Enhancing the Performance of the Public Service in a Developmental State: A Country Case Study of Nigeria

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**Introduction**

Growing gaps between the wealthy and the poor as well as larger proportions of populations in Africa being abjectly poor; shrinking public services; inaccessible public goods (either for economic; physical or intellectual reasons); the absence of social nets: all of these are issues prompting us to focus to how we could do things better.

Much of these ills are attributed to dysfunctional and poorly developed public bureaucracies on our continent. The history of how we arrived at this position is well-documented. In brief, colonialism was intent on destroying any indigenous institutional arrangements. In the post-colonial era, the scarcity of legitimate governance structures and the inability of the state to provide safety and manage conflicts constructively, contributed to successive rounds of ethnic and religious inspired violence, civil wars and political instability. The few institutions that were indeed developed in post-colonial Africa during the sixties and early seventies were seriously undermined, if not destroyed when under the rubric of Structural Adjustment Programmes the international financial and development institutions advanced a neo-liberal

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agenda of cutting back the state in favour of the market. This happened during the 1980s until the dawn of the new millennium, in an environment where there could hardly be mention of a state that needed rolling back. Equally so, the question arises rolling back for whose gains, since there was hardly evidence of an independent, budding and sizeable market constrained by the state. In the event Structural Adjustment created a vacuum on the African institutional landscape where public institutions were largely destroyed and no market to speak of that could occupy the space left in the aftermath of the campaign for the minimalist state. The so-called third sector, who also potentially could have moved in the space left vacant by an effort to reduce the role of the state and as is known in the Western context, is also poorly developed in much of the African context. Traditional and religious structures would attempt to play some role, but usually more in the domain of welfare and the provision of safety nets, rather than development in the more comprehensive sense. Too late did the apologies come from the IMF and World Bank that they were in fact dishing out the wrong medicine to Africa, and has caused further damaged to the institutional landscape, rather than actually assisting in overcoming the serious capacity problems faced by the continent.

Given this reality, this paper will deal with the complex conflation between conceptual work, and practical application by in the first instance engaging with a limited, but recent body of literature on the Developmental State, particularly dealing with the intersection between development, growth and governance. In the second instance, the paper draws on some of the most recent discussion around the possible new paradigm or theory that could replace/are busy displacing New Public Management. In the third section I present a Nigerian example of a public sector reform that clearly aspires to take us into the new era of better service delivery in order to facilitate development; more accountability; higher levels of citizen trust; more ethical government in order to release public resources for the purpose of
development; more competent public servants working in partnerships with citizens in order to be more responsive and more effective.

**Growth, Development and Governance**

With the dawn of the 21st century came a realization that an emaciated state is not what delivered the phenomenal growth that was seen in the East Asian Tigers during a period when countries elsewhere struggled to sustain standards of living. To the contrary, what seemed to have delivered the success stories of East Asia was a strong state, supported by a highly competent professional and meritocratic public administration. In many instances these states did not prioritise being democratic, and individual human rights were often curbed in the interest of achieving other policy goals. In addition, well articulated and thought through development strategies garnered all sectors of the society to cooperate in the fulfillment of societal goals. The business sector in these societies was well developed, and government and business elites were in close relationships of exchange. The state did not shy away to reward or sanction even powerful players in the market in order to provide incentives or disincentives, which ever the case might have been, in the interest of realizing the formulated policy aims and with respect to foreign trade was pursuing protectionist policies.

If the East Asian formula for the developmental state is the only one existing, a fairly superficial analysis of the presence of necessary factors for constituting such developmental states in most of Africa is elusive. Times have changed, and the impetus for establishing democratic regimes is also such that a return to autocracy to achieve development is not an option. As Mkandawire writes: “The first few examples of developmental states were authoritarian. The new ones will have to be democratic....”\(^3\) Furthermore, development can also not be seen in the aggregate, with the spoils concentrated at the elite level. The requirement now is for equitable

\(^3\) Quoted in Edigheji (2008) Forthcoming.
distribution of growth, preferable while correcting any biases in distribution that might be the result of some historical developments, e.g. under Apartheid.

Definitions of the developmental state abounds. The work of Edigheji (2008) is helpful to bring some structure to the conceptual discussion. He distinguishes three broad groups of definitions, each emphasising another set of features i.e. (1) Where the ideological disposition of the political elites is emphasized, in that the political elite possesses primacy over the ideology of development (e.g. work of Manuel Castells); (2) Where the institutional and organizational structures are emphasized, e.g. “embedded autonomy” as in the work of Peter Evans; and (3) Political institutions that can sustain processes of public deliberation and that enables the broad citizenry to determine and influence the developmental agenda.

