

Wielding the Bureaucracy for Results: An Analysis of Singapore's Experience in Administrative Reform

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Introduction

WHEN THE PEOPLE'S Action Party (PAP) government assumed power in June 1959, Singapore was a poor developing country with a population of 1.58 million that was growing rapidly at the rate of four per cent annually, an unemployment rate of five per cent, a serious housing shortage, and plagued with rampant corruption. Singapore was described as a poor country because its per capita Gross National Product (GNP) in 1960 was only S\$1,330 or US\$443 (RS, 1983: 7-12; Lim and Ow, 1971: 1-40; RS, 1986: ix). The PAP government inherited an ineffective and corrupt civil service from the British colonial government. In June 1959, the Singapore Civil Service (SCS) consisted of nine ministries with a total of 28,253 employees (RS, 1961: 41; PSC, 1962: 4).

Today, 37 years later, Singapore has been transformed in such a radical way that it has been accorded the status of an 'advanced developing country' by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in January 1996 as its per capita GNP in 1995 reached the astonishing figure of S\$34,459 or US\$24,614 (an increase of nearly 26 times during 1960-1995) (RS, 1996: viii). The population has almost doubled to 3 million but did not bloat to the projected 4 million because of the successful family planning program. Housing is no longer a serious problem as 86 per cent of the population live in public housing provided by the Housing and Development Board (HDB). Unlike the situation in 1959, the unemployment rate in 1995 was 2.7 per cent, and Singapore has to rely on foreign labor to tackle the problem of labor shortage (RS, 1995: 31, 103, 163). Corruption has been minimized as a result of the successful implementation of the comprehensive anti-corruption strategy adopted by the PAP government from 1960 onwards (Quah, 1989: 841-853). In short, Singapore is no longer a developing country today in view of the tremendous economic and social progress it has achieved during the last 37 years.

What is the secret of Singapore's success? The answer, in brief, is the PAP government's good track record of formulating and implementing 'right' policies based on its emphasis on clean government, meritocracy, policy diffusion (learning from others), and pragmatism. The PAP government was able to implement its policies because of its success in transforming the SCS, which was corrupt and ineffective during the colonial period, into an incorrupt and dynamic organization that was committed to the attainment of national development goals.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it will describe the major features of administrative reform in Singapore under the PAP government from 1959 to 1995 and explain how the SCS was transformed into an effective and incorrupt instrument for national development. Second, it will identify the lessons that can be drawn from Singapore's experience in administrative reform for other countries like Vietnam which are embarking on major reforms of the civil service.

Administrative Reform in Singapore¹

As administrative reform has been defined differently by various scholars, it is important to state explicitly what it means at the outset.² Unlike Caiden's two definitions which do not distinguish between the institutional and attitudinal aspects of administrative reform and fail to identify its goals, I prefer to define administrative reform as 'a deliberate attempt to change both (a) the structure and procedures of the public bureaucracy (i.e., reorganization or the institutional aspect) and (b) the attitudes and behavior of the public bureaucrats involved (i.e., the attitudinal aspect), in order to promote organizational effectiveness and attain national development goals' (Quah, 1976: 58).

Weaknesses of the Colonial Bureaucracy

The colonial bureaucracy in Singapore was afflicted by four major weaknesses. First, as an instrument of the British colonial government, the SCS was relatively efficient in performing the traditional 'housekeeping' functions. As such, the SCS was able to deal with regulative and routine matters, but was not equipped to expedite the implementation of socio-economic development programs. Hence, it was not surprising that only five statutory boards were created by the colonial government and these organizations did not contribute significantly to the colony's development. In other words, the SCS did not play an important role in national development during the colonial era.

Second, administrative reform was neglected by the British colonial government as it initiated only two important reforms which laid the foundation for the meritocracy in the SCS. In 1947, the SCS was reorganized and divided into four divisions according to the duties, educational qualifications and salaries of its members, following the recommendation of the Trusted Commission. The second reform was introduced in 1951, when the Public Service Commission (PSC) was established for two reasons: to keep politics out of the SCS by rejecting the spoils system; and to accelerate the pace of localization in the SCS by providing qualified local candidates with the opportunity of obtaining appointments in the public services.

