 Perspectives on Corruption Metrics

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"...indeed the beginning of wisdom on the issue is to subdivide and unpack the vast concept."

Robert Klitgaard, 1997

The manifold corruption indicators currently in use by the corruption and corruption-related indices can be distinguished through three main parameters:

(i) types / sources of data, i.e., perceptions (Do you think or how much do you think there is corruption?), experiences (Have you or how much have you experienced corruption?) or proxy evidence (What legal institutions, rules and regulations exist and what are the implementation records?)

(ii) methods of data aggregation, i.e., composite indices, which subsume several datasets into one, or single-source indices, which have a direct list of questions; and

(iii) directions of data, i.e., de jure or input-based indicators measuring the existence and quality of anti-corruption institutions, rules and procedures, or de facto or output-based indicators assessing the impact of corruption on quality of life and public service delivery.1

None of these categorizations, however, take into account the substantive content of the corruption indicators and their constituting metrics. What are some of the main and peripheral corruption indicators and their metrics? When country x is said to have improved or worsened its corruption level from one year to another, what are we really measuring regardless of whether we are talking about perceptions, experience or evidence? These are some of the questions that this paper asks in its attempt to contribute to the overall field of corruption measurements.

To this aim, the paper delves into the methodological bases and the actual survey questionnaires or metrics of fifteen indices, including Transparency International’s composite Corruption Perception Index, hence the CPI’s parts and questions from four indices. Indicator groups, individual indicators and the associated groups of metrics that are related to corruption are included while those that attempt to measure the broader concepts, inter alia, of governance, democracy and economic freedom are excluded for reasons of parsimony.2

1 For a thorough discussion on the formal characteristics of corruption indices, see UNDP (2008).
2 Governance and corruption are closely related and good governance has been used synonymously with anticorruption. The UN’s Millennium Project associates “poor governance” with “corruption” when it notes that one reason why governance suffers corrupt leadership, as when a state is run for the benefit of a narrow clique or elite. See the UN Millennium Project at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/why8.htm.
Table 1: List of Analyzed Corruption and Corruption-related Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>ACE Electoral Knowledge Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEEPS</td>
<td>Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPI</td>
<td>Bribe Payers’ Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Bertelsmann Transformation Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index (in addition to FH, BTI, WCR, GCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--AFDB—</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--EIU—</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--CRR—</td>
<td>Global Insights’ Country Risk Ratings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--PERC—</td>
<td>Political and Economic Risk Consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCI</td>
<td>Global Competitiveness Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIR</td>
<td>Global Integrity Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAC</td>
<td>Transparency in Reporting on Anti-Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCR</td>
<td>World Competitiveness Report</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

For didactic purposes only, and based on the assumptions that corruption happens as a result of a process, which involves deficiencies in transparency, accountability and integrity, the proposed *Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Indicators* groups the corruption metrics under scrutiny along three broad temporal stages and four substantive categories, none of them mutually exclusive of each other or exhaustive altogether.

*The three temporal stages of corruption* consist of the:

(i) Prevention Stage where vulnerabilities to corruption are assessed,
(ii) Detection Stage where the actual eruptions of corruption are examined, and
(iii) Elimination Stage where control of corruption, including anticorruption activities are probed.\(^4\)

*The four substantive dimensions of corruption indicators* consist of the categories of:

(i) PES—political-economic-social,
(ii) PA--public administration with three sub-categories of
  - legal-institutional,
  - administrative-organizational including Resource Management (RM), and
  - business-related
  all subsumed under PA as far as they interact with the public sector,
(iii) CE--citizen engagement, and
(iv) CU—cultural.

*On temporal stages,* the *first pre-corruption stage* focuses on the general actual or perceived conditions that make corruption more or less likely: it includes corruption

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3 This sample of indexes is preliminary and a work in progress as additional methodologies of other relevant indexes, notably the World Governance Indicators, are currently being studied.

