part by a grant from the United States Information Agency to the US-Mexican Consortium of Schools of Public Policy and Administration at the University of Colorado, Denver.
using the resources. Consequently, today more emphasis is being placed on the measurement of outcomes, hence the management for results movement.

In spite of the purported benefits of performance measurement information, there is a lack of utilization of such information by government entities in the United States (GASB, 1997; Berman and Wang, 2000; de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001). The utilization of performance measurement has been defined in terms of at least two stages, adoption-- developing performance measures or indicators, and implementation-- actually using the information to reallocate resources, program improvement and management, reporting to elected officials, the media and citizens, and for strategic planning. Factors have been found to positively but differentially affect the stages of utilization. For adoption, they include external requirements, support for the performance measurement effort from management and employees, availability of adequate resources, technical knowledge, a goal orientation; and, for implementation they include support from elected officials and citizens, internal performance measurement policies, and a culture that promotes change (de Lancer Julnes and Holzer, 2001). Conversely, lack of leadership, absence of political competition, and a conservative ideology have been found to negatively impact the performance measurement effort (Breitschneider, Gorr, Grizzle and Klay, 1989; Brudney, Herbet and Wright, 1999, Berry, 1994; Wright, Erikson and McIver, 1987).

In this paper we compare the context, process and results of attempts by two states in two different countries to develop and implement performance measurement information. We compare the experiences of the State of Utah, U.S.A., and the State of Campeche, Mexico and try to gain insights into their patterns of utilization and the factors responsible for those patterns. Data for analysis were obtained by means of personal and telephone in-depth interviews with individuals involved in the reform process in both states, review of minutes of meetings, observation of meetings, and review of written reports.

The Case of Utah Tomorrow: A Legislative Initiative for Proactive Decision-Making

Many times, attempts to change the way government organizations do business come about because of financial crises or because they are mandated to adopt change. That was not the case of the State of Utah when its legislative body created the Utah Tomorrow Strategic Planning Committee (UT) in 1990. With a population of about 2,000,000, from the late 1980s and through the decade of the 1990’s Utah enjoyed an expanding economy, had lower than national unemployment rates, and was placed at the top of the list for personal income increases among states in the Rocky Mountain West (Natelson, 1998; Utah Economic and Business Review). Furthermore, although some of the movement toward change in the State of Utah has overlapped with the federal initiative of measuring and reporting government performance for federal agencies, as embodied in the requirements of the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the motives in Utah were quite different.

In the late 1980’s, the then Speaker of the House, Representative Nolan Karras felt that there was a need to change the reactive nature of the legislative body’s decision making process and that legislators needed to be aware of the consequences of their decisions. He believed that long range planning and performance measurement could serve as the vehicle to accomplish these goals (Karras, telephone interview, 2003). Mr. Karras background includes experiences in the private sector.

Thus, when he was approached by Representative Kim Burningham about developing statewide strategic planning and performance measurement, he enthusiastically supported the idea. With that began an effort that has spanned over a decade, receiving accolades from
individuals and organizations outside the state and to a large extent ignored by those who are meant to be the primary consumer of the information included in the state-wide strategic planning report.

Adoption –the process

The first steps toward comprehensive state-wide planning and performance measurement were taken during 1988 and 1989 when the Speaker of the house began holding informal meetings with other legislators to discuss the idea of introducing the Utah legislature to these concepts (Utah Tomorrow Strategic Plan, UTSP, 2000). Some Representatives, like Kim Burningham, have been lamenting that most decisions in the Legislature were based on political whim and were made to respond to immediate needs or current crises. While things had been going well in Utah, in order to improve government performance and to be prepared for future occurrences, it was necessary to engage in long-range planning (telephone interview, 2003).

Thus, the push toward strategic planning and performance started, with strong advocacy from some members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. A few Senators and House representatives attended national meetings to learn from the experiences of other states that had been experimenting with strategic planning and performance measurement. Also, town meetings were held by the Speaker of the House, with the help of staff of the Legislative Research Office, to determine the extent to which such efforts would be supported by citizens and representatives of state agencies.

The outcome of these meetings was that in 1990 the Legislature authorized the creation of Utah Tomorrow Strategic Planning Committee (UT), charging it with the responsibility of recommending an ongoing and comprehensive strategic planning process for the state (Cannon, 1996; Rep. Bradshaw, 2002). The legislation emphasized involving all segments of Utah society in the process—“including state and local government, private industry, minority and ethnic groups and all geographic areas” (Cannon, p. 1; UTSP, 2000).

At its inception, UT had twelve members, five legislators from the House and five from the Senate, and two non-legislative members-- the state court administrator and the state planning coordinator. Selecting the legislator was mostly an act of self-selection. Those who were most interested were appointed to the committee. However, by all accounts of those interviewed, members of the legislature in general have not been interested in strategic planning and, thus, did not and still don’t necessarily support the effort.

UT worked to develop a vision for the future of the state. While the vision went through a number of iterations due to some individuals’ objections to language, a final version of the vision was adopted by the legislative body and the Governor in 1991. Then, Utah Tomorrow created task force groups to develop goals, objectives and performance measures for 10 key areas based on the newly adopted state vision. The areas included government; health and safety; free enterprise and regulatory systems; infrastructure; justice; education; culture; economic development; and environment and natural resources. The groups included interested citizens, representative from state agencies, and legislators from the appropriations and interim committees in these key areas (UTSP, 2000).

