The relationship between politicians and administrators is crucial for the success of governments. That is a rather bold statement for the usually muted world of the social sciences, but is also almost certainly true. This linkage involves, on the one hand, the political sphere of government that, in most democratic political arrangements, is supposed to animate policymaking and establish the agenda for public sector action. On the other side of this bargain are public administrators who are meant to provide continuity, expertise and loyalty in both the advice they provide to politicians and the service they provide when implementing public policies. In the traditional conception of this relationship (see for example Schaffer, 1973) civil servants (or however the administrators may be styled) accept their seemingly inferior position in government in return for a secure career, interesting opportunities to shape policies, and protection against personal blame for policy failures.

The administrative reforms of the past several decades in most industrialized democracies have put this traditional bargain in peril. In these various versions of reform both public administrators and politicians have been expected to cede some of the advantages that they may have enjoyed under the previous arrangements (Hood, 2000). The first round of changes in the relationship during the 1980s were particularly one-sided. Politicians from the political right in office during thus period sought to reduce the privileges and influence over decisions that characterized the more traditional pattern of relationships between politicians and administrators. So, for example, the Thatcher, Reagan and Mulroney governments, among others, "burned the village" that had joined politicians and bureaucrats in their joint pursuit of governance (Peters, 1985; Savoie, 1994). This initial attack on the position of the civil service in governing was extremely partisan and rather unsystematic, but it did undermine the civil service and also raised the question in many people's minds concerning just what was the appropriate role of the career public service in government.

The politicized attack on the bureaucracy was followed by a more technocratic approach to change, involving implementing many of the concepts contained within the "New Public Management". In some ways these reforms also constituted an attack, if a less explicit one, on the role of the career public service in governing. This more covert assault came about through the development of managerialist replacements for the conventional legalistic doctrines of public administration. That is, the legalism and hierarchical character of public administration was argued to produce inefficiency in the production of public services, and to ensure self-serving bureaucrats had their personal rights and privileges. These characteristics are argued to have advantaged bureaucracy to the detriment of services provided to clients, and at the cost of higher taxes for ordinary citizens (Niskanen, 1974).
Public administrators have tended to lose particularly their role as policy advisors, for many senior public servants the most treasured portion of their activity in government. For example, many politicians felt that they could not count on the advice of career public servants and sought to create their own alternative structures for policy advice (see Boston, 1994). This greater political involvement in the policy process, and the diminution of the role of the public bureaucracy was practiced initially by politicians on the right, but after the center left returned to power in the 1990s they too found it desirable to have their own people in policy advice positions. So, for example, the Prime Minister's Office in Britain has expanded under Blair to an extent not seen under the previous Conservative governments that also were presumably presidential (Foley, 1993).

The managerialist revolution in public administration was not, however, without its costs for politicians. By its very name it is clear that these changes were intended to promote public management, and with that to place the manager at the center of the process of making and administering public policies. Thus, some of these managerialist reforms, e.g. the dissemination of agencies and other devolved forms of administering programs, were designed rather explicitly (at least in numerous instances) to prevent politicians from meddling excessively in the administration of policies. Similarly, the emphasis on the role of managers and the use of catch phrases such as "let the managers manage" extolled the central role of professional public managers in the policy process. That elevation of the manager tended, in turn, to reduce politicians as amateurish interlopers into the professional and rather difficult task of making programs function efficiently and effectively.

These market-oriented managerialist reforms were most clearly manifested in the Westminster democracies, but have had some manifestations in almost all industrialized political systems. Even in the less developed systems pressures from international organizations and consulting firms have place pressures on governments to change the manner in which they administer their policies and manage their personnel. So, for example, the exclusive career of civil servants has become opened to outside competition, although that has also deprived politicians of a great deal of expertise and experience that might benefit them when attempting to place their programs into effect. In addition, the emphasis on empowering managers has as one consequence some diminution of traditional mechanics of ministerial accountability for the actions of the public bureaucracy.

In many ways the most important result of these reforms has been to highlight the contradictions that exist in the role assigned to public administrators in conventional theories of governing (Savoie, forthcoming). On the one hand public administrators are meant to skilled administrators, capable of managing large organization and also filled with policy ideas, while at the same time are expected to be meekly subservient to their political "masters" who may have little of the administrators’ capacity to perform the job of governing. Likewise, those public servants are expected to be politically neutral yet be simultaneously politically sensitive, and perhaps increasingly sensitive, given complaints that politicians have been advancing about the service they receive from the civil service. These seemingly conflicting demands make what is inherently a difficult job all the more difficult.