4 A word of caution here is that these stages might coalesce, some might be skipped and all of them are certainly prone to endogeneity: control of corruption can impact the prevention of corruption by providing signals of vulnerability to corruption, for instance, and detection can mesh with control through the process of reporting and constant surveillance of corrupt acts, transactions and behaviour. The relationship among the three stages is thus circular, not linear.
indicators and metrics that can be likened to *process variables* with focus on activities and inputs. The second *actual corruption stage* focuses on whether corruption is happening or is perceived to be happening: it consists of *result variables* with focus on outputs and outcomes.\(^5\) The third *post-corruption stage* concentrates on the actual or perceived actions to prosecute and control corruption once it occurs: it contains *control variables* with focus on enforcement of anticorruption and monitoring of corruption.\(^6\)

*On substantive categorization*, the **PES** category of corruption indicators focuses on the general assessments of corruption within the frameworks of state, markets and the media. The **PA** category of corruption indicators assesses corruption in the public sector in terms of (i) laws, rules and regulations (*legal-institutional PA*), (ii) administrative and organizational mechanisms including in the more specific areas of taxes, budget, procurement and customs (*administrative-organizational PA*, including RM—Resource Management), and (iii) the linkages with the private sector (*business-related PA*). The **CE** category of corruption indicators specifically targets the participation of citizens in (anti)corruption-related activities and processes. Finally, the **CU** category of corruption indicators gauges the culture-based corollaries of corruption.

The article finds that corruption indexes and their categories of indicators seldom differentiate between the different stages of the *process of corruption* taking it instead as a one-time phenomenon. They do that either explicitly or implicitly by lumping the different stages of corruption into one metric or indicator. The stages of corruption are thus often ignored in putting input, result and control variables of corruption in one same basket. While this may not necessarily be considered problematic given the strong endogenous relationship among the three stages, the result is indicators or survey questions that are half-clear or open to interpretation. Further research might thus benefit from a specific focus on how the input, output and result variables of corruption interact with each other and with the variables of control in ex post corruption rather than combining them together arbitrarily or seeing them as separate boxes in situ.\(^7\)

The article also finds that there is a dearth of indicators that specifically assess the citizen dimension of corruption prevention, detection and control processes. Therefore, further research on corruption would also gain from a separate focus on citizen engagement including through formulating *citizen-centric corruption indicators (3CI)* with emphasis on how citizens can have significant and innovative roles in fighting (preventing, detecting, controlling) corruption. A priori, work on 3CI could be initiated by (i) updating, elaborating and strengthening the already existing yet sparse CE metrics; and (ii) incorporating citizen engagement more fully into the other indicator categories of PES, PA and CU, where and when relevant. In this regard, mainstreaming the vibrant literature on social accountability into research on corruption prevention, detection and control

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\(^5\) Some consider ‘outputs’ as part of performance, hence as a transition from a process to a result variable. Generally, though, output indicators are used to define and measure the results of individual project activities in training, strategy planning, legal aid, or capacity building. See Andersen and Sano (2006).

\(^6\) Not to be confused with the statistical understanding of a *control variable*, defined as a variable that might have an influence on the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable, and therefore, must be controlled by the experimenter or researcher. For more, see Sirkin (2005).

\(^7\) While these stages are mutually inclusive, circular, and at times overlapping, taking temporality into account can bring potential clarity and robustness to corruption indicators. Disaggregating corruption stages where applicable and for different indicator categories can also divulge missed linkages in the understanding of corruption and the opportunity threads for innovatively addressing it, particularly and more importantly before it transpires.
could potentially yield new venues for corruption measurements that are more up-to-date, innovative and effective.  

Corruption Measurements: The Current Debates and Concerns

The existing corruption indicators have been widely criticized for their lack of validity due mainly to the vagueness, diversity and the malleability of the very concept of corruption and the secrecy involved in its empirical manifestations. The prevalence of corruption measurements based on the perceptions of citizens, businesspeople, experts and public officials has also given rise to concerns over reliability and selection bias.

A 2008 analysis of corruption indices by the United Nations Development Programme and the Global Integrity, for instance, has categorized corruption indices according to four criteria: (i) scale and scope of indicators, (ii) what is actually being measured, (iii) the methodology employed, and (iv) the role that internal and/or external stakeholders play in generating the assessments. The first two of these categories have emphasized concerns over validity: what are we really measuring? The last two categories have hinted at reliability and selection bias concerns: can we repeat the measurements and can we generalize them to an entire country? In a nutshell, reliability concerns have included debates on the extent to which ephemeral perceptions can be used to measure and compare corruption over time and across cases. Selection bias concerns have comprised the problematic of generalizing corruption to an entire country based on the input of select and specific societal groups (Tavits 2010: 1274).