The work of the task force was then refined by the UT. The UT produced a draft strategic plan which was then followed by a series of town meetings and teleconferences throughout the state to seek citizen’s input. In all, these meetings attracted as much as three hundred people (Bradshaw, 2002). After these meetings, the process became more internal. At this point, the UT began working more closely with state agencies and local governments in an effort to further refine the goals, objectives and performance measures that had been identified in the draft and then reviewed based on citizens’ input. The reason for refinement was that some of the original
goals and objectives were difficult to measure or would not have served management needs. Furthermore, since these government entities were to implement the state strategic plan, it was paramount that those entities find the components of the plan practical and relevant, a point clearly made in the 1993 annual report.

Beginning with the General Sessions of the Legislature in 1995, legislators have been encouraged, not required, to use the strategic plan report that is produced by UT as a tool to evaluate legislation. The report, which is now done every two years, provides the goal(s), objectives, and indicators of performance for each government agency in charge of the 10 key areas mentioned above. The latest report (2000) and previous reports contain a great deal of information. Each agency may have a goal with as many as three objectives and several objectives have as many as six indicators of performance. The format is not consistent from agency to agency; consistent with the practice reported in the literature, most of the indicators are output indicators rather than outcome indicators; and, there are no specific benchmarks targets of performance (see Appendix I for excerpts from the 2000 report).

Related to benchmarks, one of the persons interviewed stated that there was a general sense at the beginning of the effort that setting targets was difficult, could hurt organizations and would strip away the decision making power of the Legislature. Thus, it was decided by consensus not to include performance targets. This was probably a wise decision given that unfortunately too often when targets are not met, they are used as “accountability hammer” for agencies instead of an information piece for devising strategies to improve practice (de Lancer Julnes, 1999).

The content of the report and format is now under revision with agencies being asked to identify what they consider the most critical issues facing the state. A decision will be made as to how those issues can be incorporated into the next report and the steps that need to be taken if they are different from the specific goals and objectives reported on in previous reports.

Table 1 provides a summary of the adoption process. It outlines the main activities and the principal actors involved from the beginning of the effort to date.

Championing Utah Tomorrow

As can be observed in Table 1 above, the support and leadership for Utah Tomorrow has shifted over the years. The champions of the effort were sometimes in the Legislature, but more recently in the executive branch.

The Legislature. When Nolan Karras left in 1990 the UT had already started to aggressively pursue the idea of state-wide strategic planning and performance measurement, holding meetings that included citizens and state agency representatives. As a result, even though the new Speaker of the House, Mel Brown, was not very supportive of the activities, UT continued. While no one came out against the effort, most Legislators simply tolerated the activities of UT (Burningham, 2003).

In 1994, when Senator Lane Beattie, who had been on the UT Committee, became President of the Senate he took UT under his wing; thus, UT saw a renewal of support from the leadership of the Senate. However, once Beattie left to become a Governor’s Aid, the Senate, once again, became a mere bystander. Although UT is still co-chaired by a member of the House and a member of the Senate, and in spite of their diligence and commitment to Utah Tomorrow, they have not succeeded in getting strong support those legislative bodies.

The Executive Branch. At the beginning of UT, the executive branch of government was not supportive of long-range planning. Then Governor Norman Bangerter was not particularly
enthused about long range planning and thus there was very little input and involvement from the executive branch in the early planning process. He participated in the citizen meetings and gave speeches, but remained distant from the process. In the opinion of two individuals interviewed, the reason for the governor and others not to support the effort is their believe that such efforts curtail their political power (Bradshaw, 2002); “people like to be in power, and when you follow a plan that involves a process that represents a distraction from their power and right to make decisions, they will oppose it. They want to be the ultimate decision makers” (Burningham, 2003).

But as illustrated in the table, this apathy from the executive branch changed in 1993 when Michael Leavitt became Governor. His interest and involvement led to the enactment in 1993 of new legislation that changed the composition of Utah Tomorrow reflecting the joint efforts of these two branches of government. The legislation allowed the governor to appoint more individuals to UT, something that could have been perceived as giving the governor too much power. Yet, this did not become an issue for legislators. “They [Legislators] pretty much ignored this because they would do what they wanted anyway” (Burningham, 2003). To most Legislators UT was not important enough to get into a political battle (Bradshaw, 2002). Besides, stated Mr. Burningham, UT was becoming more integrated with the Governor’s Office for Budget and Planning anyway because they wanted to get control over their own budget process.

As of 1993, the membership of UT consists of a total of 13 individuals: three from the House, appointed by the Speaker of the House, three from the Senate, appointed by the President of the Senate; the state court administrator or designee; six members appointed by the Governor including the state planning coordinator or designee. In addition, a mayor and a county commissioner have been appointed by the Governor as well as two agency heads and a cabinet member (Cannon, 1996).

In general, the head of the office of planning and budget carries the banner for the Governor’s office. And, this office is in charge of developing and refining performance measures and also provides training to agencies and local governments as needed (Bedel, 2002). Also, a funded position in the Governor’s office was created to provide staff support to the UT committee thereby supplementing that which had been and still is provided by the Office of Legislative Research and Council.