The list of types and locales of change implemented in public management during the past several decades could be extended. The basic point is, however, that the traditional practice and ethos of governing has been altered substantially. Further, these structural and procedural have had both intended and unintended consequences for politicians and administrators. There have been some paradoxical elements to the changes, with attempts to decentralize in some instances producing more centralized policy regimes. Likewise, emphasizing the role of management has
made some political leaders press for more direct political controls over policy and over public organizations, that being seen as the only means of exercising control when many of the traditional levels of control have been eliminated (Maor, 1999). Thus, we need to examine rather carefully what has happened to the traditional village in government as a result of the numerous and significant changes in public management.

Understanding Politicians and Bureaucrats and Their Linkage

Although crucial for governing, this linkage between politicians and bureaucrats is often not adequately understood or conceptualized. A good deal of the literature on this topic still assumes the formal, constitutional position that the bureaucracy must be "on tap", rather than on top even though there have been numerous changes in the way in which these participants in governing work together (or not) in that process (see Plowden, 1994; Peters and Pierre, 2001). There have been equally exaggerated claims running in the opposite direction, with some practitioners and scholars arguing that the old system of public administration has been destroyed forever by both the political changes of the past several decades and the implementation of managerialism. Here there is a second division with some participants in the discussion lauding these changes and others deploring them. Both of these extremes are almost certainly incorrect, but each also does contain some element of truth. The system has changed but yet there are many elements of the old system that do persist.

In terms of the relationships between public servants and their (nominal) political masters the conventional wisdom was that "village" to which we have already alluded several times. In this relationship public administrators and politicians became mutually cooperative elites with a primary interest in maintaining the State and promote its efficient and appropriate functioning. These two groups tended to cooperate in maintaining that functioning regardless of the political complexion of the government of the day. So, for example, the concerns that Donald Kingsley (1944) expressed about the capacity of a (small c) conservative civil service to administer the socialist program of the British Labour Party elected after World War II provided to be totally unfounded, as that transformation was implemented with few problems attributable to the actions of the administration.

In some ways that commonality of purpose and values should be expected, given that in the traditional mode of governing they really were the same elite--common social and educational backgrounds, similar education and similar life experiences. Further, the majority of the individuals involved in government--politicians perhaps to a lesser extent than administrators--could expect to spend their entire careers within government, so that they had an interest in maintaining the institutions and procedures in good working order. Likewise, those political elites outside government had little or no incentive to attack the existing arrangements, given that they expected at some time in the not to distant future to inherit the apparatus and have to manage it. These elites therefore had a strong incentive to keep the system of public policy as proficient and effective as possible.

A Continuum of Relationships

As pervasive as the image of the village has become in the analysis of the relationships between civil servants and politicians, there are a number of other useful characterizations of that relationship (Peters, 1986). In an earlier article on this subject I argued that there was a continuum of possible relationships among these actors. At one end was the traditional notion of domination of policy by politicians, the political world familiar to Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber. In this conception of interactions at the center of government administrators accept their role as subordinate actors in the policy process, and also are willing to accept the role as implementors of
the decisions made by those political leaders. This represents a legalistic, formal pattern of relationships that offers little possibility of a creative interaction among the participants. Indeed, this pattern of relationship tends to stifle creativity (at least on the part of bureaucracy) in favor of rather simplistic obedience to the wishes of the politicians. This model may never have existed in its full sense in any real administrative system but it is a normative standard, at least for some scholars and many practitioners.

At the other extreme there is a model arguing that de facto the bureaucracy has won, and that governments have come to be dominated by their career public servants. Although there is rarely any declaration of victory or domination by the bureaucracy, a number of elements have been used to bolster the argument that the shift has occurred. The most fundamental argument advanced is that government has become too complex for politicians to handle effectively, given that many or most of them do not have any substantial training in the subject about which they will be called upon to make policy decisions. This lack of expertise means that civil servants will shape policy either through advising their ministers, or may have the authority to make those decisions directly delegated to them (Baldwin, 1995; Page, 2001). In addition to their lack of substantive knowledge, politicians are also birds of passage so that they rarely have time to master subject matters to any appreciable degree, or to follow through on decisions. This characteristic of the political class in many societies again places the public service in the central position in exercising governance.

