RECONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN POST CONFLICT SITUATIONS

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### TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1

2.0 THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF PROLONGED CONFLICTS ON THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND GOVERNANCE ..........................................................1

3.0 RE-ESTABLISHING SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN POST CONFLICT SITUATIONS FOCUSING ON SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW ........................................................................................................4

4.0 TRANSFORMING OPPOSITIONAL POLITICS IN THE POST CONFLICT SITUATIONS ..................................................................................5

5.0 HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT IN THE POST CONFLICT SITUATION .............................................................................................7

5.1 Shortage of Human Resources ............................................................................. 7

5.2 Technical Assistance in Human Resources Development ..................................... 8

5.3 Need for Human Resources Planning .................................................................. 9

6.0 ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS ........................................................................................................ 9

6.1 Public Expenditure Accountability ..................................................................... 9

6.2 The Institution of the Inspector General of Government (IGG) ......................... 10

6.3 Interagency Enforcement of Accountability ...................................................... 11

6.4 The Directorate of Ethics and Integrity ................................................................ 11

7.0 INTER-INSTITUTIONAL MANAGMENTS AND SYSTEMS: COORDINATION MECHANISMS ........................................................................... 11

7.1 Elements of Successful Coordination of Macro Economic Stability ................... 11

7.2 Coordinating the Public Expenditure and Budgeting ........................................ 12

7.3 Coordinating Projects and Programmes through Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) .......................................................................................... 12

7.4 Coordinating Decentralized District Planning and Implementation .................. 13
1.0 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this analysis is to identify challenges of establishing public services and governance systems in the post conflict situation. Examples are taken from post conflict countries in which the Author has been involved in the re-design of the public services: Uganda, Rwanda, Somalia, East Timor and Southern Sudan. In the cases of Uganda and Rwanda, post conflict redesign of public services has been by and large successful. Somalia is an example of enduring failure. East Timor and Southern Sudan are at the initial starting point and attempts are being made to establish public services at a level that had not been a national state.

The analysis begins with brief descriptions of the nature of conflict and its negative impact on the public services. It then deals with the direct connection between re-establishing security and the rule of law and restoration of delivery of public services in peaceful areas and zones. The importance of transforming divisive politics through power sharing is empathized. Since prolonged conflict decimates human resources, capacity building of individual staffs, and public services institutions, must take center stage through emphasis on the corporate, rather than individual level. The analysis focuses on the re-establishment of inter institutional arrangements and coordination mechanisms. Lastly, the challenges of supporting and mobilizing the civil society are identified, especially the need for good relations between civil society and the re-emerging state. Best practices are outlined in the conclusion.

2.0 THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF PROLONGED CONFLICTS ON THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND GOVERNANCE

In Uganda political and military conflicts stretching across several decades (1966 – 1986) had severe negative impacts on the public service. Many senior civil servants were killed and a large number went into exile. Successive undemocratic autocratic regimes used the public service as a tool for patronage to confer privileges and rewards to supporters and to punish and exclude opponents. There was irrational expansion of public service size in terms of ministries, departments, and staffing. Public service structures and functions became unwieldy, duplicative and overlapping. After the Bazilio Okello coup d’état of 1985, banking records littered the streets of Kampala and public service records were being used in markets to rap bananas and mangoes.
In Rwanda, as the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) was taking control of Kigali, the entire previous government and the civil servants were on the move heading into exile. They carried away all movable public service office assets, ripped telephones, and destroyed public service assets that they could not carry. As the saying goes nature hates a vacuum. The returnees from exile in a diversity of foreign cultures (Francophone and Agrophile) helped themselves to vacated public service offices. Most of them had no relevant qualification and experience. Later on removing them and choosing new ones became a major challenge for the new post genocide government. Initially, ministries were distributed to different political parties both at the political and technical level. This was in contrast to the Uganda case, where power sharing was confined to ministries at the political levels but not the technical public service level. While in the Uganda case there was a single co-coordinating agency for recruiting staff, in Rwanda the political party owning the ministry recruited staff into the ministry. There was no mechanism for co-coordinating the Ministry of Finance (wage bill) and the Ministry of Public Service (staffing).