Third, the SCS was also plagued by the problem of corruption during the colonial period. Corruption was first made an offense in Singapore in 1871 with the enactment of the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements. In 1879, a Commission of Inquiry found that corruption was prevalent among both the European inspectors and the Malay and Indian rank and file of the Straits Settlements Police Force. Five years later, another Commission of Inquiry confirmed the existence of systematic corruption in the police forces of Singapore and Penang (Quah, 1979: 24-27). 'However, the first specific anti-corruption law was only enacted on 10 December 1937, when the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) came into force' (Quah, 1978: 9).

Indeed, corruption had 'become a way of life for many people' (Y. S. Wah, 1973: 55-56) in Singapore during the post-war period and in 1950, the Commissioner of Police reported that graft was rife in government departments. There were two reasons for the prevalence of corruption during the post-war period. First, the rampant inflation during the Japanese occupation contributed to widespread corruption because the civil servants were poorly paid and supervised, thus providing them with both the incentive and opportunities

for indulging in corruption with little probability of being caught. Second, corruption was a serious problem because of the Anti-Corruption Branch's ineffectiveness in dealing with it. The ACB failed to reduce corruption not only because of its limited manpower and resources, but also because of its inability to deal impartially with police corruption. The ACB's ineffectiveness led to its replacement by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in 1952 (Quah, n.d.: 14-15).

The final weakness of the colonial SCS was the 'colonial mentality' of its civil servants and their insensitivity to the needs of the population. During 1955 to 1959, the civil servants were also 'hostile towards and afraid of the PAP.' On the other hand, the PAP leaders had serious misgivings about the SCS since its localization had not resulted in a national bureaucracy for two reasons: the local successor-bureaucrats shared many of their expatriate predecessors' values; and the SCS remained the stronghold of the English-educated and was unrepresentative of the local population, especially the Chinese-educated majority at that time.

Administrative Reform

When the PAP government assumed power in June 1959, it was forced to transform the colonial bureaucracy it inherited to ensure the efficient implementation of its socio-economic development programs. As it was not easy for the PAP leaders to rectify the deficiencies of the colonial SCS accumulated during the 140 years of British colonial rule, they introduced a comprehensive reform of the SCS and established statutory boards.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The SCS was reorganized into nine ministries in June 1959, with two new ministries viz., the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of National Development, to deal with nation-building and economic development respectively. Furthermore, ineffective statutory boards created during the colonial period were replaced. For example, the Singapore Improvement Trust was replaced by the HDB in 1960, and the Singapore Harbor Board was replaced by the Port of Singapore Authority in 1964.

The PAP government set up statutory boards for three reasons. First, statutory boards were formed to perform efficiently the tasks of development without facing the constraints encountered by the SCS, whose role in national development was restricted to regulative and routine matters as it was handicapped by rigid regulations and inflexibility. Second, the PAP government created statutory boards to reduce the SCS's workload by entrusting the new organizations with the implementation of socio-economic development programs. Finally, statutory boards were formed to minimize the movement of talented civil servants to the private sector to participate in the development programs by joining such agencies (Quah, 1987: 125-127).

ATTITUDINAL REFORM

As the colonial SCS was not concerned with national development, or with being responsible to the needs of the local population, the PAP leaders sought to change the mindset of the

civil servants so that they could contribute to national development. Thus, apart from the structural reorganization of the SCS and the formation of statutory boards, the PAP government also subjected the civil servants to 'intense psychological pressure' because it believed that their values were 'irrelevant, if not dysfunctional, in the context of mass politics' (Seah, 1971: 86).

Accordingly, the government initiated the attitudinal reform of the SCS with the creation of the Political Study Centre on 15 August 1959. In his opening address, the then Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, hoped that civil servants would change their 'colonial mentality' once they were made aware of the problems facing the country.

More specifically, he elaborated on the *raison d'être* of the Political Study Centre in the following way:

The purpose of the [Political] Study Centre is not only to stimulate your minds but also to inform you of the acute problems which confront any popular elected government in a revolutionary situation..... Once, the problems have been posed to you, you will be better able to help us work out the solutions to them, by making the administration more sensitive and responsive to the needs and mood of the people.... I ask you to join us in this task—that having defined and analysed the problems that confront us, [we may] work more effectively together ... to establish a liberal, just and happy society.³

The Political Study Centre conducted a two-week part-time and non-residential course for senior civil servants to change their attitudes and to increase their awareness of the local contextual constraints. The common background of the PAP leaders and the civil servants (both groups were English-educated and middle class) and their lack of fundamental cleavages were responsible for the Political Study Centre's success.

