# Table of Contents

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 1

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** ...................................................................................................................................................................................... iii

- Project Scope ........................................................................................................................................................................................... iii
- Description of the Case Studies ................................................................................................................................................................. iv
  - Service Delivery Integration ................................................................................................................................................................ iv
  - Integration around Programs .................................................................................................................................................................. v
  - Integration around Partnership Agreements ......................................................................................................................................... vii
  - Whole-Of-Government Integration................................................................................................................................................... viii
- Key Findings ............................................................................................................................................................................................. ix
- Summary ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ x

1. **INTRODUCTION** ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1 What is Integrated Governance? ......................................................................................................................................................... 1
   1.2 Methodology ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 3
   1.3 Structure of the Report ........................................................................................................................................................................... 4

2. **DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK** ......................................................................................................................... 5
   2.1 Rationale for a Shift to Integrated Governance ................................................................................................................................. 5
   2.2 Ideas Underpinning Integrated Governance ........................................................................................................................................ 13
   2.2.1 Mutuality ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 13
   2.2.2 Policy and Government Relationship Grid ........................................................................................................................................ 16
   2.2.3 Process for Integrated Governance – Network, Cooperation, Coordination, Collaboration, Partnership .................................................. 17
   2.3 Key Findings on Integrated Governance ........................................................................................................................................... 21
   2.4 Conceptual Framework ........................................................................................................................................................................ 23

3. **CASE STUDIES – SERVICE DELIVERY INTEGRATION** .......................................................................................................................... 25
   3.1 Commonwealth - Centrelink – Disability Services ................................................................................................................................ 25
   3.2 Key Features That Make the Program Work .................................................................................................................................... 30
   3.3 Barriers Or Constraints ....................................................................................................................................................................... 31
   3.4 What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn From This Program .................................................................................................................. 32
### 3.2 Tasmania – Service Tasmania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Features</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers Or Constraints</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. CASE STUDIES - INTEGRATION AROUND PROGRAMS

#### 4.1 New South Wales – Regional Coordination Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Coordination Management Groups</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Features That Make the Program Work</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers Or Constraints</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn From This Program</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.2 Queensland – Community Renewal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of the Program</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submissions</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal Areas</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for Community Renewal</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Features That Make The Program Work</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers Or Constraints</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn From This Program</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.3 Western Australia – SAFER W.A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Features That Make The Program Work</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers Or Constraints</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn From This Program</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5. CASE STUDIES - INTEGRATION AROUND PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

#### 5.1 South Australia – Working Together

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Features That Make The Program Work</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers Or Constraints</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn From This Program</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. CASE STUDIES - WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT INTEGRATION ................................................................. 73
   6.1 Victoria ................................................................................................................................... 73
       Key Features .......................................................................................................................... 76
       Barriers Or Constraints ....................................................................................................... 76
       What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn .................................................................................. 76

7. SYNTHESIS OF CASE STUDIES ................................................................................................. 77
   7.1 Drivers for Integration .......................................................................................................... 77
   7.2 Case Study Framework ........................................................................................................ 77
   7.3 Service Delivery Integration ............................................................................................... 80
       Lessons from the Case Studies .......................................................................................... 82
   7.4 Integration Around Programs ............................................................................................ 82
       Lessons from the Case Studies .......................................................................................... 84
   7.5 Integration Around Partnership Agreements ........................................................................ 85
       Lessons from the Case Study ............................................................................................. 85
   7.6 Whole-of-Government Integration ...................................................................................... 86
       Lessons from the Case Study ............................................................................................. 87
   7.7 Levels of Integration Within Government .......................................................................... 88

8. KEY FINDINGS .......................................................................................................................... 91
   8.1 Key Findings ....................................................................................................................... 91
   8.2 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 100

APPENDIX A: CASE VISITS QUESTIONS ..................................................................................... 103
   Case Study Site Visit Questions ........................................................................................... 103

APPENDIX B: INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE SURVEY ......................................................................... 105
   1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 105
   2. Definitions .......................................................................................................................... 105
      2.1 What do we mean by integrated governance? .............................................................. 105
      2.2 Sounds great in theory but what exactly does it mean in practice? ......................... 106
      2.3 What is the rationale for a shift to integrated governance? ....................................... 106
      2.4 What are the assumed outcomes? ............................................................................... 107
   3. Questions ............................................................................................................................ 107

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................... 111
Acknowledgements

This report is the result of the collaboration and cooperation of a number of individuals and organisations. Dr Michael Keating supported the research process throughout and provided valuable assistance in articulating critical issues, shaping the report, and providing editorial feedback. Tony Lawson provided expert editorial assistance. Dianne James assisted with valuable administrative support and saw the document through to its publishable form.

Members of the IPAA National Research Project Reference Group willingly participated in the research process, giving insightful feedback at critical stages and discussing key issues. The report is considerably strengthened by their valuable contributions.

- Dianne James, General Manager, IPAA Queensland and Secretariat, IPAA National
- Dr. Arthur McHugh, Auditor-General, Tasmanian Audit Office
- Carolyn Bloch, Deputy Director, NSW Department of Sport and Recreation
- David Adams, Director - Policy Development and Research, Department of Premier and Cabinet Victoria
- Diane Gilbert, Secretary, IPAA WA Divisional Council
- Professor John Halligan, Professor of Public Administration, University of Canberra
- Dr. Michael Keating, Visiting Fellow Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National University and Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science at Griffith University.
- Dr. Patty Renfrow, School of Management, University of Queensland Business School
- Tony Lawson, Tony Lawson Consultancy Pty Ltd.

We are particularly grateful to the following individuals from the case studies and to all those consultees in each State and Territory who found the time to meet with us:

- Peter Fisher, Peter Kentwell and Paul Conn, Centrelink, Commonwealth Government
- Tim Farland, Premier’s Department, New South Wales
- David Adams, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Victoria
- Lee Wightman, Department of Human Services, South Australia
- Gary Hamley, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Western Australia
- Peter Walsh, Department of Housing, Queensland
- Brian Ward, Centrelink, and Paul Kenny, Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment, Tasmania.

Finally, our thanks to the Success Works team for their contribution to this project, particularly Caroline Allen for her desktop publishing.

Dr. Tricia Szion - Zara Lasater
Dr. Jim Hyde - Cathi Moore
Executive Summary

Project Scope

In 2000 the Institute of Public Administration Australia (IPAA), National Office, commissioned a national research project titled *Working Together – Integrated Governance*. In doing so IPAA sought to advance understanding of a major shift in public administration involving integrated solutions across sectors and tiers of government within a framework of governance as opposed to single government or agency service delivery.

The methodology for the project agreed between Success Works and the IPAA National Research Project Reference Group involved three parts: desk research incorporating a literature review and examination of available government documents; case study research; and analysis and report writing. The first part included an extensive literature review (see separate document entitled ‘Supporting Material’) which highlighted general agreement on the drivers leading to an integrated approach and theory underpinning integrated governance but provided less detail on the practicalities of integration. A framework organising case study findings was derived from the literature, as was a short questionnaire to provide preliminary information on each case study.

Case Study Framework for Examining Integrated Governance

[Diagram of Case Study Framework]

- **Global Influencing Factors**
  - Globalisation
  - Public Dissatisfaction Amid Rising Expectations
  - Budget Stringency
  - Technology

- **Archetypal Methods of Public Administration Control**
  - Federal
  - Local

- **Policy and Government Relationship Grid**
  - Generic
  - Specific

- **Processes for Integrated Governance**
  - Networking
  - Cooperation
  - Coordination
  - Collaboration
  - Partnership

- **Barriers to be Overcome**
  - Structural e.g. Federalism Separation of Powers
  - Bureaucratic e.g. Civil Service
  - Regulatory Issues (Public Accountability vs Flexibility)
  - Political
  - Internal

- **Assumed Outcomes**
  - Holistic Government
  - Client Focused Government
  - Whole of Client Approach
  - Collaboration of Services at the Point of Intersection
  - Community Renewal
  - Broader Community Input
  - Increased Social Capital
  - Learning Organisations
  - Joined Up Departments, Policy, Programs, Outcomes, Indicators, Budgets
As noted in the brief, case study research was an expectation of the study. Rather than nomination by the research team, each of the case studies was proposed by the States involved, with Service Tasmania added later. Each of the seven case studies received a site visit during the months of June, July, August and September 2001. The project team met with a large number of stakeholders for each case study, conducting interviews and focus groups as appropriate. In addition, a review of internal data was undertaken.

Following completion of the case study consultation phase, a workshop was held in Melbourne, sponsored by the Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet, with the National Research Project Reference Group and representatives from each case study. The workshop was followed by a synthesis of ideas for the IPAA National Conference 2001 (held in Sydney in November 2001) and preparation of the final published report. Throughout the process, the National Research Project Reference Group provided valuable feedback, insights and critique.

Description of the Case Studies

While an inclusive definition of integrated governance as used for the purpose of this research allows for an acceptance of the mutuality of effort, the research team separated integration into categories such as service delivery integration, integration around programs, integration around partnership agreements and whole-of-government integration.

Service Delivery Integration

The two case studies that involve integration for enhanced service delivery are Centrelink and Service Tasmania.

Centrelink, Commonwealth Government:

In addition to operations and examination of the one-stop-shop concept as applied to Centrelink, the research team examined the Disability and Carers Service Delivery Improvement Strategy. This strategy combines Centrelink service delivery innovation such as the “Life Events” concept and 1-2-1 (one-to-one)
customer service relationship. The “Life Events” concept places the responsibility for tailoring services on the organisation and not the client. The client simply articulates his/her issues/needs and the organisation offers a tailored package to meet these needs based in part on the organisation’s understanding of life events such as having a baby or becoming sick or disabled. In responding to the life event, products and services can be offered from over 70 products and services delivered by Centrelink on behalf of seven government agencies. The service offer, then, crosses departmental boundaries.

In the Disability and Carers Service Delivery Improvement Strategy, rather than conduct a pre-grant interview when a customer first comes to Centrelink, customers are requested to first provide documentation so that a 1-2-1 Customer Service Officer can assess their needs before an interview is held. A Service Offer interview is then provided to the customer and includes payment information, specialist appointments, community and employment assistance referrals, information on rights and obligations, and future contact requirements. In addition to the increased decision-making roles of the 1-2-1 officer, it allows the Centrelink Disability Officer, who would formerly have been making all assessments, to seek to maintain and improve community partnerships.

Service Tasmania, Tasmania:

The research team examined the partnership established in 1998 between Centrelink and Service Tasmania to provide Commonwealth and State Government services from several common sites in Tasmania. Service configuration varies to include co-location or Service Tasmania acting as an agency for Centrelink. In this way, customers can access Commonwealth, State, and local government services from one location.

Integration around Programs

The next category of integration concerned integration through a particular program. Integration in this category concerns the “wicked problems” such as regional development, community renewal and crime prevention.

Regional Coordination Program, New South Wales:

The research team examined the Regional Coordination Program (RCP). The Regional Coordination Program began in 1994 as a pilot project to enhance Government responses to issues impacting on rural and regional communities. Extensions of the program in 1997, 1998, and 1999 have led to state-wide coverage. Under the program, Regional Coordinators lead and support projects that have demonstrable benefit for communities. Agencies retain core operations. In addition to the two-person offices of Coordinator and administrative support in each region, there is a Regional Coordination Management Group (RCMG)
comprising senior regional managers. A nominated Regional Manager chairs the RCMG. The Strategic Projects Division of the NSW Premier’s Department manages the RCP. The Program is funded by a combination of allocations from the Consolidated Fund and agency contributions. Thirty-seven agencies across the NSW Government contribute funding to the program.

**Community Renewal, Queensland:**

The research team examined Community Renewal. One component of Queensland’s 1998 Crime Prevention Strategy, Community Renewal, is a whole-of-government strategy to promote safe, healthy and confident communities based on a partnership between the Queensland Government and people living and working in renewal areas. The primary goal of the Community Renewal Program is to fund and implement strategies to reduce crime and raise the confidence and image of identified communities through a wide range of projects and activities. A place-based approach is used. Key implementation tools include notional allocations for each renewal area; community action planning to develop plans; allocation of direct funding through an auspiced agency or local government; setting up of Community Reference Groups; and validation of proposals for funding by the Community Reference Group, local Regional Managers Forums, and the local state Member of Parliament.

The program is administered by the Queensland Department of Housing and works closely with other state government agencies, local councils and communities in the 15 target areas to identify and implement renewal initiatives. The Department of Housing’s Community Renewal Unit is responsible for planning, developing, implementing, coordinating and evaluating the Community Renewal Program.

**SAFER W.A., Western Australia:**

In Western Australia, SAFER W.A. was the subject of research. In line with the new government restructure, the SAFER W.A. Unit has been amalgamated into the Office of Crime Prevention reporting to a new Standing Committee. As this change is recent, the old structure is provided below. SAFER W.A. is a whole-of-government and whole-of-community initiative established in 1998 to prevent, reduce and tackle the causes of crime. The strategic directions for SAFER W.A. were set by the Cabinet Standing Committee on Law and Order which comprised the Premier and Deputy Premier (as co-chairs); the Attorney General, the Minister for Justice and the Ministers for Police, Family and Children’s Services; and Local Government. The SAFER W.A. structure includes:

- A SAFER W.A. Council comprising government and community representatives to act as the Government’s key advisory body on law and order issues. It has strategic oversight of the SAFER W.A. funding programs.
The Chief Executive Officers Working Group comprising Executive Director, Policy Department of the Premier and Cabinet and its members and the CEOs, or the nominated representative of the CEOs, of the key government agencies. This group ensures the implementation of the across-government decisions of the Cabinet Standing Committee on Law and Order and ensures cooperation and coordination between Government agencies.

- 14 District Interagency Working Groups (DIAWGs) operating in each SAFER W.A. District, which are based on police districts. DIAWGs report to the CEOs Working Group and work to improve cooperation and coordination between the SAFER W.A. agencies at the local level.

- SAFER W.A. District and Local Committees comprising community representatives who work in partnership with State Government agencies, police and local government to address local safety, security and crime prevention issues and to share local crime solutions and exchange information. There are currently in excess of 80 community based SAFER W.A. committees involving over 1,000 members throughout the state.

- SAFER W.A. Committees’ Executive Inc. which represents the District and Local Committees.

- The SAFER W.A. Unit within the Department of the Premier and Cabinet which provides policy, coordination and secretariat support to SAFER W.A.

In addition to the funds provided to the District and Local Committees through the SAFER W.A. Committee’s Executive, grants are available from:

- The Community Policing Fund
- State Crime Prevention Strategy Fund
- SAFER W.A. Fund
- SAFER W.A. Community Security Program.

**Integration around Partnership Agreements**

*Working Together, South Australia:*

The research team examined *Working Together*. Initially called the “Resource Allocation Project”, *Working Together* is seen as providing a practical framework for addressing issues which arose out of many years of dialogue between the Department of Human Services and non-government community service providers. *Working Together* is a “living document” (2001) which provides a framework for the relationship between the Department of Human Services and non-government community service providers in South Australia. Its genesis lies in the understanding by both sectors that the effective delivery of a range of
community services requires productive working relationships based on mutual respect and cooperation. The document establishes a shared purpose, shared principles, shared framework for distributing resources, contracting principles, performance monitoring principles, shared skill development goals, agreed role of the peak bodies, and goals for a DHS/Peaks Forum. Implementation of the strategy is leading to integration of internal DHS contracting processes and documents and more integration within the community service sector through a peak body voice.

Whole-Of-Government Integration

Victoria:

Rather than focus on a particular program in Victoria, the research team looked at the overall Victorian approach to integration. The policy framework to guide what in Victoria is being termed “joined up government” includes a triple bottom line framework which is believed to lead to a focus on improving outcomes for the community in economic, environmental and social well being. There is an initial focus on organic joining up through attention to the “why” of integration by focusing on outcomes.

The current framework development arose out of the integration of four different frameworks being developed in parallel by various departments. This amalgamation has increased the focus on integration or joining up in Victoria. In addition to promoting the framework, several priority areas are receiving attention to determine how to best implement joined up government. In addition, there is an examination of:

- Pooled budgets.
- The use of community capacity building to generate more integration of government services. For example, this has led to submissions by departments to the Community Support Fund for a Strategic Initiatives program which must include cross-department support.
- Development of a set of joint indicators.
- Use of the Intranet (internal agency system) and other IT mechanisms to ensure wide communication and exploration of e-Government.
Key Findings

Seven key findings were derived from the case study research.

**Key Finding No. 1:** The concept of integration can be usefully divided, both for the purposes of categorisation and to observe the forms integration is taking within government, into the three categories of service delivery integration (to include integration around partnership agreements), integration around programs, and whole-of-government integration. Each category has specific key features, accountability issues, and success factors.

**Key Finding No. 2:** While there are various government levels at which integration can operate, each level is hindered by the lack of integration above it. Therefore, integration is complex and requires attention at all levels of government in order to be successful.

- **Key Finding 2a:** At the Government level, integration can be assisted through adoption of integrated outcomes.
- **Key Finding 2b:** At the Senior Management level, integration can be facilitated through systems change such as outcomes based funding, joint KPIs, and integrated IT systems.
- **Key Finding 2c:** At the Program Management level, integration can be facilitated through the willingness and passion of key players to work together, the pooling of resources, articulation of shared vision and purpose, and the relinquishment of some control.
- **Key Finding 2d:** At the Service Delivery level, integration can be assisted by the development of co-located services (through One Stop Shops, for example), integrated and “intelligent” IT systems, and pursuit of networking and service coordination options.

**Key Finding No. 3:** While structural, political and internal barriers are evident, bureaucratic barriers appear to be the most prominent. Given the nature of the barriers likely to be encountered, it is therefore arguable that integrated governance is about changing bureaucracy.

**Key Finding No. 4:** There are common success factors for integration. These include political commitment to new governmental working relationships, engagement by the Premier's Department and Treasury, and flexible funding arrangements.
Key Finding No. 5: Leadership is critical to successful integration, particularly leadership of the Premier. However, it is not viable to suggest a model where, in order to take the public sector forward, the Premier is accountable for everything. A better model may be to have the Premier’s Department act as incubator with responsibility given to a lead agency when appropriate.

Key Finding No. 6: Governance by committee is not necessarily more effective than top-down governance. There is a need to have an individual or a lead agency, rather than a committee, with primary responsibility for ensuring that the integrated approach works.

Key Finding No. 7: Integrated governance is hard and resource intensive. While it can be beneficial its use should be selective. Each department/agency/jurisdiction has “core business” or specialisations that need to continue. Integration is about addressing those issues and problems that can only be solved in partnership, where there is an acknowledgement of a multiplicity of stakeholders.

Summary

The research suggests that an evolution in breaking down the barriers to integrated outcomes requiring structural, bureaucratic, political and internal changes is slowly occurring at a global level in response to a maturing constituency, globalisation, and the spread of information technology. This evolution does not require wholesale systems change – for instance there will always be a need for major government departments to concentrate on their areas of specialisation. It will, however, require some systemic change at the levels suggested and a rethink of transparency and accountability in government and governance to include the meaningful inclusion of new players such as consumers and community into systems. Integrated accountability must mean shared accountability, difficult as this may be. It will also require cultural change, incorporating rewards for the policy entrepreneurs and acceptance of greater risk.

If a more fundamental change is required, this study found Australia to be in the early stages. Our research indicates that there are working examples of integrated governance which have not fundamentally altered the current style of governing. However, these case studies indicate some level of frustration in undertaking an integrated approach within the existing governmental structure.
Key questions remain:

- Is integration an end in itself?
- What are the fundamental shifts required to move this area forward?
- What are the factors required to provide credibility?
- Does the concept of mutuality and/or interdependence hold the key?
- What are the rewards/incentives required to encourage senior managers to engage in the process?
- How much of this is budget driven?
- Is a focus on solving the problems and achieving real outcomes the essential component?

This project, Integrated Governance, takes integration beyond committee meetings, service delivery collaboration and networking and the reorganisation of silo-like structures, into the more uncertain realm of dynamic and flexible solutions. Approaches to integrated governance in Australia are still developing. While this research contributes to a better understanding of current initiatives, it outlines processes which still need to be undertaken by governments in Australia for integration to be truly adopted, or fully studied.
1. Introduction

In 2000 the Institute of Public Administration Australia (IPAA), National Office, commissioned a national research project titled *Working Together – Integrated Governance*. In doing so IPAA sought to advance understanding of a major shift in public administration involving integrated solutions across sectors and tiers of government within a framework of governance as opposed to single government or agency service delivery. The research brief requested insights and a context for understanding changing relationships – including examples of best practice and experience in Australia and overseas – through a literature review; demonstration of best practice and lessons being learned in Australia including the range of relationships and issues of concern arising through an examination of case studies; and discussion of future directions and actions. This report examines the drivers for integration and develops a framework for an examination of case studies. It describes several examples of where integration has taken place in Australia and presents key findings derived from case study research.