In Uganda and Rwanda, there was a national government controlling the state. In Somalia, there was no such government. The state collapsed completely and the public service with it. Several areas emerged in which regional governments claiming statehood were established: Somaliland in the Northwest, Puntland in the Northeast, Baidoa in the South, Mogadishu fell under the control of different warlords. These warlords have been overthrowing each other. In all of these areas, except for internationally unrecognized Somaliland, establishing public services below the instable controlling and shifting authorities has proved impossible. The donors based in Nairobi have been engaged in cross border efforts to re-establish the Somali state and public services without success. The current Somali government with military backing from Ethiopia, and an AU peace keeping force have failed to stabilize and restore peace. Instead war is raging in the streets of Mogadishu. In this context of permanent armed rebellion, establishing public services is out of the question. This has become a Hobbesian state of nature where “life is short, nasty, brutish”.

East Timor is an example of a post conflict situation in which there was no state and no government and therefore no public service institution. The Indonesia colonial power had run East Timor with Indonesian nationals even to the level of nurses and teachers. The departing Indonesian armed forces conducted a scotch to earth policy to deny any incoming government public assets and facilities. It is important to note the following
factors that have complicated post conflict establishment of public services in East Timor.

East Timor leaders and communities were divided between those who collaborated and supported the Indonesia colonial power and those who fought the Indonesians. A large number of the collaborators migrated to West Timor and continued to be under the control of Indonesians to hamper and frustrate the set up of new institutions in East Timor. The anti-Indonesian groups were severely divided between the radical nationalistic party, Fretilin, with supporters from the lower classes, and pro western political leaders (reflecting liberal, middle class and Christian values). Unlike in the Uganda and Rwanda cases, no dominant and unified group triumphed over the rest to assert unified authority. East Timor was placed under UN trust-ship to manage the post conflict transition to a new national government.

There are now efforts to establish a sub-national government in Juba as part of the agreement between the leaders of Southern Sudan and the Sudan government based in Khartoum. This is a case of colonial and post colonial neglect and exclusion. Very limited public services had been built in the South. The meager public services were dominated by Arabs from the North. Arabs from the North dominated and exploited the Christian South, the same way Indonesians dominated East Timor. Whatever meager public services that had been extended to the South were destroyed during the protracted armed rebellion against the North, and the attempts by Khartoum government to military crash it. Ethnic fire between blacks and Arabs, and religious fire between radical Islam and Christianity account for the ferocity, intensity and destructiveness of the conflict.

As in the case of East Timor, a national government is being set up at a level where it did not exist before. There are no previous government structures and functions to review. In the case of East Timor the previous institutions were located in Jakarta; in the case of Juba, they were run from Khartoum. In both cases, the new leaders are hostile to their former rulers and do not regard them as models of public service to be emulated.

There are several critical challenges to setting up a government and public service at the Government of Southern Sudan (Level) in Juba. The deep challenges are the establishment of ten federal governments reflecting major ethnic groups in the South. They are being set up from zero. They do not have office space from which to run the governments. There is poor communication system (roads and telephone) to link Juba to the ten federal states. While the South is promoting activities anticipating winning the
referendum for independence, the North is promoting division to ensure the South votes to stay in the union. Because oil and gas reserves are located in the South, the North is not willing to let go.

3.0 RE-ESTABLISHING SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN POST CONFLICT SITUATIONS FOCUSING ON SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW

Re-establishing service delivery systems in the post conflict situation is a direct function of establishing effective security systems. As the case of Somalia demonstrates, when security is established in an area such as Somaliland, Puntaland, and Baidoa, the re-establishment of public services follows. In Somaliland security and the rule of law were restored and have been sustained for the last 15 years, as a result institutions such as parliament, ministries and the judiciary have been re-established and are working. In Puntaland, following re-establishment of peace and security, technical assistance and capacity building begun. Public services were re-equipped with computers and office materials, staff training commenced, members of parliament (MPs) were sent on a field visit to South Africa to learn about the roles of legislation in the post conflict setting. Suddenly warlords started fighting again. The public services being restored were attacked and the computers and equipment stolen.