In addition to the Political Study Centre, the PAP government relied on four other methods for changing the civil servants' attitudes and behavior:

- (1) 'Voluntary' participation by civil servants in mass civic projects during the weekends to enable them to get better acquainted with the political leaders and to expose them to other values;
- (2) Recruitment of non-English-educated graduates from the former Nanyang University to reduce the predominance of the English-educated civil servants and to improve the negative image of the SCS as their preserve;
- (3) Tougher disciplinary measures were introduced to deal with those civil servants found guilty of misbehavior; and
- (4) Selective retention of competent expatriate civil servants and premature retirement of incompetent ones (Quah, 1975: 86; 329-331).

In short, the PAP government's efforts in attitudinal reform 'were aimed at breaking what it regarded to be an isolationist and anachronistic outlook of the Civil Service' (Seah, 1971: 88). The PAP leaders were in a dilemma as they needed the civil servants' support to implement their programs, but they also realized that they had to first show to the civil servants that they were firmly in control before the latter would give their support.

EMPHASIS ON MERITOCRACY

The meritocratic system introduced by the British colonial government in 1951 with the establishment of the PSC was retained by the PAP government. The focus on efficiency as an important criterion for recruiting and promoting senior civil servants was reinforced by the de-emphasis on seniority as the basis for promotion. In 1961, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew clearly indicated his preference for efficiency and his disdain for seniority thus:

I am in favour of efficient service. The brighter chap goes up and I don't care how many years he has been in or he hasn't been in. If he's the best man for the job, put him there (*Malay Mail*, 1961 quoted in Seah, 1961: 88).

Consequently, competent local civil servants were promoted to more responsible positions, regardless of their seniority. This policy remains in force today and accounts for the relative youthfulness of many of the permanent secretaries.

Thus, it is not surprising that Lee has continued and supported the PSC's role in upholding the principle of meritocracy by controlling the quality of personnel entering the SCS by 'keeping the rascals out' and attracting 'the best and the brightest' candidates to apply for jobs with the SCS. He reiterated the importance of meritocracy in his keynote address to 17 leaders from ten African countries, who were attending a conference on 'The Relevance of Singapore's Experience for Africa' in Singapore in November 1993. Lee said:

A strong political leadership needs a neutral, efficient, honest Civil Service. Officers must be recruited and promoted completely on merit. ... Appointments, awards of scholarships must be made to the best candidates (Lee, 1994: 5).

Ezra F. Vogel of Harvard University has argued that 'what is unusual in Singapore is not the prominence of meritocratic administrators, but the fact that the meritocracy extends upwards to include virtually all political leaders' (Vogel, 1989: 1052). In his view, the first generation of political leaders in Singapore 'believed in meritocracy not only for bureaucrats but also for politicians' as they were regarded as 'among the brightest of their generation', having distinguished themselves academically and 'won competitive scholarships to study in England' (Vogel, 1989: 1052-1053). He coined the term 'macho-meritocracy' to describe the broader notion of the meaning of meritocracy in the Singapore context. According to him:

In Singapore, meritocracy is more than a procedure for selecting talent. It creates an aura of special awe for the top leaders and provides a basis for discrediting less meritocratic opposition almost regardless of the content of its arguments. This special awe enabled the first generation of meritocratic, impeccably honest heroes to establish what might be called a 'macho-meritocracy' (Vogel, 1989: 1053).

In his recent study of the Economic Development Board (EDB), Edgar H. Schein indicated that one of the core assumptions of its cultural context was the existence of an incorruptible, competent civil service that 'operated with an open and consistent set of rules that were vigorously enforced' (Schein, 1996: 169-170). In his view, 'having *the best and brightest* in government is probably one of Singapore's major strengths in that they are potentially the most able to invent what the country needs to survive and grow and to overcome' problems (Schein, 1996: 221-222).