Following these broad dimensions the developmental state is one endowed with qualities of having the capacity to achieve what it sets out to do in terms of economic and societal goals – either through direct intervention particularly by using the regulatory capability of the state; through direct delivery of public goods and services or through more indirect means by mobilizing other resources and rewarding these to work towards the development goals as formulated through legitimate political processes and institutions.

Fukuyama (2008) distinguishes between the economic, political and social dimensions of development. This is helpful since in their own right, or in combination, these provide possible key levers for any development strategy. In order to be regarded as developmental, it follows that the state can focus its energies on only some of the levers, instead of trying to achieve them all.

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simultaneously. The five levers are (i) economic growth; (ii) state building; (iii) rule of law; (iv) democracy and (v) social mobilization. Fukuyama cautions, that particularly with respect to the political dimension, one has to note that although they all constitute “institutions” each of these three components of political development has different effects on growth. Relevant to the African context analysis points to the fact that state capacity would seem to be much more important than either rule of law or democracy, particularly at low levels of per capita GDP (i.e., below $1000). (Fukuyama 2008: 27)

Proceeding to the issue of democracy (i.e. accountability), Fukuyama finds that the actual impact of democratic institutions on growth is highly contextual. He cautions that in countries ruled by competent developmental states, greater political participation, particularly if introduced suddenly, may lead to increased demands for redistribution and rent-seeking, both of which may be detrimental to growth. He finds though, on the other hand, in countries with some combination of predatory states, low capacity, and high levels of corruption, democratic accountability may be the only route available to institutional change and long-term growth.

With respect to social mobilisation, and drawing on the work of Samuel Huntington, Fukuyama points to an often manifested negative relationship between the mobilization of new social actors and development, especially when existing political institutions fail to accommodate their demands for participation and do not meet their newly articulated demands. Something like this scenario is unfolding today in Andean countries like Ecuador and Bolivia, where newly mobilized indigenous communities are demanding greater political participation in destabilizing ways. If the political system succeeds in incorporating these actors, it is positive for both political stability

\[5\] Fukuyama 2008: 27

\[6\] Fukuyama 2008 28 - 29
and long-term growth.\textsuperscript{7} This situation would be akin to the transition from limited access societies to open access societies as referred to by North et al.\textsuperscript{8}

Notwithstanding our emerging consensus around what the developmental state is, or is not, how growth (as distinct from development) is to be achieved is still poorly understood. However, some issues are becoming clearer.

The first of these being that the national context and the historical path of the country/region in which growth is to take place are critical determining factors. This automatically rules out the idea of transplanting ideas that has worked in one society, as is, to another society with different dynamics. The work of Acemoglu (2008) with respect to open access orders and limited access orders/natural states is very instructive in this regards.

The second being that the absence of adequate provision by the state of public goods, including infrastructure, such as transport, roads, electricity, modern communications and technology infrastructure and public services, e.g. education and health are major impediments to bring about growth. Accordingly there seems to be a self-fulfilling prophecy for poor growth if the state cannot/ could not in the past fulfill its role in terms of the provisioning of public goods and services.

The third set of factors relate to the issue of good governance in relation to economic growth. The long-run association between good governance and high incomes is indisputable. The existence of a causal link from the former to the latter is widely accepted. HOWEVER, there is no evidence that we can systematically rely upon improved governance to generate increased growth.

\textsuperscript{7} Fukuyama 30 – 31
over periods of 10 to 20 years. Econometric evidence points to a relation between *income levels* and governance criteria, but *not growth*. Rodriks (2008) goes as far as to state that large-scale institutional transformation—of the type entailed by the governance agenda—is hardly ever a prerequisite for getting growth going. In this respect he points to many of the Asian fast growth economies, the most notable being China, that does not do well on any assessment with respect to standard good governance criteria. He concludes for most countries the “good governance” and the “governance for growth” agendas are likely to differ substantially.\(^9\)\(^10\)

In the fourth instance, a rudimentary state with some minimum capacity is a precondition for growth and development.