In Rwanda and Uganda security was first restored in the capital and urban areas and public services began to function. During the first two years large rural areas remained “no go areas”. In the post conflict context, the authorized routes and areas where UN staffs are allowed to go is a barometer of the limits to the delivery of public services. While UN staff may move freely in areas where security has been restored, they may not go into areas of high insecurity. In semi-security areas they may travel under military escorts. Only when security has been secured can development promotion “services begin”. The main actors in the immediate post conflict situation are peace stabilization forces, mop-up operations to extend peace zones e.g. security, and relief and resettlement. At this stage the greatest assignment is to determine the needs for re-establishing the public services. It took 2 years to review needs for Rwanda public service reforms.

The expert was based in Kigali and could not go to rural areas. The review of Uganda public service reform was undertaken 3 years after the fall of Kampala in 1986. Even the reviewers could not go to northern areas where armed civil war has ranged for the last
twenty years. In order to assess public service needs in Soroti, Teso, the team went by air. East Timor provides a case in which the review of post conflict public services needs was premature. Only the capital, Dili, and a few of up-country towns, had been secured. Most areas were no go areas and required military escorts.

In all cases, it became apparent that targeting restoration of public service without focusing on the post conflict security sector had been a strategic mistake. The post conflict security sector extends beyond re-establishing a national army, to the creation of a national police force to maintain the peace, to restoration of judiciaries to dispense accessible and affordable justice. The security sector involves re-establishment of Criminal Investigation Departments (CIDs), and the set up of democratically controlled internal and external security organs (Agencies). It is now recognized that the restoration of the security sector and the building of its capacity must take centre stage in early post conflict governance efforts.

4.0 TRANSFORMING OPPOSITIONAL POLITICS IN THE POST CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Extreme divisive politics based on monopolization of power and the exclusion of major social forces and political groups in the pre-conflict stage is often responsible for armed rebellion and civil wars. A succession of autocratic leaders in Uganda prompted excluded opponents to take up arms being convinced that the 1980 general elections had been rigged. In Rwanda, since 1958 a succession of Hutu dominated governments expelled and excluded Tutsis. In response to the Tutsi led armed rebellion of Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), the Hutu carried out the “final solution” to exterminate the Tutsi in 1994 Rwanda Genocide. In Somalia, Siad Barre monopolized power by favoring his own clan, and excluding other clans through imprisoning and killing opponents. Recently, decades of political exclusion of Raila Odinga in Kenya and Morgan Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe and the rigging of general elections to prevent democratic transfer of power have triggered violent armed rebellions. Therefore a major priority of post conflict governance is to transform previous patterns of divisive oppositional politics.

In Uganda the approach to transforming opposition politics was power sharing. Although Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Army had decisively captured state power in 1986, a winner take all approach was avoided. Instead, leaders of opposition groups and parties were co-opted into what was called “broad based” governments. The national
Resistance Movement (NRM) regime has been able to neutralize the opposition and stay in power for the last twenty years. The pre-conflict political parties were banned and a movement (one-party, the NRM) political system was established under the 1995 Constitution.

Several features of the Uganda post conflict power sharing need to be noted. Power sharing was confined to being included as ministers in the government. The government programme remained that of the NRM. Power sharing through inclusion was not extended to the technical levels of the public service. Recruitment of Permanent Secretaries remained non-political based on technocratic and professional merit. In Rwanda power sharing was interpreted as each party “owning” the ministry down the technical level. A review of the disruptions and lack of co-ordination caused by this kind of power sharing during the first two years recommended scrapping the system. The Rwanda government abolished the system and provided for ministers to be rotated in different ministries irrespective of the party affiliations. No party could claim to own a ministry any more.

Power sharing may be based on the President freely choosing ministers of other parties instead of the parties nominating those to be appointed ministers. In Uganda the president picked ministers of the parties without having to consult. This has been described as the principle of “individual merit”, rather than party representation. In a system of “party representation”, the president does not have strong authority and power over the ministers and parties could recall and replace them. This is the emerging power sharing system in Kenya and Zimbabwe. This creates challenges of co-ordination of policies and their implantation.

The level of power sharing (broadbasedness) in Uganda has declined as the country has transitioned from a movement system (one-party) to a multi-party system. The adoption of a multi-party system was approved by a referendum 2000 and the provisions of one-movement system in 1995 Constitution have been repealed and replaced by multi-party provisions.