1.1 What is Integrated Governance?

Moving away from a command and control mode of governance to governance through multiple stakeholders is an emerging policy paradigm which is not unique to Australia. Phrases such as joined-up government have been made famous by Tony Blair in the UK, while networked government is used in some areas of the United States. Collaboration and partnership have become common parlance in policy documents. While this study has adopted the World Bank (1992) definition of governance as “the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs”, literature points to the absence of a common usage, although the term has increasing meaning as a concept with integration implicit in its functioning. ¹

¹ See for example, Stoker (1998); Rhodes (1996); and Rhodes (2000).
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its discussion paper “Reconceptualising Governance” defines the term as:

*the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation’s affairs. It is the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences* (1997, p: 9).

The concept of integration, while being value laden, is less complicated. Integration is used to mean both integration within government (both inter and intra) and collaboration with other sectors.

The concept incorporates some element of what the research team has termed mutuality, as opposed to individual action. The focus on individual actions by government in recent years is being modulated by a resurgence in the use of collective action. A subset of collective action is mutuality. Given the policy cycle, this means mutuality at any point – not in terms of consultation but in terms of shared responsibility for policy development, planning, implementation and evaluation. Drawing together the definitions noted above, for the purposes of this study, the following definition is used: “*Integrated governance describes the structure of formal and informal relations to manage affairs through collaborative (joined-up) approaches which may be between government agencies, or across levels of government (local, State and Commonwealth) and/or the non-government sector.*” As a term that encompasses rather disparate ways of working, it can include such concepts as informal relationships, cooperative relationships, coordinated relationships, collaborative relationships, and partnerships (i.e. partnerships in joint planning, implementation or evaluation). While these terms and concepts are not new, it is the attempt to apply them more broadly across government that is being explored here. It would appear that the drivers for integration, which are explored in the next Chapter, are prompting an extensive exploration of these concepts beyond collaboration at the point of service delivery.

Integrated governance, as defined for this study, can be seen as a “catch-all term” for activities which include some acknowledgment of mutuality (i.e. reciprocity or bi/multilateral links). However, the core event is integration which implies organisational fusion not just collaboration or more organic links. Activities which fall under the rubric of “integrated governance” for this study, given the broad focus of the assigned case studies and the need to retrofit the definition and concepts to the case studies, include:

- Pooled budgets
- Triple bottom line analysis
- Government/Voluntary Sector Compacts or other partnership
• Partnerships with the private sector
• Partnerships with other levels of government
• Revisions of relationships between provider and client
• Coordination of service delivery
• Broad policy frameworks
• Integrated planning
• One Stop Shops
• Community-based cabinets
• Summits/Roundtables/Visioning
• Networks
• Tendering with partnering criteria
• Joint databases
• Joint intake and referral mechanisms
• Joint indicators.

Fundamentally, the concept incorporates an acknowledgment of mutuality and a movement away from a “silo” mentality.

1.2 Methodology

The methodology for the project agreed between Success Works and the IPAA National Research Project Reference Group, involved three parts: desk research incorporating a literature review and examination of available government documents; case study research; and analysis and report writing. The first part included an extensive literature review (see separate document entitled ‘Supporting Material’) which highlighted general agreement on the drivers leading to an integrated approach and theory underpinning integrated governance but provided less detail on the practicalities of integration. A framework organising case study findings was derived from the literature, as was a short questionnaire to provide preliminary information on each case study (contained in Appendix B).

---

2 The IPAA National Research Project Reference Group comprised a self-nominated group of interested individuals including former and current senior bureaucrats, policy makers, academics, and consultants.
As noted in the brief, case study research was an expectation of the study. Rather than nomination by the research team, each of the case studies was proposed by the States involved, with Service Tasmania added later. Each of the seven case studies received a site visit during the months of June, July, August and September 2001. The project team met with a large number of stakeholders for each case study, conducting interviews and focus groups as appropriate. In addition, a review of internal data was undertaken. Questions which assisted in guiding the case study research are in Appendix A although, in true qualitative fashion, the research team was not limited to these questions. The information gathered from the case studies is dated and does not reflect policy changes beyond November 2001. In particular, the SAFER W.A. case study is based on an old structure.

Following completion of the case study consultation phase, a workshop was held in Melbourne, sponsored by the Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet, with the National Research Project Reference Group and representatives from each case study. The workshop was followed by a synthesis of ideas for the IPAA National Conference 2001, held in Sydney in November 2001, and preparation of the final published report. Throughout the process, the National Research Project Reference Group provided valuable feedback, insights, and critique.

1.3 Structure of the Report

The report is structured into three major sections:

- Chapters 1–2 provide an introduction to the project and concepts which underpin the analytic framework of inquiry. In particular, Chapter 2 interrogates the national and international literature to bring together a conceptual framework for clustering of case study findings.

- Chapters 3–6 outline the case studies from each Australian State. The case studies have been grouped according to:
  - Service Delivery Integration – Centrelink and Service Tasmania.
  - Integration around Programs – NSW Regional Coordination; Queensland Community Renewal; Safer WA.
  - Integration around Partnership Agreements – S.A. Working Together.

- Chapters 7–8 synthesise the main findings. In Chapter 7 the case studies are analysed within the Case Study Framework while Chapter 8 identifies key findings and their implications.
2. Development of a Conceptual Framework

A full literature review is contained in a separate document entitled “Supporting Material”. Relevant sections are presented here as a context for the discussion of the case studies. Given that the case studies were in Australia an effort was made by the research team to focus on the international literature. Within Australia this is an area of growing interest as has been noted by recent journal articles. The structure of this chapter reflects the development of a conceptual framework which is fully discussed in Section 2.4.

2.1 Rationale for a Shift to Integrated Governance

The global drivers for integrated governance are diverse. These include globalisation, the public’s dissatisfaction with government amid rising expectations of the quality and tailored responsiveness of government services, budget stringency and the opportunities offered by technology for shifts in service delivery. All of these factors mean that governments are increasingly turning to opportunities for working jointly.

In Australia, other drivers include the perception of government as fragmented both internally and in its dealing with other sectors; a focus on outcomes rather than outputs to measure success; and the recognition that issues such as community renewal, safety, health and rural regeneration require many different players.

Sheeham notes in his article “Governance and the global knowledge economy” that the global knowledge economy will force changes in governance in Australia to include new forms of policy coordination which are unlikely to be highly centralised. These new forms of policy coordination will require a sophisticated set of tools. Policy coordination will be derived from disaggregated approaches to governance. Bellamy (1999) points to “information age government” and the use of information technology (“joined-up government” in the United Kingdom) to build a virtual world of holistic and client-focused government rather than streamlining and integrating government through reorganisation (as was undertaken in Australia in the 1990s). Business has taken on the concept of partnering as a way
to improve performance. Cherrett (1994) notes that it is linked to “total-cost competition, total-quality management, and environment friendly and design influence” (p.7). The use of the triple bottom line to measure company impacts (social, economic and environmental) has also influenced business.

As Schorr (1997) writes in Common Purpose: Strengthening Families and Neighbourhoods to Rebuild America, another rationale driving integrated governance is that of creating a government supportive to innovations in welfare reform. In examining current public sector reform movements, Schorr states that devolution will not solve problems as shifting responsibilities between layers of government does not in and of itself improve outcomes. Nor will service integration and collaboration work, asserts Schorr. The fragmentation of services caused by program-driven government caused the majority of human services reform to involve integrating services at the point of delivery. However, integrated services at the point of delivery, which Schorr notes was the reform of choice in the
1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, cannot overcome fragmentation. This type of reform cannot fix complexities in financing, administrative practices, the insufficiency in necessary services, the absence of supports, isolation of the service system from the community or economic problems. It is a popular notion because it allows for something to be done without new resources or a change in existing bureaucracies. What is actually needed, states Schorr, are new social policies.

**Overseas Initiative - United Kingdom**

When the Blair Government came to power in 1997 it had a focus on modernising government which proved to be the catalyst for a massive program of reform. The White Paper, *Modernising Government* (1999) outlined the government’s commitment to create a modern government for the new millennium.

In the first Annual Report on Modernising Government (2000) a number of initiatives are summarised with particular emphasis on the role of information technology. A more evaluative document is the Peer Review of the Cabinet Office led by the President of the Canadian Centre for Management Development (1999). In a series of “observations” the review team noted that while a great deal had been accomplished, the Cabinet Office did not function as a fully joined-up organisation.

Joining up is a mind-set and a culture. It is not a system or a structure. The concept of joining up recognises that no one has all the knowledge and resources, or controls all the levers to bring about sustainable solutions to complex issues. The key to joined-up government is to learn about shared purpose, teamwork, partnerships and building relationships. Joined-up organisations are built around the knowledge and know-how of people. This differs from the organisational model of the past which was build around tasks, units and titles (pp.3.6.1-3.6.2).

In defining the future Cabinet Office, the Peer Review noted that it should become a learning organisation.

… cont’d over
According to Schorr, privatisation and entrepreneurship will not solve the problems of contracting out. This is because conditions of meaningful competition are not prevalent in the human services sector. What Schorr proposes is a debureacratisation involving a series of key decisions about ways to impose fewer restrictions by focusing on that which must be standardised and that which needs to be responsive. Schorr concludes: “with the creation of new public-private partnerships and post-bureaucratic models of public accountability, the heavy hand of bureaucracy can be gentled” (p.114). This means that the outdated concept of integrated management of services at the point of delivery must be replaced by the notion of collaboration of services at the point of intersection, with each service focusing on its core business.
Another factor leading to an examination of integrated governance is that it is now recognised that, in order to successfully rebuild neighbourhoods or regenerate areas, successful initiatives must combine economic, service, education, physical redevelopment and community-building elements (Schorr, 1997). Penn (1993) states that in order to transform cities, government must act as an enabler by understanding issues, involving others, ensuring responsiveness and enabling networks and individuals to respond.

The report by the Social Exclusion Unit *Bringing Britain Together: a national strategy for renewal* (1998) states that the highly fragmented nature of government programs have exacerbated social trends and economic decline in the most deprived areas. The nine lessons regarding the failure of previous initiatives to be drawn from the study included several related to a lack of integration:

- Policies have often been implemented in a fragmented manner.

---

3 Durst and Newell (1999) conducted a survey of randomly selected organisations of varying types in the United States to ascertain their experience of “reinvention”. Organisations generally considered that activities had been successful in increasing productivity and service delivery, and had led to improved performance and management of costs. Interestingly, 66% of those surveyed had begun the process as a result of their executives’ personal belief in reinvention. The top three methods of reinvention were the introduction of new processes/technologies to increase efficiency and effectiveness (77.3%); strategic planning/strategic management (75.7%); and increased opportunities for employee participation (68.2%). However, the study found that reinvention did not have a single definition.

4 McKinney and Howard (1998) point out that while reinventing government reduced the number of middle managers, it increased their authority (particularly by expecting them to coordinate policy implementation) and expected them to be greater risk takers for the sake of entrepreneurial government.
Different programs have slightly different rules reflecting departmental boundaries and traditions.

Routine joint planning at the local level is rare and the quality of partnerships is variable.

Neighbourhoods cannot be turned around in isolation from the surrounding areas.

Programs have worsened detachment.

In Australia, education has also been a key driver with a focus on strategic partnerships with parents/carers, community, business/industry groups and schools to create better outcomes for children. One example is South Australia’s Partnerships 21 which sets out to use a planning process to bring about stakeholder ownership for outcomes.

Issues around regional coordination and the need to service rural communities are forcing integration as well. Radin et al. (1996) discuss intergovernmental relations in assisting rural areas in America. New South Wales (see Gellatly, 1994) recognised that improved coordination was needed to ensure a coordinated and systematic response for rural areas.

Getting Government Right - Canada

Preceded by Public Service 2000, the Canadian reform in the 1990s “Getting Government Right” had four elements:

- Program review
- Cultural shift to results and values
- Client/citizen focus
- Smarter use of information technology (Winberg 1998, see also Aucoin 1995).

In undertaking change, there has been a move to results rather than rules. Part of this shift involved a change in structure around the system of comptrollership and internal management processes. In addition to Quality Services Initiatives, with a focus on consultation and improved client satisfaction, “Getting Government Right” has also included service clustering around citizens’ needs. It is believed that service clustering and an emphasis upon partnerships have led to the reduction of overhead costs, duplication of services and the gap between government and citizens. The final reform involved the use of information technology to improve service delivery. Of note in Canada is the emphasis upon the need to change culture, not just systems and processes.
The issue of social capital (see, for example, Putman 1999) is a further influence in the debate. Gregory (1999) notes that a preoccupation with efficiency, in the case of public sector reform in New Zealand, may have threatened the social capital of the public service. Contrasting the business sector which is enhanced through competition with the public sector which, according to Alford (1993) depends for its effectiveness on “co-production” or the cooperative effort of agencies, Gregory cites Savoie and Peters (1996) describing public servants as managers of networks. According to Senge and Kaufer (1999), it is internal networkers who allow for the diffusión of innovation.

A more sophisticated understanding of community is another factor. There is a move toward recognition that policy making must include the dynamics of a complex environment where the participants are not only individuals but also groups of interests, such as communities, professionals and political parties. It takes as its base the notion of community on which politics and public policy are founded. As Stone (1988) notes:

Because politics and policy can happen only in communities, community must be the starting point of our polis. Public policy is about communities trying to achieve something as communities (p.14).

Further, the public interest, or the common good, is not static but dynamic; good public policy making is about ideas and legitimacy. This is critical to the government’s relationship with communities.

‘Whole of client’ approaches are also leading to a focus on integrated governance. Keating (2001) articulates client responsive services as involving:

- Focus on performance
- Devolved management structure allowing for an immediate response
- Greater reliance on choice through market mechanisms
- Improved accessibility through one stop shops and use of information technology.
The development of one stop shops and integrated case management are two examples of this approach. Information technology development has meant that government can be integrated virtually rather than structurally. However, as noted in the Call Centre Guidelines (2000), developed as part of the e-government strategy in the United Kingdom, lack of support from senior management, demand for other types of service delivery, a non-routinisable process, data access issues or too much emphasis on cost savings are not conducive to this type of process.

The reasons for a need to focus on integrated governance in order to be client focused are made clear in a study in the United Kingdom (by Service First) into joined-up public services (1999). Consultation with the People's Panel, a representative panel, indicated that:

- People have to give the same information to different organisations or individuals within the same organisation.
- Organisations, as well as the offices within organisations, do not communicate with each other.
- Different contacts within the same organisation provide different advice.
- Staff do not know their own organisation and therefore can not give joined-up advice.

A further development is the literature on learning organisations. Senge in The Fifth Discipline (1990) and The Dance of Change (1999) articulates how challenges inside an organisation which stifle innovation can be countered by diffusion of learning across boundaries, an analysis of assumptions and an understanding of the life cycle of change. These books suggest that only by learning faster than the competition can organisations stay ahead. The focus on systems thinking involves both an understanding of larger “systems” but also the discipline of looking for the patterns and connections underlying complexity.
2.2 Ideas Underpinning Integrated Governance

Mutuality

As noted earlier, mutuality implies a degree of reciprocity. Using a systems approach, Christopher Hood in an article entitled “Control Over Bureaucracy: Cultural Theory and Institutional Variety” (1996) described four archetypal methods of public administration control including contrived randomness, competition, review and mutuality. He hypothesised that these polar types form a grid-group with too much emphasis being placed on one leading to serious side effects and reverse effects. This may partly explain the interest in mutuality now following an undue focus on competition.

Mutuality fits closest to an egalitarian paradigm. Within organisations, mutuality can be manifested as peer group audits and externally (between the state and society) as the development of the maximum ‘face to face’ group interactions. Interestingly, Hood writes “a cultural prerequisite of mutuality is acceptance by members of the entitlement of the collective to hold them to account and to accept the priority of group decisions over individual wishes” (p.216). However, it has two dimensions, communitarianism with mutuality as obligation (see Mandelbaum 2000) and community with mutuality as rights and responsibilities. While this is only one small article, its placement of the concept of mutuality within an archetypal system is embraced in this study.

In Australia, the concept of mutuality, or mutualism, is used by some politicians. Mark Latham (1999) in a paper entitled “Mutualism – A Third Way for Australia” emphasises that this issue is of primary importance in Australia with the key to mutualism being networks as “the natural mode of organisation for an information society” (p.4). Espousing a redesign in the public sector with government devolving power and acting “as a facilitator of social capital” (p.6) one idea suggested for change is for government to act as a catalyst for forming partnerships through connecting the provision of funds with a partnership approach.
Much of the research on mutuality is contained within discussions of integrative organisational structures, the network state and network management as outlined below.

**Integrative Organisational Structures**

Writing about the dynamics of administrative reform, Zifcak (1994) outlines work by Kanter (1983) proposing two separate organisational structures: integrative and segmental. According to Kanter, innovation is fostered in integrative systems by:

> treating problems as wholes, by encouraging the exchange of ideas as information across organisational boundaries, by reducing vertical and hierarchical division and by considering multiple perspectives in making organisational decisions. Segmented organisations, by contrast, compartmentalise problems and activities, are finely divided by levels and functions, treat information as owned rather than shared and take decisions on the basis of specialism and expertise (p.146).

**The Network State**

Davis and Rhodes (2000), in examining the future trends of government in Australia, discuss the Contract State, the Hierarchic State and the Network State. In their articulation of the Network State, networks act to bring together the fragmented elements of government both internally and externally. The increased expectation of managers will be for diplomacy, i.e. management through negotiation and the ability to engender trust as part of cooperative behaviour. This type of system will not require corporate management with objectives, targets and performance indicators but will require matrix management styles. Skills needed will include communication (interpersonal and listening) and persuasion, and the ability to build reciprocity and long-term relationships.

In drawing out the distinctions between new public management and governance in policy networks, Kickert et al. developed the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New public management</th>
<th>Governance in policy networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem</td>
<td>(Cost-)effectiveness</td>
<td>Interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main orientation</td>
<td>Intraorganisational</td>
<td>Interorganisational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main concern</td>
<td>Administrative Control</td>
<td>(Facilitating) co-governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-private dimension</td>
<td>Businesslike</td>
<td>Specific role government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*Kickert. W, et al., 1999, 40*)
Network Management

As ideas became more sophisticated, models of network management have been further refined. Rhodes (2000), (also see Kickert. W, et al. 1999) uses a chart to illustrate the various approaches to network management.

Table 2: Approaches to Network Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Instrumental Approach</th>
<th>Interactive Approach</th>
<th>Institutional Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Improving steering conditions</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Network arrangements and their impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of analysis</td>
<td>Focal organisation</td>
<td>Interactions of actors</td>
<td>Network structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of policy networks</td>
<td>Closed and multi-form object of steering</td>
<td>Horizontal interaction</td>
<td>Product and context of interaction and governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of network management</td>
<td>Strategic steering</td>
<td>Game playing to develop co-operation and prevent blockages</td>
<td>Diplomacy and incremental adaptation of incentive structures, rules and culture of networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria of evaluation</td>
<td>Effective problem solving</td>
<td>Satisfying policy, consensus</td>
<td>Institutional key interests and relationships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Rhodes, 2000, 73)

In Table 2, the Instrumental Approach is top down managing of networks with the key problem to this approach being the costs of steering, that is, the loss of flexibility and intransigence of participants leading to “control deficits” (p.74). The Interactive Approach involves networks. Rhodes articulates that the key problem is the cost of cooperation in terms of time taken to gain agreement, blurred objectives and indeterminate outcomes. The Institutional Approach involves the creation of new agencies or structures. In this approach, three problems exist, including the fact that incentives, rules and cultures are resistant to change, networks are closed, and appointments are often based on patronage and are not accountable to elected bodies. In noting the faults of this table, Rhodes acknowledges that it is based on problems as perceived by public sector managers and does not allow for the “anti-foundational” (p.76) approach.

According to Rhodes, (p.81) networks work where:

- actors need reliable, ‘thicker’ information
- quality cannot be specified or is difficult to define and measure
- commodities are difficult to price
- professional discretion and expertise are core values
• flexibility to meet localised, varied service demands is needed
• cross-sector, multi-agency co-operation and production is required
• such co-operation confronts disparate organisational cultures
• actors perceive the value of co-operative strategies
• long-term relationships are needed to reduce uncertainty
• monitoring and evaluation incur high political and administrative costs
• implementation involves haggling.

