

Maciej Bartkowski
Central European University, Budapest
Ph.D. Candidate, International Relations and European Studies
e-mail: iphbam01@phd.ceu.hu

Image IV Institutionalized in a Leadership Structure of International Administration. Administrative and Political Roles of Directorship General of the International Labor Organization.

This paper analyzes roles performed by international entrepreneurship. It specifically looks at Directorship General, which is understood as a particular type of international leadership carried out by the heads of international administrations of inter-governmental organizations. This paper analytically assesses a peculiarity of the Directorship General's status, which institutionally embeds two functional roles: that of a manager and that of a policy-maker. More precisely, this study conceptualizes roles of Directorship General in reference to the case study of Directors General of the International Labor Organization (hence the ILO or the Organization).

Determining a multiplicity of different administrative and political roles, which are institutionally-derived from Directorship General will show that "the pure hybrid" of Image IV (Aberbach, Putman and Rockman 1981), or the idea of convergence of political and administrative roles applied in the studies of national governments, is not only present in intergovernmental organizations but has been strongly embedded in the nature of Directorship General of international administration and institutionalized within a post of a Director General¹.

This paper, although having less modest goals than other international studies, which utilize roles to conduct analysis of complex socialization processes or to examine influence of actors and institutions, makes, nevertheless, a humble claim to its own originality. Roles are studied here as an independent variable. They are seen as important explanatory variables, which can shed greater light on the nature of a specific type of international leadership: Directorship General. While applying a cross-disciplinary approach, this paper intends to show that what political science literature understands by Image IV in the studies of a national (American) government is actually a well-established international phenomena reflected in the institutionalized form of a leadership of international administrations.

In the first two sections, the paper will review, respectively, the literatures on the study of the roles in international relations and on the concept of Image IV. Then, while differentiating between the impacts of institutions, on one hand, and actors and environment, on the other, in connection with roles of international leadership, the research will be firmly set to examine an institution of Directorship General, which is built into the post of a leader of international administration. A brief look at the position of a Director General within a framework of an intergovernmental organization will allow to determine his ambiguous status between political-diplomatic and international administrative worlds. Subsequently, a case-

¹ Director General is the term used to denote a head of an international administration and has been mainly applied to the chief executives of the UN specialized agencies (International Labor Organization, World Health Organization, etc). However, even within the UN specialized agencies, one encounters different terminology, for example, the title of Secretary General is used for the heads of the International Telecommunication Union or the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

study of the roles of the ILO Directors General will follow. It will demonstrate various role foci of the ILO chief executives, which, in turn, will serve as the empirical evidence of the embeddness of Image IV in the leadership structure of international administration.

The Study of Roles from the International Point of View

As Michael Bennett admits, the theories of international relations have been “relatively negligent of roles” and only “the foreign policy (...), American politics (...) and comparative politics (...) literatures have been more attentive to their research value” (Bennett 1993: 272, footnote 2). In the end of the 1990s, the study of a role in the international relations scholarship has been mainly connected with the burgeoning body of constructivist and institutionalist literature on the (EU) European Union (for a notable “rationalist” exception see the accounts of different roles performed by the Presidents of the EU Commission in Moravcsik 1999). The analyses of a role in the EU context are generally focused on examining a process of socialization or Europeanization of national and supranational political and bureaucratic elites in order to evaluate progress of deeper politico-administrative integration (Egeberg 1999; Trondal 2001a; Trondal 2001b) or to elaborate on a position of influence and autonomy of a supranational institution such as the Commission (Laffan 1997, Moravcsik 1999). The notion of a role, is often analyzed as an intervening variable, important for understanding how a casual mechanism is established and operates between independent and dependent variables. Thus, considering a role as “central to the development of social identities” (Pratt 1998:196), which, in turn, is important to determine an impact of socialization process, implies, even unintentionally, that an identity not a role is a crucial “end-variable” or an independent variable in explaining a given (socialization) process. Trondal (1999:10) makes a similar point in connection with the EU by arguing that identity understood as a “feeling of belongingness” to a national government or to the EU-system *determines* particular roles of politico-administrative elites, who may act either as national representatives or independent EU experts. In this way, a role is considered as an intervening rather than independent variable. Thus, what ultimately a role (and other intervening variables such as norms, rules, bureaucratic ideology or organizational culture), is utilized for, is to explain actors’ behavior, choices they made and preferences they hold (dependent variables), while determining actors’ identities, loyalties, different logics of their actions (logic of appropriateness vis-à-vis logic of consequentiality) or the extent, to which certain values and goals have become internalized by particular persons (independent variables).