**STATE OF THINKING ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

Changing perceptions as to the role of the state tends to mirror itself in the dominant paradigms of public administration. As already alluded to New Public Management which enjoyed its peak during the 1980s and 1990s, but which has not been entirely displaced in current thinking on Public Administration is closely associated with a neo-liberal ideological agenda, favouring minimising the role of the state.

However, with the reinstatement of the importance of the role of the state, e.g. concepts of the developmental state, as well as the restoration of the public domain, the space has opened up again to revisit our theoretical perceptions of Public Administration. One of the most influential documents on this discussion is undoubtedly the Mini-symposium structured by the editor of *The International Review of Administrative Sciences* (1\(^{st}\) Quarter, 2007), Christopher Pollitt. Picking up on the 2006 Braibant lecture by Jocelyn Rodriks, 2008. p 24.

\(^{10}\) Fukuyama agrees on this aspect.
Bourgon, Pollitt opened up the discussion on a “New Public Administration (NPA) Theory”.

Bourgon argues traditional Public Administration theory falls short on many dimensions. Nevertheless traditional Public Administration theory did offer, and still offers some sound foundations, especially with respect to working in large organisations, and also the avenues available for comparative Public Administration. The challenges with traditional theory are especially related to flexibility and responsiveness; the perceived divide between politics and policy implementation; as well as accountability frameworks in an era where citizens fundamentally distrust government and other public institutions.

New Public Management Theory which succeeded Traditional Theory and that derived its intellectual foundations from Public Choice Theory, according to Bourgon, equally fails to serve as a viable theory for public administration in the 21st Century. She argues that this is mainly because of the private sector values proposition inherent in NPM, which is wholly unsuitable for application in the public sector.

The current debate around a possible NPA theory suggests some pointers to future thinking in our discipline.

The first aspect is the ethical and values base of public administration. In this regard there is a return to issues of a public orientation where shared or common interests of citizens are the compass, rather than a philosophy dominated by private and individual interests. It is an orientation searching for social justice in the aftermath of a dispensation that resulted in increasing inequities both on individual level, but also mirrored on a global level in the growing gap of prosperity between the economically strong regions of the world and those classified as developing or under-developed. This return to public interest does not mean hostility to issues of efficiency and particularly effectiveness. It emphasises that the available resource base
ought to be deployed and managed in a way to serve the public and human
development agenda, to promote social justice and enhance quality of life as
opposed to pursuing cost saving as an end in itself.

The second pointer is the **centrality of citizens** and the changes that this
will mean in terms of ways of working. Greater direct **accountability** to
citizens, more opportunity for **participation** and direct involvement in the
delivery process, e.g. through social contracts and so forth.

The third pointer is provided by Marcel Pochard in discussion to Bourgon’s
suggestions for future public administration theory, when he refers to the
**extensiveness of the role of the state**, particularly in the future. He
argues that this role will go much beyond the limited perception of delivery of
services, either through direct or indirect interventions. Pochard argues that
this role will make other demands on the public administration than the
service delivery role. It will demand again more of the traditional nature of
administration, i.e. a capability to draw on the full range of traditional
prerogatives of a public power in terms of regulation, control and sanction.
In this respect the state will have to rely on strong, highly competent and
impartial public servants capable of intervention, free of arbitrariness and
ones able to stand up to powerful interests, or “titans” as he refers to these.
Given this power, authority and administration will have to be subjected to
control commensurate with such responsibility and power, keeping it entirely
respectful to the rule of law.

A general pessimism prevails around the capacity of states to take up these
new and extended roles. Identified as one of the most significant contributors
to the capacity shortfall is the sharp decline in public service professionalism,
with repercussions in terms of performance, prestige and most of all,
integrity. This in turn contributes to the diminishing trust that ordinary
people have in public institutions, an issue which were high up on the
international agenda, with the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government
choosing to focus on that particular issue, attempting to find ways to restore trust in government and public institutions.

The Africa Chapter of the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government was of the opinion that government performance, meeting the needs of its citizens, is more than likely the single most important factor that influences trust in governance arrangements in a country. It also noted that public servants as a collective are thus logically at the centre of the future of African countries and their people. Trust in government would grow exponentially if public servants deliver, in a professional manner, services to the public. The meeting found that failing in doing this could lead to socio-political instability and the denigration of human rights.

Having set out some conceptual and analytical frameworks, the question now arises, “how do these relate to ongoing initiatives that are implemented by our African countries in a quest to perform ever better for our citizens?” In the rest of the paper, I want to turn to the SERVICOM experience in Nigeria.