The validity concerns over the concept of corruption have been twofold. First, given its culture-driven nature, scholars have criticized operationalizing corruption in a way that can be comparable across different societies, let alone within societies (Treisman 2000, Montinola and Jackman 2002, Robinson 1998, Lancaster and Montinola 1997). The historically-based “home-grown specificities” or the “national culture” affecting the understanding, categorization and perceptions of corruption have been at the root of controversies over whether a given act is or should be considered corrupt (Tänzler et al. 2007: 35; Harrison 2006, Rohwer 2009: 8, Pillay and Dorasami 2010). One culture-sensitive understanding of definition has put emphasis on the blurred boundaries between private and public mentalities, hence the internal depiction of corruption as the “solution to the problem” rather than the "problem" itself, particularly from the perspective of the corrupt actor (UNDESA 2011).

Several empirical examples are in order. One example comes from Europe, which otherwise can be said to have a homogenous culture: while a “corrupt civil servant or politician in the Netherlands is defined as one involved in providing, requesting or obtaining private favours or promises” (Graaf et al. 86), survey research in France finds that favouritism is largely accepted and seen as a non-corrupt act there (Lascoumes and Tomescu-Hatto 2008). To continue with the same example of favouritism, what is seen as corrupt in the western world might simply connote obligations to family and friends in other cultures--as in China’s guanxi meaning “social relationships” or “social connections” and implying reciprocity and indebtedness (Yang 1994: 108) or India’s

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8 Fighting, curbing, combating, eradicating corruption, in this paper, are used interchangeably and to encompass prevention, detection and control of corruption.
**dharma** meaning “micro domain of action” and implying the moral obligation to develop patron-client nexi (Price 1999). Another example comes from Africa where the way state-society relations are structured traditionally may not always overlap with their legal counterparts often times based on the Weberian notions of bureaucratic rationality. Such divergences between the traditional-societal and the modern-legal frameworks have given birth to debates over the perfectly legitimate act of “gift-giving” versus the illegal transaction of “bribery” (Kurer 2005: 228) and the views of “state being captured” versus “state being outside of society” (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 23).

The second line of reasoning used by those scholars who have voiced validity concerns over corruption measurements has emphasized the ubiquitously versatile nature of corruption as opposed to its cultural specificities. Corruption manifests itself in many different ways—from the looting of major assets to small-scale bribery, from nepotism to bribery and embezzlement, and from political and party finance to corruption interfacing with organized crime (Cockcroft 2010). As a result, scholars have found it problematic to compress the myriad types and forms of corruption into one-number assessments per country (Arndt and Oman 2006).

### Table 2: A Sample of Different Types and Forms of Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Types of Corruption</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bribery</strong> is understood as the payment (in money or kind) that is given or taken in a corrupt relationship. Equivalent terms to bribery include kickbacks, commercial arrangements or pay-offs. They are payments or returns needed or demanded to make things pass more swiftly, smoothly or more favorably through state or government bureaucracies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Embezzlement</strong> is theft of resources by people who are responsible for administering them, e.g., when disloyal employees steal from their employers. It is not considered corruption from a strictly legal point of view, but is included in a broader definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fraud</strong> is an economic crime that involves some kind of trickery, swindle or deceit such as manipulation or distortion of information, facts and expertise by public officials for their own profit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extortion</strong> is money and other resources extracted by the use of coercion, violence or threats to use force.</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Forms of Corruption</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Petty (street-level) Corruption</strong>: Everyday corruption that occurs when citizens interact with low- to mid-level public officials in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other bureaucratic agencies. The scale of monetary transaction involved is small and primarily impacts individuals, particularly the poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand (political) Corruption</strong>: Policy-level corruption involving politicians and high-level officials, and transactions, which are usually large in scale.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Other validity concerns have leaped from the conceptual to the methodological domain involving criticisms against the gap between the “perceptions” and the “realities” of corruption. Some examples might include methodological concerns on treating corruption as a hard-core variable in par with GDP/capita (Abramo 2007, Sampford et al. 2006) and
conceptual concerns such as the “echo chamber effect” whereby corruption scandals in
the media and elsewhere culminate in increased corruption perceptions when they simply
mean an increased fight against corruption and/or strong investigative journalism
(Markovits and Silverstein 1988, Moodie 1980).9

Subjectivity of perception-based corruption indicators are not the only targets of criticism
in the literature on corruption measurements. 10 Empirically-grounded objective
corruption indicators have also received their fair share of blame for false representation.
For instance, should measurements of corruption focus on the value of the bribe, the
economic advantage which the bribe payer is able to obtain through the bribe, or the
impact, both financial and other on the “victim” of corruption (UNODC 2005: 8)?
Similarly, Johnston (2008) has pointed at the confusion created by the objective output
indicators of audits and accounting, public reporting of budgets and political funding, and
reports by citizens and whistleblowers11 since the objective number of investigations,
trials and convictions they include can be more about contention among factions than
about actual corruption. For instance, the increased number of corruption cases brought
to trial could well mean increased level of confidence in the judicial system or easier legal
procedures for claiming complaints as opposed to increased levels of corruption (5).