But something else has happened over the years with some repercussions on UT. The relationship between the governor’s office and the legislature has become increasingly strained. While the majority of Legislators are still Republican, and Governor Leavitt is also a Republican, their political ideologies are diametrically opposed. The Utah Legislature has become increasingly conservative body with the Eagle Forum having a great deal of input in the caucus. Governor Leavitt, a moderate Republican, has had to increasingly rely on the Democrats to support him.

This ideological chasm may have negative implications for UT because the conservative view of government, often associated with Republicans, traditionally emphasizes market solutions. The Democratic Party, on the other hand, is associated with liberal views de-emphasizing market solutions and greater emphasis on government programs and improved internal decision making (Wright, Erikson and McIver, 1987). Thus, it may be no surprise that the legislature continues to ignore the efforts of UT. And, should Mike Leavitt not run for governor again next year, the future of UT may be very uncertain. In fact, stated former Rep. Burningham, “I think to myself that it will end but it keeps continuing and it does because the governor’s office use it as a device to help them have sensitive planning” (2003).

---

2 The Eagle Forum is an organization with ultra conservative moral and political views.
Citizens. Citizens, including members of private industry and non-profit sector groups, had an important role to play during the initial steps toward state-wide strategic planning and performance measurement. However, after those first few years, they have been almost absent from UT, with only a few remaining active. The reasons for this are two fold. First, according to Cannon (1996), it is difficult to maintain such level of enthusiasm and participation from these groups. Second, Rep. Bradshaw pointed out that active participation from citizens also requires a tremendous amount of effort on the part of the UT members, who also have many responsibilities above and beyond those of the committee.

State Agencies. Other key actors in UT over the years have been State agencies. Although not all agencies have exhibited the same level of commitment, many have worked unrelenting with UT in the development and refinement of the goals, objectives, and performance indicators that are included in the strategic planning report.

Furthermore, in 1993 the Governor’s office of planning and budget directed agencies and programs to develop goals and objectives at the agency level and later to also develop performance measures at the program level. Many agencies are actually conducting their own strategic planning and they provide the information that is used to update the state-wide strategic planning report produced by UT.

Yet, another factor that may have increasingly influenced state agencies’ continuous interest in strategic planning and performance measurement may be an existing requirement for all agencies, and other parties, who receive federal funds in the form of grants to report on the accomplishments of activities funded by the grant. This requirement is directly tied to the outcome monitoring mandated at the federal level by GPRA.

Implementation

Unfortunately for UT, the lack of support from the legislature has translated into a lack of use of the information contained in the strategic planning report. Although the goal of Utah Tomorrow was to change the way the Legislative body made decisions, this goal has not been reached. According to Rep. Bradshaw and others interviewed, the Utah Legislature still continues to be a reactive body.

As suggested earlier, some of those interviewed speculated that the reasons Legislators do not support the effort include a perception of UT eroding their political and constitutional power. For example, a proposal to have all bills introduced by Legislators accompanied by a fiscal note from UT stating its financial cost was not well taken. Rep. Bradshaw believes that, perhaps for good reasons, the prominence of UT caused Speaker Mel Brown to be against it. The speaker believed that such action made it look as if Utah Tomorrow was making the budget for the Legislators, something that goes against their constitutional duty. Interestingly enough, as stated by former Utah Speaker of the House, Nolan Karras, the whole reason Utah Tomorrow was created was to get individuals and organizations to think about the [fiscal] impact of legislation on the future (minutes of meeting on July 19, 2001).

But there are other reasons as well. Using performance information represents a new way of thinking for them. Legislators are used to dealing with line-item budgets, performance measurement information would force them to consider how a program is doing before they vote on budget allocations. Also, state legislators are mostly part-time positions with many issues needed to be resolved in a short period of time. Thus, a recurrent complain among legislators is that they do not have time to review a lot of information.

Notwithstanding, a positive outcome of the strategic planning process is that, although not mandated to do so, state agencies are doing strategic planning on their own and then
incorporate their plans and information into the Utah Tomorrow reports. They also make reference to the report in their budget requests (Karras, 2003). An agency that has been highly commended by Mr. Burningham is the office of Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture, because they “do good planning and make decisions based on that.” Likewise, the governor makes reference to the goals and objectives of agencies in his annual budget. The state-wide strategic planning report is also a very important component of the governor’s own planning process.

Another outcome, and perhaps a paradox, is that because Utah has engaged in strategic planning and performance measurement efforts, it has been rated very positively by Financial World and Governing magazines. The activities of UT “are better received outside of the state than inside of the state” (Bradshaw, 2002). Mr. Burningham believes that this national recognition of strategic planning being used by agencies and the executive branch is part of the reason UT is still alive.

The Case of Campeche, Mexico: Toward Accountable Government

The attempt in Campeche to introduce performance measurement in government is best understood within the context of similar initiatives at the federal level. These initiatives can help illustrate why it wasn’t until recently that states like Campeche have started to pursue such endeavors.

The process of Adoption: Federal government Initiatives

For more than seven decades, a one-party system, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), dominated Mexican government with administrations characterized by a series of economic crises created by permanent fiscal debt and an increasingly large external debt. Corruption was rampant, and social institutions had no legal recourse for holding government agencies accountable. Because the Legislative and Judiciary Branches usually were subordinate to the Chief Executive, they were unable to function as part of the indispensable system of checks-and-balances, which would have made it possible to scrutinize government’s performance.