There are few, if any, cases in which the bureaucracy might said to have been accepted in a governing role. This description of the relative positions of politicians and civil servants is therefore often more of a political statement than it is an empirical statement. Thus, politicians coming into office and finding themselves frustrated in reaching their policy goals may blame the bureaucracy rather than simply accepting the complexity of the task with which they have been charged. This then leads to charges that the bureaucracy has subtly but effectively usurped the rightful governing role of those elected officials, and that something must be done.

The structures and procedures of government will make domination by bureaucrats a more or less plausible description of the reality. For example, coalition governments make it more difficult for politicians to exercise control over bureaucracy than having majority governments. In the case of extreme multi-party democracies (Sartori, 1966) the bureaucracy may at times be the only viable force for decision-making and stability. As well as being influenced by the level of devolution within government itself, the capacity of the bureaucracy to influence policy may also be influenced by the more general level of disaggregation in the implementation structures of government. More decentralized systems of implementation, such as those found in the Scandinavian countries provide some advantages for bureaucrats not found in more integrated administrative systems. In addition, governments that have a more professional, expert bureaucracy that has been institutionalized over a long period will be more capable of exercising control, or be seen to be exercising control, that less well institutionalized bureaucracies.

In between the two extremes can be found several intermediate patterns of interaction between politicians and administrators. All of the intermediate patterns imply less of a "zero-sum" game between the participants in this process. For example, as already noted in the village life model there is strong cooperation rather than conflict in the interactions of the "players", each seeing that their most important goals will be achieved by working together rather than attempting to "win" the game. In light of recent changes in interactions between these actors (see below; also, Rouban, 1998) it is important to remember that the agreement on basic values of governing within the village extended well beyond the government of the day, so that the political element in these
relationships was of relatively little importance. The "we feeling" within government did not depend upon being members of the same political party but rather was a deeper commitment to government as a fundamental social process.

A second intermediate pattern has some of the features of village life but also has a more disaggregated sense of the governance task. While the village life conception conceptualizes government as a single entity, the "Functional Village Life" model considers government divided among a number of competing policy sectors. Within each sector there may be a good deal of integration but across those policy areas there may be more competition than cooperation. The competition is over budgets and over control of the policy area. The idea here is that government organizations tend to reflect societal interests and that organizations in the public sector, even if they are deemed to represent the interests of the public as a whole, also represent the interests of their immediate constituents. For example, in the United States, the structure of agencies and departments is very much influenced by the power of interest groups, and reinforced by a committee structure in Congress so that the US may have many governments, but often seemingly no single government (Rose, 1980; Seidman, 199x). Even if there is no direct linkage with a powerful interest group,

Certain types of political and administrative systems tend to foster the creation of the "functional village life" model more than do others. For example, the recruitment of public servants by the individual organizations or on the basis of specific expertise tends to encourage departmentalism in administration, while generalist administrators are more likely to be able to work across a range of interests and constituencies. That difference in recruitment may be reinforced by career patterns in which individuals do, or do not, tend to work for a number of departments within the course of a normal career. Further, the internal control structures of government may be able to overcome some aspects of departmentalism. If there are powerful central agencies these may be able to impose coordination and coherence on departments that otherwise might be more fractious and divided.

Finally, we can conceptualize public administrators and politicians as engaged in a more overt form of competition for power and influence over policy. The above discussions have tended to assume that some equilibrium has been reached between political and administrative officials, but that may not be the case. In some cases bureaucrats and politicians are struggling to find such an rapprochement, but each side in this struggle is attempting to maximize its own rewards from the contest. This struggle may be conducted in terms of more tangible rewards (Hood and Peters, 1994; Hood, Peters and Lee, forthcoming), but the more relevant to this paper is the contest over influence. To some extent the level of overt conflict between administrators and politicians may have been enhanced by the emphasis on empowerment in many contemporary administrative reforms.

In summary, there is no single pattern of interaction among politicians and bureaucrats. This statement is true for the empirical reality of their behavior and it is also true of intellectual models that can be employed to understand those interactions. The above has been a description of five alternative conceptions of interactions between politicians and bureaucrats as they engage in governing. The reality of most cases may be a combination of these five, with the different patterns emerging in different policy areas and in different political situations. These five models are means of imposing some intellectual orders on this difficult world of interaction, but also are subject to a good deal of change as politics and government also change in response to domestic and international influences.