The costs of networks include that they are:
• closed to outsiders and unrepresentative
• unaccountable for their actions
• service private interests, not the public interest
• difficult to steer
• inefficient because co-operation causes delay
• immobilised by conflicts of interest
• difficult to combine with other governing structures (p: 81).

In addition, networks are constrained by political contexts such as rapid change, social conflicts, and short-term political interests.

The benefits of networks include:
• When markets and hierarchies fail, networks succeed.
• Increased information and expertise result from wider involvement.
• The acceptability of a policy derived from networks is higher.
• Resources are increased.
• Networks allow for self-governing.

Policy and Government Relationship Grid

Using a technique developed in New South Wales, initiatives can be classified according to a grid to provide information at a glance, placing federal to local levels of government on a vertical axis and generic to specific services on the horizontal axis. With this grid it is
possible to categorise policy in terms of both the point at which it is generated (federal to local) and, on the same axis, the point at which it is delivered. At the same time the grid makes it possible to classify policy as generic, or universal, or specific, i.e. targeted at particular groups.

**Process for Integrated Governance – Network, Cooperation, Coordination, Collaboration, Partnership**

As integrated governance implies mutuality, so the processes for delivery include joint efforts which can be classified according to degree of formality, with ‘network’ (meaning informal interchange here as distinct from the discussion above) on one end of the continuum and partnership (meaning formally contracted joint efforts) on the other. This classification, adopted for the purposes of this report, flows from an evolution in understanding documented below.

Initially, use of terms such as coordination, collaboration, and networking were used interchangeably to differentiate new ideas from those of competition. However, there is emerging research which supports the placing of concepts on a continuum based on the degree of change and commitment required.

Informal relationships require little commitment and no organisational change; cooperative relationships are similar to informal ones but have increased levels of commitment with possible management by a Steering or Management Committee. Coordinated relationships/partnerships require some organisational change, meaningful training and a commitment to the aims of the other players. Collaborative relationships imply “change and innovation” and are often started at the grassroots level. “Integration” requires partnership in participation and can include joint planning, implementing and evaluating of policies (Franklin and Streeter 1995).
Although only using three categories (cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate) Stokes and Tyler present a similar continuum. While such delineation is welcome, the fact remains that the terms are often used interchangeably in policy documents and in the parlance of service deliverers. Further, the literature chronicled below lacks this clarity. What is important to note, however, is the return to a focus on process dictated by the need for joint efforts, i.e. networking, cooperation, coordination, collaboration and partnership and the focus on relationships.

**Networking and Cooperation**

At the lowest end of the continuum of joint efforts, networking and cooperation imply a dialogue over issues, with cooperation moving beyond the dialogue to informal attempts to work together. These are the easiest types of joint efforts as they do not require a change in the autonomy of the participating organisations.

**Coordination**

As reported in the second edition of *Public Sector Management in Australia* by O'Faircheallaigh et al. (1999), improved coordination is often regarded as the prime solution to government problems. The authors quote Seidman’s notion of coordination as the “twentieth century equivalent of the medieval search for the philosopher’s stone... If only we can find the right formula for co-ordination, we can reconcile the irreconcilable, harmonise competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which none will dissent” (p.179).

O'Faircheallaigh et al. note the different meanings of coordination as:

- a sense of cooperation
- a process of negotiation
- a sense of overseeing (as a way of requiring consistency)
- a means of coercion (an imposition of policy over others)
- a means of planning
- a strategic or corporate activity.

The authors also point to the inevitability of clashes over coordination around:

- *broad policy coherence against functional independence*
- *allocative efficiency against program efficiency*
Examining coordination, Glyn Davis (quoted in O'Faircheallaigh et al., 1999) identified the political domain (ministers and staff), the policy domain (ministers and senior officials) and administrative domain (departments) as the domains for internal coordination. However, Peres (quoted in O'Faircheallaigh et al., 1999) stated that:

> the co-ordinating capacity of government is scarce, irrespective of the nature of the political system. The more power that is required for performance and the pursuit of objectives, the less power is available for co-ordination. Conversely, the greater the number of co-ordinating processes adopted, or the more a particular process is extended, the less power is available for performance (p.184).

Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) classify coordination within organisational trajectories of reform. It is an element alongside specialisation, centralisation/decentralisation, and scale. The authors articulate three types of coordination: hierarchy, voluntary cooperation in a network, and market mechanisms.5

**Collaboration and Partnerships**

Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) in their article “The Dynamics of Multi-organisational Partnerships: An Analysis of Changing Modes of Governance” separate the notion of partnership as distinct from network as an organisational structure. Indeed, in their analysis of regeneration efforts in the United Kingdom, they find several modes of governance in operation throughout the life of a partnership. These include:

- **Pre-partnership collaboration** is characterised by a network mode of governance based upon informality, trust and a sense of common purpose.

- **Partnership creation and consolidation** is characterised by hierarchy based upon an assertion of status and authority differentials and the formalisation of procedures.

- **Partnership programme delivery** is characterised by market (or quasi-market) mechanisms of tendering and contract, with low levels of co-operation between providers.

---

5The authors note that the main reforms of the UK, New Zealand and Australia had been toward specialised organisations; coordination by means of market mechanisms and contractual relationships; decentralisation of authority; and decreasing the size of bureaucratic organisations.
Partnership terminology or succession is characterised by a re-assertion of a network governance mode as a means to maintain agency commitment, community involvement and staff employment (p.320).

Lendrum (1998), writing for the business sector, describes the logical progression from individual business competition to partnering as a way to gain an advantage. However, he notes that while there has been enthusiasm for the idea, many businesses have found it difficult. Failures have occurred because of:

- A change in management
- A change in vision or strategy
- The wrong choice of partners or markets
- Difference between reality and perception
- Exit of the ‘champions’ of the partnership
- Renewed silo mentality
- Lack of senior management leadership.

An examination of partnerships in eleven local authorities in the United Kingdom found that the most common partnerships were “contractual strategically co-ordinated service delivery arrangements or planning and goals-based coalitions”. The main drivers for partnering were found to be both external and internal. External drivers included Single Regeneration (a fund for regeneration efforts) and lottery requirements (for example, application to the lottery for charitable dollars), Best Value, Local Government legislation such as the Crime and Disorder Act 1999, and pressures for “joined-up” government and the need to provide community leadership. Internal drivers included opportunity to strengthen links with the community, service improvements, making best use of resources, and extending strategic influence over services delivered by other agencies.

The four categories of barriers to partnership included:

- Financial – inability to fund projects, budget constraints or inconsistency in funding
- Cultural – resistance to change or new ways of working, unwillingness to work in partnership or lack of clarity on partnership working
- Resources – limited resources and limited capacity
- Existing legislation.
The study identified the following consistent themes in reducing these barriers:

- Leadership by politicians, Chief Executives and senior officers
- Clearly identified and comprehended objectives, roles and responsibilities
- A move to Cabinet style government
- A change in the organisational structure.

Successful partnerships combined an organisational commitment, honesty and trust with a common agenda of shared objectives and understanding of partners’ priorities. In addition, structures for managing partnerships were found to include: statutory partnership model, model for meeting funding conditions, contractual partnership model and voluntary sector quasi-contractual model.

### 2.3 Key Findings on Integrated Governance

As a result of their interest in the area of integrated governance, both the United Kingdom and Canada have undertaken research into this area. Following on from the *Bringing Britain Together* report mentioned previously, the Policy Action Team 17 (a research group organised for the purpose of the study) was tasked to look at joining up government at the local level. The key findings for joining up in practice included the need for better understanding of the dynamics of partnership; the development of new skills around consensus building and systems thinking; and the breaking down of professional and hierarchical barriers.

In Annex C of the report, the following key issues influencing the success of joined-up government at the local level were summarised from extensive research:

- The creation of a shared vision and the clarification of objectives and direction is a prerequisite for any joint initiative. This sharing must be vertical and horizontal.
- There are no unique models of successful partnership... simply setting up new partnerships is no recipe for success. There needs to be more rigorous thinking about the nature, form and terms of inter-organisational collaboration.
- What needs to be joined-up will vary from one locality to another and general prescriptions for co-ordination may be inappropriate.
- More emphasis should be laid on networks, trust, informal relations and mediation as the basis for joined-up working.
- Discussion of social capital inevitably draws attention to the role of social entrepreneurs. Innovative individuals may have a role to play but the function of the 'social entrepreneur' in assisting organisations to become joined-up locally remains unclear.
- Front line staff are widely recognised as having key roles and there is much scope for redefining, varying and strengthening the role of front line staff in the implementation of joined-up working (p.107).
The Performance and Innovation Unit in the United Kingdom was asked to look at ways in which government could tackle cross-cutting issues. Their report, *Wiring It Up* (2000), articulated the main forms of cross-cutting interventions and working as:

- Organisational change
- Merged structures and budgets
- Joint teams (virtual and real)
- Shared budgets
- Joint customer interfaces
- Shared objectives and performance indicators
- Consultation
- Information exchange.

One of the key recommendations of the report was that this way of working is not always appropriate. Benefits and costs are given in Table 3 below.

**Table 3: Benefits and Costs of Cross-Cutting Interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helps to convey 'big picture' strategic issues not captured by departmental objectives</td>
<td>Less clear lines of accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps to realise synergies and promotes effectiveness</td>
<td>More difficulty in measuring effectiveness and impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allows for economies of scale</td>
<td>Increased direct and opportunity costs to establish and maintain arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brings together those whose cooperation would benefit in other areas</td>
<td>Organisational and transitional costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides for improved client focus and better service delivery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides a framework for potential conflicts and trade-offs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improves service delivery for particular groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from PIU, 2000, 17)

While the report notes the experiences of Sweden, Hong Kong, and New Zealand in attempting internal governmental integration, it makes clear that while these initiatives had benefits, they raised concerns.
In a report prepared for the Canadian Centre for Policy Management Development by Peters (1998) several lessons for “would be collaborators” are articulated:

- **Structure is important and can facilitate coordination, but to produce behavioural changes may require active intervention of political leaders.**

- **There is often greater willingness to coordinate programs at the bottom of organisations than there is at the top.... Coordination at this level may, however, be extremely inefficient. It requires breaking down a series of structural and procedural barriers that have been created by the organisations, rather than solving these problems of coordination at a policy level in the first place.**

- **Timing is important.**

- **Formal methods of coordination may not be as beneficial as the more informal techniques involving bargaining and creating the analogues of markets** (p.48-49).

### 2.4 Conceptual Framework

Derived in parts from a review of literature and the research team’s synthesis of key concepts, a framework was developed to guide inquiry into the seven case studies. Categories examined included acknowledgment of the global factors at play; a choice of mutuality as the method of public administration control; application of the policy and government relationship grid; examination of the processes used; barriers; and assumed outcomes. This framework served in the first instance to organise the case study findings. Thus, in a sequence of logic moving from left to right, all case studies shared the same global influencing factors (derived from the review of literature) and the choice of mutuality as the archetypal method of public administration control (with the literature guiding the researchers in understanding this concept and its accompanying ideas). Each case study was then placed on the policy and government relationship grid, with the processes for integrated governance outlined as well as the barriers. While assumed outcomes could have been placed at the beginning of the Case Study Framework, they were placed at the end to denote the anticipated end product for each case study. After the description of the case studies which follow in Chapters 3–6, the Case Study Framework is applied in Chapter 7.
The framework was devised as a method for clustering the diversity of findings across the case studies. It is fundamentally a classification tool.

While an inclusive definition of integrated governance as used for the purpose of this research allows for an acceptance of the mutuality of effort, the research team separated integration into categories such as service delivery integration and integration around programs. Such designation proved helpful in deriving the key criteria necessary for success according to the type of integration. This clustering is used in Chapters 3–6 which follow.
3. Case Studies – Service Delivery Integration

The two case studies that involve integration for enhanced service delivery are Centrelink and Service Tasmania.

3.1 Commonwealth - Centrelink – Disability Services

The Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency Act 1997 established Centrelink as a government agency delivering a range of Commonwealth services to the Australian community. Centrelink was part of the Government’s strategy to “integrate the administration of payments and training functions by merging the Commonwealth Employment Services (CES) with the Department of Social Services (DSS) to create a more effective one-stop-shop for unemployed persons.” However, instead of amalgamating the former departments, a new service delivery structure was established with a one-stop-shop concept as the basis of its organisation. Services from the former departments were then transferred to Centrelink.

A paper by Centrelink’s Strategic Services Team dated 19/10/2000, “Centrelink – The Government’s ‘One-Stop-Shop’” examined one-stop-shop approaches worldwide. It posits that the concept should be examined not as a “theoretically pure” concept “related to a narrow application to particular projects” but rather as a “broader phenomenon of integration of government services.” Judged by these criteria, Centrelink is a success in terms of its ability to link up government through services delivered in one place. In so doing, Centrelink is committed to offering services in rural and regional Australia and ensures that, as much as possible, customers receive the same service regardless of the location. In some areas Centrelink has co-located with state services and in one example, Service Tasmania, is delivering services jointly.

Centrelink is a statutory authority responsible, through its Board, to the Minister for Family and Community Services (FaCS). The two major client departmental Secretaries are non-voting members of the Board, which is appointed by the Minister for Family and Community Services. This raises two issues for Centrelink related to its governance and options for integrated governance:
• Having the core clients FaCS and the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB) as non-voting members of the board
• Centrelink’s location in the FaCS portfolio.

Centrelink is entirely funded through contracts with client departments. The majority of Centrelink’s services are undertaken for the Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS). An annually negotiated agreement between Centrelink and FaCS (Business Partnership Agreement) specifies the nature of the services, outcomes, performance measures, financial agreements, etc. for FaCS services. All services are provided with departments and agencies based on similar Business Partnership Agreements.

With over 400 offices nationwide, Centrelink offers a wide range of services to its customers. Centrelink has defined customers as those receiving benefits and services as well as clients of those departments or agencies that contract Centrelink to deliver their services.

**Disability and Carers**

As a window into Centrelink operations and to highlight possible innovations, the research team met with the Chief Executive Officer and Deputy Chief Executive Officer, the Disability and Carers Community Segment Team at Centrelink headquarters and with the Area Pacific Central Office. Site visits were conducted at a variety of customer service centres in the Area Pacific Central. In addition, group interviews were conducted with representatives from the Department of Family and Community Services, and members of Centrelink’s Strategic Services, Business Assurance Services and the Business Development Unit.

Within Centrelink, service delivery to those with a disability and carers is handled by the Disability and Carers Community Segment Team. This service delivery is managed within two sub-teams, the Business Management Team and the Disability Programs Team. The Carer Services Team and the Disability Services Team work closely with the Service Integration SHOP, which has been recently organised to ensure integration of Centrelink services. Clients include Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS), Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR), Department of Education, Science and Training, and Department of Health and Ageing. Business Partnership Agreements with clients include sections relevant to the Disability and Carers Community Segment Team. For example, a section of the Business Partnership Agreement with FaCS sets out the specific services and performance measures for people with a disability and carers. There are two principal services offered. The first is assessment and payment of income support and allowances.
These are categorised as Disability Support Pension, Mobility Allowance, Sickness Allowance, Carer Payment and Carer Allowance. The second principal service is one of assessment and referral of jobseekers with a disability to appropriate disability employment services. Such employment services include Job Network agencies, Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service and a variety of specialist disability services funded by FaCS.

The seven key objectives of the Disability and Carers Community Segment Team are to:

- improve performance for client agencies
- position Centrelink to effectively deliver on Welfare Reform Initiatives
- reduce the complexity of dealing with government
- align employee culture and skills with business direction and demonstrate Centrelink’s commitment to its people
- enhance services for rural Australia
- increase quality
- move to a more efficient business.

With a very strong focus on customer satisfaction, Centrelink recently undertook extensive consultation with customers to determine customer need. The results of this consultation showed that many customers were satisfied with services. Nevertheless, areas for service improvements were identified. As a result, two innovative service delivery areas were developed, namely the “Life Events” concept and that of “one-to-one service.”

The “Life Events” concept places the responsibility for tailoring services on the organisation and not the client. The client simply articulates his/her issues/needs and the organisation offers a tailored package to meet these needs. In her speech “Restructuring in the Australian Government,” Sue Vardon, Centrelink CEO, stated of the “Life Events” approach, “We are tipping the bureaucracy upside down to present an approach to service delivery from the customer’s point of view. Service that is presented in terms of life events – things like ‘having a baby’ or ‘arriving to settle in Australia’ – is more intuitive, logical and immediately recognisable for customers.” In addition to the life events above, other events could include: planning your retirement; becoming sick or disabled; caring for someone sick or disabled. In responding to the life event, products and services can be offered from the over 70 products and services delivered by Centrelink on behalf of seven government agencies. As a result, these services may be offered across departmental boundaries.
One-to-One Service (1-2-1), established in 1999, provides a personalised service by ensuring that all customers have an identified Customer Service Officer. In this manner, the customer does not carry the onus of responsibility for determining appropriate services. Instead Centrelink guarantees that its employees will navigate the system on the customer's behalf.

The Disability and Carers Service Delivery Improvement Strategy, integrated “Life Events” and 1-2-1 service concepts provide “customers with disabilities, illnesses and injuries and carers with a holistic, personalised service”. It has been tested in the Area Pacific Central. This innovation further developed the ideas noted above and included a shift in employee roles to include community partnership building and referrals as part of the services on offer. Rather than conduct a pre-grant interview when a customer first comes to Centrelink, customers are requested to first provide documentation so that a 1-2-1 Customer Service Officer can assess their needs before an interview is held. A Service Offer interview is then provided to the customer which includes payment information, specialist appointments, community and employment assistance referrals, information about rights and obligations and future contact requirements. In addition to the increased decision-making roles of the 1-2-1 officer, it allows the Centrelink Disability Officer, who would formerly have been making all assessments, to seek to maintain and improve community partnerships.

The “wins for Centrelink” from this innovation are believed to be that it reduces double handing of customers and helps build rapport with customers. The additional, less-obvious benefits have included an increase in job satisfaction for staff and increased and improved outcomes for customers. The major benefits for Centrelink Disability Officers are an increased capacity for training and supporting staff and quality decision-making. Other outcomes include:

- Community partnerships and referral networks working with Centrelink at a local level are also enhanced
- It enables greater national consistency in service delivery
- It links with other Centrelink initiatives (Manager’s Kit).

Suggested strategies to support managers in delivering this approach:

- to establish the environment – illustrate the benefits to customers and staff by demonstrating management commitment
- to brief service delivery improvement facilitators – hold regular area conferences
• to improve Centrelink systems – create action plans which take into account Centrelink Service Centre’s issues and barriers. (In examining community partnerships, one element of the action plan, a whole of office approach is recommended to engage effectively the community.)

Innovations such as the Service Delivery Improvement Strategy and the 1-2-1 service were developed by local staff and trialed before being adopted more widely. They demonstrate the learning organisation focus of Centrelink and its capacity for flexibility and risk taking.

While the above innovations are clearly seen to be of immediate benefit to improving services to the customer, the medium term vision adopted by Centrelink is much broader in scope. In its 2001 Business Plan, Delivering Today/Transforming Tomorrow, Centrelink uses a schema of development (2000-2001), advancement (2002-2004) and excellence (2005 to 2006) to cluster goals. Under the goal of customer and community, the following are provided:

| Table 4: Centrelink’s Schema of Development (2000-2001) |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Development** | **Advancement** | **Excellence** |
| Strengthening and supporting the “life events” approach | Becoming a premier broker | Being a premier broker |
| Making it easier to do business with us | Integrating service delivery channels | Establishing extensive virtual service delivery |
| Tailoring service offers | Connecting the public to federal, state and local government, business and community based organisations | Providing a one-stop-shop for federal, state and local government, business and community based organisations |
| Preparing to implement the Government’s Australians Working Together initiative | Delivering the Government’s Australians Working Together initiative | Delivering results that make a difference to individuals, families and the community |
| Providing consistent and equitable access to services across all customer groups | Becoming a key part of local communities | |
| Implementing “Getting It Right” strategy | Integrating strategic data for stronger business outcomes | |

(Centrelink, 2001: 16)
Key Features That Make the Program Work

Centrelink CEO, Sue Vardon, in an address to the National Press Club in 2000, suggested:

“The one stop shop concept has the power to unite all levels of government in cooperation. All levels aspire in their service delivery visions to make government access simpler and easier. The people of Australia still have problems reconciling and differentiating levels of government. The story of Centrelink is not just about uniting Commonwealth Government services but how, by creative use of location and technology, we can carry each other’s brands and services through single channels.”