As a result, political considerations rather than objective criteria have been molding public administration in general, and decision-making in particular, in Mexico; verification of results and government efficiency were not relevant in this system (Arellano, 2001). From the Mexican political system’s conformation in 1929 until Miguel de la Madrid’s Presidency in 1982, government programs and policies were rarely, if at all, evaluated in order to measure their impact. The Executive branch, the principal actor in public administration, did not feel compel to be accountable to either congress or citizens. The Mexican political system lacked a truly democratic institutional component, which made the President’s constitutional obligation of informing the Nation about governmental action a perfunctory act.

Furthermore, there were no procedures for holding public servants accountable to the people, or for transparency in the use of public funds. This helped support an intricate administrative system riddled with corruption and inefficiency were policy-making and implementation were carried out unilaterally through a discretionary and highly centralized

---

decision-making process, something characteristic of not only the federal government, but also state and municipal government.

However, during the last two decades there have been some attempts to change Mexican public administration. Beginning with President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado’s administration (1982-1988), certain reform initiatives took place. Those included modifying the Mexican economy by imposing a strong fiscal discipline, reducing federal spending, selling public enterprises and relinquishing some federal functions to the private sector, and modernizing public administration to increment governmental efficiency. Some of these policies were augmented and continued more strongly under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s administration (1988-1994).

One of President De la Madrid Hurtado’s first governmental actions in 1982 was to send an initiative to Congress, to modify the Federal Public Administration Legislation\(^4\), in order to create the Office of Federal Comptroller, Secretaría de la Contraloría General de la Federación, SECOGEF, (López Araiza Orozco, 1999). The fundamental objective of this legislation was to increase control and audit powers over public funding to combat the high incidence of corruption that had plagued former administrations. Priority was given to controlling public debt and to preventing misuse of public funds, with little attention paid to government efficiency.

Nonetheless, the agency also started to question the parameters that had been previously utilized to evaluate public sector performance. It was realized that controlling debt and prohibiting reallocation of public funds were not longer enough; evaluating whether public spending had a real impact on solving social problems became important. Yet, specific attempts to measure this did not appear until 1989 when SECOGEF created a task force to examine the latest techniques in public finance, administrative audit, and public management (López Araiza Orozco, 1999 p. 16).

As a result of this group’s efforts, including a review of Canada, United States, and the United Kingdom’s experiences, the task force developed the concept of “integral audit”. This included actions not only directed toward preventing budget control, but also toward evaluating federal department’s objectives and programs’ goal achievement as well as overall performance. This was the first official attempt to evaluate government performance within the federal environment.

Armed with integral audit’s new philosophy, SECOGEF undertook approximately sixty agency audits, making way for the creation, five years later in September 1994, of the Mexican National Academy of Integral Audit- Academia Mexicana de Auditoría Integral (López Araiza Orozco, 1999 p. 17). Three months later, the newly elected President Zedillo sent an initiative to Congress to once again modify the Federal Public Administration Legislation to give the federal government new government tools to not only complete functions such as budget control, but also to increase efficiency. Through this modification, the SECOGEF changed its name to the Agency for Audit and Administrative Development, Secretaría de la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo, SECODAM and acquired the specific function of auditing performance and evaluating the efficiency of government efforts.

As stated by the Comptroller General of the state of Campeche\(^5\), “by 1996, and as a part of its new mandates, SECODAM could also ask public agencies and departments to draft a set of performance indicators that would allow quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the quality of

---

\(^4\) Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal

public services and their outcomes. The final indicators were to be developed in collaboration with SECODAM and the Department of Internal Revenue and Public Credit (SHCP).

In addition, in May of 1996 the Program for Modernization of Public Administration (Programa de Modernización de la Administración Pública, PROMAP) was created under the auspices of SECODAM and SHCP. The goal of this program was “to implement changes to make public administration more responsive to citizen’s needs and to evaluate the efficiency and results of public services” (López Araiza Orozco, 1999 p. 23).

In order to further advance evaluation procedures in the federal government, in 1998 the Zedillo administration created the System for Performance Evaluation (Sistema para la Evaluación del Desempeño, SPE). Using the SPE guidelines jointly set by SECODAM and the SHCP, all governmental agencies had to develop indices that not only permitted the identification of how the budget was spent, but also the evaluation of the impact of objectives met. Through the advances derived from integral audit information, created during President Zedillo’s administration, the SPE was transformed into legal obligations by including it as one of the guidelines for public debt in the Federal Budget (Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación, PFE), which is annually approved by the national Congress.

Despite the legal requirement to evaluate efficiency, such evaluations have not been systematic. Much of this has to do with one of the Mexican political system’s characteristics of recurring abandonment of governmental programs every six years due to change in the ruling elite. PROMAP is an example. Despite the fact that President Fox (2000-) has emphasized developing a more transparent public administration, one that is subject to accountability, PROMAP, a natural for this initiative, has been discontinued and replaced with a unit directly controlled by the President, further discussed below.

In 2000, Vicente Fox won the presidential elections on a platform that pledged to end government inefficiency, corruption, lack of transparency in the use of public funds, pork barrel policies, and lack of accountability. President Fox has tried to differentiate his administration from those of the past by establishing a set of reforms in his National Development Plan 2000-2006 (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, PND) that, he hopes, will lead to the fulfillment of his promises. One of these initiatives has been the emphasis on achieving public administration management results through a strategic planning approach.