STRENGTHENING ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES

Apart from getting the support of the civil servants, the PAP leaders realized that they had to curb the serious problem of bureaucratic corruption if they wanted the public bureaucracy to attain the goals of national development. Indeed, an immediate task facing the newly-elected PAP government in 1959 was to minimize, if not eliminate, corruption in general, and in the SCS in particular. In Lee Kuan Yew's words:

Our first goal in Singapore was to shape the government into an effective instrument of policy. This required strong, fair, and just leaders, who would have the moral strength to command the respect of the people. ... Responsibility for the people under their care required that luxurious living whilst our people were mired in poverty and backwardness was out. We ensured complete accountability and open separateness between personal assets and public funds. Corruption, which we regard as a cancer, had to be eradicated as soon as detected (Lee, 1994: 5).

In short, the PAP government's mission was a challenging one: to minimize corruption and to change the public perception of corruption as 'a low risk, high reward' activity to 'a high risk, low reward' activity (Quah, 1995: 394).

The PAP government's anti-corruption strategy is based on the following logic of corruption control: since corruption is caused by both the incentives and opportunities to be corrupt, 'attempts to eradicate corruption must be designed to minimize or remove the conditions of both the incentives and opportunities that make individual corrupt behavior irresistible' (Quah, 1989: 842). Initially, the government focused its efforts on strengthening the existing legislation to reduce the opportunities for corruption and to increase the penalty for corrupt behavior as it could not afford to raise the salaries of civil servants. Accordingly, in 1960, the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, originally enacted in 1937, was amended and replaced with the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA), which is more comprehensive in scope and gives the government more powers of enforcement. The POCA's continual effectiveness is ensured by the government through the introduction of amendments (in 1963, 1966 and 1981) or new legislation (in 1989) to deal with unanticipated problems (Quah, n.d.: 395-396).

The PAP government was only able to implement the second prong of its anti-corruption strategy—the reduction of incentives for corruption by improving the salaries and working conditions in the SCS—in the 1980s, long after it had achieved economic growth. On 22 March 1985, the then Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, provided an eloquent justification for his government's approach in combatting corruption when he explained in Parliament why the salaries of his cabinet ministers had to be raised. According to him, the choice was a simple one: 'Pay political leaders the top salaries that they deserve and get honest, clean government or underpay them and risk the Third World disease of corruption' (*Straits Times*, 1985: 1). As Singapore needs a corruption-free administration and an honest political leadership to preserve its most precious assets, Lee concluded that the best way of tackling corruption was 'moving with the market', which is 'an honest, open, defensible and workable system' instead of hypocrisy, which results in duplicity and corruption (*Straits Times*, 1985: 14-16).

In sum, Singapore's comprehensive anti-corruption strategy has been effective because it has minimized corruption through the reduction of both the incentives and opportunities for such behavior in the SCS.

COMPETITIVE PAY FOR HIGH-FLYERS

In 1990, the Volcker Commission in the United States contended that the commitment to performance depended on the government's ability to provide 'adequate pay, recognition for jobs done, accessible training, and decent working conditions' (Volcker, 1990: 33). Like the Volcker Commission, the PAP government also subscribes to this view and this explains why it has attempted since 1972 to provide competitive salaries and favorable working conditions for civil servants. In March 1972, all civil servants were given a 13th-month non-pensionable allowance comparable to the bonus in the private sector. The salaries of senior civil servants were later increased in 1973, 1979 and 1982 to reduce the gap with the private sector in order to minimize the brain drain of senior bureaucrats from the SCS to the private sector (Quah, 1984: 296-297).

In March 1989, the then Minister for Trade and Industry, Lee Hsien Loong, recommended a substantial salary increase for the SCS as the low salaries and slow advancement in the Administrative Service had contributed to its low recruitment and high resignation rates. He indicated that the government's philosophy was to 'pay civil servants market rates for their abilities and responsibilities'. Thus, it 'will offer whatever salaries are necessary to attract and retain the talent that it needs'. He concluded his speech in Parliament by promising that the government 'will continue to carry out regular surveys of private sector salaries to stay competitive'. According to him, providing competitive salaries for civil servants 'is absolutely essential to maintain the quality of public administration which Singaporeans have come to expect' (H.L. Loong, 1989: 5).