Similar, power sharing strategies have been followed by the leaders of the Rwanda Patriotic Front. They had militarily defeated opponents and could have pursued a winner take all approach. All the post conflict governments in Rwanda have a majority of ministers being Hutu’s reflecting the ethnic composition in the population (85% Hutu,
13% Tutsi, and 2% Twa). Ethnic exclusion and hatred cannot be used as a basis for opposing the RPF ruling regime.

In Uganda power sharing was extended to the armed forces. All previous armed groups (except, Kony’s the Lords Resistance Army) were co-opted. A lot of incentives (money) were used in exchange for being disarmed, demobilized, and re-integrated. This is one way of ensuring and building an effective post conflict security sector. Unless former combatants are successfully resettled and re-integrated, they may resort to criminality and may be recruited into new armed rebellions.

5.0 HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT IN THE POST CONFLICT SITUATION

5.1 Shortage of Human Resources

As has been indicated above, the Uganda post conflict public service was bloated in size with overstaffing, too many square pegs in too many round holes. First, ministries and departments were merged, and redundant positions abolished. The public services were downsized, and right sized. Duties and responsibilities were re-defined. Second, training needs of staff to be retained were identified, appropriate training designed and implemented. In the immediate post war situation only short term remedial human resource development can be undertaken.

Meeting critical shortages of accountants, economists, and engineers required five through ten to fifteen years in which large numbers of secondary school graduates are pushed through universities and relevant professional colleges. After some of them have worked in the public service for five to ten years, they are sent for masters degrees and promoted to senior management positions as heads of departments.

In Rwanda there was massive exit of the staffs of the outgoing regime at all levels. They were replaced by new staffs without requisite training and without any public service experiences. Thus human resources development was required at all levels. However, it had to be preceded by fresh recruitment. In order to ensure transparency, the interviewing and selection was outsourced to a Canadian firm, and its recommendations approved by parliament. Lower level civil servants could be retrained in Rwanda by rebuilding the university and setting up new training institutions. Higher level civil servants were sent to
training centers in neighboring countries (UMI, in Uganda), ESAMI in Arusha Tanzania. Others were sent abroad. The human resources development needs of East Timor were similar to Rwanda situation. There was no existing staff at all levels including teachers, and nurses, positions monopolized by the Indonesians. Unlike Rwanda, there were no local universities or training colleges to improve. It was a situation where you had to start from scratch.

5.2 Technical Assistance in Human Resources Development

In the immediate post conflict situation, the priority is to restore and sustain public service operations. Since there are severe human resources shortages, there is need for technical assistance.

Skilled and professional staff may be acquired under technical assistance programs. The design of technical assistance may provide for counter part staffing. In Uganda in the mid 90s there were shortages of accountants and economists. Foreign specialists were brought into the country to ensure that current operations are restored and maintained. Ideally, national staffs should be attached to ensure that skills are transferred yo nationald. Such anticipated transfers fail to occur if there are no nationals to be attached and if the counterparts do not have the skills, or the appropriate motives to engage in capacity building.

In the immediate post conflict situation, emphasis is on direct execution to restore and maintain services, as a large supply of local graduates increases, there is shift to national execution so that projects and services are managed by nationals. Human resources development in the immediate post conflict situation cannot be standardized because it depends on the effects of prolonged conflict on the supply and demand of skills and professions and the extent to which training institution were destroyed, if they existed. In Juba for example Khartoum has a list of civil servants supposed to be in office in the South and they are on the payroll, but they are not in post in the South. The challenge now is to design the public services for the South, determine the types of civil servants required, and recruit a new civil service and allow absorption of any suitable ones from the previous civil services.
5.3 Need for Human Resources Planning

In most post conflict situations, there are severe shortages of staff including those with human resources planning skills. A ministry of Finance and Planning may be set up, as well as a ministry of Public Service. These are the key institutions which should determine the demand and supply of human resources and develop strategies and plans to meet them. Sector ministries such as agriculture, education, and health will also not have up to date information now and in the future.

It is generally recognized that increased, access to education and health is a good thing and that Asian Tiger economies invested heavily in the production and provision of human resources. But there are no specific models and formulas to follow.