Alternative Conceptualization
The earlier paper and the above discussion have characterized the relationships between
politicians and bureaucrats as more or less Ideal Type models existing along a continuum, with that
continuum being defined by the power of bureaucrats, or by the power of politicians. While that
linear perspective may be useful for locating the two extreme positions, the three intermediate
positions are less clearly defined by this dimension. Another means of conceptualizing the same
set of models of relationships between bureaucrats and politicians is presented in Table 1. In this
Table the five cases are put into a typology according to the power over policy possessed by
politicians and bureaucrats.

The two cells of the typology in which one set of actors is powerful and the other is not
appear to require little additional explanation, and represent the two ends of the continuum in the
original presentation. The other two cells are more interesting. In the case in which both actors are
powerful there are two possible outcomes which are to a great extent contradictory. In the now all
too familiar Village Life model both sets of actors have substantial power but they have agreed to
use that power together, and there may be little direct consideration of the relative powers of the
two sets of participants in government (see also Spanou, forthcoming). The other possible outcome
is the adversarial model in which there is overt conflict over their relative powers. The difference
appears to be the extent to which there is a culture of cooperation and reciprocity or a conflictual
one in which a zero-sum game is assumed to be inherent in these relationships.

The cell in which neither politicians or bureaucrats are argued to have substantial power
contains the "functional village life" model. In this model it might be argued that the principal
locus of power in the model is external to government. The assumption here is that the principal
source of the influence resides in the societal interest groups that can exert control over both
politicians and administrators concerned with the policies in that area. That influence may not be
exerted directly over the behavior of ministers and bureaucrats, but rather generally will come
through indirect routes, not least of which is the agenda being set for the organization. As already
noted, a prevalence of this pattern of governing will tend to produce rather incoherent governance.

One problem with this presentation of the relationships is that it tends to represent the
power of the two sets of actors as something of a competitive game, or at least it highlights the
extent to which one group may have to gain influence at the expense of the other. As already
noted, however, there are instances in which there can be positive sum games, and further those
positive sum outcomes may produce the most effective governance. The problem for institutional
design (see below), therefore, is to find ways of creating those positive interactions without also so
politicizing the process of governance that it loses public confidence and/or becomes excessively
variable over time.

Changing Patterns of Relationships

The above description of interactions represents a reasonable summary of patterns that have
existed for a number of years in the industrialized democracies, and to some extent in other
countries. The political and administrative world has, however, been changing and there are a
number of factors that should be considered in attempting to understand contemporary patterns of
interaction between politicians and bureaucrats. This influence of changing politics is all the more
evident when we attempt to understand the interactions among the actors in a wider array of
political systems that have had rather different political histories and that face different challenges
in governance.

New Public Management

One of the most important influences on changing patterns of interactions between
politicians and administrators is the spread of the ideas of "New Public Management." This phrase
can mean any number of things to different people (Hood, 1991; Bouckaert and Pollitt, 2000) but the basic import is that traditional concepts of legalism and hierarchy that have dominated the study and practice of public administration have been devalued, if not completely rejected. Indeed in some versions of NPM managers (or public administrators in more traditional language) are extolled as the principal actors in governance, with politicians seemingly being something of a necessary evil, if indeed they are really necessary if one wants government to perform as effectively as it might be able to. We have already noted the pervasiveness of these ideas and their potential influence on the ways in which politicians and administrators interact in performing their task of governing.

Not unexpectedly, the influence of NPM ideas on the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats have been played out in a number of different ways (Peters and Pierre, 2001). The impacts have to some extent been a function of where the political system was prior to the adoption of those ideas, but there also have been some more general impacts. For example, the disaggregation and devolution of government that has been central in the reform of the public sector. These changes have included the creation of agencies and the expanded use of "quangos" and similar, non-ministerial organizational formats (see Bouckaert and Peters, 2001; Thynne and Wettenhall, 2001). These structural changes in government minimize the capacity of ministers, or even parliaments, to exercise control over public sector managers, and also appear to assume that accountability can be exercised through other mechanisms. These changes have tended to insulate managers from direct interventions in the day-to-day running of their organizations (but see below) but have not totally eliminated the impact of politicians, as several notable cases from the United Kingdom have indicated (Polidano, 1999).