In December 1993, Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong announced in Parliament that the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants would be increased in January 1994 to keep pace with the private sector and to compensate for the reduction in their medical benefits (*Straits Times*, 1993: 1). There was an average salary increase of 20 per cent for the Administrative service and superscale officers received between 21 per cent and 34 per cent increase in wages, including bonuses.

On 21 October 1994, a White Paper on *Competitive Salaries for Competent and Honest Government* was presented to Parliament to justify the pegging of the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants to the average salaries of the top four earners in six private sector professions: accounting, banking, engineering, law, local manufacturing companies, and multi-national corporations. It recommended the introduction of formal salary benchmarks for ministers and senior bureaucrats, additional salary grades for political appointments and annual salary reviews for the SCS. The adoption of the long-term formula suggested in the White Paper will not only eliminate the need for justifying the salaries of ministers and senior bureaucrats 'from scratch with each salary revision', but will also ensure the building of 'an efficient public service and a competent and honest political leadership, which have been vital for Singapore's prosperity and success' (RS, 1994: 1, 7-17, 18).

As a result of the 1994 salary revision, senior civil servants in Singapore earn perhaps the highest monthly salaries in the world compared to their counterparts in other countries. For example, the gross monthly salary for the top administrative position (Staff grade V) of S\$48,400 (or US\$34,571) is extremely high by world standards. In contrast, the top monthly salary of GS-18 (the highest salary scale for the United States Federal Service) is

US\$7,224 and the monthly salary of the top civil servant in the New South Wales Public Service in Australia is A\$18,278 (Quah, 1993: 323).

In sum, the PAP government's policy of ensuring competitive pay for high-flyers by periodically revising civil service salaries to keep pace with rising wages in the private sector has enabled the SCS to retain its high caliber personnel and also to maintain its quality service.

Lessons for Vietnam

In his comparative analysis of bureaucratic systems, Wallace S. Sayre gave the following advice:

The nature of a particular bureaucracy is linked to the system of government and the society in which it operates.... Bureaucratic models are not packages ready for export or import; they provide illustrations of options and styles for consideration in their separate parts, and for adaptation before acceptance in a different context (Sayre, 1967: 354).

The above advice by Sayre is particularly relevant when considering the relevance of Singapore's experience in administrative reform for Vietnam and other developing countries.

Singapore's rapid economic progress since 1959 and its transformation from a resource-poor developing country into an Asian 'dragon' or 'tiger' or, to use the World Bank's terminology, a High-Performing Asian Economy (HPAE) (WB, 1993: 1), have attracted worldwide attention and many political leaders and senior civil servants from other countries (including Vietnam) have visited the city-state to identify the reasons for its success and to consider the applicability of Singapore's experience to solving the problems encountered in their own countries. For example, after his first visit to Singapore in 1978, Deng Xiaoping was so impressed with Singapore's progress that he announced that 'he wanted to use the Lion City [Singapore] as a model'. Consequently, 400 delegations comprising of mayors, governors, and party secretaries from the People's Republic of China visited Singapore in 1978 on study missions (*Asiaweek*, 1994: 24). Indeed, the number of foreign leaders visiting Singapore has increased in recent years from 48 in 1990 to 231 in 1993 (*Asiaweek*, 1994: 25). In 1995, Singapore was ranked as the second most competitive country in the world, after the United States (Zyla, 1995: 76) and according to *The World Competitiveness Report 1995*, 'its record offers blueprint for other developing countries on how to succeed' (*Straits Times*, 1996: 34).

The tremendous interest shown in Singapore's developmental experience by foreign political leaders in recent years indicates their belief in its transferability and applicability to their own countries in spite of the contextual differences between the model country (Singapore) and their own target countries. However, I would argue that it would be difficult to copy Singapore's model of development *in toto* because of its unique historical, geographical, economic, demographic and political context. Indeed, the differences in context between the model and target countries would prohibit copying and also prevent the target countries from implementing successfully the policies learned from the model country.