This focus has led to the creation of new administrative units to work with the former SECODAM, now the Ministry of Public Management, Secretaría de la Función Pública, and the still current SPE, and a group of general actions to combat corruption and graft with public funds. One of these units, the Presidential Office for Governmental Innovation- Oficina de la Presidencia para la Innovación Gubernamental - responds directly to and is staffed by the Office of the President. Its mandate is to radically modify the way government functions and re-orient government toward obtaining results. However, because it is a unit directly staffed by the President’s office, it has no legal clout to force governmental agencies compliance with recommended actions.

In Table 2 below, we summarize the major changes oriented towards performance measurement that have occurred at the federal level in Mexican public administration beginning with President De La Madrid to current President Fox. There were discussed above.

**Adoption in Campeche**

If the movement toward developing and implementing tools that can allow for measurement and accountability of the public sector has been inconsistent at best and absent at
worse at the federal level, the story at the state level is not only similar but also much more recent. A performance and accountability measuring system cannot exist without a previous master plan for what a public agency/program/government wants to accomplish and how it is going to do it. Although, since at least 1978, planning has been a major issue in the political discourse of various state administrations, political considerations still prevail in defining the agenda. The approach to decision making in meeting public needs has been to respond to immediate crises. The governor of turn’s world view often becomes the state’s vision regardless of reality. The fact is that planning units inside state government usually have the necessary information to develop a much more accurate plan of action that the governor’s vision dictates.

In this kind of environment, and despite the fact that as early as 1976 states have been encouraged to create planning, programming, and budget units by the federal government, performance measurement has been virtually non-existent. Part of the reason is that these units simply served as “rubber stamp” on state executive decisions. Likewise, similar to the federal government, institutions that demand accountability have not existed at the local congressional level or as a grassroots citizens’ initiative. And, the executive branch’s power over the legislative branch eliminates the possibility of demanding an efficient government. Furthermore, as in the federal government, the closest thing to a performance evaluation for state public administrations has been the governor’s annual “state of the state” address. However, this report has often been more a ritual than a true analysis of debt or budget impact; it has often been a short recount of inputs and outputs rather than outcomes.

Yet, after the creation of SECOGEF at the federal level and as democratic institutions have begun to expand in Mexico, there has been a slow introduction of control measures for public debt and performance evaluation at the state level. The emphasis that the current federal administration has put on measurement of results and the management for results movement as well as greater managerial control, have encouraged states to be more honest in the expenditure of public funds. Also as a direct result of Mexico’s transition to democracy, there is a growing social and political pressure for governments to measure the performance of policy and programs.

Given this background, it is understandable, and predictable, that the utilization of performance measurement in the Mexican states in general, and the state of Campeche in particular, will be at a very early stage. In 2000, three years after the current state administration began, the State Comptroller’s Office in Campeche created a Program for Public Administration Development 2001-2003 (Programa de Desarrollo de la Administración Pública, PRODAP). The program has three main goals: 1) to guarantee that civil servants behave in a transparent and honest manner; 2) modernize public administration; and 3) close the gap between society’s needs and expectations. PRODAP’s public administrative modernization component recognizes a greater need for adopting performance evaluation beyond simple audits. As the State Comptroller General mentioned, “what is needed is to transform budget audits into the most basic component of evaluation and not the other way around.”

In 2002, the state Executive sent an initiative to the State Legislature to consider a full and transparent accountability system for the use of public funds at the end of the 1997 – 2003 gubernatorial period. It also requested that the social and economic impacts of government

policies’ be evaluated by compiling a complete and official record of all state agencies’ administrative actions.

Approved by the State Legislature in May, 2002, the Integral Program for the Submission – Reception of the State Public Administration, 1997 – 2003 (Programa Integral de Entrega Recepción de la Administración Pública Estatal, PIERAPE) mandates that all state agencies create an official administrative policy record. This report, encompassing the 6 years of the current state administration, documents the state of the state as well as the activities and achievements that have taken place during this administration. It also created two separate sets of indicators to measure performance. Under the auspices of the State Comptrollers’ Office the first of these indicators considers three management elements measuring budget efficiency, goals efficiency, and impact or results. The other set, called administrative indices, compares performance with those of other states. These indices serve as benchmarks, and include among others measures in the areas of health, education, housing, and poverty.

Recently, on June 6, 2003, another initiative from the State Executive was sent for analysis and comment by the State Legislature to modify the State Public Administration Act, in order to expand the power of the to carry out evaluations and not just simply control and oversight of spending practices. In an interview with the new Department of Administrative Evaluation and Administration for the State of Campeche, the director stated that “what we are trying to do [in Campeche] is not only analyze how public money is spent, but also to see if what is being spent is really useful.”

Thus, as can be observed, performance measurement in the State of Campeche is an old concept but a recent initiative. Table 3 summarizes the major accomplishments.

Implementation and Results

For the first time in the history of the State of Campeche a process that is akin to a true performance evaluation has begun. In less than a year since starting this process, three important issues can be observed to be playing an important role in the implementation process. The first issue deals with the difficulty in generating a local atmosphere for true evaluation. For a very long time evaluation of government performance has been confused with reporting on inputs and outputs (e.g., how much is being spent, and the human resources used in delivering health care, educating children, rural development, etc.). The limitations of these indicators have been recognized, however, as illustrated by a comment made by a former state representative of a federal agency in Campeche: “those indicators are not measuring the important stuff. Central offices have stressed coverage indicators but little has been done in terms of measuring impact. It seems much more important to spend the program’s funds in a rapid way than to spend them wisely.”