**Example in Nigeria: SERVICOM**

My choice fell on the issue of the Service Compacts, an initiative in line with, for example, the Citizen First initiative in the UK or the Batho Pele (People First) in South Africa. It is a logical start for me, not only since I can speak first hand from the dynamics that gave rise to the adoption and implementation of the SERVICOM, but because I agree with the notion expressed late last year by the SERVICOM National Coordinator, Mr. Ad’Obe Obe. According to him no reform by government would succeed unless it brings about improved service delivery in a specific aspect of life of the people. He went on to state, “Therefore, whatever reform you embark on, service delivery is both the subject and object of the reform. Without

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11 Unless separately referenced, all material used in preparation for this section was taken from the official SERVICOM website that can be accessed on [www.servicom.gov.ng](http://www.servicom.gov.ng)
improving service, no reform would be said to have been successful. Therefore SERVICOM is the mother of all Reforms”.

Allow me to provide some background. In June 2003 at the Inauguration Ceremony of the New Members of the National Assembly, former President Olusegun Obasanjo focused the attention on the poor quality of public service delivery in Nigeria, mentioning that Nigerians are in fact being short-changed. He stated:

"Our Public offices have for too long been a showcase for the combined evils of inefficiency and corruption, whilst being impediments to effective implementations of government policies. Nigerians deserve better. We will ensure that they get what is better!"

This initiative followed two and a half years after the adoption of the Kuru Declaration in February 2001. This declaration embodied the New Orientation and the New National Ideology for Nigeria, captured as:

"To build a truly great African democratic country, politically united, integrated and stable, economically prosperous, socially organized, with equal opportunity for all, and responsibility from all, to become the catalyst of Black Renaissance, and making adequate all-embracing contributions, sub-regionally, regionally, and globally.”

The Kuru Declaration displays the era within which it was conceived, repeatedly highlighting concerns of efficiency and economy, while emphasising the modernization of management. These were typical points of emphasis of the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm, driven hard from within a neo-liberal ideology which came under severe criticism by the turn of the century, but which is still widely evident in Africa.

The theme of service delivery is one that bridges NPM and more emphasis in Africa on the developmental state. It was taken forward when in December
2003 a review project of Service Delivery in Nigeria was commissioned, focusing on the institutional environment of service delivery, but also taking into consideration the people’s views and experiences. By February the review study was completed, *inter alia*, making the following conclusions:

- services are not benefiting people as they are inaccessible and indifferent to customer needs;
- public confidence is poor;
- institutional arrangements are confusing and wasteful;
- service delivery programmes should rather respond to citizens and consumer demand; and
- service entitlements and rights (including timeframes and fees) should be communicated to the people.

The actual Service Compact (SERVICOM) with all Nigerians was adopted in Abuja on 21 March 2004, following the Special Presidential retreat on Service Delivery during the period 10 – 21 March 2004. The Service Compact contains elements speaking to

- improved service delivery;
- trained staff;
- transparency and accountability by sharing information re service delivery standards and progress with Nigerians;
- responsiveness to needs of the population, formulated in a way that will ensure understanding by ordinary people; as well as
- popular empowerment.

It expresses a commitment to a human rights approach to service delivery, whilst honouring the principle of the Rule of Law. The population is recognised as the keepers of lay knowledge that could be beneficial to the overall service delivery endeavour and provision is made for active involvement of the population’s role. The Compact takes issue with corruption, clearly expressing a desire for ordinary Nigerians to become
partners in the fight against corruption and formulating the basics for an integrity system. The Compact is also formulated as an addition to the already existing Code of Ethics for top leadership, which outlines the following seven principles to be adhered to: selflessness; integrity; objectivity; accountability; honesty; openness and leadership.

In its formulation the Service Compact addresses negative issues associated with the public sector employees such as:

- the traditional high-handedness and all-knowingness of officials;
- their incompetence;
- the disempowerment of ordinary people through the officious language typically being used;
- asking of bribes in anticipation of services required;
- their tardiness in responding in a timely manner;
- the facelessness and impunity of the bureaucratic machinery by clearly identifying complaint channels and providing for regular performance reporting; and
- the exclusive hold of the bureaucracy on information, and therefore their power vis-à-vis ordinary people;

In the final clause of the Compact the link is firmly made between service delivery by the State and development/prosperity. Clause 5 clearly states that Nigeria can only realize its full potential when citizens start to receive prompt and efficient service from the State and the final expression of determination to achieve exactly that.