Table 3: Categorizing Governance Indexes based on their data approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Measures</th>
<th>Measuring Quality of Processes, Rules, Practices</th>
<th>Measuring Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• PEFA indicators*</td>
<td>• Investment Climate Assessments**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CPI sub-indicators*</td>
<td>• Business Environment &amp; Enterprise Surveys (BEEPS)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Global Integrity Index (GI) sub-indicators*</td>
<td>• Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) - selected sub-indicators***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Open Budget Index (OBI) sub-indicators*</td>
<td>• Transparency International***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• OECD Procurement Index*</td>
<td>• Freedom House*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Doing Business</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Measures</td>
<td>• Overall CPIA*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Overall CPI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Overall OBI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Overall DB Index*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political constraints*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Methodologically, expert polls have been criticized for being detached from the local
norms, hence problems involved in generalizing from these specific groups to an entire
country (Kurer 2005: 235). Concerns have also been raised against composite indices,
such as Transparency International’s CPI and World Bank’s World Governance
Indicators, which aggregate and synthesize different measures generated by several other

9 Similar concerns have been raised regarding experience-based corruption indicators, including
Victimization Methodology that assesses direct and personal experience with corruption. The time lag
between the time the corrupt act occurs and that of the survey questionnaire taking place, people’s
interpretations or perceptions of their own experiences change (Abramo 2005, Seligson 2006, Miller 2006).
10 Objective data on corruption are difficult to obtain, because current indicators are imperfect proxies for
actual levels of corruption. Perception-based indicators, in this sense, have proved useful in raising
awareness, making cross-country comparisons and conducting statistical analysis, and helping establish
correlations between corruption and a wide range of variables (U4 2009, 2).
11 These indicators have also been called “proxy indicators” as they measure “signals of corruption” by
focusing on its opposite: anticorruption, good governance and public accountability mechanisms.
research organizations, as opposed to indicators based on a single data source, i.e., newly gathered data produced by any given research organization without recourse to third party data, such as the Global Integrity Index and the Open Budget Index. While composite indexes limit the measurement error in individual indicators, conceptual clarity is lost.\textsuperscript{12} The reverse is true for indexes using single data sources.

**Corruption Measurements: Emerging Debates and a proposal for a Path-driven Taxonomy**

While all legitimate and useful, none of the aforementioned concerns has included a direct and in-depth focus on the actual variables and the associated survey questions that are used to measure, assess and understand corruption. A 2007 initiative by the World Bank on *Actionable Governance Indicators (AGIs)* has taken some steps towards such a micro-focus but the scope of this initiative has included corruption only as part of the larger governance framework. Furthermore, the AGIs have targeted mostly the meso-level indicators located between the inputs and outputs of development projects, and their outcomes—not the first-line metrics used by the survey questionnaires. The “missing middle” has been described by the Bank as the group of indicators that assess the direct impact of institutional arrangements, procedures and practices (WB 2007).\textsuperscript{13}

Adopting a micro-focus on corruption metrics, the following exercise assesses the survey questions used by a total of fifteen indexes related to corruption. In case of governance indexes, corruption indicators are chosen based on whether corruption or its forms and types\textsuperscript{14} are stated explicitly either within the category or sub-category or in any of the actual metrics used. Although the methodology for the selection of metrics is still a work in progress, a priori the rationale for the selection overlaps with the shaded area of the governance parameters used by the World Governance Assessment (WGA), another governance index yet to be added to the scope of this study.

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\textsuperscript{12} For example, the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) asks about ineffective audits, conflicts of interest, policies being biased towards narrow interests, policies affected by corruption and public resources diverted to private gain whereas the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) asks about the amount of bribes paid. Therefore it is unclear what exactly the CPI and the WGI are measuring, when their measures are averaged together (Rohwer 2009: 49).

\textsuperscript{13} Particular examples of actionable indicators include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development– Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Procurement Indicators or the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicators. While useful to monitor progress vis-à-vis policy-making, concerns over actionable indicators have been raised with regard to their undue focus on utility as opposed to the understandings of corruption (Urra 2007).