Related to developing a culture that supports measurement, the fact that the current measurement initiative in Campeche has come from the Executive branch just as it did at the federal level, with some collaboration from agencies department heads, has a potential of backfiring if there is no buy-in from lower level employees. Previous efforts that did not attempt to gain lower level employee’s buy-in found these bureaucrats dragging their feet in the implementation of reform (Mixcoatl, 1997). For them this is just another of their boss’ initiatives, whose future job security and continuity is not certain. In addition, to these

---


employees, evaluation has a negative connotation because it implies a greater supervision of their work.

To address this potential problem, a training program about the positive effects that evaluation brings has been developed by the State Department of Evaluation and Administration. The program is attempting to positively change this view. As the Department Director expressed, “the agency personnel in charge of annual planning and programming now understands that evaluation need not have a negative connotation, but that it helps them to program and establish goals more realistically, and, therefore, assures a greater possibility of achieving them” (Lic. Carrillo, 2003).

This lack of buy-in is further complicated by the fact that in the State of Campeche lower level employees do not have the necessary performance measurement and evaluation skills. According to Lic. Carrillo, several meetings were held with personnel in all state public administration agencies to explain performance measurement and evaluation methodology, their objectives, and the definition of the two groups of indicators discussed previously. She stated that “in some cases people do not understand what an indicator is or how to construct one.”

A second issue revolves around the possibility of having multiple political parties participating in the state governance, a historical first for Campeche. If current national trends continue, in the upcoming elections in July, the Legislature may end-up not being totally comprised of representatives from the PRI party, nor will this party have an absolute majority. If the literature is correct, this may represent an opportunity for more support for accountability and measurement of government performance. However, the recent experiences of the federal government in implementing change predict resistance from opposite parties (Perez Herrero, 2001).

The real test for support of the performance measurement efforts initiated by the current Governor will come after the elections. The Governor can not be re-elected. There is a possibility that the incoming Governor will want to put in place his own “pet” projects and do away with current initiatives, as is customary in Mexican public administration. Nevertheless, whoever gets elected, will have to adopt the federal governments’ initiatives on increasing oversight over how federal funds are administered at the state level. This is going to be a major factor for further adoption and implementation of performance evaluation in Campeche given that approximately 76% of the resources in its budget come from federal transfers. Thus, like all federal agencies, Campeche, will have to comply with the requirement of measuring results.

The situation could be complicated because more often than not, there is no agreement between national government’s objectives and goals, spending policies, regions or priority where the money should go, and the population to be targeted and those of the states. Barring instances when the governor has the “right” political party identification, state governments have very little power to influence such decisions. But, some steps have been taken to remedy this situation. Since state governments are supposed to retain certain amounts of sovereignty within a federalist pact, even in the case of Campeche with its large resource dependency, the creation of mechanisms for performance evaluation has been done through signing agreements between the federal government and the state government. In these agreements, the federation articulates the rules but allows state governments to adapt them to particular needs. That is, the federal government cannot directly order that states adopt performance evaluation mechanisms that the federation has designed for its own use. But it can and has conditionally stressed that for receiving additional funds these mechanisms be implemented on federal funding which comprises the lion’s share of Campeche’s annual state budget.

---

11 Interview with Luis Palacios-Román, Advisor to the Governor of the State of Campeche, by June 11, 2003.
However, there is an issue of lack of capacity that does not permit states like Campeche develop and implement their own indicators. The State Comptroller General conceded that “...state agencies do not have the experience to develop mechanisms to evaluate the performance of their programs. Because of this, what has been done is to copy many of the indicators that have been developed for agencies at the federal level and adjust them to the sector needs at the state level.”

Another important issue that has fomented the impetus for performance measurement at the state level is citizen’s demands. There is an increasing pressure by citizens for government performance, transparency and accountability. According to Palacios Roman, “nowadays citizens are worried about how government spends their tax pesos.” The democratic transition that began in 2000 has generated a vigilant public opinion, favored by the mass media that has played an important part in governmental oversight. Furthermore, the Access to Public Information Law passed by Congress will have direct repercussion on Campeche’s performance measurement efforts.

LESSONS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE TWO CASES

This study compares two states whose initiatives for strategic planning and performance measurement began very differently, Utah’s as a Legislative initiative and Campeche’s primarily fomented by the Executive branch of the federal government. Yet, overtime in Utah, and recently in Campeche, the state executive office has had an important role to play at both stages of utilization. Here we highlight some of the lessons that can be learned from these two cases. This is done with a caveat. Even though the concept of performance measurement is not new in the Mexican states, in Campeche, and Mexico in general, serious attempts to measure government performance did not start until recently.

Factors Affecting Adoption and Implementation

In general, the expectation is for inclusive approaches to organizational change to be more effective in obtaining buy-in and thus ensuring its success. For performance management systems, participatory approaches are supposed to lead to more use of the information produced (de lancer Julnes, 20001). In the case of Utah, only those legislators that have participated actively in the strategic planning process appear to use the performance measurement information. The rest of the legislators, who receive copies and other reports from UT, have accepted the effort, adoption, but have not explicitly used the information in their decision-making process. That is, they do not implement the information and thus have not changed their decision making process. State agencies, on the other had, who were not the primary target of the effort, did change, making strategic planning and performance measurement part of what they do. While there are no external requirements for the Utah Legislature and state agencies to use performance information both have been encouraged to do so. Research suggests that implementation of performance measurement information is more likely to occur when organizations voluntarily develop their own policies for use (de Lancer Julnes and Holzer, 2001).