Institutionally and organisationally the Service Compact makes provision for the following roles and functions:

1. The President of Nigeria: receiving reports regarding the progress made by the Ministries and Agencies with respect to implementation of the Service Compact
2. A **SERVICOM** office in the Presidency, responsible for the following:
   a) Co-ordinating the efforts to formulate and operationalise **SERVICOM** Charters;
   b) Monitoring and progress reporting to the President
   c) Carrying out independent service delivery and customer satisfaction surveys, and
   d) Publicising the results of these surveys to keep citizens fully informed.

3. The Federal Executive Council approves policies and resource proposals that include measurable performance based front-line service delivery indicators, with a clear result-oriented timescale for delivery

4. Ministers:
   a) Ensure policies and resource proposals presented to the Federal Executive Council meet the requirements set, including that they are responsive to needs of the population, identified through a participatory process of stakeholder involvement and that feedback regarding performance is similarly received through participatory processes;
   b) maintain effective liaison with relevant agencies of all tiers of government concerned with service delivery so that **SERVICOM** Principles are upheld throughout the Nigerian Society;
   c) establish dedicated **SERVICOM** units within Ministries with the responsibility of operationalising **SERVICOM** Principles; and
   d) ensure full co-operation by those under their watch with the Service Delivery (**SERVICOM**) Office.

5. Ministries, Parastatals and Agencies were responsible for the preparation and publication of **SERVICOM** Charters by 1 July 2004

6. Citizens have to fulfil their civic responsibility, being active partners, fulfilling their own constitutional and legal obligations, contributing to the development of their respective communities while simultaneously advancing values and virtues imbibed in African tradition.
It is particularly the establishment of a dedicated office, resourced with a senior component of staff at the centre of government which is critical for sustaining an emphasis on the Compact and driving the service delivery forward. The Management Team of SERVICOM comprises a national coordinator, the Chief SERVICOM officer, the Head of the SERVICOM Institute, a Public Awareness manager plus six others.

The SERVICOM charters are the chief mechanism through which the implementation of SERVICOM takes place. Every Government Department since July 2004 is supposed to have one, and is responsible for displaying it where the public can engage with it. The Charters are the basis for:

- Managing customers’ expectations with respect to the quality of Service Delivery;
- Formulating customers’ rights to good service and facilitate them demanding these rights;
- Outlining customers’ recourse when services delivery fails; and
- Mobilising customers’ involvement in the Service Delivery Programme

In order to give particular impetus to service delivery improvement, pilots have been established across the country and in different sectors. These include in the area of Road safety, General Outpatient Department in selected hospitals; Police communications: Passport office and the Cross River state SERVICOM pilot. For example, the road safety pilot has established the One-stop-claims shop for Motor Vehicle Insurance code named OSCAR in Abuja to assist accident victims in processing third party insurance claims. This initiative has been tested for replication across Nigeria and is ready for rapid roll-out.

The SERVICOM office is responsible for conducting Compliance Evaluation of services charters provided by Government Departments. Herein lays one of the shortcomings of the system. Although compliance evaluations are useful, its utility is limited and easily lapses into meeting the requirements of a “tick-list”. If real progress is to be made with service delivery improvement, if the internalization of service delivery as part of organizational and cultural change
needs assessing and particularly if this initiative with respect to supporting the
development agenda for Nigeria needs determining, the emphasis on
compliance monitoring will fall short. For that process and impact evaluations
would be required.

A SERVICOM index is currently displayed on the SERVICOM web page, clearly
using a compliance evaluation approach to determine a score out of 4, which
is then labeled either as “shamefull”; “fair”; “commendable” or “praiseworthy”.
What is curious is that not in one instance, not even the “praiseworthy”
category, is any “major strength” noted that could conceivable serve as an
example or encouragement to others. The practice of concentrating on the
negative and the shortcomings are inherently anti-developmental, and the
Office will have to attend to this tendency, recognizing strengths as well as
weaknesses. It also needs noting that currently only 19 public bodies are
listed in the index, where many more are intended under the SERVICOM
approach.

More recently the SERVICOM Institute was established as part of the
SERVICOM office. The Institute is responsible for training of public officials
with special reference to service delivery improvement. With its specialised
focus on service delivery, the Institute very quickly processed 1000 trainees,
even before the official launch of the Institute. This initiative enjoys the
generous support and continued commitment of DfID. During 2007 a special
training programme was launched for SERVICOM Nodal points in all
Ministries, Departments and Agencies, in order to equip them to drive the
SERVICOM process with vigour in their respective settings.