The impact of changes derived from the ideas of New Public Management are not, however, one sided and there have been some changes that have reduced the role of public administrators on policy. For example, one of the important changes in public administration as a result of New Public Management has been the devaluing of the career service and the opening of most senior posts in government to individuals who have had some or all of their career in the private sector. This change on the one hand makes the role of these new administrators, or managers as now styled, substantially more powerful, given that they are more closely allied with the political powers of the day and have that relationship as a source of power. That relationship may be less partisan, per se, than it is a cast of mind in attempting to get things done. In a funny way, therefore, managerialism is rebuilding a village of sort, but it is one with many more visitors than long-term residents. This means, on the other hand, however, the career public service per se is likely to be less influential. These careerists can apply for positions that have been opened to competition but their role as a source of expertise and continuity is being minimized by the emphasis on competition, and the implicit assumption that the careerists are not as capable of fulling the posts as outsiders.

In addition, one of the principal tenets of NPM has been that government should "steer, not row" (Osborne and Gaebler, 1991). That is, whenever possible, governments should not provide services themselves but should use non-governmental actors to actually do the work. This does not necessarily alter the face-to-face relationships between senior bureaucrats and their political associates but it does tend to minimize the power of administrators in general. This is a function of the power that administration provides for administration, through the contact with the public in the process of implementation (Lipsky, 19xx') and also the power that comes through the capacity to redefine policies in that process of implementation.
Faced with the problems of maintaining influence over policies in the face of managerialist changes political leaders of all partisan persuasions have sought to find ways of reasserting their authority. They often have found that they were still responsible in the public mind for devolved services even though nominally much of that responsibility had been transferred away from them. Certainly many of the levers that ministers had over now privatized and devolved services had been eliminated or at least weakened. Therefore, politically politicians faced a situation of responsibility without control, a difficult position to hold in government.

One of the reactions has been to begin to make public sector managers, whether career or not more visibly responsible for their actions. Under conventional doctrines of ministerial responsibility (especially in Westminster countries) the minister should take political responsibility for all actions in his/her department so that even if a public servant was primarily at fault for an error the minister would answer. Increasingly, however, public administrators are being held to account in parliaments and before parliamentary committees so that the old doctrine of anonymity is weakened. In fairness this doctrine might have been less powerful than sometimes assumed, and ministers have been reluctant for some time to be left holding the political can for the failures of their civil servants.

The first reaction of politicians who have been left with responsibility but little power has been to diffuse the responsibility. The second reaction has been to attempt to recapture the power. This reaction has been seen in particular in the form of attempts to increase the availability of political appointments available to political leaders. In almost all industrialized democracies there has been some increase in the real level of political involvement in appointments (Rouban, 1998; Peters and Pierre, 2001), although the apparent levels may exceed the reality (Clifford and Wright, 1998). The creation of the numerous autonomous and quasi-autonomous organizations in government has actually aided in the pursuit of enhanced political control through appointments, given the number of appointments to boards, commissions and the like created to supervise these organizations (Skelcher, 1998).

Politicization also provides an alternative form of accountability. The reduction of ministerial controls coming about through the New Public Management reforms, including the creation of autonomous and quasi-autonomous organizations, have left political leaders searching for alternative means of implementing controls over the bureaucracy. One of the means through which that control can be restored is through appointing party loyalists to any available positions. This is certainly a different means of accountability than conventional parliamentary accountability but it is control nonetheless.

The more controversial aspect of political involvement in appointments has been for civil service positions per se. As already noted there may be fewer positions that remain civil service in the traditional sense of the term, but even for those who remain in those positions there have been apparent attempts to exert some influence over the appointments. Certainly there has been a "thickening" of government, with political appointments being made on top of the career civil service, especially in politically sensitive organizations (Light, 1995; Ingraham, Thompson and Eisenberg, 1995). In addition, even those positions that are not nominally subject to political appointment have become more subject to influence and pressure.

The degree of politicization of the public service varies across political systems. These differences appear also to be a consequence of a variety of political and administrative factors. One of those factors is the opportunities available to politicians to exert their control without having to move outside the existing bureaucratic structures to create new positions. So, for example, the Danish system for appointments of senior public servants was always open for political
considerations, and the evidence is that governments have come to exercise that option more readily (Christensen, forthcoming). The degree of politicization may also be a function of the degree of perceived difference among the political parties, with parties that believe themselves further apart being less willing to accept civil servants who have been in any way tainted by their involvement with another party._

Politicization can be seen as one means of reducing conflict over the distribution of political power between civil servants and politicians. This may be a means of creating a village, or perhaps more appropriately creating more of a campground in which the actors lodge together for a period, until they are replaced by a new set of residents. This failure to develop enduring positions for the public servants and the absence of trust indicated thereby may be a major problem in creating effective governance, whether in an established democracy or a transitional political system..