Uganda launched universal primary and secondary education. In response to increased demand for university enrollment, universities have expanded from 3 to 29 in the last ten years. In the mid 1990s Uganda had severe shortages of professionals (accountants, economists, engineers) now large numbers have been produced and are unemployed.

6.0 ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

6.1 Public Expenditure Accountability

In the Ugandan governance system, the foundation for accountability is the budget. Over the last twenty years Uganda has been following a cash budget system. The government guides ministries, department and agencies to prepare budgets based on budget ceilings reflecting expected revenues (cash inflows) and priority allocations. These expenditure allocations are authorized by parliament. The Auditor Generals report is submitted to parliament showing the extent to which actual expenditures conformed to the budget allocations. Parliamentary Accounts committees call ministries, departments and agencies to explain unauthorized expenditures and losses.

Currently there are five accountability committees. Two of the Committees: the Public Accounts Committee (General) and Local Government Accounts Committee focus on the Auditor Generals reports. The other four committees focus on accountability for programs in the key sectors.
In the post conflict situation, ministries, departments and agencies do not have up to date books of accounts and financial expenditure records and internal audits. In most cases the accounting institutions will have been corrupted and destroyed during protracted conflict. The post conflict government may have an Auditor General office. But it will have no qualified staff, and no experience to conduct audits. In any case, financial records will not exist. There may be parliamentary accounts committees but they will have no audited accounts to inspect.

In Uganda public expenditure without audit reports covering several decades were exempted. The country embarked on training of accounts to ensure that Ministries and Departments had up date financial records which would enable the Auditor General Offices to audit them. Uganda also embarked to the establishment of the institutions of professional bodies to handle the certification and accreditation of the accounting profession. In the immediate post conflict situation, there was severe shortage of accountants, and economists. Twenty years after there is now an oversupply and unemployment. Even when the large backlog beyond a baseline year was exempted and the baseline considered feasible was set up, the Audited Accounts are still five years out of date. It becomes rather late to recover money lost or diverted five years ago.

The coming into being of a multiparty parliament has boosted the power of parliamentary accountability committees. Rules of procedure now require all accountability committees to be chaired by opposition members of parliament. This minimizes the potential for cover up by pro government Members of Parliament.

6.2 The Institution of the Inspector General of Government (IGG)

Unlike public expenditure accountability that depends on the Auditor General Reports to parliament, Uganda innovated by introducing the office of the Inspector General of Government (IGG) modeled on the Scandinavian institution of Ombudsman It can monitor and enforce accountability for operations in the current period based on current investigations. Aggrieved citizens can report cases of miss-governance and mis-rule to the IGG and the IGG can initiate investigations. In Uganda the IGG has been effective in investing cases of corruption. The IGG has had two major weaknesses: firstly, low investigative capacity due to poor staffing, equipment and logistics, and secondly, lack of enforcement powers.
The IGG Act has been amended and the IGG given enforcement powers to take offenders to courts. But the IGG is helpless when the offenders are political heavy weights. The IGG model has been introduced in Rwanda where it appears more effective because of strong support from the Kagame regime (which is more strict and has zero tolerance for corruption).

### 6.3 Interagency Enforcement of Accountability

The IGG is but one of many agencies that enforce accountability including, CID. These are coordinated by the interagency committee allowing share of a data and information and the adoption of co-coordinated common strategies and operations.

### 6.4 The Directorate of Ethics and Integrity

It was soon realized that in the course of conducting current accountability measures, issues emerge that require decisions at policy levels. This need led to the set up of the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity which can propose new accountability policies, laws and institutions.

### 7.0 INTER-INSTITUTIONAL MANagements AND SYSTEMS: COORDINATION MECHANISMS

#### 7.1 Elements of Successful Coordination of Macro Economic Stability

In the immediate post conflict situation in Uganda, activities of Ministry of Finance were not co-coordinated with those of the Ministry of Planning. The Ministry of Finance perceived plans and projects designed by Ministry Planning to be over ambitious, financially exorbitant and, unrealistic to the available resource envelope. Several measures were undertaken. Though a first generation reform, the Ministry of finance was merged with that of planning. The World Bank and IMF trained and equipped a finance and planning team in the new Ministry to use standardized monetary and fiscal tools to control exchange rates, interest rates, single digit inflation. The Uganda Revenue Authority and the Bank of Uganda were integrated into this school of thought. This
Ugandan core of Finance and economics specialists has controlled the commanding heights of the economy and ensured a sustained application of these tools and instruments in the last twenty years.