How relevant is Singapore's experience in administrative reform for Vietnam in view of the significant contextual differences between both countries? For one thing, Singapore is a city-state with a total land area of 647.5 square kilometers and a multi-racial population of 2.98 million in June 1995 (R.S. 1996: 1 & 3). In contrast, Vietnam is 512 times larger

than Singapore as its total land area is 331,685 square kilometers (MacPherson, 1994: 10). Similarly, Vietnam's homogeneous population of 72.5 million in 1994 is 24 times that of Singapore's (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1995: 83). On the other hand, Singapore's per capita GNP is 112 times that of Vietnam, which was US\$220 in 1992 (Quinlan, 1995: 57). There are also important differences in the histories and political systems of both countries which cannot be discussed here because of limitations of space.⁴

Thus, in view of the contextual differences between Singapore and Vietnam, it would not be possible for the latter to transplant the former's experience in administrative reform. In fact, it will be quite difficult to replicate and transplant Singapore's model of development to other countries because of the high economic and political costs involved. It is costly to pay civil servants high salaries and extremely difficult to minimize corruption or to introduce meritocracy.

However, as Singapore's own experience in learning from other countries has shown, it is possible for other target countries like Vietnam to emulate and adapt some features of Singapore's experience in administrative reform to suit their own needs provided that their political leaders, civil servants, and the population are prepared to pay the price of success by making the required changes.

Viewed in this context, and bearing the above qualifications in mind, three lessons can be drawn from Singapore's experience in administrative reform for the consideration of the policy-makers in Vietnam. The three lessons are:

Lesson No. 1: The political leaders in Vietnam must introduce programs to change the attitudes of uncooperative and unproductive civil servants so that they can share their leaders' vision and contribute towards the attainment of national development goals. If the PAP leaders in Singapore had not changed the civil servants' colonial mentality and hostility, the SCS would have been a serious obstacle to the effective implementation of the various socio-economic development programs.

Lesson No. 2: The political leaders in Vietnam must be committed to the minimization of bureaucratic and political corruption in the country. Both forms of corruption hinder policy implementation as scarce resources are wasted on bribes and not on development programs. Furthermore, delays are very common and do not contribute to the swift implementation of public policies. Indeed, bureaucratic red tape and corruption have been identified as two significant risks in doing business in Vietnam (Lim and Chyi, 1994: 24-25, 29-30). Singapore's effective anti-corruption strategy has resulted in a low level of corruption, which is an important factor responsible for its good record in policy implementation (Quah, 1987: 89).

Lesson No. 3: The political leaders in Vietnam should introduce a meritocratic system so that appointments and promotions in the Vietnamese Civil Service are based on merit and not patronage. Needless to say, this will not be an easy task. However, without talented and competent personnel, a civil service will not be a useful instrument for implementing a government's development programs. To play a key role in national development, the civil service must be able to attract and retain 'the best and the brightest' people in the country. Initially, the government might not be able to afford to pay civil

servants competitive salaries. No matter how prestigious the civil service, it will fail to retain its talented personnel if there is an enormous gap between salaries in the public and private sectors. Hence, if the Vietnamese government can afford to do so after attaining economic growth, it should pay its civil servants competitive salaries.

In conclusion, it can be seen that the critical factor responsible for the SCS's role in national development is the honesty and competence of its political leadership. Singapore's incorrupt and capable political leaders have resisted the temptation to create a spoils system when they assumed power in 1959 and they have adhered to this policy during the last 37 years. Instead, they have transformed the colonial SCS into a national institution by minimizing corruption and by attracting the talented to join and remain in the SCS through its meritocratic system and its policy of paying competitive salaries. It is hoped that the above three lessons will be useful for the policy-makers in Vietnam in reforming their civil service for the attainment of national development goals.

NOTES

1. The analysis in this section is based on the works of Quah, 1991: 85-100; 1992: 119-154; and 1996: 59-89.
2. See for example Caiden's original definition of administrative reform as the 'artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance' in his pioneering book, *Administrative Reform* and his more recent definition of administrative reform as 'the induced systemic improvement of public sector operational performance' in his more recent book, *Administrative Reform Comes of Age*.
3. Speech of Lee Kuan Yew at the Official Opening of the Political Study Centre in Singapore on 15 August 1959, of which text is reproduced in Seah, 1971: 3.
4. See the chapters on Singapore and Vietnam by Cho-on Khong and Thaveeporn Vasavakul, respectively, in Alagappa, 1995: 108-135, 257-289.

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