Transitions

Another set of issues about the relations of politicians and civil servants arise in transitional political systems. Much of the discussion to this point has examined administrative change in political systems that have well-institutionalized civil service systems as well as reasonably stable and legitimated political institutions for governing. Those happy conditions will not be present for many if not most transitional regimes that are being confronted with the joint challenges of attempting of building effective democracies and effective machinery for governing in compressed time periods, while simultaneously attempting to institutionalize viable market economies. This has been all the more a challenge given the absence of any significant history of democracy or autonomy in many of these regimes.

In an earlier paper (Peters, 1995; see also Kvistad, 1994) I discussed the problems of transitions within administrative systems in the immediate post-independence period, whether in former socialist systems or former authoritarian countries. This problem was conceptualized as a simple game between incoming political leaders and bureaucrats, many or most of whom they had inherited from the previous regime. The question at stake here was the loyalty of public employees to the new regimes, given that their initial recruitment and careers had been under the previous regime and with the ideological character of those regimes there was a good chance that those bureaucrats might find it difficult to function effectively and comfortably in a democratized regime. On the other hand, however, those new regimes were to some extent dependent upon the skills and experience of those public servants so that the new leaders could not readily dismiss those bureaucrats without some element of risk for their capacity to perform the central task of governance (see Steen, 1997).

Although that earlier paper was written in the context of the early days of transition some of the same issues remain at later stages of transformation. Although many regimes in former socialist and former authoritarian countries have become more institutionalized and have survived transitions of power, a number of governance problems remain. Many of those governance problems center upon the administrative capacity of governments, the most obvious is the ability of candidate countries to administer the Union acquis (Verheijen, 1999; Fournier, 1998) This concern about governing capacity raises the familiar, and continuing, question of where the talent to perform that administration will come from. Many governments seemingly are faced with the choice of a children's crusade or relying upon a group of individuals who were to some extent compromised by their participation in earlier regimes. And even if not compromised there may be questions about the commitment of those elites to the goals of more democratic governments now in office.
Another aspect of the governance equation for the transitional regimes is that the bureaucracy has been somewhat less successful than other government institutions in building legitimacy for itself, and for government more generally (Steen, 1995). This relative absence of political success on the part of bureaucracy may be in large part because the bureaucracy has a somewhat checkered history in many of these countries, and often has been an instrument of repression and the maintenance of privilege rather than a source of benefits for the average citizens. On the other hand the other institutions of government may be considered "talking shops" by some but they do have the trappings of democracy.

In a funny way the absence of experience with effective legislatures, independent courts, and the rest of the institutional apparatus of democratic government may render the public less capable of interpreting the actions of those institutions so that any failures may be more forgivable. The bureaucracy is at least a familiar structure, even if past experiences have not always been positive. In this case familiarity does breed some contempt and an expectation that the behavior of the bureaucracy will be less than beneficial for citizens. The bureaucracy therefore faces a major problem in asserting its appropriate role in the policymaking process. Rather than being a positive attribute, stability in many transitional regimes may be problematic, and the public may want to move away from the past.

By definition transitional regimes have not had the opportunities for institutionalizing their political and administrative systems that more established democratic systems have had. This means, among other things, that they will not have had the opportunities for institutionalizing patterns of trust among those sets of actors or for establishing norms of reciprocity in the allocation of positions and the treatment of public servants inherited from earlier governments. Therefore, politicization is likely to be a more natural reaction to the demands for effective governance even than in the more industrialized systems, and finding a means of building a village, or even building a small hamlet for mutual respect and cooperation may be difficult.

Building that village may be easier in the context of a stable and relatively constrained party system. That is, if there are a limited number of parties and those parties can be expected to survive from election to election then they may be able to develop a system of accommodation that permits limited politicization yet also draws on experience and expertise. That is, the most difficult aspect of transition may be the uncertainty about politics and the absence of any sense that any concession today will be met with equal concessions from the next government. A "winner take all" attitude promoting short-term gains at the expense of longer term success in institution building is rather logical when it is clear neither which parties will be in existence after the next election nor the basis of any longer term arrangements.