A similar trend took place in Rwanda. It was pointed out that power sharing and ownership of ministries was the main obstacle to effective co-ordination. This share of ministries was abolished 1996. It should be noted that one of the Uganda architects of the macro economic management tools and instruments moved to Rwanda and assisted in its adoption. Similarly, another architect is now in Juba assisting its adoption by Ministry of finance.

### 7.2 Coordinating the Public Expenditure and Budgeting

The United Uganda Ministry of Finance and planning introduced a new co-coordinated approach to public expenditure and budgeting initially called the “cash budget”. The starting point is determining (estimate) available revenue and limiting the public expenditure within the available revenue resource envelope. Ministries, departments and districts prepare their three year rolling budgets within budget ceilings issued by Ministry of Finance. This budget framework has come to be known as the medium term expenditure Framework (MTEF). The requested expenditures are based on priorities and programmes prepared in budget expenditure framework papers.

### 7.3 Coordinating Projects and Programmes through Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)

Uganda has gone through four PEAPs of 3 years rolling planning. The importance of PEAP as a co-coordinating mechanism is to provide a focus for all ministries and departments to design their projects. There will be variations in projects but there will be common outputs and outcomes. Each planning office is instructed to specify activities which reduce poverty by specified rates. Over the last decade of PEAPs, poverty levels have been reduced from 56% in 1992 to 31% in 2006.

The PEAP planning framework adopted the sector-wide planning approach. It is not enough to coordinate activities within a single ministry such as Education or Health. A sector wide approach to health or education is much wider than each Ministry. By the
time the PEAP system is being phased out, there are about fifteen sector/working groups implementing the sector-wide approach to planning and implementation. As the county moves to the National Planning Authority approach, it is essential to build on the sector wide approaches that have been used in the past.

7.4 Coordinating Decentralized District Planning and Implementation.

In several post conflict countries, decentralization has been adopted to effectively bring services to the people. However, there are so many sub-national units for decentralization that it is essential to put in place effective mechanisms of co-coordinating the process. In the case of Uganda, this has been accomplished in three ways; first, is the development of standardized district planning guidelines, which all local government follow and second, the establishment of a co-coordinating unit in the Ministry of Local Government; thirdly, the design and implementing of annual local government performance assessments and the set up a basket fund to finance local government development and capacity building projects and programmes.

7.5 Coordination through Inter Ministerial Committee

The inter ministerial committees are set up at two levels; the level of ministers and the level of permanent secretaries (PS). The PS deal with Technical issues and the details, and Minister’s step in to resolve contentious disagreements and debates.

7.6 Coordination through Inter Agency Committees

In Uganda there are many agencies fighting corruption. The IGG is involved, various security agencies (internal, external) are involved, and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Interagency Committee reduces duplication, and cross agency interference, through share of vital information. Similarly an inter-agency task force has been set up to co-ordinate efforts in the security sector.

7.7 Coordination through Modern Information Technology (MIT)

First, MIT’s can be used to generate information to facilitate co-ordination in specific ministries and sectors (health, education etc). Secondly the advanced second stage is to
interlink sector management information to each other, between healthy, finance, education, and public personnel records in Ministry of public service and local government. Thirdly, the National Statistical Bureau has to be entrusted with setting up a national information data base for use in the Public service. Uganda is one of the few countries that have set up a Ministry for modern information technology with a mission of establishing the e-governance throughout the public service.

7.8 Coordination through the Prime Minister Offices

Since the offices of Prime Minister are the centers for co-coordinating government business (in some countries it might be the Presidency) there are two critical capacities to be built. The first one is to set up an effective cabinet secretariat to record, monitor and evaluate all policies and programmes. In Uganda, the head of the public service is also the secretary to cabinet. This arrangement provided an institution system for systematic monitoring of policy formulation and policy implementation. There is a standardized format for submission of a new policy and best practice regulations.

The second capacity is technical, the set up of monitoring and evaluation systems utilizing modern information technology. This is behind the set up of The National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES). Unless modern information systems are set up in ministries and districts, a national policy monitoring and evaluation system cannot work. These are the co-ordination challenges that Prime Ministries (or Presidencies) encounter.