\textsuperscript{14} A preliminary list of terms related to corruption: Embezzlement, Money-laundering, Fraud, Collusion, Patronage, Clientelism, Nepotism, Looting, Cheating, Collusion, Spoils system, Neopatrimonialism, Kleptocracy, Bribery, Favoritism, Conflict of Interest, Extortion, Rent-seeking, etc.
The metrics of corruption examined in this study can be categorized along four different substantive focus areas. Some of the metrics assess corruption generally in the broad areas of political, economic and social systems and relations (PES). Others do the same but stay confined to public administration (PA). Very few include direct focus on citizen engagement (CE) in countering corruption, and even fewer directly assess the cultural dimension of corruption. As it is, not only the cultural/moral/ethical and the rational/transactional/utility dimensions of corruption are enmeshed within the current indexes but there is little explicit differentiation made between grand (political) and petty (administrative) corruption.\footnote{Global Corruption Barometer does differentiate between these two types/levels of corruption.}

The taxonomy of current corruption metrics also reveals that corruption is often taken as a lump-sum phenomenon without a separate focus on the conditions that lead to it: conditions that make corruption more likely to arise, conditions that make it easier to detect corruption, and conditions that become important in the aftermath of corruption for monitoring and sanctioning it. While these three stages of corruption, namely prevention, detection and control are not cast in stone, and in fact are highly endogenous in practice, such categorization can shed light on the different dimensions of corruption, and potentially pave the way for the formulation of innovative corruption indicators and metrics.

**Stages of Corruption as a Process**

Conditions that lead to corruption or make it more likely to occur are characterized by \textit{process variables} related to vulnerability points or risks of corruption. They ask: \textit{What...}
individual and systemic loopholes or tendencies foment or increases the risk of corruption?

Conditions that make the detection of corruption easier or harder are characterized by *result variables*, which are linked with the outputs and outcomes of actual corrupt transactions. They ask: *Do corrupt exchanges take place; are they detected, and through what means?*

Conditions that gain salience in the aftermath of corrupt transactions for monitoring and sanctioning are characterized by *control variables*, which are associated with ex-post corruption control. They ask: *How is corruption (believed to be) countered once it transpires, at individual, institutional and systemic-levels of analysis?*

**Categories of the Process of Corruption**

**PES indicators of corruption** cover the domain of government, political systems and regimes, markets, their interactions, and social systems such as the media. They target (i) *corruption-prone structures* in the pre-corruption stage of vulnerabilities to corruption; (ii) *extent of corruption perceptions, experiences and transactions* in the corruption detection stage of eruptions of corruption; and the (iii) *presence and success of corruption containment* by the government and its agencies in the control stage.

**Figure 1: A Proposal for a Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics**

**PA indicators of corruption** focus on the vulnerabilities, eruptions and control of corruption in the public/civil service and administration. Its three sub-categories are
legal-institutional, administrative-organizational including a more specific enclave of Resource Management, and business-related corruption indicators.

In the pre-corruption stage of vulnerabilities to corruption, the PA indicators cover the following:

(i) Legal-institutional PA: guidelines, policies, regulations, institutions, laws related to transparency and accountability
(ii) Administrative-structural PA: established rules, standard operating procedures and formal coordination mechanisms. The Resource Management (RM) enclave includes the same but specifically in the more technical PA areas of taxes, procurement, budget, customs, etc.
(iii) Business-related PA: procedures and rules for establishing a business, social responsibility rules pertaining to the private sector as far as the latter interacts with the public sector, particularly in service delivery.

In the corruption detection stage consisting of eruptions of corrupt dealings, the PA indicators are not distributed along the aforementioned three sub-categories. Instead, the focus is on whether corrupt dealings, such as bribery for instance, is (or is perceived to be) among public servants, between public servants and citizens, and/or between public servants and the private sector.

In the post-corruption stage of control, the PA indicators are the following:

(i) Legal-institutional PA: anticorruption laws, proceedings on corruption cases and the effectiveness of these proceedings
(ii) Administrative-structural PA: public service integrity and ethics as reinforced by auditing institutions and processes
(iii) Business-related PA: business principles for countering corruption, anticorruption programmes of companies in as far as they work with and in the public sector

CE indicators of corruption are few. They probe the presence/absence or the extent to which citizens are part of processes to fight corruption. They focus on (i) citizen participation in public decision-making processes in the pre-corruption stage of vulnerabilities to corruption; (ii) citizen/civil society participation in detecting/reporting corrupt behaviour, acts, actions and transactions in the detection stage of eruptions of corruption, and (iii) citizen participation in anticorruption processes and institutions in mostly formal ways, i.e., through government-initiated programmes and institutions and/or civil society, and not grassroots anticorruption initiatives.