This research moves away from the main-stream international relations and the European Union literature and treats roles as independent variable while transposing Image IV into the study on international entrepreneurship. This is done in order to broaden the understanding of the international executive leadership in general and the ILO Directorship-General in particular.

Image IV in the Political Science Literature

Image IV was derived based on a motivational approach, which is found in empirical studies of politicians’ and civil servants’ behavior as well as in the minds of politicians and civil servants themselves. In the motivational approach roles are understood as politicians or civil servants see or understand them (Searing 1994:10-11). This, in turn, has an impact on the methodology employed by the researchers, which is based on “semistructural interviews with moderate-sized samples” (Searing 1994:8, particularly Table 1.2). Regardless of how Image IV was methodologically generated, the most relevant issue to this study is the content of Image IV itself. And, in order to understand it, one needs to discuss briefly three other images.

Image IV represented an end point of an on-going process of development in government and public administration and has been preceded by three other conceptual images.

Image I represents the Weberian distinction between politicians and bureaucrats, where the latter perform technical and legalist functions based on expert considerations, whereas the former formulate policies in response to the interests he/she represents. Thus, Image I captures a dichotomy: “bureaucrats ought to manage, and politicians ought to make policy” (Aberbach *et al* 1981:84). Image I was subsequently substituted by Image II, which indicates that growing responsibilities may have compelled “administrators to forge consent for concrete policies, to represent interests, and to reconcile or broker conflicting claims”—all activities, which (...) had been thought to lie in the sphere of political rather than administrative activity” (Aberbach *et al* 1981:85). Thus, Image II represents “a more complex view where both politicians and bureaucrats were seen to exert political influence” (Jacobsen 1996:50). In turn, Image III takes on board the Image II assumption about the involvement of both, bureaucrats and politicians, in policy-making activities and further problematizes their activities by claiming that bureaucrats and politicians “are engaged in policy-making in different settings linked to different constituencies—one relatively narrow and more concretely specified (e.g. concrete interest groups—M.B.); the other broader and less easily defined (e.g. electorate—M.B.)” (Aberbach *et al* 1981:85).


Finally, Image IV refers equally to politicians and bureaucrats, by making an assumption that “bureaucrats in the industrial democracies (became) more sensitized to political concerns (whereas) political leaders (became) increasingly familiar with administrative and technical aspects of policy problems” (Aberbach *et al* 1981:85). This image denotes an on-going process, whose end-point is a complete convergence of political and administrative roles, according to which the roles of elected politicians and recruited civil servants may eventually overlap, creating “the pure hybrid” (Aberbach, Putman and Rockman 1981; Aberbach and Rockman 1997). In 1981, Aberbach *et al* made a strong claim about the possible convergence of public administrator and politician’s roles, whereas in their later publications in 1988 and in 1997, Aberbach and Rockman became more skeptical about the role change in the direction of the pure hybrid of Image IV (“The Image IV type is less at center stage now than we thought it might become”, Aberbach and Rockman 1988:22). Therefore, Image IV in the analysis of national governments is treated as an “ideal type construction” (Aberbach and Rockman 1997:325).

However, in the studies of Directorship General of international administrations, this “ideal type construction” of Image IV turns out to be a part of the very reality of intergovernmental organization. Based on the situational rather than motivational analysis, the later sections will show that the idea, which is represented by Image IV in political-science studies, has actually been for a long time well institutionalized in the work of a chief executive of international administration.

Understanding the Impact of Three Variables: Institution, Actor, Environment on the Study of *Roles* of Directorship General


Expanding on Hollis and Smith’s argument that “roles are two-way process between structure and actor”. (cited by Barnett 1993: 272, footnote 3), this study adds a new variable: (international) environment, in order to complement the analysis of roles of international leadership. Figure 1 shows that roles are still understood as two way process, which, however, takes place between three variables: institution (internal factor), actor (idiosyncratic features, or professional and educational experience) and (international) environment (external factor).