Centrelink works as well as it does because of a number of key factors:

- Senior management and CEO leadership and commitment
- Excellent management and organisational culture driven by a committed CEO and Executive
- A commitment to quality that is a genuine part of the organisational culture
- Investment of resources into service improvement including exploration of innovation and experimentation with new models
- Strong leadership reflected in the development of contracts with client agencies
- Entrepreneurial culture that drives the organisation to seek new partners and clients
- The largest call centre operations in Australia
- Investment in IT
- Strong political backing from the Prime Minister.

Differences Made

Centrelink has a clear outcomes focus and has:

- Taken on a broker role as much as a service provider or benefits payment role
- Thus it has become a hybrid that provides services for its major client agencies, brokers services for customers and brokers services for other client agencies in both directions. In doing so it has attempted to value add by core process redesign that affects outcomes for customers at certain points in their life
- Taken a level of complexity from customers’ lives
- Provided over 70 services and benefits to customers from one service location
- Actively sought to develop innovative measures of enhancing customer service delivery.
Barriers Or Constraints

Centrelink is particularly advantaged in its potential for developing whole of customer approaches as a result of its unique genesis, existing infrastructure (both virtual and physical), and the number of services and benefits currently being delivered. However, it is apparent that further opportunities could be seized through client departments adopting a more joined up approach in formulating their requirements of Centrelink.

One of the constraints arises as a result of inherent limitations of purchaser/provider arrangements. Centrelink is fundamentally a provider and its view of integrated service delivery does not necessarily match that of its client departments. For example, during one meeting it became clear that usage of the term “one-stop-shop” meant a historic amalgamation to one member of the providers present and a vision for becoming the government pathway to services for Centrelink. However, Australians Working Together is seen to provide a vehicle for fostering more effective integration of service delivery.

Another common scenario that may cause problems is that of agencies which do not have the same level of development as Centrelink nor share its vision and commitment to quality and innovation. This can be particularly problematic when these agencies are the funders. Likewise, client agencies that have not fully grasped notions of customer satisfaction can be problematic as they continue to focus on output and exhibit a lack of outcomes expectations.

An additional problem arises from the shortcomings of the current purchaser/provider model, which is regarded by some consultees as inappropriate to cope with community expectation and demand in social and human services. Centrelink is limited both by the degree of integration of client agencies as well as its own contracts in responding to community need.

Further problems faced by Centrelink include:

- Interface between IT system and new business
- Each client agency wants its own identification of products/services which under a tailored life events package may not be clearly identifiable
- Mixed reaction to community role of Disability Services Officer
- Centrelink is still building internal integrated services as is clear from the segmentation and lack of linkages within a Centrelink Service Centre
- Limitations in “smart” IT systems ensuring a need for specialisation of staff.
What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn From This Program

This program can provide valuable lessons for other jurisdictions. A primary lesson is that strong leadership, the commitment of CEOs and those at the Senior Executive level are paramount to success in service delivery. The need for service delivery process redesign to add value to flexible delivery of services, is another key lesson. To maximise the benefits of such a redesign, a transparent and strong feedback loop is essential between service delivery and policy development.

The Centrelink model has also highlighted the inadequacies of the purchaser/provider model in its current form in promoting collaboration and flexibility especially at a local level. Outcomes accountability rather than process output should drive collaboration. Agreement on outcomes would ensure greater service delivery flexibility and innovation.

Integration of services through “one stop shop” delivery is limited by the degree of integration of client agency services with separate branding, accountability, procedures, and delivery ensuring divergent customer response.

3.2 Tasmania – Service Tasmania

Initially established in 1997, the Service Tasmania Project set out to improve customer service through innovation and integration using information technology and telecommunications. Using either over-the-counter transactions at one stop shops, over the phone or Internet (24 hours a day, seven days a week), Service Tasmania allows Tasmanians to:

- pay Government bills
- purchase Government products
- obtain Government information
- apply for Government licenses, permits, grants and assistance
- make bookings and appointments
- notify address changes in one place for all Government agencies
- provide feedback comment and seek help.

Service Tasmania is administered by the Service Tasmania Board. The Board is chaired by the Deputy Secretary, Department of Premier and Cabinet, and includes six State government representatives. Under the Board are Shops, Phones and Online delivery, led by three different lead agencies (the Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment; Telecommunications Management Division [TMD] and the Department of Education) with the Service
Tasmania Unit within the Department of Premier and Cabinet having a development and coordinating role. Funding is provided by the transfer of resources on a cost recovery basis from State Agencies, Fee for Service from external partners, contribution from the Consolidated Fund for rural and regional services and capital grants.

In 1998 a Statement of Intent between the Commonwealth and Tasmania was signed by the then Minister for Social Security, Senator Jocelyn Newman and the then Premier Tony Rundle MHA for cooperation and exchange of information between Centrelink and Service Tasmania. Premised by an acknowledgment of the integrated approach to service delivery used by Centrelink and Service Tasmania, the statement outlines that potential cooperation could include:

- sharing of technical and operational information and experience
- provision of services by each organisation on behalf of the other
- provision of collocated facilities
- development of service packages that bring together multi-agency and multi-government transactions so that they appear as a single transaction from the customer’s point of view
- joint development of system components
- trialing of new service delivery approaches and systems
- development of common window access to services provided by each organisation especially through electronic channels (Statement of Intent, 1998).

In effect, the Statement of Intent provided for increased customer service through the alignment of Centrelink’s Commonwealth services and Service Tasmania state and local government services. The initial pilot was conducted at two locations, Smithton and Queenstown. Other sites added have included Sheffield, Scottsdale, Triabunna, New Norfolk, Deloraine, George Town, St Helens, and Huonville. This equates to seven sites where Service Tasmania acts as an agent for Centrelink and three co-located sites where operations take place from two separate counter areas. Expanded service delivery has been funded in part through the Trials of Innovative Government Electronic Regional Services (TIGERS) initiative. Until recently, a quid pro quo has guided the integration until the Protocols were agreed between the two organisations.
Given the potential for lessons on integrated service delivery, the case study of this collaboration and partnership effort was added to the original six case studies. In September 2001 the research team held interviews with key individuals from Service Tasmania and Centrelink and visited a co-located site and an agency site.

**Key Features**

Key features included:

- Partnership developed on the ground in good faith between Service Tasmania and Centrelink. (This has meant that neither Service Tasmania nor Centrelink view each other as competitors but rather as partners in meeting the needs of Tasmanians.)

- Recognition of a mutual advantage model

- Willingness to innovate and go outside of traditionally defined territory to explore the best options for service delivery. “We just did things, the bureaucratic paper chase came later.”

- Improved services, particularly in rural areas, with an increase in options for customers

- Increased customer satisfaction

- Assistance to client departments to be clearer on procedures by developing a Help File database for Service Tasmania customer service officers

- Agreement on a focus on increased customer service rather than integration

- Political mandate at Commonwealth and State level.

**Barriers Or Constraints**

Barriers articulated by consultees included:

- Difficulty in gaining agreement by both organisations on the logistics and legality of the arrangement. (There was only a *quid pro quo* arrangement with the mandate provided by the Statement of Intent for the first three years of the partnership.)
• Limited integration. (While services are offered from the same site, there continue to be different operational systems and accountability structures.)

• Limitations in Centrelink services available at agency sites. (As Centrelink is seen as a specialist service within Service Tasmania’s generalist service delivery, Service Tasmania is a gateway to Centrelink’s “special” brand of services – an agent for an agent – rather than a provider.)

• Differing organisational priorities and local priorities

• Lack of engagement of client departments on a discussion of integrated service delivery

• Political will

• IT limitations both in terms of cost and capacity

• Operational differences between Centrelink and Service Tasmania

• Internal organisational culture.

What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn

Several valuable lessons have arisen from the Service Tasmania experiment. These include the necessity of clarifying advantages to be had for both parties and starting small to begin with. This may mean, for example, counter co-location before an eventual integration of Internet services. Starting at a local level and ensuring good working relationships are developed at this level has also worked well in the Service Tasmania context, particularly when combined with a focus on customers. The finding has been that customers are interested in quality, not who delivers the services. Discussion should be at the level of outcomes, not expressed in terms of managing the process.

Other recommendations flowing from the Service Tasmania model include the benefits of finding champions to promote this model, ensuring there is a mandate or high level commitment to the project and minimising the effects of bureaucracy at both the planning and implementation stages.

Further lessons surround the nature of the interaction between client providers and Service Tasmania. These include the need to:

• Clarify individual and mutual advantage

• Get protocols right but allow for flexibility in the process

• Be clear and transparent

• Recognise that integration of this type is an iterative process without a final destination and, because of the ongoing nature of changes, it is valuable to identify early wins.
While articulating the lessons for other jurisdictions, many consultees felt that the success of the partnership may be unique to Tasmania. This is because both Tasmania and Centrelink have the same geographical boundary; Tasmania has a small population with a relatively small government; and the Service Tasmania infrastructure and whole-of-government approach gave the project a local impetus. Thus, whilst Centrelink has other agent arrangements and co-locations in Australia, Centrelink in Tasmania benefited from Service Tasmania’s integration of State and local government services and its commitment to integration.
The next category of integration concerned integration through a particular program. Integration in this category concerns the “wicked problems” such as regional development, community renewal and crime prevention.

### 4.1 New South Wales – Regional Coordination Program

The Regional Coordination Program (RCP) is an example of collaborative and coordinated government at the regional level. The program is effective in improving communication, cooperation and collaboration between State government agencies at the regional level. Further, the program is contributing to enhancing coordination between CEOs.

The program is effective in working collaboratively with local government and in some regions regular meetings are being established with Regional Organisations of Councils. There is also interaction with Commonwealth agencies.

The RCP began in 1994 as a two-year pilot to enhance government responses to issues impacting on rural and regional communities. The pilot was based in the North Coast and Western Regions of New South Wales. In 1996 the pilot was evaluated and in 1997 the program was extended to cover the regions of the South East Illawara, Riverina-Murray, New England/NorthWest and Hunter/Central Coast. In 1998 the Western Sydney Region was included. In 1999 separate regions were established for the Illawarra, Central Coast, South West Sydney and Coastal Sydney thereby giving the program state-wide coverage.
**Objectives**

The program aims to:

- achieve sustainable social, economic and environmental benefits for regional and metropolitan NSW by leading collaboration between government agencies and communities
- enhance Government services by coordinating service delivery in ways that better meet the needs of regional communities and make the best use of government resources.

The program gives effect to NSW Government policy priorities which recognise that many of the significant pressures on communities require a corporate and holistic response from government and its agencies.

**Management**

The Strategic Projects Division of the NSW Premier’s Department manages the RCP. Thirty-seven agencies across the NSW Government contribute funding to the program. These funds are allocated to the Premier’s Department and are then allocated to the regions.

The Strategic Projects Division was established in 1996. The goal of the division is to achieve sustainable social, economic and environmental benefits for regional and metropolitan NSW by leading collaboration between government agencies and with communities.

The mandate for the Division’s activities is clear. The Premier’s Department’s Evaluation Manual (January 2001), states that “communities and business are asking government to respond to a broad range of global and local challenges. The variety of the challenges facing government is evident from the following list:

- economic development and job growth
- urban and rural regeneration
- enhanced environmental and natural resource management
- infrastructure development
- dynamic and improved IT capability.

Effective responses to these concerns are beyond the efforts of single agencies or communities acting alone.”
The management of the RCP by the Strategic Projects Division of the NSW Premier's Department is a key factor in the success of the program. The Division’s activities are initiated or approved by the Premier or the Director General. Its work reflects the government’s priorities. The division has developed constructive links with central and line agencies. The Division does not replicate the role of other agencies but seeks to improve results for communities by leading and facilitating holistic and public sector responses.

The RCP has a simple structure of eleven two-person offices, consisting of the coordinator and administrative and project support. However, this structure has been added to in a number of regions, as project officers have been put in place to undertake specific projects.

**Funding**

The RCP is funded by a combination of allocations from the Consolidated Fund as well as agency contributions.

**Projects**

Examples of projects by region include:

**Riverina-Murray Region**

*Riverina-Murray Regional Coordination Management Group (RCMG)*

The community and business stakeholders conducted a successful Workforce Availability Forum to identify solutions to workforce shortages, because of significant economic development in the Riverina.

*Mineral Sand Mining*

The RCMG and Australian Inland Energy and Water worked in partnership to develop a whole-of-government approach to maximise opportunities for mineral sand mining and processing in the Murray Basin.

**South East Region**

*Old Delegate Hospital*

The Regional Coordinator coordinated a partnership between the NSW Government, Bombala Council and Willmot Forests, a plantation company, to convert the former Delegate hospital into Willmot Forests Regional Headquarters. This initiative achieved 30 new jobs in the Delegate community of 350 people.
**Goulburn Youth Project**

In response to the needs of youth in Goulburn, government agencies, council and the community successfully developed a project that provided a more flexible, coordinated and integrated health and support service delivery point for young people.

**Central Coast Region**

*Central Coast Moving Forward*

The Regional Coordinator facilitated the development of the Central Coast Moving Forward Strategy. The strategy was developed by the community, key groups and individuals from the region. Priorities for 2001–2001 will be launched in July 2001.

*Child and Youth Strategy*

The Central Coast Child and Youth Strategy was developed to encourage both Government and non-Government agencies to work together with the aim of improving the health and wellbeing of children and young people in the Central Coast region.

**North Coast Region**

*The North Coast Aboriginal Communities*

The RCMG initiated a successful Workshop of Aboriginal, State, and Commonwealth agencies to discuss issues of concern to Aboriginal communities. The RCMG is also supporting the Shared Vision Wula Wula Information and Access Centre in the Richmond Valley.

*Improved Service Coordination with Local Government*

The RCMG held regular service coordination meetings with the 16 North Coast local government areas. These forums identified opportunities for cross servicing and for collaborating in the development of a North Coast Regional Strategic Infrastructure Plan.

**New England/North West Region**

*Regional Priorities Framework*

The Regional Coordinator worked closely with other key players in New England to continue the effective Regional Priorities Framework initiative. Core regional organisations supported or monitored a range of projects to address regional priorities.
Community Link Pilot – Service Access Model for Remote Communities

Following feasibility studies of two remote community clusters, a number of service delivery options specifically geared for small populations will be piloted in 2001–2002. The pilots include working with communities to ensure decision-making and advisory structures will be made at the local community level.

Western NSW Region

Community Participation – Bourke and Brewarrina

In partnership with the rural communities of Bourke and Brewarrina, the Western Regional Coordination Program and the Strengthening Communities Unit developed a Community Participation model. The model aims to develop an action strategy to redress local social and economic issues.

Access to Transport in Remote Areas

The RCMG, in collaboration with the Department of Transport, developed a major project to improve access to services and identify infrastructure necessary to support transport services in remote areas. The project was approved and funded under the Regional Service Delivery Plan.

Illawarra Region and South East Region

Illawarra Transport Strategy

An Illawarra-Shoalhaven Transport Development Officer commenced employment to drive implementation of newly completed public transport strategies in the Illawarra and Shoalhaven. The collaboration of Government agencies, Local Government and transport operators have yielded significant early outcomes.

Port Kembla Community Renewal and Safety Plan

Working with Illawarra Area Health, NSW Police, Wollongong City Council and the local community, a Port Kembla Community Safety and Renewal Plan was prepared to address key issues including, street-sex work, substance abuse and economic regeneration.

Hunter Region

Hunter Community Renewal Scheme

The RCMG with the support of agencies developed the Hunter Community Renewal Scheme to improve the quality of life in highly disadvantaged communities. The Scheme, based on place management, commenced at Windale and Booragul in the Lake Macquarie City areas.
The Regional Coordinator facilitated planning and associated development approvals for a private irrigation scheme to drought proof the Pokolbin and Broke-Fordwich wine producing areas.

The Regional Coordinator chaired a task force to develop manuals to assist potential developers access information to enable them to make investment decisions. The manual will be available in 2001–2002.

**Regional Coordination Management Groups**

Regional Managers of State Government Agencies, together with Regional Coordinators, are responsible for the setting of regional priorities and the strategic management of projects and issues. Each region has a Regional Coordination Management Group (RCMG), comprising regional managers of State Government Agencies and the Regional Coordinator. A number of State Agencies are not represented at the regional level or have a different regional structure to that used by the RCP. In these situations representation is sent from the central office or the nearest relevant region. A number of Regional Managers are members of more than one RCMG. The RCMGs usually meet every two months and often rotate their meetings around the region.

The role of the RCMGs is to:

- identify and prioritise issues that require a multi-agency response
- develop and manage regional strategic projects
- allocate and monitor resources to support projects
- ensure program objectives are achieved
- evaluate and monitor project outcomes
- enhance interagency networks and information exchange.

RCMG formats are flexible, reflecting agency regional arrangements. Some RCMGs divide their work into clusters such as economic development, natural resources or human services. Other RCMGs prefer to retain all their activities in one forum. Regional Managers argue that it is useful to be aware of the range of issues being dealt with in the region.

The Regional Coordinators and RCMGs work closely with local government and in a number of regions, for example the Riverina-Murray, plans are in place to meet regularly with local government mayors and general managers to work on areas of common interest. Representatives of local government are usually invited to meet with the RCMG on a regular basis, often in relation to specific issues. Similar arrangements are in place for Commonwealth agencies.
Cooperation with local and Commonwealth government agencies in the regions reflects the capacity of the RCP to enhance regional governance by creating cross-jurisdictional connections.

The role of Regional Coordinators is a key factor in the success of the RCP. The Coordinators act as regional “catalysts”, providing project support, leadership and coordination. The Regional Coordinators also act as an “early warning” system in identifying issues and problems that are emerging in the regions and alerting the Premier and the Premier’s Department.

The Regional Coordinator does not replicate the work of the line agencies, but strives to achieve positive outcomes for the community through collaboration and coordination between agencies.

**Coordination**

The NSW Government endeavours to ensure that coordination takes place with each level of government to enhance project outcomes at the regional level. The Government has identified that “project development and management should take into account:

- issues of significance identified by non-government organisations, Local Government and Commonwealth agencies
- the requirements of localities from across the region
- the mix of factors impacting on community well-being (i.e. social, environmental and economic)
- balance of long and short term projects.

The RCP also sets out to identify project closure or a transition strategy at the commencement of the project.

At the central office level, coordination occurs at a strategic level with meetings of Chief Executive Officers being convened on an “as needed” or task specific basis. The CEOs meet in clusters according to work groups, such as human services and natural resources. Integration of agency effort at a central level in relation to policy, budgeting and service development is being informed by the lessons and achievements of RCP regional projects. CEOs report that it will take time to enhance the statewide mainstreaming of effective regional initiatives.

Senior Officers and CEOs commented that the RCP has been a very effective process in improving coordination and outcomes at the regional level and, as a consequence, at state-wide level. For example, the development of natural resources plans for each region has been able to be facilitated through the structures provided by the RCP.
A series of interviews were undertaken with chief executives and senior officers of a number of state government agencies to discuss the impact of the RCP on the work of agencies delivering programs and projects throughout NSW. Interviews were held in the Department of Land and Water Conservation; Department of Urban Affairs and Planning; Environmental Protection Agency; Department of Ageing; Disability and Home Care; Department of Mineral Resources and the Department of State and Regional Development. Site visits to several regions also occurred.

A site visit was undertaken of the Riverina-Murray Regional Coordination Management Group to look at the strategies used to encourage integration and coordination and the impact of projects undertaken.

### Site Visit: Regional Coordination Management Group (RCMG)

The Regional Coordination Management Group (RCMG) in the Riverina-Murray meets on a quarterly basis, in different locations throughout the region. The meetings usually comprise an afternoon, dinner and morning meeting. Late in the afternoon local Mayors and General Managers of Councils are invited to meet with the members of the RCMG. The RCMG values local government as having a key role in service delivery and the provision of infrastructure. Meeting with local government ensures that relationships are established and many issues that emerge in the region can be solved quickly through informal networks that have been forged through the RCMG process.

The membership of the RCMG comprises Regional Directors of State Agencies and in some cases a representative from the Central Offices of Agencies if they do not have a regional presence. At the meeting attended during the IPAA project, members of the RCMG met in Gundagai and had travelled from Wagga Wagga, Sydney, Albury-Wodonga, Bathurst, Dubbo and Orange.