From the above we can argue that incoming political leaders in these governments face the same sort of game as did the initial set of elites after transition. Can they trust the civil servants whom they have inherited to be sufficiently loyal to follow the wishes of the new government? Can they afford to sacrifice the talent they have inherited even the individuals are less than fully committed to the program of the new government? The decisions about balancing these conflicting demands placed on the civil service--loyalty and expertise, commitment and competence--again is not confined to transitional regimes but the issues do appear more acute in that context (see ).

Although patrimonial styles of administration are usually a major target for reformers, they may always be the anathema they are made out to be. One interesting case of an more patrimonial arrangement that can manage at least one part of the task of building effective government comes from the South American country of Uruguay (see Lonzaro, 2000). Uruguay had been a stable and largely democratic political system, albeit with one relatively brief period of authoritarian rule. In
terms of this particular argument Uruguay has had the advantage of a stable and strong two-party system with relatively low levels of polarization between the parties. That party system has produced a proportional system for allocating public sector positions among the parties so that rather than winner take all it is a question of "winner take just a few more" jobs. Of course having a patronage system as a central element of a public personnel system does present risks of both diminished competence and excessive growth of the bureaucracy, but it also is a means of preventing excessive loss of talent when there is a change of parties. It also helps to institutionalize norms of trust and reciprocity (see also Mishler and Rose, 2000) that can be crucial for maintaining effective democracy.

The patrimonial style of administration described for Uruguay is, in many ways, what reformers have been attempting to move away from, given the patronage basis of the system (see Bresser Pereira, 1999). That having been said, however, building this stable system of linking state and society may be one possible intermediary stage between authoritarian and more managerialist structures for bureaucracy. Elsewhere I have argued (Peters, 2001) that building a traditional Weberian state may be necessary before managerialist principles can be introduced successfully. For a different set of political and administrative problems it may be that some means of more directly linking the political and the administrative may also be a useful intermediate stage. This is, of course, only a transitional process for legitimation of the bureaucracy as an allocator of values within the political system so that a balance between the political and the administrative can be maintained.

Therefore, bureaucracies in transitional regimes confront a range of significant challenges in their relationships with political authority. There is probably no single way in which those relationships have been, or can be, worked out most successful among the actors. One of the important analytic tasks, therefore, is to develop a means of understanding the possible relationships in both an empirical and a normative manner. On the empirical side of the analysis there is a need to categorize those relationships, whether in terms of the structural dynamics as mentioned above or in more behavioral terms (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981; Campbell and Peters, 1988). On the normative side there is a need to develop some sense of what style of relationship is most desirable. This then leads to perhaps the most fundamental question, that of institutional design.

Institutional Design

Based on the empirical evidence available, as well as the analytics available, what sorts of recommendations for institutional design are possible for relating politicians and bureaucrats? The prior question, of course, is what sort of outcome do we want? The concept of a village existing within the central policymaking institutions of government is still an appealing concept but may not have the drive and change-orientation required for governments in transitional regimes. Further, perhaps the simplest means of creating at least one version of a village may be to politicize the public service so that there will be greater agreement on policy. However, as noted above, that would actually construct more of a temporary arrangement rather than the stable pattern of interaction associated with the "village" concept.

The conventional norms of democracy might require accepting the Weberian model of domination by political leaders. In the normative component of the task this may be the most conventional set of values to be pursued in the design of institutions (see Savoie, forthcoming). The difficulty in promoting such a model is that it may undervalue the experience and expertise that an effective, career public service can provide for those politicians. While that expertise is crucial for any system of government it is perhaps most crucial for transitional regimes that face multiple
challenges and have fewer "slack" resources available to subsidize error. Further granting of higher levels of power to the government of the day may make patterns of policy more subject to rapid change and make the consequences of democratic transition more serious. Thus, we are thrown back onto the contradictions that exist in the role ascribed to the public bureaucracy, and its place in governing.

Building effective relationships between the political executive and the career executive also may depend upon structures and practices that might not be thought to be directly associated with those institutions. For example, as implied in some of the above discussion the nature of the party system will be important for this relationship. A stable party system with some limited levels of polarization among the parties will make managing the succession of one party to another easier, and is also likely to produce something more closely approximating the "village" with which we began this discussion. Further, building norms of trust and reciprocity may require creation of general norms of reciprocity in political life as much as it does the manipulation of the formal norms within the executive branch.