Figure 1.



Despite the fact that interrelations between these three variables are of equal importance, the variables themselves generate different effects in connection with roles of Directorship General. On one hand, an institution or, in other words, an institutionalized position of Directorship General in the structures of intergovernmental organization, creates the very possibility of having various administrative or/and political roles. Thus, the institutional variable sets the range and variety of administrative or/and political roles, which can be invoked when required. In other words, an institutional variable provides a kaleidoscope or a menu of political or/and administrative roles, from which a concrete role foci can be chosen. On the other hand, actors' (Directors General) personality, his educational and professional background as well as given international circumstances determine what sort of and when a specific role foci is invoked or enacted. See Fig. 2.

Figure 2.



In brief, a possible range or scope of roles is embedded within a given institution (e.g. Directorship General within intergovernmental structures) and the a role or roles one enacts in a given situation, depends on personality, experience and external factors. Understanding this differentiation is important, because it indicates that the institutional variable is the key element for determining whether it is justified to claim that the institution of Directorship General embeds Image IV, which is generally about the range of administrative and political roles not about a particular role foci.

Analytical Positioning of Director General: “Neither...Nor...” Dichotomy

The position of a Director General (as well as other heads of international administrations) is a peculiar one. He functions on the verge of politico-diplomatic and administrative worlds. This would imply that he is neither a “fully-established” civil servant nor a “fully-fledged” politician-diplomat. He cannot be easily compared with a head (or for that matter with any minister) of a government. It is true that both are elected in a politicized process and both hold political offices/positions. However, here similarities end. The Director

General is supposed to maintain neutrality and impartiality in conducting his duties, whereas a head of a government is actually required to have and to express certain ideological biases and political commitments. Director-General's powers are very much confined: he does not have his own political constituent and is surrendered by the most powerful entities present in the international system: the nation-states, towards which he needs to keep an equal distant, not favoring any of them. Head of a government usually has his own political organization to rely on, deals with political parties and explicitly favors some of them in order to ensure the majority in parliament necessary to maintain support for his government.

Although exercising the functions of "the chief administrative officer", Director General does not belong to the corpus of (international) civil servants. He is elected, often in a tough political bargaining, rather than recruited via the merit-system of examinations as the rest of the civil servants are. He holds a position on a fixed, relatively short-term basis, which cannot be compared with the employment conditions of civil servants, who enjoy much greater permanency. Thus, he is more of a "parachuted" official rather than a career civil servant.

The ILO Directorship General in Practice: "Either...Or..." Duality or even a Singularity

The analytical distinction of a position of Director-General based on "neither... nor..." dichotomy; neither a politician nor a civil servant; does not seem to hold ground as far as empirical observations of the ILO Directorship General are concerned. These observations reverse above-mentioned dichotomy to yield "either...or..." duality of Directorship General. The findings even suggest that Directorship General may generate roles, which integrate both administrative and political features.

The source of this duality is rooted in the institution of Directorship General, which, in turn, originates in the post of the Director General. Like any other institutions, the post of Director-General consists of characteristic sets of rules and practices (both formal and informal), which prescribe certain behavioral roles (for a definition of an institution see Keohane 1989:3). The ILO Constitution does not precisely define a formal set of rules and practices associated with the post of Director-General. According to Article 8 (1) of the ILO Constitution says only that "a Director-General of the International Labor Office shall be responsible for the efficient conduct of the International Labor Office and for such other duties as may be assigned to him". The mandate of the ILO Director-General is broad and leaves much leeway for a person in office in choosing such (informal) rules, practices and implement specific tasks and activities, which would ensure the "efficient conduct" of the ILO Bureau (Office) and the Organization in general. As Ghabli argues, the ILO Director General's formal and informal competences enable him to "go far beyond the limits of secretariat tasks" (Ghebali 1989:159). Discretionary power, which is a result of the specific position of the Director General within the ILO structure and vagueness of legal provisions, enables him to invoke roles, which can have either political or administrative characters or would likely include both, while he pursues various goals within the Organization and outside of it.