The main aim of the meeting held in August 2001 was to focus on the finalisation of the Riverina Murray Regional Service Delivery Plan (RSDP). The plan is an excellent example of the members of the RCMG working together and of State Agencies committing to work together to improve the delivery of NSW Government Services to a regional community.

The plan “aims to provide a consolidated, and whole-of-government approach in the Riverina Murray region to improve government services by coordinating service delivery in a way that meets the need of individual and communities while making the best use of government resources”. The RSDP identifies priority combined agency initiatives and incorporates them into a strategic plan as the basis for the coordinated and managed response to those key issues.

Prior to developing the plan, the 2000 plan was reviewed and of the 52 actions identified in that plan, 12 had been completed, 18 are underway and 10 are considered as ongoing actions. Six actions are currently being considered by the RCMG and six actions are yet to commence.
The Key Result Areas (KRAs) identified in the 2001 Plan are a good example of the focus of the work of the RCP. They are:

- Rural Community Involvement – capacity building and improved service delivery through partnerships between the community, government and industry
- Industry, Natural Resources and Infrastructure – improving services in the whole-of-government context
- Operational issues – improving government service delivery

Within the context of these KRAs the RCMG has a very clear and practical approach to developing the criteria that projects must meet before they are funded. These include:

- whole-of-government
- delivered through, or encourage partnerships
- meet defined community needs
- are strategic
- have measurable outcomes
- organisationally efficient
- demonstrate, or are capable of, innovation or novel approaches
- can be devolved to an operational level
- do not duplicate existing initiatives
- add value to existing initiatives or provide leverage
- have defined exit strategy/time frame.

An example of the effectiveness of the RCP is the development and implementation of a Workforce Availability Forum in the Riverina-Murray Region. The Forum was an initiative of the Riverina-Murray Regional Coordination Management Group.
The members of the RCMG have indicated that the RCP has been a very effective process and has enhanced their ability to do their jobs effectively in the Region. Members have indicated that one of the key success factors is the location of the program in the Premier's Department. Members have also indicated that the skills, energy and networks of the Regional Coordinator are critical to the success of the program. The linkages built at the meetings are critical. For example, youth justice strategies require the involvement of the Police and a range of agencies. Practical approaches, such as the funding of “The Place” project in Wentworth will make a difference to the future of young people in that community.

Positives of the RCP as noted by the group included:

- Improved liaison between RCMG, agencies, communities and local government has resulted in improved, workable social plans
- Communities are taking ownership of their problems and not waiting for external or state government agencies
- Barriers have been removed for agencies to work together
- There has been a reduction in the adversarial way in which needs, issues and services are identified
• Resources have been shared
• Health issues are being addressed in the community to reduce workload
• Policy decisions have “triple bottom line” – a balanced concern for social, environmental and economic issues.

Similar examples of cooperation can be found in the New England/North West Region. The RCMG in this region has identified the key issues facing the region as:

• Chronic unemployment – amongst Aboriginal people and due to a loss of traditional industry
• Youth homelessness and suicide – domestic violence and other alcohol and drug related crime
• Roads and transport – small towns without sealed road access
• Coordination of services and active involvement of the community in planning the delivery of services.

The New England and North West Region has implemented a number of strategies to deal with some of the identified problems. These include:

• Regional Priorities Framework and Regional Services Delivery plan
• Moree Place Project – a practical initiative in a neighbourhood that has led to decreased crime rates
• Regional Extended Family Service
• BIGhART – a project which engages successfully with young people in crisis
• Duckweed Project – biological way of cleaning waste water in an Aboriginal community
• Position of Regional Coordinator Aboriginal Affairs.

The RCP in the New England and North West also works with the Cabinet Office to ensure that the Families First program is implemented effectively throughout the region. The Families First Program aims to increase the effectiveness of prevention and early intervention services to help families raise healthier, well adjusted children. The program involves joint funding and management of the program by the Departments of Community Services, Ageing, Disability and Home Care, Housing and Education and Training facilitated by the Cabinet Office. The broad aims and objectives of the program are, through a coordinated network of services, to support parents and carers to raise their children and help them solve problems early before they become extreme.
This project is another example of a regionally based program in NSW that aims to target local problems and to work with local communities to tailor services to meet local needs.

**Key Features That Make the Program Work**

Based on interviews, literature and site visits it is determined that the RCP works because:

- It is located in the Premier’s Department
- The program has the strong support of the Premier and members of Cabinet
- Regional Coordinators and support staff are allocated to each region. The Regional Coordinators are well paid and are at a senior level
- Regional Coordinators have very effective communication skills and are able to encourage coordination and cooperation
- Regional Coordinators are given strategic roles and only become involved in issues that involve several state agencies
- The flexible role of Regional Coordinators allows them to act as “change agents”; as “honest brokers” in resolving differences or as regional negotiators with the ear of the Premier as regional demand requires ensuring an issues based approach
- Resources have been allocated to fund strategic regional projects
- Transaction costs of the program are kept low through an office staff of two in each region
- The program enhances agencies’ capacity to leverage off each other to improve outcomes for communities. A major determinant of benefits accruing for agencies is the quality and strength of their participation in the program and its projects
- The program has a State, Regional and local frame
- There is strong central program management with a pragmatic results-orientated approach, not coordination as an end in itself
- There is a maturing understanding of what does and does not lend itself to a coordinated approach.
Differences Made

The RCP is clearly making a difference to outcomes in local and regional communities and is increasing the amount of cooperation and collaboration between agencies in NSW including:

- All of the agencies interviewed for the project identified positive outcomes from the RCP. Outcomes included faster resolution of issues; quick, effective and open communication between regional managers; early identification of issues and problems; more effective development of policies; and for smaller agencies the RCP enhances their ability to work with a range of agencies on common issues.

- In 1998, the Premier announced a new requirement in all Senior Executive Performance Agreements for senior agency staff to demonstrate a coordinated, multi-agency approach to service delivery. The program is assisting agencies meet this requirement.

- The development of human services programs, such as Families First, are an example of effective regional cooperation involving the identification of priorities and funding of key areas.
  - the Upper Hunter Water Pipeline (300 new jobs and investment of $100 million)
  - interagency planning activity through the Regional Priorities Framework in the New England Region, involving 30 agencies yields estimated minimum savings of $45,000 p.a.
  - coordination of cross-government assistance for the redevelopment of a major industrial site in Western Sydney will yield up to 5,000 jobs for the Region
  - the program’s facilitation of the mineral sands industry in the Riverina Murray will fast track some $350 million in royalty payments and State taxes
  - the facilitation of ten new investment projects for the Western Riverina will yield $208.5 million in investment with an estimated 1600 new permanent jobs.

- A particular strength of the RCP has been its capacity to lead and support local initiatives, e.g.:
  - job creation and economic development in places facing particular challenges such as: the Hunter Region, Wollongong, Bega, Lithgow and Greystanes (Boral)
  - local community development in places such as Kempsey, Moree, Bourke, Windale and Redfern/Waterloo
  - a more integrated approach to delivering services, for example in Gunning, Armidale and Goulburn-whole-of-government approach to managing the environment and natural resources
  - local government and communities, for example: Lake Macquarie Estuary, Menindee and Willandra Lakes.
Barriers Or Constraints

Some of the issues which emerged through consultation include:

- The level of collaboration between CEOs over specific issues can lag behind the “multi-agency successes” of regional managers. This can slow down the generalisation of effective projects to other regions.
- Success of the program is contingent on the skills and abilities of the Regional Coordinators.
- While the RCMGs are essential, engagement can vary as the work is not seen as core business by some line agency regional managers.

What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn From This Program

- To ensure effective cooperation at the regional level, location of the management of the program/initiatives should be in the Premier’s Department.
- The support and leadership of the Premier, CEO of Premier’s Department and the Cabinet is critical.
- Resources need to be allocated to appoint a Regional Coordinator, who must be at a senior level.
- Funds need to be available to fund regional initiatives.
- Regional Coordinators must not become involved in issues that are the line responsibility of one agency.

4.2 Queensland – Community Renewal

One component of Queensland’s Crime Prevention Strategy, adopted in 1998, Community Renewal, is a whole-of-government strategy to promote safe, healthy and confident communities based on a partnership between the Queensland Government and people living and working in renewal areas. Community Renewal utilises a place management approach.

The program commenced in September 1998 as part of a crime prevention policy initiated by the Queensland Government and designed to respond to the multi-dimensional nature of various Queensland communities. The program has already received allocations of $37.5m over the past three years, with a further $45m allocated for the period of 2001-2002 to 2003-2004.
The primary goal of the Community Renewal Program is to fund and implement strategies to reduce crime and raise the confidence and image of identified communities through a wide range of projects and activities.

The program is administered by the Queensland Department of Housing and works closely with other state government agencies, local councils and communities in the 13 target areas to identify and implement renewal initiatives. The Department of Housing’s Community Renewal Unit is responsible for planning, developing, implementing, coordinating and evaluating the Community Renewal Program.

The Community Renewal Program brings together government departments with a key concern for community well being; Department of Families; Health; Education; and Police are integral to the process. The Department of Employment & Training and the Department of State Development are also important partners in maximising links between area-based initiatives and the Queensland Government’s major employment and enterprise development programs. Each local council with a renewal area within its boundaries works closely with the Department of Housing to implement Community Renewal initiatives.

History

Community Renewal is the most recent in a long line of programs aimed at targeting particularly disadvantaged localities, or those with particular local problems.

The Commonwealth Building Better Cities (BBC) program was one of the original precursors to Community Renewal. It was announced in the 1991–1992 budget and commanded an impressive budget of $800 million over five years. The result was the initiation of eight projects, predominantly involving capital upgrades of facilities. However, an important educative basis was laid for the Community Renewal project through the BBCs introduction of Community Action Plans. This later became part of the methodology of Community Renewal.

Integrated Human Services and Planning Pilots were also initiated in the early 1990s. These differed from the predominant program approach of the government departments by focussing on improved regional social planning and improved human services. A key lesson learnt was the advisability of linking decision-making processes with planning and allocation of resources. It also gave strategists a better concept of the depth of resources required and the possible barriers to be met in order to create genuine community ownership.
The Community Renewal and Local Jobs Program established in 1995 did not attract funding commensurate with the BBC project of the early 1990s, but it did have an allocation of $100 million over five years and an ambitious mandate to “break the reinforcing effect which the local physical, social and economic environment can have on personal and household deprivation.” The anticipated outcomes of safer neighbourhoods, improved education, training and employment opportunities and better social infrastructure and amenities were similar to the anticipated outcomes from the current Community Renewal program. This is unsurprising given that the project was prematurely abandoned in 1996 before being revived in the form of the current Community Renewal project in 1998 with an additional offshoot, the Community Jobs Program, which comes under the auspices of the Department of Employment and training.

The contextual history of Community Renewal has implications for current community developments. These include impacting upon the manner in which the local community may accept a new program and be willing to contribute to it. It is conceivable that in areas with a history of intervention, such as Inala, the community may be suffering from program fatigue.

The process of layering of programs has led to a gradual shift away from infrastructure focused projects, towards projects with more ephemeral, yet important, goals. These include community capacity building to increase the resilience of communities, thereby hopefully influencing the unemployment rates and other social indicators of the areas. The history of community renewal also acted as a pre-warning for the current program about the challenges of establishing processes that foster integrated governance.

**Evolution of the Program**

Implementation processes have evolved with the establishment of the project, but always with the knowledge that the Department of Housing was keen to see Community Renewal in operation and the allocated budget spent. At the local level, there were expectations of rapid action to redress problems that had been neglected.

However, although the program was embraced with enthusiasm right from the start, lack of role models for such a program led to an underestimation of the staff and administrative resources required to establish such an extensive project in all fifteen areas, not to mention at its administrative source. As a result of the inefficiencies caused by understaffing, facilitator and coordinator positions are being introduced. This is just one example of the evolving nature of the program.
Objectives

The goal and objectives of the program were endorsed by Cabinet in 1998 and the primary goal endorsed was, “To reduce the level of disadvantage and raise the confidence and image of identified communities.”

In addition, there were seven endorsed objectives:

1. Improve the safety and security of people and property.
2. Better integrate socially and economically disadvantaged residents into broader community and economic networks and systems.
3. Ensure accessibility of residents to community services and facilities they require.
4. Strengthen and expand opportunities for young people.
5. Improve neighbourhood amenity.
6. Ensure public expenditure is directed to projects and activities which will have lasting and positive impacts on the communities.
7. Make the communities central to achieving program objectives.

In each of the renewal areas, partnership arrangements with local councils have been negotiated, along with a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Employment and Training. In addition, there is strong community group and local resident interest in the program. In particular, public housing tenants and other local residents have expressed interest.

Submissions

Since the inception of the program in September 1998, there have been 338 projects, worth over $36m, approved to fund a wide variety of innovative Community Renewal projects in thirteen local areas.

Submissions for funding are assessed against the following criteria:

- Meets community needs and priorities
- Is consistent with program objectives
- Is cost effective
- Integrates with the government’s urban renewal initiative and crime prevention strategy
- Builds on existing resources
- Contributes to economic development
• Meets agreed objectives within the project budget and time frame
• Complements and not duplicates existing government programs
• Supported by local council and relevant Local Members
• Conforms with program guidelines.

Examples of funded programs include:
• Safety and security measures.
• Streetscaping
• Park upgrades
• Youth diversion and assistance programs
• Community consultation and planning
• Remedial help for stressed families
• Innovative cultural developments
• Employment and training opportunities
• Service integration and coordination.

Renewal Areas

There are currently fifteen designated community renewal areas (at various stages in the process), namely Caboolture, Deception Bay, Eagleby, Garbutt, Goodna, Inala, Kingston, Leichhardt, Loganlea, Manoora, Palm Island, Rasmussen, Riverview, Woodridge, and Vincent. The most recently designated areas are Palm Island (July 2001) and Rasmussen and Vincent (February 2001).

The renewal areas share a number of social characteristics that are relatively unique when compared with other urban Queensland areas. These include:
• Statistically higher proportions of households with children
• Relatively young populations, with 40-45% being aged less than 25 and with higher proportions of the population aged less than 15 years (with the exception of Garbutt and Manoora)
• Low median individual and household incomes
• Relatively culturally diverse populations, including significant Indigenous and Culturally and Linguistically Diverse communities
Noticeably higher unemployment levels across all age groups

All 12 areas are among the 10% most disadvantaged Queensland communities.

Another feature of commonality is that in each community at least 40% of households live in rented accommodation. The maximum percentage of tenants is experienced in Inala, with 59%. Additionally, in Inala, Loganlea, Leichhardt and Riverview most tenants are public housing clients. By comparison, private renters predominate in the two Caboolture Shire renewals, Eagleby, Manoora and Woodridge. Goodna and Kingston have roughly equal proportions of public and private tenants.

Another characteristic of all areas except, perhaps, Inala, is their high proportion of home purchasers, relative to state wide figures, yet low levels of home ownership. Along with the high percentage of households with children, these figures are likely to indicate a high percentage of first homebuyers. The population bases of the areas are very varied, with a minimum of 3,112 in Riverview and a high of 16,677 in Woodridge.

Funding for Community Renewal

The Community Renewal program enjoys a flexible funding source, designed to meet identified community needs within each renewal area. This is a rare example of “place budgeting.” The consequences of this approach are that funding earmarked for the entire program is not dedicated to any particular activity. Whilst the funding is intended to support and enhance existing and new services and activities, the scale of funding is such that significant capital works may be undertaken as part of the program. The improvement activities are to be decided upon through a process involving local stakeholders. It has been observed (Spiller Gibbins San Pty Ltd, 2000) that knowledge that there are significant financial incentives to be gained by participating in renewal acts as a significant motivator for community interest and involvement.

Management

Due to the level of community interest, as well as the coordinated government approach required to fuel community renewal, the management and governance structures are relatively complex. The key players and decision-making structures are listed below.

- Renewal Coordinators
- Central program staff
• Local renewal facilitators
• Community Reference Groups
• Local Government
• Project coordination groups
• Regional Managers’ Forums
• Local Members of Parliament
• Crime Prevention Taskforce
• Inter-departmental working party.

**Key Features That Make The Program Work**

The research team met with senior management and staff within the Unit as well as the evaluator. Site visits to several community renewal areas to meet with community participants and stakeholders occurred. Consultees indicate that whilst integration is a sub-theme, it is not a driver of Community Renewal. The program employs a place management approach by having consultants work with the community to articulate a Community Action Plan and project officers (and more recently coordinators) undertake the role of coordinating the layers within the Community Renewal structure. Rather than illustrate good practice in integration, consultees felt the case study highlighted the fact that in order to achieve local outcomes for the community, central and regional structures needed to be better integrated. Having said that, however, elements of integration include:

• The Community Renewal structure (which includes Regional Managers’ Forums in several renewal areas as well as local area coordinators in some renewal areas) employed at a senior level to generate collaboration. In some areas there are also on-the-ground workers.

• The Community Reference Group and Regional Managers’ Forum can support or deny a project. It cannot go on to be approved by the Local Member and then the Minister unless both bodies approve the request.

• In order to receive funding, projects need to have an auspicing department to oversee and implement the project.

• The Community Action Plans cross departmental silos.
• The success of Community Renewal is based on a network of involvement.

• A discretionary pool of funding ensures departmental involvement.

• As part of the Premier’s Crime Prevention Taskforce a senior officers’ group is responsible for integrating aspects of the crime prevention strategy (although this has not been as effective as was hoped).

• This is a strong central mandate.

In its original guise, the initial conception of Community Renewal emphasised the originality and importance of an area-based approach (Department of Housing, 1998), recognising as it does the concentrations of social problems and disadvantage in discernible areas. The establishment of the program in Queensland coincided with the publication in the United Kingdom of A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (SEU, 1998), and the Queensland model draws substantially upon its United Kingdom counterpart’s concepts. The key aspects of community renewal were conceptualised as being (1) a specific focus on particular localities; (2) coordination and integration of programs to tackle a wide range of social problems; (3) meaningful community participation in identifying problems and solutions.

The area-based approach was also designed to challenge the State Government to rethink its established approach to planning and resourcing the delivery of local level programs in five key areas. These are:

• Community involvement. This was designed to be central to the planning and development of submissions.

• Coordination and Integration. As already discussed, there is the partially realised potential for the program to encourage agencies to focus their program spending on identified priority issues in the predesignated areas.

Differences Made

Key successes of Community Renewal include community action plans of variable quality, integrated service delivery models in two renewal areas to improve human services delivery, a revitalisation of Neighbourhood Watch in another renewal area, a Community Access Schools Pilot in four renewal areas, myriad environmental amenity projects, and the Service Integration Project. A Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated with the Department of Employment and Training. Partnership agreements with local councils in each of the renewal areas have also been developed.

Community Renewal has recently been expanded to provide additional government employees in the renewal areas. The program is currently being evaluated and recommendations may change the current structure.
• Service delivery innovation is also encouraged under a system that will allow the trialing of new models and approaches. An example of this would include co-location of services.

• Local economic development was also regarded as a strategic goal of the program. In particular, it is hoped that the renewal program will facilitate the growth and establishment of local enterprise.

**Barriers Or Constraints**

Some of the issues which were identified as problematic for the project include:

**Government**

• Departmental response to community expressed need based on “this is not what we do – try that department” rather than thinking of ways to integrate internally

• Lack of integration centrally

• Add-on nature of integrated work – (i.e. not seen as a core to service delivery)

• Public sector culture including valuing of secrecy over open debate

• Different political persuasions between state and local level

• Budget constraints.

**Coordination**

• Burn out of project officers due to stress of forcing integration

• Cessation of a local project if auspicing department does not continue to fund after Community Renewal funding is finished

• Complex, varied and overarching set of stakeholders including all levels of the bureaucracy, politicians, residents and community members with no mechanism to bring these stakeholders together

• Silo mentality of services and some departments

• Pressure to start the program quickly detracted from the setting of a clear strategic framework to guide activities

• Ad hoc nature of attendance at Regional Managers Forums.

**Community**

• Cynicism in the community and, conversely, high and sometimes unrealistic community expectations

• Varying levels of resources and leadership within the community.
What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn From This Program

The lessons from this case study relate to processes for leadership, decision-making, cultural change and community engagement:

- Support and leadership from the Premier is essential and commitment at the Ministerial and CEO level assists timely and effective decisions.

- The establishment and planning phase needs to be substantial and therefore requires adequate time before funding can be distributed.