The SERVICOM initiative is different from many other public service reform
processes, since it is outward looking, focusing on the strengthening of the
demand side, as well as the supply side. With respect to demand, much is
going into educating Nigerians regarding their rights with respect to service
delivery and clarifying routes to be used for recourse should the performance
of the public bureaucracy fall short of the stated standards. The initiative is
clearly aimed at making a correction in the distribution of power between officials and citizens and mobilising the citizenry in the fight against corruption.

Through its emphasis on openness; information sharing; accountability; and so forth, the long term spin-off of this service delivery improvement initiative will inevitable be the restoration of trust in government and public institutions, a critical component in the development equation.

If successful with respect to curbing the perennial loss of significant resources for public development purposes through corruption and other unethical practices, the SERVICOM initiative, which obviously operates in consort with the other existing integrity frameworks, will contribute greatly to the developmental agenda of the Nigerian government.

**IN CONCLUSION**

SERVICOM, although it is analogues to public sector reform initiatives in other contexts, i.e. Citizen First of the UK, is truly rooted in our own Nigerian reality. In this respect I believe we are underlining the insight of Bagchi\(^\text{12}\) that “every successful developmental state introduces its own innovations in the economic and social organisation of the country and cannot afford to simply live on imitations”. Differently put, we acknowledge the need to recognise our own context, building on institutions that will work in our own setting, in the search for public sector reforms that could support us in making the transition to a developmental state.

SERVICOM is targeted to address shortcomings in the delivery of public goods and services. It has targeted in its early years exactly the agencies responsible for much of the infrastructure and services that according to our conceptual discussion, will underpin economic growth and development and

\(^{12}\) Quoted by Edigheji
serve as levers to catapult us into a higher trajectory of performance, i.e. transport, roads, energy supply, and so forth.

With respect to our choice in path to becoming such a developmental state the following observations. The analytical framework of Fukuyama discussed earlier identified five separate economic, political, and social dimensions of development. As pointed out any one of them could be an entry point for a development strategy. The SERVICOM initiative is however a broad sweep initiative, touching on all three the political factors distinguished by Fukuyama, i.e. state-building (specifically capacity development of the bureaucracy); Rule of Law; and democracy. In addition, it also embraces elements of social mobilisation, activating the citizenry and endowing them with their own responsibilities in the big endeavour of service delivery improvement. In comparing this endeavour then with, for example the developmental state as expressed in the East Asian situation, it is very different, indeed rising to the occasion of addressing the shortcomings with respect to democratic, inclusive and participatory political and social institutions.

Nigeria at the start of the millennium closely resembled the key characteristics of what Huntington described as a “blocked” country: economic decline, high levels of corruption, lack of transparency and an overall political system that was not entirely accountable to the population. Obviously, even in a short space of time these features are changing as a consequence to new reform initiatives we are introducing, e.g. SERVICOM. Huntington is particularly positive about social mobilisation as an important entry point for development in such cases. As already suggested the SERVICOM initiative contains many features that are empowering to the citizenry, providing the basis for social mobilisation. In fact, it is an initiative that caters generously on the demand side of service delivery, rather than on the traditional supply side, and as such is particularly promising to bring about effective change also on the development and economic growth front. In addition, SERVICOM constitutes,
combined with the Kuru Declaration and the Code of Ethics, a powerful integrity framework which if effectively implemented, monitored and sanctioned could be a powerful mechanism to address corruption in our society.

With respect to how SERVICOM fits into the discussion regarding the transition away from NPM to support a state conceived to have a much more extensive role than what was provided for in a minimalist perception the following: Although the initial concept of these charters was originally rooted in a NPM framework, i.e. a private sector orientation to customer satisfaction, it is one of the public sector reform initiatives that with little adaptation could translate into that of NPA, given its emphasis on restoring an ethical and values base for public administration that gives a true reflection of the public nature of public administration, and it also firmly revolves around the centrality of citizens, greater accountability to them, as well as increased opportunities for participation. Our own declarations still reflect a mixture of NPM associated language, with the odd reference to customers, and a heavy emphasis on efficiency and economy. I believe as time goes by, and as the new theoretical framework becomes clearer we might adjust this to show the real direction of our transformation.

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