Thus, the roles of the Directorship General show that the Director General has a "Janus" face, that of an international administrator, and that of an international political representative (diplomat). Directorship General can embrace the features of either bureaucratized politician or politicized bureaucrat or both simultaneously. Consequently, the Director General is an example of institutionalized duality or even institutionalized singularity: he can act either as an administrator with professional cues or he may become an international diplomat with political cues, or, finally, he may invoke roles, which include both cues.

Administrative and Political Roles of Directorship-General.

In order to determine different roles performed within the institutionalized framework of Directorship General, this paper will apply situational analysis in order to account for a role-enactment by particular leaders of the ILO Bureau (Office) in specific situations. Thus, empirical observations of the work of the ILO Directors General will serve as a tool to distinguish different roles embedded in the concept of Directorship General.

It is not the intention of the author to provide a complete list of all the roles (having either a positive or negative impact on the Organization), which are associated with Directorship General and which could have been carried out by various ILO Directors General during more than 80 years of the ILO's history. What, however, the analysis aims at, is to distinguish several different roles performed by various ILO Directors General (some of the roles will overlap) and to show that these empirically-derived roles can have either administrative and political natures, or both. This, in turn, would serve as an important indication that Directorship-General is an institution, which reflects the administrative-political convergence represented by Image IV.

Albert Thomas 1919-1932: When he became the first ILO Director General, he had behind himself a career of a government minister and that of a member of the French parliament². In the "heroic" early days of the ILO, Thomas earned a reputation for leading "electric leadership" (Goodrich cited by Langrod 1963: 311). **Administrator:** Thomas focused on strengthening the international civil service within his Office. He led the policy, which excluded career diplomats from the posts within the Bureau and promoted permanent appointments based on the functional specializations. In order to maintain contact with the ILO constituents, the Director reorganized the Bureau, set up diplomatic and research departments, opened a new information and communication unit and pushed for the establishment of the national correspondents and the ILO administrative offices within particular states. **Boundary guardian:** The ILO Director-General was entrusted with the power to appoint the ILO staff and Thomas was "jealously defending his prerogative" (Langrod 1963:145). He vigorously defended the "Balfour" principle³, successfully resisting the pressure of the governments, which wanted to see the expansion of the rule of geographical distribution of seats rather than a competitive examination system. **Legal boundary stretcher:** From the early years of the ILO existence, Thomas and the Bureau he was heading, acquired (or actually usurped) the rights, which were neither explicitly nor implicitly given to the ILO international administration by the ILO Constitution or other documents. Despite the lack of the right of legislative initiative, the ILO Director General was frequently presenting to the Governing Body and to the ILO Conference his own policy proposals (Paździor 1975: 24 and 155). **Advocate:** Thomas always looked for public support for the work of the ILO. "The strength of the ILO lay, he was never tired of insisting, in public support" (Phelan cited in Langrod 1963:148). He made sure that the staff-members "visited different countries, had interviews with persons in leading positions, attended important conferences, examined and discussed on the spot the questions and tendencies of the day" (quoted by Ghebali 1989:13). Thus, the Director General and his Bureau were constantly engaged in open public debates to promote concrete ILO conventions or, more generally, the Organization's objectives.

Harold Butler 1932-1938: Having been a close associate of the former Director General, Butler was "brought up" within the bureaucratic structure of the ILO Bureau. He "approached his job more as a civil servant and economist than Thomas had done with his

² He headed the French Armaments Ministry in 1916/1917 and was elected to the French Parliament in 1910, reelected in 1914 and 1919.

³ This principle was spelled out in A. J. Belfour's well-known report of May 1920: "the members of the (international administration) once appointed are no longer the servants of the country of which they are citizens, but become for the time being the servants of the (international organization). Their duties are not national, but international (...). Nothing should be done to weaken the sense of their international allegiance; (...). Langrod (1963:51).

emphasis on political dynamism (Lubin and Winslow 1990: 43). **Administrator and geographical boundary stretcher:** Butler focused the work of the ILO on more technical advisory meetings involving the ILO constituents' experts. He opened the ILO Bureau to other non-European states in the sense that under his supervision, the Bureau designed special measure to recruit personnel from oversea states and further extend the role of the correspondence offices. Butler intensified contacts between the Office and overseas countries by establishing the Overseas Section within the Bureau, dispatching the ILO Office officials on various mission to Latin America, Asia and the Middle East⁴ and by coming out with the concept of ILO regional conferences.