Summary

This paper has built on earlier work analyzing the relationship between politicians and their civil servants. While we begin with the same basic models of those relationships the crucial question has been to what extent have they changed, either as a result of changes in doctrine about management or changes in political systems. The certainties on which administration had been carried out for a number of years, if not decades, are no longer so certain and there is the need to examine carefully just what is happening as new types of politicians confront new types of public servants.

Just as it is necessary to understand the details of what is happening as these officials work together in an attempt to govern, it is also necessary to think more prescriptively. Based on the experience of a number of administrative systems there are some patterns that appear to influence the way in which bureaucrats relate to politicians. The question then is, of course, can those patterns be extrapolated from the particular cultural and political settings in which they arose to provide advice for other settings. This is become a more crucial question for comparative analysis as more and more attempts at "lesson drawing" and "transfer" inform policymaking around the world. Many of these have been attempts to impose the patterns found in the developed democracies in less-developed and transitional regimes, although there is an increasing interest in sharing policy ideas among the more affluent countries as well.

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Table 1

Patterns of Interaction Between Politicians and Bureaucrats
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Politicians</th>
<th>Bureaucrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Powerful</td>
<td>Village Life;</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1

Modes of Relationships Between Politicians and Bureaucrats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weberian</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Adversarial</th>
<th>Functional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Life</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Village Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td></td>
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Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) had argued that Whitehall in the United Kingdom was a "village" in which the inhabitants could work together in close cooperation to provide a seamless pattern of governance for the society. A more detailed presentation of these ideas is made below. This was hardly the first time that this question had been raised, but this attack came after a period of post-war consensus on a activist state heavily involved in the economy and society.
This consensus was clearly undermined, and with it the central role of a powerful public bureaucracy in steering the mixed economy welfare state was also weakened. For example, Thatcher expanded the office of Prime Minister significantly, and the Mulroney government created parallel hierarchies in ministries, staffed by loyalists. The political hierarchy was the source of policy advice, while the career civil servants retained responsibility primarily for implementation and making the machinery of government function as smoothly as possible.

For good discussions of the agenda of "New Public Management" see Hood (1991), Pollitt (1994) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000).

It should be remembered that much of the leadership of the Labour Party shared the sane educational advantages as the civil service and the Conservatives. Indeed, in recent years it is the Conservatives that has had leaders drawn from the lower middle class rather than the Labour Party.

Wilson, however, did argue that administration was superior to politics given that administration was amenable to scientific inquiry while politics was more an art (Doig, 1983). Further, Wilson to some extent recanted on his rather extreme conception of the dichotomy (Martin, 1988), arguing that it reflected a misreading of the German sources being used.

On the utility of this model for both politicians and bureaucrats see Peters (2001a), Chapter 2.

One of the best expositions of this position remains Rose (1974).

In member countries of the European Union the need to incorporate EU regulations into national law has tended to require higher levels of delegation (Praetorius, 1999).

Japan may be a case here not because of party per se but because of factions within parties that make ruling difficult even when there is nominally a majority party in the Diet.

Of course, in some countries such as the United States and France career have been less exclusive than in most Westminster political systems. This raises the point of the extent to which much of the concern about New Public Management has been located in those systems derivative from the British system.

The evidence, however, is that career public servants have been reasonably successful in competing for posts when they have been opened.

In Europe Greece appears to fit this model (Sotriopolous, forthcoming), as does to some extent Germany with the possibility of early retirement of civil servants (Goetz, forthcoming). Of course, in other countries the election of former communists and/or authoritarians may indicate that the certainties of the past may be preferable to the insecurities of the present. In such a setting the old bureaucracy may be a boon.

This may, of course, be a chicken and egg problem. If a stable pattern of governing is developed then parties may follow, or if parties are able to be institutionalized then more reciprocal norms of interaction and governing may be possible.

Robert Merton (1940) made a not dissimilar argument about the utility of political machines in American cities as a means of linking a newly enfranchised public (composed largely of immigrants) with the political system.

Indeed the success of the British government (and other Westminster governments) in maintaining that pattern may be a function of the limited differences between the parties in a two party system, rather than any particular cultural pattern or any excess of virtue.

Once greater polarization of the parties occurred, e.g. with Thatcher that pattern appears to have been eroded.