The outcome in Campeche, and Mexico in general, is to some extent similar to that in the Utah Legislature. Leaders have used a top-down approach in the introduction of planning and performance measurement. In the state of Campeche the initiative has been adopted by the executive branch and further fomented by what can be called external requirement to adopt federal mandates in the management of federal funds at the state level. In the words of Mintzber (1994) a top-down approach to strategic management produces a negative impact on the sense of

---

ownership other members of the organization feel toward performance information. The apparent lack of buy-in from lower-level state government employees in Campeche may be attributed, in part, to this approach.

The differences observed in Utah and Campeche, can be further explained by arguing that outcomes of reform depend not only on the process but also on other important contextual factors. One of those factors may be leadership. In Mexico, with changes in leadership, priorities changed. As leader’s priorities changed the agencies adopted the change. In Utah, with the change in leadership first in the House and then in the Senate support for Utah Tomorrow in the legislature has waned. Now, Utah Tomorrow is mostly supported by the Governor. The question is what will happen when he leaves? The same question is being asked in Campeche since the current governor will not be there as of September of 2003. While it is important to have a champion there also needs to be buy-in from others in order for there to be continuity once the champion leaves. As concluded by Hannessey (1998) much of the change that is facilitated by good leaders, is the result of efforts by individuals at every levels. Therefore, even though leadership is important, the relationship between leaders and subordinates is just as important (Bass, 1985).

In addition, it has been recognized that public leaders operate in an organizational context over which they may have little if any control (Hooijberg & Choi, 2001) and thus leadership is not just a matter of extraordinary leaders molding the environment to fit their agenda as suggested by some (Doig & Hargrove, 1990). Effective leadership depends on the interaction of leadership capacities and the environment in which leaders operate.

For example, local political context and party competition have an impact on leaders’ ability to influence change. As a state, Utah is very homogenous in every respect and party identification is not the exception. The majority of the state is Republican. It is often argued that when there are governing majorities, elected officials are less likely to use performance information for decision making but with greater political competition there is a higher expectation of use of performance information (Bretscheider, Gorr, Grizzle and Klay, 1989). In Utah there is no party competition, so, the differences in use of information between the two branches of government is not explained by this theory but is more fully understood when we consider ideologies. As noted earlier, in contrast to the Governor, most legislators appear to ascribe to a very conservative ideology. The values embodied by UT are not consistent with this ideology.

In the case of Mexico, at the national level the theories of divided government and ideology apply. Up until 2000 the national government had been in the hands of one party, the PRI. Although that party introduced many reform efforts to improve government decision making, performance information was rarely used and changes were not enforced. In Campeche, it is not until now that the prospect of divided government at the state level is beginning to emerge. But, since 2000 the state has been feeling its effect because the governor of Campeche and the majority in the Legislature are from the old ruling elite (the PRI).

Furthermore, our cases indicate that when it comes to government performance measurement, leadership appears to be more influential at the executive branch of government than at legislative branch. In the Utah case, in spite of counting with strong support from leaders of both chambers of the legislature at times and the fact that members of both chambers co-chair Utah Tomorrow, that has not been sufficient motivation for legislators to change the way they make decisions. However, although the Governor has not required agencies to use information, he has encouraged and has modeled the use of performance information in the state budget process. Agencies have followed suit. This is consistent with research that has shown a positive and important impact of the Governor in reform efforts (Berry, 1994; Brudney, Herbet and
Wright, 1999). The hope is that such behavior has become usual practice in state government and will not change once the current Governor is no longer there.

In the case of Campeche, leadership in the executive branch of government has been essential, with little if any shown in the legislative branch. Both at the federal and state level, initiatives for developing and implementing performance measurement were advanced either by the presidential office or by the governor of the state. Yet, maybe because of this, there is the danger that such initiatives might not be embraced by subsequent presidents or governors.

Finally, citizen’s demand for accountability will moderate the effectiveness of government performance measurement initiatives. In the case of Utah Tomorrow, it has been suggested that if the public is once again involved in the strategic planning process or if the public starts expecting legislators to use information they will do it. Former Rep. Nola Karras suggested that UT raise the political risk for people [legislators] who do not support the effort. Basically, the suggestion was to involve the “heavy hitters,” those who donate to campaigns, and to use the media for heightening the political awareness of the strategic plan (Bradshaw, 2002; Representative Julander, Minutes, October 2001). If public officials do not meet public expectation, they stand the risk of loosing the public’s support and thus their vote. In Campeche, and Mexico in general, the democratic transition that began in 2000 has generated a vigilant public opinion, favored by the mass media, that has played an important part in calling for government oversight and accountability.

REFERENCES


Fernández Pérez, Francisco. (2003). Personal Interview

**Biographical Information**

Dr. Patria de Lancer Julnes is assistant professor and coordinator of the Masters of Social Science in Public Administration program in the Department of Political Science at Utah State University. Her research focuses on public productivity—measurement and management, government reform and policy analysis. She teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in public policy, public administration, and research methods. She serves as co-chair elect of the American Society for Public Administration’s (ASPA) Center for Accountability and Performance (CAP) and is member of the executive committee of the Inter-American Network for Public Administration Education (INPAE) sponsored by the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA).