John Winant 1939-1941: A former Republican state legislator and a governor of New Hampshire. During his directorship, Winant made clear where was the stance of the ILO during the war. He placed the ILO firmly on the side of the democracies (Lubin and Winslow 1990: 54). **The ILO trustee and executor of the Organization's external relations:** As Haas noted "the major organizational need of the ILO leadership (is) survival in a new and potentially hostile environment" (Haas 1964:158). This statement was particularly true and accurate as far as Winant directorship was concerned. When the war broke out in Europe, Winant became the one, who was entrusted with the "ILO survival mission". Winant, as the representative of the ILO (its trustee) led series negotiations with British, American and Canadian government officials on a possible new location of the ILO's headquarters. Finally, he managed to conclude an agreement with the Canadian government. Thus, the most important achievement of Winant in his short cadency was to ensure the ILO survival during the war. He moved the ILO from Geneva to Montreal and maintained the continuity of the work of the Bureau.

Edward Phelan 1941-1948: He had worked as an international civil servant in the ILO since 1920. **Policy drafter/maker:** During his first years in the office, Phelan was more concerned with the ILO future survival after the war, rather than with its day-to-day role of providing direct advice and other services to the member-states (Lubin and Winslow 1990: 59-60). He was working intensively on the program of the ILO for the post-war period and pushed for a new, "global social reconstruction mandate" (Haas 1964: 155) to be a guiding principle for drafting a declaration (the famous Philadelphia Declaration), in which human rights, in the context of social policy, were to become a major post war issue. The Declaration, prepared by the Bureau and enacted during the ILO Conference in 1944⁵, if it had been taken literally, would have transformed the ILO "into a master agency among the emerging family of functional international bodies" (Haas 1964: 156). **International negotiator and competence boundary setter:** In 1946, Phelan led negotiations between the ILO and the United Nations (UN). He reached agreement with the UN, which ensured the recognition of the ILO competence in the labor filed and secured non-intervention in its internal-financial and administrative-affairs⁶. Thus, on the international fora of intergovernmental organizations, the Director General managed to legitimate the organizational ideology of the ILO "as a generally expansive doctrine of welfare under international auspices" (Reinalda in Reinalda and Verbeek 1998:52).

David Morse 1948-1970: He was a former Assistant Secretary of Labor in the Truman Administration. As he later recalled, his task "was to rebuild an organisation which had run down during the Second World War. It had survived, which was a feat, but it had not yet found a firm footing in the post-war world"⁷. **Administrator:** In 1964, Morse undertook serious

⁴ <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/staff/formers/butler.htm>. Accessed on 20th February 2002.

⁵ Two years later, in 1946, the Philadelphia Declaration was incorporated into the ILO Constitution.

⁶ This agreement was the first of its kind, which was concluded between the United Nations and a specialized agency and served as the model for subsequent agreements with other agencies.

⁷ <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/staff/formers/morse.htm>. Accessed on the 20th of February 2002.

reorganizational steps in order to “facilitate the national allocation of resources to the various major programmes” (Ghebali 1989:68). He refocused the work of the ILO Bureau towards more operational activities connected with providing technical advice to the developing countries. Morse merged several departments and created three large administrative units providing the ILO with more effective tools to implement its programs. At the same time, the areas of the ILO Bureau’s focus were prioritized and programme budgeting was introduced.

Broker: The issue of Soviet Union membership in the ILO was debated in 1954. The controversy raised in connection with the autonomy and independence of the worker and employer representations in the Soviet Union. Since, the issues required certain constitutional interpretations as well as legal fact finding, the involvement of the ILO Bureau in general and the Director-General in particular were considerable. Eventually, the ILO constituents accepted the Director General’ opinion that autonomy of trade unions and employer organizations should be a goal rather than a condition for membership and that the ILO should be guided by the objective of universality of membership in admitting the Soviet Union to the Organization (Cox and Jacobson 1974: 107).