8.0 INSTITUTION BUILDING FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE POST CONFLICT SETTING

8.1 Institution Building through Clear Articulation of Vision, Goals and Strategies

Even after setting up various ministries, departments and agencies in post conflict Rwanda, not much was being done by these public service institutions. One key factor inhibiting performance was lack of institutional vision, goals and strategies. The new public services were spending most time in and hoc responses to crises. Senior staff was
focusing on mundane and routine tasks. Most of them had no relevant education and training and no on the top experiences. This example shows the importance of defining institutional goals and objectives and ensuring that they are internalized at all levels.

8.2 **Institution Building through Outcome and Results Management**

Institutional objectives need to be reduced to required actions over a specified time period. Using log frame logic, outputs are determined and arranged in the form of targets and milestones. The approach enables the institutions to monitor and evaluate the achievements of its goals and targets and carry out timely remedy of identified implementation bottlenecks.

8.3 **Institutional Building through Transparent Workplans and Assignment of Duties**

Managers in high performing institutions, build teams around clearly spelt out annual, quarterly and monthly work plans. They assign specific duties, and expect, review, and discuss timely progress reports with subordinates.

8.4 **Institutional Building through the Institution Wide Approach**

The traditional approach in capacity building is to train individual staff in the hope that this will be reflected in improvements at the institutional level. Several organizational factors may hinder trained staff from using new acquired skills. Tools and equipment appropriate for new skills may not be available. If there is autocratic top down management styles, this may inhibit creativity and innovativeness. The pre dominant institutional culture may not accommodate new practices. The newly trained high performing staff may be considered a threat by the average performers.

It is therefore important to look beyond the capacity of individual staffs, and adopt an institution wide approach to analyze factors such as organizational culture and climate. Individual staffs come and go, but the typical institutional rules and norms remain. Most staffs in Somaliland report for duty about 9:00am. The work day ends around 2:00pm and
most men go to cue cut (intoxicating leaves). These cultural practices put boundaries and limits to institutional capacity.

Strategic planning for the institution should not start at the individual level. But the corporate level to identify institutional factors similar to those identified above. In Uganda for example, there was a rule that no staff could be paid higher than the Permanent Secretary. This was creating friction with Ugandans working for International bodies earning international salaries working on their Uganda assignments. This rule has long been abandoned.

8.5 Institutional Building through Modern Information Technology

Effective use of the Internet provides access to vital information and tools that would transform public services into high performing institutions.

Several factors are limiting this capacity. Computers are not widely availed to most staff. Computers are still status and power symbols. There is unwillingness to set up open institution-wide net-works and allow most staff access to the internet. There is also a need to train staff on conducting policy research on the internet.

9.0 SUPPORTING AND MOBILIZING CIVIL SOCIETY

9.1 State Collapse Creates a Vacuum Filled by Civil Society

In post conflict situations, the collapse of the state creates a vacuum which is filled by civil society organisations. Such organisations are most often called non-government organizations (NGOs). NGOs can go into areas of conflict and engage in the provision of relief of internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps such relief may involve food, clothing, shelter etc. They may also distribute urgently needed medicines to the sick. They also participate in resettlement and reintegration. It is important to identify factors that facilitate civil society effectiveness and those that impair civil society performance in the post conflict situation.
9.2 Too Many Civil Society “Flooding” The Post Conflict Situation

At a time when most country-sides were “no-go-areas” for government, there was a large number of NGOs operating in those areas. Donors were channeling funds through the NGOs and government resented the fact that there was no reporting framework to know much money was involved. At the moment, large numbers are operating in post conflict Northern Uganda. In a recent statement, the LC5 Chairman of Gulu complained that NGOs are ignoring coordinating with his office about what they are doing in the region. He specifically identified international NGOs for ignoring his office.