- Engagement with departments should allow for differing cultures i.e. some departments are more planning-focused while others are only willing to be involved in implementation.

- Integration will not automatically happen because issues are cut across departments – structures and cultures need to shift.

- The difficulties in working outside and across silos should not be underestimated.

- Initially this way of working is more resource intensive, not less.

- A discretionary pool of funding will aid departmental engagement but care must be taken that the funding is not used for departmental “wish list” projects.

- Tying the program with the urban renewal program allowed for visible early successes such as park improvements.

- “It is easier to ask for forgiveness than permission.”

- Timelines need to reflect “community time” and allow for local engagement.

- A feedback loop to the community is needed, as is a proper communication process with all stakeholders.

- Not enough credit is given to communities and their ability to self-govern.

- Sometimes the process becomes the outcome (i.e. issue of whether measurement of the success of community renewal was to produce the outcome or to put a process in place so that the community can produce the outcome).

- This type of work can be politically sensitive at all levels.
4.3 Western Australia – SAFER W.A.

_Caveat:_ In line with the new government restructure, the SAFER W.A. Unit has been amalgamated into the Office of Crime Prevention and reports to a new Standing Committee. As this change was commencing at the time of the case study investigation, the old structure is provided below.

SAFER W.A. is a whole-of-government and whole-of-community initiative established in 1998 to prevent, reduce and tackle the causes of crime.

The strategic directions for SAFER W.A. were set by the Cabinet Standing Committee on Law and Order which comprised the Premier and Deputy Premier (as co-chairs); the Attorney General, the Minister for Justice and the Ministers for Police, Family and Children’s Services; and Local Government. The Cabinet Standing Committee has also overseen a legislative reform program to ensure that the needs of the community are reflected in the State’s laws.

The SAFER W.A. Council comprises government and community representatives. The Council has been established as the Government’s key advisory body on law and order issues. It plays an important role supporting the partnership approach to community safety and security. It has strategic oversight of the SAFER W.A. funding programs. It has also implemented a range of initiatives to enhance community awareness about crime prevention and SAFER W.A. (its objectives, directions and activities).

These include:

- Information booklet and pamphlets
- SAFER W.A. Newsletter
- SAFER W.A. website
- SAFER W.A. Project Register.

The Chief Executive Officers’ Working Group directs the implementation of the across-government decisions of the Cabinet Standing Committee on Law and Order. The CEO’s Working Group also ensures cooperation and coordination between Government agencies. This Working Group is chaired by the Executive Director, Policy Department of the Premier and Cabinet and its members are the CEOs or the nominated representative of the CEOs of the key government agencies:

- Department for Community Development
- Department of Justice
• WA Police Service
• Department of Indigenous Affairs
• Department of Education
• Department of Housing
• Department of Local Government and Regional Development.

There are fourteen District Interagency Working Groups (DIAWGs) operating in each SAFER W.A. District, which are based on police districts. DIAWGs report to the CEO's Working Group and work to improve cooperation and coordination between the SAFER W.A. agencies at the local level. DIAWGs also support partnerships with the community and local government. The two objectives for the groups:

• To manage local cases collectively
• To develop a dialogue with the community about safety and security concerns and, as necessary, to liaise with the community in developing strategies to address those concerns.

The groups were initially chaired by the nominee of the WA Police service for each region and were given little central direction so that structures and partnerships could form. However, there has been ad hoc work on “agreed outcomes” and “Strong Families” piloted in two areas is testing the group’s ability to collectively case manage. In order to resolve the ad hoc nature of staff involvement, the CEO’s group in 2001 established that all agencies must recognise SAFER W.A.’s role in strategic and business plans and that all District Working Groups develop a three year strategic plan with consideration of secondments to support the planning process.

SAFER W.A. District and Local Committees are composed of community representatives who work in partnership with State Government agencies, police and local government to address local safety, security and crime prevention issues and to share local crime solutions and exchange information. There are currently in excess of 80 community based SAFER W.A. committees involving over 1,000 members throughout the state. There is a SAFER W.A. Committees’ Executive Inc. which represents the District and Local Committees. This structure predates SAFER W.A. and was formerly under the Community Policing banner. In 2001, the SAFER W.A. Committees’ Executive was re-examining its constitution and working toward a strategic plan.
Local government plays a major role in helping to identify and implement solutions to local safety and security problems. As members of SAFER W.A. committees, local councils also contribute to the development and implementation of coordinated responses to law and order issues.

The SAFER W.A. Unit within the Department of the Premier and Cabinet provides policy, coordination and secretariat support to SAFER W.A.

In addition to the funds provided to District and Local Committees through the SAFER W.A. Committee’s Executive, grants are available from:

- The Community Policing Fund ($600,000 per annum, managed by the Police Service in partnership with the SAFER W.A. Committees’ Executive Inc.) – which provides funds to police officers for local activities involving the police and community in reducing crime and anti-social behaviour, improving safety and security, and reducing the fear of crime.

- State Crime Prevention Strategy Fund ($500,000 per annum, State Crime Prevention Advisory Committee through the SAFER W.A. District Committees) – which provides one-off grants to community groups to tackle crime.

- SAFER W.A. Fund ($500,000 per annum) – one to three-year grants for ongoing community based initiatives but programs must have proven ability to achieve stated objectives and be in accord with local crime issues as noted by the District Safer W.A. Committee.

- SAFER W.A. Community Security Program ($4 million over 4 years) – for local government crime prevention initiatives.
Key Features That Make The Program Work

The research team met with representatives from each of the levels of the Initiative and went on several site visits across Western Australia. While there is general recognition that not all elements of the SAFER W.A. structure are integrated, there are reporting mechanisms for each component of the structure and the whole is united through the SAFER W.A. Unit, now the Office of Crime Prevention. At a local level lateral links occur; the SAFER W.A. District Committees often share a member with the District Interagency Working Groups and the SAFER W.A. District Committee minutes are sometimes, but not always, circulated to the District Interagency Working Groups. Hierarchical links occur with the District Interagency Working Groups reporting to the CEO’s Working Group and the SAFER W.A. District Committees reporting to the SAFER W.A. Committees’ Executive and so on. State departmental involvement in the District Interagency Working Group is mandated by the CEOs.

Differences Made

In 2000 SAFER W.A. was only one of two Western Australian government outcome-based activities where funds were tied to an outcome rather than an agency. Differences made by the program include:

- Some successes on the ground in terms of reducing crime and key initiatives such as the introduction of a compulsory vehicle immobiliser scheme to reduce the incidence of motor vehicle theft and local council crime audits.
- Through “Strong Families” pilot agencies can jointly case-manage clients.
- Targeted community approach through the District and Local Committees structure.
- On the ground response or “local solutions for local problems” which has urban and rural community involvement through the District and Local Committees and the District Interagency Working Groups.
- Indigenous involvement in the District Interagency Working Groups.
- Represents community/government/policy/NGOs working together.

For District Interagency Working Groups, SAFER WA:

- provided networks
- improved communication
- created linkages for new players
- enabled a sharing of collective wisdom
- promoted a willingness to try creative ideas
- created more synergies outside of meetings
- provided a focus on common clients
- developed a more strategic approach
- enhanced awareness of cross-departmental issues.
Barriers Or Constraints

Three key barriers to implementation of such an initiative were identified. Firstly, historical legislation such as agencies’ own statutes, Section 81 Criminal Code and the Public Sector Standards Act make information sharing between departments difficult. Secondly, agency boundaries do not necessarily match and, finally, funding allocation and accountability requirements from the Treasury do not support integrated projects.

Other barriers as articulated by consultees included:

Government

- Accountability – who will be held responsible for funding and reporting
- Political shifts
- Complexity, rules, regulations – organisational cultures
- Mixed messages from CEO level regarding importance of integration
- Central agency restructure – self preservation
- Difference between coordination and integration – need to be really clear about the motivation behind the initiative
- Cost of the processes
- Large departments with silo mentality
- Funding cycles.

Coordination

- Responsibility for driving the process at the district, regional and local levels
- Program allocations
- Process based on goodwill – commitment requires funds and accountability – if action doesn’t happen, people lose their commitment
- Passing on the information, approach and commitment to other staff
- Links between the various committees need to be improved
- Community renewal and integration is happening from all directions
- Geographical constraints
- Different delegations and accountability at regional level
- “Turf” issues
• Could have supportive CEO but the budget manager may find it problematic
• Quality of managers at programmatic and regional levels
• Most of the funding through SAFER W.A. is one-off.

Community
• Community commitment
• Considerable variation in the relationship between inter-agency and district committees dependent on personalities, superintendent interpretation, local departmental bureaucratic whim, bureaucrats who are unwilling/unable to move outside the square
• Varying accountability requirements both within and across departments
• Understanding that the process of engagement has value.

What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn From This Program
Some of the lessons identified through the case study include:

Government
• It is a difficult process to balance community expectations and the need for participation and strategic approaches which meet government needs.
• There is a need to establish benchmarks as it can be difficult to measure success.
• The centre should not be overly directive; rather it should support local activity. However, this has led to an ad hoc engagement by District Interagency Working Groups which is being addressed through a mandated strategic planning process.
• The involvement of the Premier is critical in delivery of whole-of-government approaches/strategies.
• If this type of work is seen as an add-on, then core business will always take precedence.
• Some government policies create barriers to integration, e.g. organisational structures, legislative frameworks and budget processes.
• When governments change they want to “brand” activities.
• In order for integration to be sustainable, there needs to be policy coordination; pooled KPIs; CEOs held accountable through their performance appraisals; shared budgets; a tie to regional development; and a conscious decision to allocate a percentage of funds to joint projects.
Coordination

- There may be a need to support the committee structure, particularly local and district committees, through a small team of “coaches”.

- Collaboration works when things are going fine but when things get tough collaboration declines, for example during a restructuring phase.

- If a separate body is set up to support the process it may take responsibility away from departments to work in an integrated manner.

- Differences in engagement in rural and urban areas need to be understood and acknowledged.

- While the level of involvement of local government may vary, it is a critical factor to the sustainability of local initiatives.
5. Case Studies - Integration Around Partnership Agreements

There is only one case study on integration around partnership agreements, although this is an approach being adopted by other States.

5.1 South Australia – Working Together

*Working Together* is a “living document” which provides a framework for the relationship between the Department of Human Services and non-government community service providers in South Australia. Its genesis lies in the understanding by both sectors that the effective delivery of a range of community services requires productive working relationships based on mutual respect and cooperation. The document establishes a shared purpose, shared principles, shared framework for distributing resources, contracting principles, performance monitoring principles, shared skill development goals, agreed role of the peak bodies, and goals for a DHS/Peaks Forum.

The document states: “The Department of Human Services and non-government community service organisations pledge to maintain our sense of shared purpose and cooperation to improve the quality of life for South Australians and in particular those who are most disadvantaged.” In order to achieve the shared principles and shared purpose noted above, the document contains practical measures including skills development, a framework for performance monitoring and a conflict resolution process. In this way, the document goes beyond the theoretical and into the practical. This is also a key element of the process which led to *Working Together*.

Initially called the Resource Allocation Project, *Working Together* is seen as providing a practical framework for addressing issues which arose out of many years of dialogue between the Department of Human Services and non-government community service providers. In 1990, the South Australian Council of Social Services (SACOSS) approached what was then the Department of Community Welfare, to request a joint review of the government and non-government sector. The resultant report, the *Report of the South Australian*
Community Services Sector Review, concluded that “relationships between the non-government sector and those parts of government to which they closely relate have become unbalanced, and are in danger of becoming more so” (13). Difficulties were identified as confusion in lines of responsibility, overlapping administration, cost shifting, and inconsistent and poor consultation. This report was followed by two other stages including From Solo to Symphony (1992) which flowed from the earlier report and sought to propose a directional and structural framework for both sectors to work collaboratively.

The prelude to Working Together was the Resource Allocation Project. The Resource Allocation Project was conceived as a strategic opportunity for government and non-government sectors to reflect on the experience of contracting and to agree on an agenda for improvement. The project was recast across the portfolio of Human Services following the 1997 restructure and formally endorsed by the Minister for Human Services on 2 November 1998.

Initial management of the Resource Allocation Project involved two working groups – one DHS and one convened by SACOSS with the whole overseen by a Steering Committee made up of representatives from both groups. Each working group was responsible for consultation within their sector. Findings included:

- cynicism on rhetoric around partnering
- quality and best practice, with semantics not matching practice
- problems associated with contracting (for example similar efforts for tendering required of small grants – under $10 000 – and larger grants – over $50 000)
- politicisation of funding decisions
- blurring of roles and accountability around funding and purchasing
- lack of consistency.

Following separate consultation, the joint Steering Committee jointly wrote and edited the final document, Working Together. Working Together’s implementation has included:

- A joint DHS/SACOSS group to oversee implementation in both sectors.
- An implementation group within DHS to oversee implementation internally.
- A contracts and performance management group to develop and coordinate approaches to contracting and performance management.
- A joint DHS/SACOSS group to look at consistency of contracts between DHS Divisions with an initial focus on insurance requirements and disposal of assets, access to records and intellectual property.
Since its launch, the document is proving to have more significant consequences than originally intended. For example, issues which arose in one meeting of the Consistency of Contracts Working Group included:

- Inconsistent approach to insurance with some divisions asking for large amounts
- Some organisations are in the government system and others are not
- Some agencies do not have insurance
- Some agencies are paying 10% of their grant in insurance.

Both the Department of Human Services and SACOSS are committed to ensuring delivery of the document’s potential.

**Key Features That Make The Program Work**

In assessing the case study, researchers met with representatives of the Department of Human Services and peak bodies. During consultation, several notable success features were emphasised. These include the fact that there is significant variability in the history and the nature of the relationship across different program areas, population groups and across service sectors. This throws up enormous challenges, but on the other hand, underscores the need for a broader system-focused approach:

- At the centre of the many issues and debates is the sense of two sectors trying to describe and manage an increasingly complex and pluralistic relationship. Yet those same sectors have seen the quantum and the scope of funding grow substantially and, if anything, an increasing interdependence between the sectors has developed. Over time, there has been a significant alignment of objectives which has expanded the opportunities for collaboration in the delivery of services.

- However, the government and non-government sectors remain independent stakeholders in achieving outcomes for the community. Each has its own responsibilities and accountabilities, its own decision-making authority and operational independence. As the different roles and interests of each sector emerge, there is increasing tension arising from managing the legal and working relationships. The sectors’ perceptions of each other will be influenced by the way in which these tensions are managed and these, in turn, challenge the rhetoric and reality of a cooperative culture.
While it is recognised that the implementation of the *Working Together* document is in its infancy, it has implications for integration both within the non-government sector and within the Department of Human Services, as well as between the two sectors. These implications are beyond the scope originally envisaged.

The achievement of the framework in greater integration is believed to result from:

- The articulation of common outcomes from the Department of Human Services and peak bodies (e.g. SACOSS).
- The structure used to guide both the process and implementation which includes a joint group with internal subgroups.
- The realisation within the Department of Human Services of the need for internal integration.
- The strong support of the DHS CEO.
- The ability of SACOSS to represent the peak bodies.
- Recognition that the sector should choose its own representatives.
- The fact that the process only involved the Department of Human Services not other departments at this stage.
- The longevity of involvement of key stakeholders from the non-government sector.
- The fact that it is seen as a pragmatic approach to examining very pragmatic problems.
- High commitment of both sectors to the process.
- A history of collaboration and job movement between government and community sectors in South Australia.
- A culture of risk taking.
- DHS funded support to SACOSS to undertake its own consultation.
- Resourcing of the process through DHS personnel.

**Differences Made**

The process involved in producing the *Working Together* document led to major improvements in trust and relationships between the two sectors. There is also a genuine recognition of partnership. Implementation of the document is leading to streamlining of departmental policies and contracts and has resulted in a conflict resolution process and joint training. It has also strengthened the capacity of NGOs to work together.
Barriers Or Constraints

Some of the issues which needed to be addressed before the process could proceed and/or be successful included:

- The history and lack of trust both between and within the sector
- Different cultures within the Department of Human Services which predated the merger
- Recently completed departmental restructure and changing involvement by the Department of Human Services personnel
- Culture of welfare as the poor relation to health
- State/Commonwealth funding agreements which may not allow flexibility in implementation
- Different understanding of key words
- Implementation capacity at the middle management level within DHS which relates to agreement on definitions; willingness to change the existing systems; and the perceived applicability of the document
- Turnover in departmental staff leading to lack of continuity and corporate memory
- Lack of internal DHS integration
- Lack of integration and resourcing in the non-government sector can create communication difficulties which can result in varying degrees of understanding and ownership.

There is recognition that the document will become meaningless without both a change in systems and the rewarding of linkages and collaboration through staff performance indicators, and cultural change to enable more collaborative working within the Department.

What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn From This Program

- Other jurisdictions can learn several lessons from this initiative. Firstly, there was an acknowledgment on behalf of the participants that integration means some power/territory has to be given up in specific parts of departments. This requires a change management process to build ownership. It is also vital to have the right people “at the table” who are committed to and capable of representing their sectors and who are consistent attendees to ensure continuity and consistency.
• The framework needs to be bigger than the interests of both sectors. For example the focus should be on better, more effective delivery of services to the community. Likewise, to be successful, there needs to be recognition that the process is greater than the words agreed upon and that the agreement reached is organic in nature, having the potential to expand along with the expanding influence of the integration process or initiative.

• In addition to internal integration, for the process to be most effective the non-government sector must be willing to accept leadership from one peak body and work collaboratively to support the process. The process outlined in this case study is enjoying ongoing success because it built on existing processes and allowed sufficient time for all parties to gain ownership.
6. Case Studies - Whole-Of-Government Integration

The only case study utilising a whole-of-government approach was Victoria. This was a unique case study in that the research team undertook research during the development of the approach.

6.1 Victoria

Having identified fragmentation both within and outside of government, the need to be outcome driven and the need to focus on rural and regional issues, the Victorian Government is moving toward integrated governance by placing the achievement of fair and sustainable prosperity as the overarching outcome for Victoria. This is being pursued by linking economic, social and environmental directions and actions. The current Growing Victoria Together framework architecture includes:

- Examination of Victoria’s strengths and challenges
- Examination of important issues for Victorians
- Demonstrating progress measures
- Focusing on initial priority areas of innovation economy; community building; environmental modernisation/sustainability; early years; and work and family
- Examining ways of working with Victorians on next steps.

Principles being used to demonstrate progress measures include:

- Overall package provides a basis for a more integrated approach to economic, social, environmental and governance outcomes
- Capability of reflecting public expectations
- Mix of objective and subjective measures
- Use of valid and reliable data sources
• Ability to be expressed in plain language
• Linked to capability of State Government
• Can be cut further by people and place.

Thus, this policy framework to guide what in Victoria is being termed “joined-up government” includes a triple bottom line framework which is believed to lead to a focus on improving outcomes for the community in economic, environmental and social well-being. There is an initial focus on organic joining-up through attention to the “why” of integration by focusing on outcomes.

The current framework development arose out of the integration of four different frameworks being developed in parallel by various departments. This integration of four frameworks into one has increased the focus on integration or joining-up in Victoria. Launched in November 2001, the Growing Victoria Together framework outlines the key vision for Victoria in 2001, priorities and action being undertaken to achieve these, and progress measures.

The current focus on community-building falls under Growing Victoria Together which sets out how the State government will tackle issues of importance to Victorians. Growing Victoria Together outlines three main goals for government:

• Providing decent and responsive government
• Getting the basics right – good schools, quality health care, more jobs, safe streets
• Leading the way to a better Victoria with education and lifelong learning as the key.

While the Community Building Initiative addresses several of the strategic issues, its particular focus is on the eighth issue, “building cohesive communities and reducing inequality”.

One example of the way in which progress measures are used to bring about integration is a measure on social capital (in a crisis there will be more people Victorians can turn to) which involves six departments working together to map and assess social capital impacts of current and planned decisions. These processes, in turn, are connected to work underway in local communities. For example, there is a partnership arrangement with local government (through the Municipal Association of Victoria) to work jointly on integrated planning and reporting models at the local level. There is already a project underway in Benalla for the Northeast of Victoria using the suite of progress measures from the Growing Victoria Together framework to assess trends and how they might better influence the future.
While there is some criticism that Growing Victoria Together is a public relations document, it does identify a group of agreed strategic issues which are used to provide a framework to bring about integration. One of the rationales for this approach is the advisability of having a small number of high-level outcomes as a reference point for other actions.