Coalition builder in the ILO: Morse succeeded in the implementation of certain projects because he was able to employ effective “behind the curtain” diplomacy, which ensured a successful method of a coalition-support building. For example, in order to win the support of the ILO constituents to establish an educational institution (later known as the International Institute for Labor Studies), which would enjoy an autonomous status within the ILO, the Director General first ensured the full support of the workers’ group, then he privately discussed the matter with the governments and employers. Only after gaining (informally) enough support, did he present publicly the proposal for the establishment of the Institute to the ILO Governing Body, which won the constituents’ formal acceptance (Haas 1964:188; Reinalda in Reinalda and Verbeek 1998:55).

Domestic support winner/lobbyist: In the mid 1950s, in the United States, the anti-ILO campaign gained a considerable pace. Right-wing business leaders in the United States were actively lobbying for the reduction of the US payment to the ILO and eventually for the US withdrawal from the Organization. The fact of the Soviet Union’s joining the ILO in 1954 only strengthened criticism of the Organization in the United States. However, Morse kept good relations with the Dwight Eisenhower Administration and moreover, managed to mobilize the support of certain domestic groups within the United States such as liberal businessmen, the Catholic groups and, most importantly, the powerful and influential American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations. This support enabled the Director General “to counter the threat of reduced participation or even withdrawal of the United States from the Organization” (Cox 1969: 224) in the 1950s. In other words, Morse was successful in playing the domestic pressure groups’ card in order to secure the position of the ILO.

Wilfred Jenks 1970-1973: He was “exclusively an international civil servant” (Ghebali 1989:160), working for the ILO Bureau since 1931. **Boundary guardian:** Jenks did not bow to the pressure of the United States to compromise the independence of the Director General’s decisions related to the personnel and employment issues. In 1970, he appointed a Soviet citizen to the post of Assistant Director-General, which was met with a US stiff response and withholding funds to the ILO budget. The Director General, however, has not reversed his decision. **Lobbyist:** The absence of the United States in the ILO from 1977 till 1980, meant that the Director General was placed in a position to introduce “immediate and unprecedented Draconian cuts” (Ghebali 1985:327). These cuts effected budget expenditures, staff employment and the ILO program activities. However, the ILO Director General led successful lobbying for additional funding from other governments and private sources (amounting to \$ 7 million), which covered all the remaining (after the introduction of the budgetary cuts) shortfalls for the 1978-1979 budget (Ghebali 1989:170-171).

Francis Blanchard 1974-1989: He was trained as a French civil servant and worked as an international civil servant in the International Refugee Organisation until 1951 when he joined the ILO⁸. He brought a more “bureaucratic approach to the position of Director General than that of his predecessors (and) seldom challenged the Governing Body of the ILO” (Lubin and Winslow 1990: 200). **Administrator**: As the Director-General, Blanchard expanded ILO technical cooperation programs and effectively dealt with the financial difficulties, which the Organization faced after the US withdrawal. In that situation, when the ILO lost a quarter of the budget, Blanchard successfully managed to “avert major damage to the (ILO)”⁹. **Executor of the ILO external relations**: Blanchard saw to maintain the ILO influence by establishing a closer cooperation with other UN agencies and the Bretton Wood institutions. He also established contacts with the European Communities, which resulted in signing the agreement on cooperation between the EC Commission and the ILO in 1989.

Michel Hansenne 1989-1999: His previous career was that of a politician and a minister in the Belgian government. **Administrator**: With the support, coming particularly from the developing states, the Director General pushed for the Active Partnership Policy, which aimed at deconcentration¹⁰ of the ILO functions via the establishment of Multidisciplinary Teams (MdTs). Thus, the Director General supported a transfer of responsibilities from the ILO Bureau to MdTs while, at the same time, retaining a direct control on and oversight over the MdTs. Faced with the decline in the conventions’ ratification rate, the Director General reviewed the methods of work and pushed for the use of other (non-binding) instruments (e.g. codes of practices, resolutions, guidelines and a declaration), whose impact gave the Organization a necessary impetus for revitalizing the ILO labor standards.