Dr. Gerardo Mixcóatl Tinoco is the Director of the Social Sciences School Autonomous University of Campeche and teaches in the areas of methods, social research, public policy and
administration, and the Mexican political system. He has served as Technical Secretary in the Social Development Ministry Delegation of the state of Campeche, Sud-director of Municipal Development in Campeche, and Coordinator for the Program of Decentralization of the National Institute of Public Health, Cuernavaca, Mexico. His current research focuses on implementation of public policies.
Table 1. Timeline of Utah Tomorrow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988-1990</td>
<td>A reform-minded speaker of the House promotes a more proactive approach to decision-making when dealing with the state’s future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Speaker of the House convened town meetings to garner support for the strategic planning and performance measurement effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Legislation authorizes the creation of the Utah Tomorrow Strategic Planning Committee with an emphasis on including all segments of Utah society in the strategic planning process. The members of the committee include 10 legislators, the state court administrator and the state planning coordinator. Utah Tomorrow is co-chaired by a member of the House and a Member of the Senate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Adoption of a vision statement for Utah by the Legislature and the Governor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>Involvement of external stakeholders and new Governor keeps the process alive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Task force groups composed of representatives from executive branch agencies, legislators, and citizen volunteers worked to identify goals, objectives and performance measures for key areas. Draft strategic plan is developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Town meetings throughout seek input from citizens on the draft plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategic planning process shifts from a citizen-based focus to an internal focus with UT working with stage agencies and local governments to further refine the draft plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mike Leavitt, a strong advocate for strategic planning, gets elected as governor (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• New legislation changed the composition of Utah Tomorrow showing more involvement of the Executive Branch. Utah Tomorrow is still co-chaired by a member of the House and a member of the Senate (1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-2000</td>
<td>Leadership and support for Utah Tomorrow shifts from the House to the Senate and the Governor’s office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A former member of Utah Tomorrow becomes president of the Senate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Governor creates a position in the Governor’s office to provide additional staff support to Utah Tomorrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Governor’s office starts providing training to state and local agencies interested in developing strategic planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Leadership and support shifts from Legislature to the executive branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Governor’s Office of Planning and Budget coordinates the development, refinement of performance measures as well as data collection and monitoring.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2. Timeline of Mexican Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>President/Reform Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982-1988</td>
<td>President De La Madrid and institutional change. Created the Office of Comptroller General – SECOGEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The goal was to tighten control on the use of public funds, as well as monitoring the financial worth of public officials upon entering and leaving government. Performance measurement was not at the core of the reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1994</td>
<td>President Carlos Salinas promoted less government through privatization and deregulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Office of Comptroller General—SECOGEF—became the Office of the Comptroller General and Administrative Development—SECODAM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Created the Program for Modernization of Public Administration-PROMAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Created the System for Performance Evaluation (SPE) to be implemented by SECODAM and the Department of Internal Revenue and Public Credit. Its aim is to identify efficiency, costs, and quality of federal public administration, and its social impact through public spending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-</td>
<td>President Vicente Fox introduced a strategic plan and a management approach for obtaining results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Replaces PROMAP with the Presidential Office for Government Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• SECODAM becomes Ministry of Public Management (April 2003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3. Timeline of Campeche’s Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Governor/Reform Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2000, created the Program for Public Administration Development 2001-2003 (PRODAP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• May 2002, created the Integral Program for the Submission – Reception of the State Public Administration, 1997 – 2003 (PIERAPE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• June 2003, Campeche’s Legislature modified the State Public Administration Act to further strengthen the evaluation functions of the Office of the State Comptroller General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX I
Examples of the Information included in the Utah Tomorrow Strategic Plan Report, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY AREA</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>GOAL</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>MEASURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Development</strong></td>
<td>To advance opportunities for higher quality employment and prosperity for all the citizens of Utah.</td>
<td>Economic development activities should be a force for improving the state’s business climate.</td>
<td>Diversify Utah’s economy, increase the average wage, and increase the median household income relative to the nation.</td>
<td>Utah average annual wage as a percent of U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>Educate our citizens by providing an environment that supports lifelong learning and occupational skills that enable Uthans of all ages to reach their potential as productive and responsible individuals.</td>
<td>Utah’s public education system will implement high student performance standards, school accountability, and appropriate student assessments.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Percentage of students meeting established standards of performance in mathematics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Enhance our local and global environment through prudent development, conservation, and preservation of our natural resources while protecting public health, and preserving our sustainable food and fiber resources.</td>
<td>Utahns will understand the interrelationship between the environment, natural resources, the economy, and quality of life.</td>
<td>Implement public education and public relations programs that consider the interrelationship between the environment, natural resources, the economy, and quality of life.</td>
<td>Number of persons contacting DEQ for information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Resources and Agriculture</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Free Enterprise and Regulatory Systems</strong></td>
<td>Strengthen our free enterprise system by providing a reasonable regulatory environment that protects our citizens.</td>
<td>Utah will streamline its regulatory programs for greater efficiency and responsiveness and ensure that employers provide a safe and non-discriminatory work environment.</td>
<td>Ensure that state and local licensing, permitting, registration, certification, and filing of reports and returns are easy to understand.</td>
<td>Number of public education presentations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>