9.3 A Lot of Zeal and Motivation But Limited Know How

Most founders of NGOs are motivated to reduce suffering. They want to heal people caught in the scourge of civil war. This is positive social capital. But many NGOs are poorly staffed and do not have appreciate expertise in services they seek to render. Some over zealous individual providing for orphans may set up an NGO for orphans but has no knowledge to run an orphanage especially dealing with trauma, malnutrition and counseling. There are also opportunists who set up NGOs to trap government and donor money. This is a negative social capital. In Rwanda, a pedophile, who set up an NGOs for children complained about being deported and that it was because of his deep love for the children that he had set up the NGO to help them.

9.4 Supporting Civil Society through Umbrella NGOs

The weaknesses of isolated and atomized NGOs can be overcome by creating umbrella organizations. All NGOs in Uganda operate through two main umbrella organizations: the Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Association (DENIVA), the Uganda National NGO Forum. Attempts to merge them into a single national NGO co-ordination body have not been successful. These umbrella organizations provide a framework for supporting capacity building of their members. Capacity building takes place at the level of both the umbrella and the member level.
9.5 Mobilizing Civil Society through Umbrella Networks

Umbrella NGOs and forums exist to mobilize member NGOs through networking. They also mobilize resources from donors and governments which pass on to the members. Their main motivation is to attract and retain members. If they do not effectively provide these services to their members, the number of members may decline and donor support may be jeopardized. The umbrellas and forums also protect members from external threats, especially government restrictive regulations.

9.6 Government Monitoring and Regulation of Civil Society Organizations

Good relations between the government and civil society are the best foundation for the effective performance of their respective roles. As the state re-emergences from state collapse, the government begins to monitor civil society activities. Government monitoring and regulations may range from permissiveness to outright restriction. In Uganda the first NGO Act 1989 and the regulations of 1990 were largely permissive. All it required was to register and give basic information about the NGO. The responsible government ministry was the Prime Ministers office.

Several factors have led to the perception that NGOs can be a security threat and therefore should be handled by the ministry of Internal Affairs.

First, thousands of Ugandans were led to fiery death through the messianic Kibwetere apocalyptic promise of being taken to heaven. Most people came to believe that this occurred because of unregulated civil society activities. Second, it is not easy to make a balance between advocacy and opposition to government. Many NGOs involved in advocacy especially political ones, are perceived as opposition to the government.

As a result government has passed a draconian NGO Act 2006 which by and large treats NGOs as an internal security issue. The registration of NGOs was moved from Prime Ministers office to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
9.7 The Case For NGO Self Regulation

As has been pointed out above, the attempts to merge DENIVA and NGO forum into one national umbrella organization did not succeed. Government monitoring and regulation has not worked. But the civil society stakeholders seeking to limit government involvement have crafted a highly innovative mechanism for NGO self regulation. NGOs will have to meet high standards of NGO organization and performance to be issued with the NGO Quality Assurance Certificate. This has been called the NGO Quality Assurance Mechanism (QUAM). A national council to implement it has been set up.

This will promote NGOs of high quality and performance and eliminate bogus brief case NGOs and this will in turn increase civil society credibility and government trust of civil society.

10.0 CONCLUSION

This conclusion contains the summary of required actions and best practices in post conflict public service and governance reconstruction.

- Review and assess the public service and governance reconstructions needs.

- Conduct rationalization and streamlining of functions and structures (first generation reforms)

- Conduct diagnostic studies and survey of service delivery. Initially, hire international experts to do this, but take steps to develop national capacity (in Uganda National Bureau of Statistics).

- Initiate macro economic monetary and fiscal instruments and tools to deal with exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation.

- Develop guidelines and standards for co-coordinated and integrated public revenue and expenditure systems. Priorities and investment to be justified in detailed budget expenditure frame work papers.
• Where decentralization by devolution (political) is being implement the set up of a nation local government capacity building unit can co-ordinate the local government planning an evaluation systems so that standardized and harmonized frameworks exist in all local decentralized governments.

• All policies, project and programme designs should be focused on achieving specified outputs and outcomes over a specified period with continuous monitoring and evaluation of targets and outcomes.

• Managers should clearly assign duties and assignments based on annual, quarterly and monthly work plans and targets.

• Special attention should be paid to building capacity at the institution wide level. Institutions have a life of their own beyond individual staff that enter and existing livery behind institutional climates and cultures which shape the next generation of managers and its unique style of performance.

• The NGO Quality Self Assurance Mechanism is vital system that could reduce the need for government intervention.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