Juan Somavia 1999- His career was that of a politician and a diplomat in GATT and in the United Nations. Being a Chilean, he is the first ILO Director General from a non Western nation. **Administrator and manager**: Somavia started his term in office from reengineering bureaucratic structures of the ILO Bureau. Simultaneously with the introduction of the Decent Work concept, the ILO Bureau and its Multidisciplinary Teams were structured according to the four strategic objectives¹¹, which had a significant impact on the visibility of the ILO mandate and its effectiveness (measured by the growth of ratification rates of the core ILO conventions)¹². Somavia embarked on strengthening staff cohesion by introducing certain incentives for the specialists and experts working on short-term contracts for ILO to become permanent employees of the ILO Bureau. The idea behind it, is to reinforce the experts’ attachment to the Organization’s tradition, thinking and its distinctive approach to specific labor issues. **Enforcer of the Organization’s values and principles**: The Director General did not hesitate to use newly available tools given by the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, in order to promote certain core values of the Organization. In the first global report, the Director General named 12 countries, where violations of freedom of association were occurring. Many of the same states criticized Somavia for “naming names”, which was viewed as the Director General’s attempt to go beyond the letter of the Declaration seen as a promotional rather than a complaint-based document (Tim De Meyer 2000: 8,

⁸ <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/staff/formers/blanchard.htm>. Accessed on 20th of February 2002.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ In the case of decentralization, the ILO Bureau would need to relinquish part of its responsibilities to regional offices, which could then go under a supervision of the ILO political body, for example, the Governing Body. Process of deconcentration allows the Director General to maintain his leadership over the regional ILO organs.

¹¹ Four strategic objectives connected with “securing decent work for women and men everywhere” relate to a) the renewed attention to ILO standards based on the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, b) the creation of greater employment and income opportunities for women and men, c) strengthening social protection and d) promoting social dialogue and tripartism aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of ILO constituents. See Decent Work, Report of the Director-General: Decent Work. International Labour Conference, 87th Session. Geneva, (June 1999).

¹² This is the opinion expressed by various ILO senior specialists during the interviews, which were carried out in January and February 2002, in the ILO Multidisciplinary Team in Budapest.

particularly footnote 23). The Director General energetically rejected the criticism and defended himself and the Bureau by saying: “it is difficult to see how the Office can do credible reporting unless countries are identified and facts are stated” (Elliott 2000:4).

The ILO Directorship General Roles: Institutionalized Image IV

As it was already mentioned, Image IV is based on the expected convergence of roles, which have specific administrative or political cues. In this context, Aberbach and Rockman (1997) distinguished seven different “role foci”: technician, legalist, broker, facilitator, partisan, advocate and trustee. Earlier, in 1981, Aberbach *et al* also included: policy-maker and ombudsman. In general, role foci that of a technician and a legalist is the closest to be associated with the work of bureaucrats (Aberbach and Rockman 1997:336), whereas the others are more of a political nature.

The above case-study of the ILO Directorship General distinguished several roles, which were performed by various executives of the ILO Bureau in relation to specific issues, which were raised in the given situations. Some of the same roles were performed by different ILO Directors General and some roles were enacted only by a particular Director General. Yet, all of these roles clearly illustrate that Directorship General has as much an administrative as well as political character, or even both. This can be “catalogized” in the following way: Administrative roles include role foci of administrator and manager. Political roles include role foci of advocate, policy drafter/maker, domestic support winner/lobbyist and coalition builder. Finally there are politico-administrative roles, which may include role foci such as: broker, boundary definer: boundary guardian, legal boundary stretcher, competence boundary setter, geographical boundary stretcher and trustee: international negotiator and executor of the Organization’s external relations.

Regardless of a possible controversy, which foci-role is more or less political or administrative in its nature or the fact that the list of different roles performed by various ILO Directors General is, by no means, exhaustive, the case-study does show that the ILO Directorship General includes the range of specific foci-roles, which have either political or administrative character or often both at the same time. This, in turn, serves as an important indication that the claim about having an institutionalized Image IV embedded within the institution of Directorship-General is, by all means, a valid one.

As a Conclusion: Is Generalization Possible?