Key actions underway to promote integration in Victoria include:

- The incorporation of Growing Victoria Together into the corporate and business planning templates of departments (which provides continuity across government in both high level content and format).
- The incorporation of Growing Victoria Together into performance agreements.
- The use of the Premier’s Victorian Economic, Environmental and Social Advisory Committee to coordinate stakeholder input into integrated governance issues.
- The mapping of data sets to ensure continuity in scope, definitions, counting rules, reporting, etc. so that data sets can simultaneously provide performance and reporting information for both output and corporate/business planning.
- The development of a system to manage cross cutting issues (e.g. drugs, road safety) by initially establishing whole-of-government objectives which then cascade through departments, and where data sets are joined up.
- The exploration of pooled, place-based funding (for example through community building projects).
- The development of knowledge management strategies which better map, develop and capture flows of knowledge from multiple sources into the policy process.
- Introduction of integrated governance related training and development programs (for example developing and using cross cutting indicators).

Victoria is also conscious of the need to change the culture of government and to use basic change management principles to undertake the process of integration.
**Key Features**

While it is still “early days” for Victoria, the key aspects of integration include government outcomes leading to departmental objectives leading to outputs and performance measures rather than using a traditional funding structure.

**Barriers Or Constraints**

Rather than use the language of barriers, Victoria is speaking of “puzzles” which better reflect its learning. Puzzles include:

- Getting the mix right between vision and concrete action
- When to listen and when to lead
- Deciding what actions come first
- Making it real for people and places
- How and when to engage communities
- Managing multiple and conflicting expectations of stakeholders.

**What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn**

While research is still ongoing in Victoria, feedback on emerging lessons includes:

- Make sure that Ministers and staff are involved by: engaging them very early on; having strong research base based on the experience of the jurisdiction and elsewhere; and keeping it short and simple.
- Show that the initiative of integration can help solve issues rather than create more problems.
- Have both political, public sector and community champions.
- Have the two central agencies working together (Treasury and Premier and Cabinet).
- Engage the middle managers of agencies.
- Be able to showcase examples and show relevance at level of day to day activity.
- Be able to join up outcomes with outputs.
- Be prepared for lots of hard work and failures (treat the process as one of learning riddled with uncertainties and paradoxes rather than a rational one).
- Be aware it is as much about craft as science.
7. Synthesis Of Case Studies

7.1 Drivers for Integration

In order to understand the context in which case studies were implemented, it is necessary to comprehend the motivation governments have for adopting an integrated approach. Research of the literature and case studies, has led to the identification of the following drivers for integration:

- Previous and current models of decision-making and service delivery for individual services based on hierarchical command and control models are not working satisfactorily.
- There is recognition that there are some problems that have not or cannot be solved regardless of the resources allocated unless there is an integrated approach across government departments e.g. poverty, family and community dysfunction, environmental degradation, drug issues and violence. These are the “wicked problems”.
- There is increasing recognition that the causal factors for many social problems are the same.
- Costs of intervention are escalating with very little evidence of return on investment.
- Communities are becoming increasingly disillusioned by governments’ apparent inability to manage/solve their problems.
- The silo approach to service delivery results in inefficient and ineffective use of resources.
- Short term approaches such as one-off pilots or demonstration projects lack sustainability and long term impact.
- Customers are no longer content with “one size fits all” solutions.

7.2 Case Study Framework

As noted in Chapter 2, the Case Study Framework used for inquiry included:

- Acknowledgment of the global factors at play
- A choice of mutuality as the method of public administration control (see Hood, 1996)
• Application of the policy and government relationship grid
• Examination of the processes used
• Barriers
• Assumed outcomes.

The Case Study Framework was derived in the first instance to organise the case study findings. Placing information gained from the case studies into the Case Study Framework produces the following results:

Table 5: Analysis of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Mutuality</th>
<th>Policy and Government Relationship Grid</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Mechanism for Integration</th>
<th>Examples of Barriers</th>
<th>Assumed Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>Rural and regional issues</td>
<td>State: predominantly regional Local and Commonwealth Government, NGOs and business and industry Generic</td>
<td>Collaboration Coordination</td>
<td>Regional Coordinator Regional Coordination Management Group</td>
<td>Mechanisms for CEO/ regional specific input need to be enhanced</td>
<td>Social, economic and environmental benefits Enhanced government services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonweal</td>
<td>Shared customers</td>
<td>Federal Some State Some Local Specific</td>
<td>Partnership based on Business Partnership Agreement Networking</td>
<td>One stop shop Service offer</td>
<td>Limitations in integration within and between client agencies Role in policy debates</td>
<td>More effective service delivery Whole of customer responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Shared outcomes</td>
<td>State one department Non-government community service providers through peak bodies Specific</td>
<td>Partnership based on Working Together Collaboration</td>
<td>Working Together document and processes</td>
<td>Lack of internal DHS integration Divisions within the non-government sector Little awareness at direct service delivery level</td>
<td>Provision of quality community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Mutuality</td>
<td>Policy and Government Relationship Grid</td>
<td>Processes</td>
<td>Mechanism for Integration</td>
<td>Examples of Barriers</td>
<td>Assumed Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Community safety and community renewal</td>
<td>State Local government Community Specific/ General</td>
<td>Networking Cooperation Coordination Collaboration Partnership</td>
<td>Regional Managers Forums Community Action Plans Project Officers and Coordinators Discretionary pool of funding</td>
<td>Departmental silos Budget constraints No mechanism to bring stakeholders together Add on nature of work</td>
<td>Promote safe, healthy and confident communities using a whole-of-government approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Community Safety</td>
<td>State Local government Community Specific/ General</td>
<td>Networking Cooperation Coordination Collaboration Partnership</td>
<td>Safer WA structure Funding</td>
<td>Funding cycles Program allocation Links within Safer WA structure</td>
<td>Prevent, tackle and reduce the causes of crime using a whole-of-government and whole of community approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAS</td>
<td>Shared customers</td>
<td>Commonwealth State Local government Specific</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Service delivery from same site</td>
<td>Integration only site based</td>
<td>More effective service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC*</td>
<td>Shared outcomes</td>
<td>State Local government Community Specific/ General</td>
<td>Networking Cooperation Coordination Collaboration Partnership</td>
<td>Growing Victoria Together Shared indicators Pooled budgets IT</td>
<td>Competencies gap Systems issues Structural Cultural</td>
<td>Providing decent and responsible government Getting the basics right – good schools, quality health care, more jobs, safe streets Leading the way to a better Victoria with education and lifelong learning as the key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taking the Case Study Framework analysis beyond providing an organisational frame allows for analysis according to typology which the researchers assigned to the case studies.

*As Victoria is adopting a whole-of-government approach and is not at the same stage as the other case studies, information contained in this table is based on desired achievements only.
7.3 Service Delivery Integration

Case studies with the needs of the customer (or client) at the core of the integrated effort were clustered according to the category of service delivery integration.

Table 6: Service Delivery Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Mutuality</th>
<th>Policy and Government Relationship Grid</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Mechanism for Integration</th>
<th>Examples of Barriers</th>
<th>Assumed Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
<td>Shared customers</td>
<td>Federal Some State Some Local Specific</td>
<td>Partnership based on Business Partnership Agreement Networking</td>
<td>One-stop-shop</td>
<td>Limitations in integration within and between client agencies Role in policy debates</td>
<td>More effective service delivery Whole of customer responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>Shared customers</td>
<td>Commonwealth State Local government Specific</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Service delivery from same site</td>
<td>Integration only site based</td>
<td>More effective service delivery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The point of mutuality for both case studies was the same, that of shared customers, with the assumed outcomes also being similar, that of more effective service delivery and a whole of customer response. The Policy and Government Relationship Grid included the potential for inclusion of all levels of government in the provision of specific services. The main process used included a formalised partnership (in the case of Centrelink, Business Partnership Agreements; and in the case of Tasmania, formalised Protocols).

Accountability, therefore, is derived from these partnering arrangements which explicitly articulate parties’ expectations. The mechanism for integration includes the use of One Stop Shops (co-located agencies in the case of Tasmania).

The main barriers to service delivery integration surround the lack of integration beyond the service delivery level. Thus, whilst a clearing house function can be utilised to better link services to the customer without bringing about integration of services, the research found that this approach is limited. For example, information can be offered from one site, but core services remain separated. Branding of services and separate accountability requirements hinder an integrated customer response. However, as illustrated by its wide adoption in the UK and in some areas of the US, integrated service delivery is seen as fundamental to an integrated approach.
Service delivery integration is probably the easiest type of integration to undertake in the initial stages. It also has the greatest potential for cost benefits, but with the disadvantages of very high start up costs. One of the more substantial time and resource costs that has to be factored in to such a model of integration is that of ensuring standardisation and employing a facilitator (in most cases) and a committee or group to make this type of integration operational. The facilitator and/or committee should fulfil the role of ensuring that agency executives and senior management agree on standards to be used and are informed about the process of implementation. In the two case studies on Service Tasmania and Centrelink, this type of integration is still limited by the lack of a total approach to integration. For example, in the case of Service Tasmania, it proved much easier to have services offered from one site, but with two different agencies responsible for actual service delivery, than to have one agency offering all services. This case study reflects the important issues that often arise around specialisation of delivery and which are difficult to reconcile at a practical service delivery level. Centrelink provides additional insight into this scenario. Management of Centrelink discovered that they can only integrate service delivery as much as Centrelink’s client agencies are prepared to integrate. Reluctance on behalf of the client agencies relates to the specialised branding and services offered, outcomes anticipated for clients, accountability, structures etc. Thus, because departments need to be separate, Centrelink can only co-locate services, rather than provide an integrated single response to the customer beyond that of information provision and referral.

The case studies also revealed a lack of IT infrastructure to support service delivery integration, although such IT capability is in the process of being developed. This is an area in which Australia may have fallen behind the UK and the US, who perceive great potential benefits for government through the use of new technology and are working to introduce this where possible.

Finally, in terms of accountability, service delivery integration has the clearest accountability given the use of business agreements and other legally binding contractual relationships. In addition, the core autonomy of agencies can be retained through virtual integration.

---

7 It should be noted that this is an area where further work by Centrelink and client departments is occurring. These findings are specific to one part of the organisation and the time limited nature of the study.
Lessons from the Case Studies

- There is a need for service delivery process redesign to add value to flexible service delivery.
- A transparent and strong feedback loop is essential between service delivery and policy development.
- Outcomes accountability rather than process output should drive collaboration. Agreement on outcomes would ensure greater service delivery flexibility and innovation.
- Integration of services through “one stop shop” delivery is limited by the degree of integration of client agency services with separate branding, proprietary information systems, accountability, procedures and delivery ensuring divergent customer response.

7.4 Integration Around Programs

Case studies with the community as the focus are categorised according to integration around programs.

Table 7: Integration Around Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Mutuality</th>
<th>Policy and Government Relationship Grid</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Mechanism for Integration</th>
<th>Examples of Barriers</th>
<th>Assumed Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>Rural and regional issues</td>
<td>State: predominantly regional</td>
<td>Collabor-</td>
<td>Regional Coordinator</td>
<td>Mechanisms for CEO/ regional specific input need to be enhanced</td>
<td>Social, economic and environmental benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local and Commonwealth Government,</td>
<td>ation Coordi</td>
<td>Regional Coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td>Enhanced government services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NGOs and business and industry</td>
<td>nation</td>
<td>Management Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Generic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Community safety and</td>
<td>State: Local government</td>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>Regional Managers</td>
<td>Departmental silos</td>
<td>Promote safe, healthy and confident communities using a whole-of-government approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>community renewal</td>
<td>Community Specific/ Generic</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Forums</td>
<td>Budget constraints</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Community Action Plans</td>
<td>No mechanism to bring stakeholders together</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Project Officers and</td>
<td>Add on nature of work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Discretionary pool of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>funding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While the point of mutuality between the three case studies varied, it concerned either rural and regional issues or the “wicked problems” such as community renewal and community safety. In terms of the Policy and Government Relationship Grid, there was the involvement of different levels of government but also the community and/or business and NGOs. Services offered were of both a specific and generic type.

Mechanisms for integration included predominantly committee structures, funding mechanisms to allow for “buy in” and staff dedicated to the program to act as networkers. Accountability was more difficult to enforce than in a service delivery integration scenario, as was achievement against outcomes. Stakeholder ownership was also an issue, with government often taking the prominent role rather than acting as network leader. Barriers to integration included the inability to enforce the integration needed from the top down as well as the need to work within internal structures not geared toward integration. The research found that this type of integrated approach, beyond that of integration at the level of service delivery, is very difficult to sustain politically whilst maintaining the engagement of all levels of government. Finally, all the above factors make ensuring accountability a difficult task in its own right.

Integration around programs is the type of integration that least lends itself to definition, because it relies upon integration through communities and other groups. The drivers for this type of integration exacerbate the inability of any one agency to undertake such a form of integration by themselves. Multi-agency cooperation is essential, so accountability becomes a real issue. In this instance, the role of individuals or committees, playing a negotiating role as “network managers” becomes key. In addition, this form of integration is closely related to theories of social capital and community building. These are concepts which are difficult to implement and are made more complex by overlaying issues of integration.
Political commitment is also essential to successfully undertake this form of integration. This is the model most vulnerable to political change. Another vulnerability in this model is the potential to form integrated silos through the program. These silos, then, interact with unintegrated services, programs and agencies. This makes it extremely frustrating for the networkers or committee trying to bring about integration. They may feel that the hard work of the integration effort is being undone by the non-integration of organisations with which they are, of necessity, dealing.

Furthermore, it is not clear from the available research to date that this type of integration is cost effective. Certainly, this form of integration is not necessarily efficient. This can often be because this model is reliant upon putting in place costly new structures and personnel, e.g. Regional Managers/Coordinators in NSW, staff in the Safer WA program and project officers in the Queensland Community Renewal project. In the worst case scenario, these staff and/or structures may duplicate available services. Finally, such programs do not generally show short term and attributable benefits.

**Lessons from the Case Studies**

- The support and leadership of the Premier, CEO of Premier’s Department and the Cabinet is critical.
- Core business and line responsibility remain valid for many issues.
- Engagement with stakeholders (departments, communities, etc.) should take into account differing cultures.
- Integration will not automatically happen because issues are cross-cutting – structures and cultures need to shift.
- The difficulties in working outside of silos should not be underestimated.
- A discretionary pool of funding will aid in ensuring departmental engagement but care must be taken that the funding is not used for departmental “wish list” projects.
- Sometimes the process becomes the outcome.
- It is easy to create integration silos.
- It is difficult to balance community expectations and the need for participation with strategic approaches and the need for accountability which meet government needs.
- This type of work should not be seen as an add-on to core business.
• In order for integration to be sustainable internal systems must change such as policy coordination, pooled key performance indicators (KPIs), CEO accountability through performance appraisals, shared budgets, links to place management, joint funding of projects and outcomes based budgeting.

• Local government involvement is critical in sustaining local initiatives.

7.5 Integration Around Partnership Agreements

There was only one case study which involved a partnership agreement between government and the community sector.

Table 8: Integration Around Partnership Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Mutuality</th>
<th>Policy and Government Relationship Grid</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Mechanism for Integration</th>
<th>Examples of Barriers</th>
<th>Assumed Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Shared outcomes</td>
<td>State – one department Non-government community service providers through peaks Specific</td>
<td>Partnership based on Working Together Collaboration</td>
<td>Working Together document and processes</td>
<td>Lack of internal DHS integration Divisions within the non-government sector Little awareness at direct service delivery level</td>
<td>Provision of quality community services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this example of integration around a partnership agreement, commonalities with service delivery integration are clear in that both models use legally binding agreements to clarify the obligations of each participant to the integrated effort. Therefore, the reader is guided to compare this case study with the category of service delivery integration discussed earlier. However, this model requires more work in building the relationship and trust that make the legal documents enforceable and viable.

Lessons from the Case Study

• Integration means some power/territory has to be given up in specific parts of departments. This requires a change-management process to build ownership.

• It is vital to have the right people “at the table” who are committed to and capable of representing their sectors and who are consistent attendees — to ensure continuity and consistency.
- There needs to be recognition that the process is one of change, with sufficient attention paid to change-management processes.
- The framework needs to be bigger than the interests of the stakeholders. For example, the focus should be on better, more effective delivery of services to the community.
- There needs to be recognition that the process is greater than the words agreed upon in that the document is static while the process gains momentum with potential for wider influence.
- This process is successful because it builds on existing processes and allows sufficient time for all parties to gain ownership.

### 7.6 Whole-of-Government Integration

Victoria represents a unique approach in the case studies examined. The State Government is adopting a whole-of-government approach to integration. While other States are exploring similar options, only Victoria has been investigated for this research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Mutuality</th>
<th>Policy and Government Relationship Grid</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Mechanism for Integration</th>
<th>Examples of Barriers</th>
<th>Assumed Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VIC(^8)</td>
<td>Shared outcomes</td>
<td>State Local government Community Specific/ General</td>
<td>Networking Cooperation Coordination Collaboration Partnership</td>
<td>Growing Victoria Together Shared indicators Pooled budgets IT</td>
<td>Competencies gap Systems issues Structural Cultural</td>
<td>Providing decent and responsible government Getting the basics right – good schools, quality health care, more jobs, safe streets Leading the way to a better Victoria with education and lifelong learning as the key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the findings of this report only involve one State at the beginning stage of a complex process, it is difficult to make overarching statements. However, this model of integration reflects current thinking that has been promulgated in recent policy documents in the UK. For example, the 2000 report entitled, *Wiring It Up*, articulated the main forms of cross-cutting interventions and working as:

---

\(^8\) As Victoria is adopting a whole-of-government approach and is not at the same stage as the other case studies, information contained in this table is based on desired achievements only.
• Organisational change
• Merged structures and budgets
• Joint teams (virtual and real)
• Shared budgets
• Joint customer interfaces
• Shared objectives and performance indicators
• Consultation
• Information exchange.

These are concepts of relevance in the Victorian context.

Of the three models of integration, the whole-of-government model has the most impact across government at all levels, but particularly with senior management. It also has the greatest potential for bureaucratic change. Further, cultural shifts are necessitated. Conceptual use of this type of integration relates to popular methods implemented by private businesses internally in order to become more competitive. However, it is of concern that government agencies may attempt to model themselves on their private sector counterparts, using this approach as a panacea for a range of economic ills which are unique to government. This model of integration, therefore, comes with a warning to government that there is no guarantee that effective private sector reform efforts will be equally successful in the public sector. Differences with which government must grapple include the large number of employees and the unwieldy nature of interconnected departments and branches of government. In addition, government agencies are generally more restricted than their private sector counterparts due to the need to satisfy more players and fulfil a variety of roles and responsibilities which go beyond mere fiscal management.

While the Victorian case study was not as progressed as the other case studies, the following lessons can be learned from the initial planning and engagement phase.

**Lessons from the Case Study**

• There is a need to make sure that Ministers and staff are involved by: engaging them very early on; having a strong research base derived from the experience of the jurisdiction and elsewhere; and keeping it short and simple. However, the issue of inconsistent focus given the lack of urgency around integration needs to be considered.

• Those engaged in promoting integration need to show that integration can help solve issues rather than create problems. They need to be able to showcase examples and show relevance at the level of day to day activity.
• It is important to have both political, public sector and community champions.
• The two central agencies (Treasury and Premier and Cabinet) need to work together.
• It is important to engage the middle managers of agencies.
• It is important to join up outcomes with outputs.
• It is important to be prepared for lots of hard work and failures.
• Those engaged in a whole-of-government approach need to treat the process as one of learning riddled with uncertainties and paradoxes rather than a rational process. It appears to be as much about craft as science.

7.7 Levels of Integration Within Government

One of the key findings of the study is that within each case study, there are different levels of integration at the government level, the senior management level, the program management level, and the service delivery level. Out of this understanding came a schema, see Table 10, used to further analyse the findings within each case study (as opposed to the Case Study Framework which allowed for an examination between case studies).
Table 10: Levels of Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Driver</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political imperative to meet increasingly complex needs</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>Community expectations are met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social/Economic Development Committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand from government</td>
<td>Senior Management</td>
<td>Joint CEO meetings</td>
<td>More effective use of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>Groupings / Clusters of portfolios</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for innovative solutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for more cost effective and efficient program delivery</td>
<td>Program management</td>
<td>Joint programs and funding IDCs</td>
<td>Reduced duplications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community expectations and requirement to do more with less</td>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>Joint service delivery Networks</td>
<td>Better use of resources and assessment of need</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While this schema will be discussed further in Chapter 8, as an example of its usefulness, it is applied to the overall drivers for the case studies from 7.1. Therefore, the following diagram expresses how some of these drivers are affecting different levels of government in Australia.
Diagram 2: Drivers for Integration

- Government
  - Resource Rationalisation
  - Service Delivery
  - Senior Management
  - Program Development
  - Complex Problems

- Community Expectations
  - Rural/Regional Pressure

- Client Complexity
  - Service Delivery
  - Efficient Program Delivery
  - Outcomes focus

- Senior Management
  - Outcomes focus

- Government
  - Resource Rationalisation
  - Service Delivery
  - Senior Management
  - Program Development
  - Complex Problems
8. Key Findings

8.1 Key Findings

KEY FINDING NO. 1:
The concept of integration can be usefully divided into the three categories of service delivery integration (to include integration around partnership agreements), integration around programs; and whole-of-government integration. This division is useful for categorisation and to observe the forms integration is taking within government.