Having demonstrated the case for the institutionalization of Image IV within the ILO Directorship General, the question raises whether Image IV is a common feature for all leaderships of international administrations. The easiest way to address the question is by separating changeable variables such as informal (discretionary) power of chiefs executive of different international administrations or different personalities of the leaders and different externalities they face, which, in turn, effect variations in role foci enactment, from a constant institutional variable of international administration leadership. This variable shows that the heads of international administrations continually oscillate between administrative and (international) political arenas, which also indicate that Image IV might be a generally embedded feature in all types of leaderships of international administrations. Having this determined might help us better understand an international leadership, which, as any other leadership, “is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth” (Burns quoted by Jönsson 1993:472).

Bibliographies

Aberbach Joel D., Putman Robert D. and Rockman Bert A. (1981), *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Aberbach Joel D. and Rockman Bert A. (1988), Image IV Revisited: Executive and Political Roles, *Governance: An International Journal of Policy Administration*, No.1:1-25.

Aberbach Joel D. and Rockman Bert A. (1997), Back to the Future? Senior Federal Executives in the United States, *Governance: An International Journal of Policy Administration*, Vol.10, No.4: 323-349.

Barnett, Michael (1993), Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.37: 271-296.

Cox, Robert W., (Spring 1969) The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization, *International Organization*, Vol. XXIII, No.2: 205-230.

Cox, Robert and Jacobson, Harold K. (1974), *The Anatomy of Influence. Decision Making in International Organization*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Decent Work (June 1999), Report of the Director-General: Decent Work. International Labour Conference, 87th Session. Geneva.

De Meyer, Tim (2000), ILO Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in Asia Pacific: Emerging Standards for Emerging Markets? *Centre for ASEAN Studies*, Discussion Paper, No.28.

Egeberg, Morten (1999), Transcending Intergovernmentalism? Identity and Role Perceptions of National Officials in EU Decision-Making, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.6, No.3: 456-474.

Elliott, Kimberly Ann, (July 2000) The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Standards, *International Economics Policy Briefs*. No.00-6. www.iie.com.

Ghebali, Victor-Yves (1985), The Politicization of UN Specialised Agencies: A Preliminary Analysis, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.14, No.3: 317-334.

Ghebali, Victor-Yves (1989), *The International Labour Organisation. A Case Study on the Evolution of U.N. Specialised Agencies*, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Hass, Ernst B. (1964), *Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Jacobsen, Dag Ingvar (1996), The Role of the Public Manager: Loyalty, Autonomy or Advocacy? *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol.19, No.1: 45-65.

Jönsson, Christer (November 1993), International Organization and Co-operation: An Interorganizational Perspective, *International Social Science Journal*, Vol.138: 463-477.

Keohane Robert O. (1989), *International Institutions and State Power : Essays in International Relations Theory*, Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

Laffan, Brigid (1997), From Policy Entrepreneur to Policy Manager: the Challenge Facing the European Commission, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.4, No.3:422-438.

Langrod, Georges (1963), *The International Civil Service. Its Origins, its Nature, its Evolution*, Leyden: Oceana Publications.

Lubin, Riegelman Carol and Winslow, Anne (1990), *Social Justice for Women. The International Labor Organization and Women*, London: Duke University Press.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1999), A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation, *International Organization*, Vol.53, No.2: 267-306.

Pratt, Michael G. (1998), „To Be or Not to Be: Central Questions in Organizational Identification“. In D. A. Whetten and P. C. Godfrey eds., *Identity in Organizations. Building Theory Through Conversations*, Thousands Oaks: SAGE:171-207.

Reinalda, B. (1998), “Organizational Theory and the Autonomy of the International Labour Organization: Two Classic Studies still Going Strong”. In Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek eds., *Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations*, London: Routledge: 42-61.

Searing, Donald D. (1994), *Westminister's World. Understanding Political Roles*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Trondal, Jarle (1999), Integration Through Participation-Introductory Notes to the Study of Administrative Integration, *European Integration online Papers*, Vol.3, No.4

Trondal, Jarle (2001a), The ‘Parallel Administration’ of the European Commission. National Officials in European Clothes, *ARENA Working Papers*, No.25.

Trondal, Jarle (2001b), Is There any Social Constructivist-Institutionalist Divide? Unpacking Social Mechanisms Affecting Representational Roles Among EU Decision-Makers, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.8, No.1: 1-23.