The definition of integrated governance adopted for this report needed to be broad, given the diversity of the case studies allocated to the research team. From the literature, a working definition of integrated governance was formed, as well as some findings that sit under that broad definition. By looking at the case studies, it became clear that there were some natural clusters occurring that could form the basis for categorisation of case studies according to certain types or models of integration. (However, this report does not purport to cover the field in terms of possible existing or potential types of integration, as research was limited to the allocated case studies.) As integrated governance is not a term commonly recognised in the literature, for the purposes of this report three types of integration evident from the case studies were:

- Service delivery integration
- Integration around programs
- Integration around partnership agreements.

Differentiation between these three types of integration, as in Chapter 7 of this report, highlights different accountability issues, success factors and features encountered between case studies.

There is still a need to explore the way in which the principles of integration apply to place-based management and the solving of cross-departmental issues or problems such as drugs, mental health, suicide or domestic violence. At the moment it would appear that approaches are confined to a programmatic model.
KEY FINDING NO. 2:

While there are various government levels at which integration can operate, each level is hindered by the lack of integration above it.

Using an alternative schema for analysis of integration within each case study, the case studies tell us that there are various levels at which integration can operate. For example, if integration was attempted at just the service delivery level, its ability to be successful was hampered by a lack of integration at a program management, senior management or government level. Therefore, integration is complex and requires attention at all levels of government in order to be successful. However, integration between levels is an issue. SAFER W.A. addressed the issue of integration at all levels within a program, and found coordinating those levels of integration proved to be a major difficulty.

Key Finding 2a: At the Government level integration can be assisted through adoption of integrated outcomes.

- Conditions
  - Leadership capacity
  - Policy commitment
  - Resource commitment
  - Commitment to stakeholder consultation

- Factors
  - Negotiation skills and capacity at political level
  - Preparedness to collaborate across sectors and boundaries
  - Recognition of opportunities and barriers

- Barriers
  - Political cycle
  - Public attitudes
  - Political accountability

The government or strategy level is responsible for theories, principles and frameworks and it is at this level that there is the most commonality and compatibility. The mandate for policy direction, program development and action resides at this level. Integration breaks down with targeting of similar client groups through a plethora of strategies.
Key Finding 2b: At the Senior Management level integration can be facilitated through systems change such as outcomes based funding, joint KPIs and integrated IT systems.

- Conditions
  - Public policy capacity
  - Program development capacity
  - Flexibility in policy development

- Factors
  - Knowledge and commitment of public policy development
  - Commitment to collaboration and partnership
  - High level Funding Agreements
  - Infrastructure support and commitment

- Barriers
  - Departmental silos
  - Lack of relevant data
  - Lack of flexibility in funding arrangements
  - Poor understanding of performance indicators
  - Accountability of decision-making

The authority for policy development and resources allocation resides at this level. The greatest need for and greatest barriers to integration lie at this level.

Key Finding 2c: At the Program Management level integration can be facilitated through the willingness and passion of key players to work together, the pooling of resources, articulation of shared vision and purpose, and the relinquishment of some control.

- Conditions
  - Program management capacity
  - Flexibility in policy development
  - Flexibility in service development
Factors
- Commitment to collaboration and partnership
- Capacity to link Funding Agreements and Performance Agreements
- Ability to develop agreements, procedures and protocols
- Understanding of relevant performance indicators

Barriers
- Lack of relevant data
- Lack of flexibility in funding arrangements
- Poor understanding of performance indicators
- Mismatch between policy objectives and program outcomes
- Accountability of decision-making

The authority for implementation of policy and expenditure of resources resides at this level. Core business and accountability issues conflict with the desire to integrate through collaborative working.

Key Finding 2d: At the Service Delivery level integration can be assisted by the development of co-located services through One Stop Shops, for example, integrated and “intelligent” IT systems, and pursuit of networking and service coordination options.

Conditions
- Authority to act
- Capacity to implement policy and program objectives
- Adequate resources for processes
- Adequate resources for implementation of services

Factors
- Commitment to functional collaboration and coordination
- Understanding of local environment
- Capacity to manage local resources
• Barriers
  - Inadequate management processes
  - Inadequate, inconsistent and inflexible resources
  - Mismatch between local demand and policy objectives
  - Mismatch between government focus on accountability through procedures and due process versus frontline worker focus on customer service and community focus on accountability through personal and professional integrity

The authority for flexible service delivery and expenditure of resources resides at this level. This is the level which experiences the greatest frustration with the lack of integration, whether from the perspective of the customer or the frontline worker.

**KEY FINDING NO. 3:**

While structural, political and internal barriers are evident, bureaucratic barriers appear to be the most prominent.

Each of the case studies experienced barriers on all the above-mentioned levels. For the purpose of this research these barriers have been explained as follows.

**Structural:** e.g. constructs that are not easily changed such as federalism, branches of government, constitutional and legal requirements.

**Bureaucratic:** e.g. constructs which may also be difficult to change but can be influenced within the bureaucracy.

**Internal:** e.g. organisational culture.

**Political:** e.g. political and stakeholder influences.

Regardless of the approach taken to integration, common barriers to its effective operation include lack of skill, lack of will, financial silos, territoriality, lack of political mandate, lack of systems integration, culture, high transaction costs and existing structures. While structural, bureaucratic, political and internal barriers are evident, bureaucratic barriers appear to be the most prominent. Throughout the course of the research, barriers were often articulated as internal in nature and deriving from the program management level (i.e. middle managers). However, a systematic clustering of the barriers for each case study found the greatest number of barriers were bureaucratic and at
the senior management level. Given the nature of the barriers likely to be encountered, it is therefore arguable that integrated governance is about changing bureaucracy. If this is true, it would be the case that the barriers encountered will be around issues that senior management can change. Should this hypothesis be accepted, then integrated governance needs to be led by this level of government.

However, at the government level structural barriers such as funding arrangements and constitutional/legal obligations impinge on the options open to senior management, and political barriers provide the overall mandate which may not include an integrated approach. These givens in the system seriously hamper the success of integrated governance.

In order for senior management to engage in integrated governance the following need to be addressed:

- greater opportunity for integrated governance
- greater accountability within joint efforts
- linking of program and service delivery integrated outcomes to personal senior management performance arrangements
- allowance for more risks.

These measures equate to changes to risk management, accountability structures – perhaps through adoption of outcomes-based measurement systems, and professional rewards for integration tied to performance assessment. Program management and service delivery integration would follow the lead set by senior management.

**KEY FINDING NO. 4:**

**There are common success factors for integration.**

Even though there were differences, as already noted, in terms of the categorisation of integration, there also were common success factors.

The research suggests the following success factors are needed:

- Political commitment to new governmental working arrangements.
- The key role of central departments including the Premier as driver/leader
- Treasury engagement
- Commitment of key CEOs and a structure for dialogue
• Recognition at central and senior levels that traditional policy and program responses are not always effective, i.e. many problems require multi-agency responses

• Capitalisation of technology through an examination of its potential in the integrative process

• Protocols and tools for effective and sustainable effort

• Commitment of all staff at program and service-delivery levels to working together and across agencies

• Skilling the senior and middle management level and creating opportunities for communities of practice, or for internal networking and joint working

• Increased capacity for program and service-delivery staff to use funding flexibly

• Additional resources, particularly at the initial stages

• Recognition that outcomes and benefits are longer term and transaction costs may be higher

• A move away from single agency appropriations and accountability to pooled budgets, place-based budgets and outcomes-based budgets. (As governments function through appropriations allocated to departments based on their core responsibilities, this represents a fundamental shift in appropriations. Several States are in the process of trialing such an approach. Lessons from these States should increase the understanding of how to better integrate government services.)

• Performance appraisals at all levels to identify and reward collaborative work. Indicators and outputs to support integration need to be identified

• A need to create ownership of the point of mutuality with all stakeholders which includes the acknowledgment of limited individual stakeholder control.

Given the importance of addressing integration from the top down, those wishing to engage in integration may wish to address the following at the Government level:

• Enlist the support and commitment of Cabinet colleagues for a whole-of-government approach based on agreed outcomes.

• Direct department heads to identify core business and whole-of-government responsibilities, perhaps through the linking of outcomes with a performance measurement process.
• Include whole-of-government outcomes in departmental head performance contracts and agreements.
• Work with Treasury to undertake a cross-cutting spending review to ensure that resources are realistically allocated.

KEY FINDING NO. 5:
Leadership is critical to successful integration.

Once the need for integration is identified, the identity of the individual or agency bringing the players together is also a key point for consideration, as is their “network management” skill. Clearly, government is still taking the lead in integrated governance because it has the resources and authority to do so although the focus on capacity building in several states is addressing the community’s ability to more fully participate. Reasons include a concern regarding accountability, lack of knowledge (perceived and otherwise) of external stakeholders, and a lack of resources at the local community level. In terms of who takes the lead within government, our research indicates that this is best done through the Premier. However, as one State bureaucrat mused, it is not viable to endorse a model where, in order to take the public sector forward, the Premier is accountable for everything.

Further, the culture within Premier and Cabinet does not lend itself easily to direct service delivery. A better model may be to have the Premier’s Department act as incubator with responsibility given to a lead agency when appropriate.

Government is still taking the lead in integrated governance
KEY FINDING NO. 6:

**Governance by committee is not necessarily more effective than top-down governance.**

Another finding concerns the need to have an individual or a lead agency with primary responsibility for ensuring that the integrated approach works, rather than relying upon a committee. In other words, departments must not fall into the trap of believing that the problems of a customer will be solved if all of her issues are addressed by a series of committees, each of which is leaderless and in which no participant has direct responsibility for a particular issue. Governance by committee is not necessarily more effective than top-down governance.

The key to understanding and maximising administrative efficiency in this regard is to establish the best manner in which to ensure involvement and efficiency when there is no single agency responsible for integration. Related to this is the issue of how agencies can ensure information is shared, without the need for committees.

KEY FINDING NO. 7:

**Integrated governance is hard and resource intensive. While it can be beneficial its use should be selective.**

One of the critical points for government is identifying how and when integration is most effective. This is an issue with which many States are grappling. Our research suggests that integrated governance is not appropriate in all situations. Each department/agency/jurisdiction has “core business” or specialisations that need to continue. Integration is about addressing those issues and problems that can only be solved in partnership, where there is acknowledgment of a multiplicity of stakeholders. It is about adding value to government responses. A focus on integrated outcomes, with agencies and stakeholders ensuring core delivery within...
these outcomes, may be an effective approach. What makes integration different from collaboration and partnership, however, is the recognition that systems must change to accommodate the integration.

8.2 Summary

While this project has been careful to avoid placing value statements on integrated governance, preferring to use a “horses for courses” approach, the research does suggest that an evolution in breaking down the barriers to integrated outcomes requiring structural, bureaucratic, political and internal changes is slowly occurring at a global level in response to a maturing constituency, globalisation, and the spread of information technology. This evolution does not require wholesale systems change – for instance there will always be a need for major government departments to concentrate on their areas of specialisation. It will, however, require some systemic change at the levels suggested and a rethink of transparency and accountability in government and governance to include the meaningful inclusion of new players such as consumers and community into systems – in other words to adopt what Schorr describes as post-bureaucratic models of public accountability (see Section 2). Integrated accountability must mean shared accountability, difficult as this may be. It will also require cultural change, incorporating rewards for policy entrepreneurs and acceptance of greater risk.

If a more fundamental change is required, this study found Australia to be in the early stages. Our research indicates that there are working examples of integrated governance which have not fundamentally altered the current style of governing. However, these case studies indicate some level of frustration in undertaking an integrated approach within the existing governmental structure. The literature contained in Chapter 2 reflects the difficulty in undertaking integration. Our research suggests that this is because not all levels of integration have been addressed and silos of integration are being developed. The one case study that has moved away from this approach to adopt a whole-of-government model, Victoria, is still in the process of implementing its strategy. Victoria will be worthy of examination in several years’ time to determine the extent to which its whole-of-government approach, (particularly around outcomes-based budgeting, joint key performance indicators, and use of IT), has been effective. Better comparisons with other governments such as the United Kingdom will be more effective at that stage, as initiatives came in with the Labor government.
Many of the issues raised in this report are not new, examples of working together between government and non government organisations exist. For example, the work of the Australian Assistance Plan was an early attempt to empower communities to find local solutions to local problems. Joint approaches to difficult problems have been tried, particularly in crisis situations. Further, there is a wealth of literature on the process discussed for integration (networking, cooperation, collaboration, coordination and partnership).

So what is different? Perhaps these case studies illustrate the initial steps in Australia which have led to a more profound examination of the role of integrated governance, not just integration at the service-delivery level. There certainly is more interest in joint efforts involving all levels of government with less clarity on the solutions but clear agreement on the drivers including:

- Recognition that we have not solved the critical, time consuming problems
- Level of interest and commitment to finding solutions
- Acknowledgment of the increasing complexity of the problems and the need for comprehensive responses.

Key questions remain, not just for Australia:

- Is integration an end in itself?
- What are the fundamental shifts required to move this area forward?
- What are the factors required to provide credibility?
- Does the concept of mutuality and/or interdependence hold the key?
- What are the rewards/incentives required to encourage senior managers to engage in the process?
- How much of this is budget driven?
- Is a focus on solving the problems and achieving real outcomes the essential component?

This project, *Integrated Governance*, takes integration beyond committee meetings, service-delivery-level collaboration and networking, and the reorganisation of silo like structures, into the more uncertain realm of dynamic and flexible solutions. Approaches to integrated governance in Australia are still developing. While this research contributes to a better understanding of current initiatives, it outlines processes which still need to be undertaken by governments in Australia in order for integration to be truly adopted, or indeed fully studied.
Appendix A: Case Visits Questions

Case Study Site Visit Questions

**CEO/DG (Broad Concepts)**

1) What do you understand integrated governance to be and what are its components? [prompt: see detail in Survey].

2) What do you see as the drivers for integrated governance? [prompts: global, Australia, in jurisdiction, for the project]

3) What do you see as the benefits of integrated governance (both expectant and emerging)? [prompts: government as a whole, stakeholders, public sector as a whole, their department, other government partners, other NGO partners (if appropriate), other community organisations (if appropriate), clients and communities]

4) What do you see as the barriers to integrated governance? [prompts: structural, bureaucratic, political, and internal]

5) When is the concept most usefully applied? [prompts: around what issues, when most appropriate, when least appropriate]

6) In looking particularly at project X or case study X [will depend on the case study]:
   
a) what are the key successes? [prompt: what made it successful]
   
b) what is understood as success at what levels? [prompt: will depend on those involved in the project]
   
c) what have the outcomes been?
   
d) what is being used to measure these outcomes?
   
e) were there any unintended outcomes?
   
f) if you had to do the project again, what would you change?
   
g) what did you have in place at the beginning of the project?
   
h) if someone else were to undertake a similar project, what would they need to have in place to have a successful outcome?
Program Manager(s) (Specific Operational including implementation, evaluation, and infrastructure)

Variation on Q6 and:
1) How has the project been implemented?
2) Has the project been evaluated? What were the key findings?
3) What infrastructure needs to be in place to support the project?

Project Managers(s) (Operational Factors including accountability)

Variation on Q6 and:
1) What are the accountability issues for the project?

Staff/Clients (Service Delivery)

Variation on Q6 and:
1) Has the project met your expectations? [prompt: why, why not, what needs to be in place].
Appendix B: Integrated Governance Survey

1. **Introduction**

This survey forms an important first step in preparing for the case study site visit. So that we can better target our research during the site visit, we ask that you take the time to answer the questions below and return the survey to our office by 15 June. We appreciate that many of the case studies have already sent some background information which also will be used in the formation of our key questions for the case study visit. While it is intended that the survey be filled in only by yourself as the key contact for the case study, if you think others would like to fill it out as well, please send it to them.

2. **Definitions**

2.1 **What do we mean by integrated governance?***

Integrated governance is a term that is being used to define a way of governing. It includes both integration (i.e. joined-up, or joining up) within government (to include internal departments, as well as other levels of government such as Local Government, State and Commonwealth) as well as collaboration with other sectors outside of government. As a term which encompasses rather disparate ways of working, it can include such concepts as informal relationships, cooperative relationships, coordinated relationships, collaborative relationships, and partnerships (i.e. partnerships in participation around joint planning, implementation or evaluation). Fundamentally, the concept incorporates some acknowledgment of mutuality and a movement away from a “silo” mentality.
2.2 Sounds great in theory but what exactly does it mean in practice?

An initial examination of activities being carried out both in Australia and abroad include:

- Pooled budgets
- Triple bottom line analysis
- Government/Voluntary Sector Compacts or other partnership arrangements with the community/voluntary sector
- Partnerships with the private sector
- Partnerships with other levels of government
- Revisions of relationships between provider and client
- Coordination of service delivery
- Broad policy frameworks
- Integrated planning
- One Stop Shops
- Community based cabinets
- Summits/Roundtables/Visioning
- Networks
- Tendering with partnering criteria
- Joint databases
- Joint intake and referral mechanisms
- Joint indicators.

2.3 What is the rationale for a shift to integrated governance?

Another way of explaining integrated governance is to examine the global drivers. These appear to include globalisation, the public’s dissatisfaction with government amid rising expectations of the quality and tailored responsiveness of government services and the opportunities offered by technology for shifts in service delivery. All of these factors mean that governments are increasingly turning to opportunities for working jointly.

Closer to home, drivers include the perception of government as fragmented both internally and in its dealing with other sectors; a focus on outcomes rather than outputs to measure success; and the recognition that issues such as community renewal, safety, health, and rural regeneration require many different players.
2.4 What are the assumed outcomes?

Some of the outcomes believed to emerge from integrated governance include:

- Holistic government
- Client-focused government
- A whole-of-client approach
- Collaboration of services at the point of intersection
- Community renewal
- Broader community input
- Increased public interest and trust in government
- Increased social capital
- Learning organisations
- Joined-up departments, policy, programs, outcomes, indicators and/or budgets.

3. Questions

Please fill in the following questions.

1) Which of the following elements of integrated governance are included in your case study project?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Integrated Governance</th>
<th>Tick All That Apply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pooled budgets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple bottom line analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government/Voluntary Sector Compacts or other partnership arrangements with the community/voluntary sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships with the private sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships with other levels of government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisions of relationships between provider and client</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of service delivery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad policy frameworks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Elements of Integrated Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Integrated Governance</th>
<th>Tick All That Apply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Stop Shops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community based cabinets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summits/Roundtables/Visioning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendering with partnering criteria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint databases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint intake and referral mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Why are you doing this – what are the drivers?

3) What theoretical or conceptual frameworks influenced the approach(es) taken?
4) What informed the process/methodology(s) chosen?

5) What are the expected outcomes?

6) What have you learned so far? What are the emerging issues?

7) On a scale of 1 to 5 (1=not important to 5=extremely important) how important is integrated governance as part of overall developments in your jurisdiction?

   1                      2                      3                      4                      5
   Not important          Somewhat important    Important               Very important          Extremely important

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
Bibliography


Call Centre Working Group (2000) *Call Centre Guidelines: version 1.3*, Central IT Unit, United Kingdom.


Senge, P. and Kaufer, K., “Communities of Leaders or No Leadership at All”, paper presented at Learning Communities, 3 November 1999, Atlanta, GA, U.S.A.


Strategic Partners (2000) Innovation and Best Practice In Schools: Review of Literature and Practice, Australia.


Third Way Australia, Welcome to Third Way Australia, www.thirdway-aust.com/page0.htm


UNDP (1997) UNDP and Governance: Experiences and Lessons Learned, Management Development and Governance Division Lesson-Learned Series No. 1, magnet.undp.org/docs/gov/Lessons1.htm