CU indicators of corruption are also a few and look into the subjective area of whether a corruption-prone culture exists. The cultural dimensions of pre-corruption

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16 The Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics shows that there are no indicators in this sub-category and that the assessment of administrative/organizational dimensions of PA is merged with the broader PES in the control stage of ex post corruption.
17 The Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics also shows that CE indicators pertaining specifically to the second stage of corruption detection are particularly sparse and could gain from further focus in research and policy.
vulnerabilities and of eruptions of corruption are not differentiated since such distinction would be tenuous conceptually—culture is a constant, at least in the foreseeable future, and the culturally determined conditions that increase the likelihood of corruption and those that lead to its detection are very much intertwined. Together, they include questions focusing on whether there is a service-oriented culture, a professional civil service and public trust in institutions. The post-corruption stage of control of corruption is also part of the cultural constant and the one specific question that this study finds suitable for the control category is about the level of trust in government and its entities to “fight” corruption and is thus open to interpretation in terms of the “fight being staged after corruption occurs” or all throughout—preventing, detecting and controlling it.

Below is a detailed description of the Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics with focus on the vulnerabilities, eruptions or controls of corruption in the four substantive categories of PES, PA, CE and CU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Prevention Stage—Vulnerabilities, Risks, Opportunities, Danger Zones</th>
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Corruption is hardly a one-shot phenomenon. Instead, its occurrence is based on a combination of several factors that come together during a process of multifaceted conditions prior to its actual occurrence. If, for instance, we picture corruption mainly as a transaction between an agent (bribed) and a client (briber), then in order for both of these actors to decide that the corrupt transaction is in their best interest, there should have been a rational thought process on the part of each calculating the expected outcomes of a variety of factors. Some of these factors can include the probabilities of detection by the principal (public), of sanctions if caught, of non-legal enforcement mechanisms such as reputational damage or group shunning; of institutions, rules and regulations that can be used in fending off against accusations, of trust relationships which can informally help circumvent the formal system to deviate charges and/or rumours. The list can be made longer.

If corruption is seen as deviation from socially accepted norms and ethical behaviour, then there still is a process of factors that prepare the ground for corruption to arise and to propagate. Some of these factors might include the excessiveness and opacity of rules and procedures, clarity of boundaries for corrupt and non-corrupt acts in certain sectors, beliefs among different strata of society about the pervasiveness and importance of corruption, the clarity of norms, societal consensus about these norms and the degree of strictness in their application in community settings, political influence, social degradation, etc.

These prior conditions and considerations can be likened to the “danger zones of corruption” as done by Andersson (2008), “follow the money approach” by Schopf (2011), “vulnerabilities to corruption” by Johnston (2010), “opportunities for corruption” by Ogus (2004), and still discussed amply by other scholars without necessarily being assigned a specific name but under the headings of “policy fields considered vulnerable to corruption” (Graaf et al. 2008). These and other scholars find that bureaucratic arrangements that give public officials significant discretion and little accountability
increase the incidence of corruption (Xin and Rudel 2004, 306). They also take the stand that corruption often involves violations of integrity which step-by-step become more intense. In this understanding, and often times in practice, corruption therefore is preceded by less serious integrity violations, such as the lack of transparency and accountability (92).

The mirror image argument is advanced by Apaza (2007) who shows that higher accountability in public organizations is associated with lower levels of corruption. He thus recommends to concentrate on “clear policies and procedures, quality and ethical standards, systems of transparency, and effective law enforcement mechanisms” in order to fight corruption. Likewise, Picci (2005) pinpoints to (i) increased accountability, obtained through a high degree of transparency, and (ii) regular monitoring activities, to allow for proper incentives to be in place, as measures to cure corruption.

It is in these specific niches that the seeds of prospective corruption can potentially be found and assessed.

Danger zones of corruption are “areas and activities in society where corrupt transactions are most likely to occur— and not necessarily those that are characterized by high levels of corruption” (Andersson 2008: 199). They could be determined by location as to whether a level of government (central versus local) or a sector of activity (policing versus judiciary) is more prone to corruption, whether certain actors (politicians versus civil servants) are more likely to get involved in corrupt activities. Ogus (2004), for instance, maintains that regulatory activity is particularly and ubiquitously prone to corruption. He cites both quantitative and qualitative evidence to argue that corruption and the size of the public sector are highly correlated (Goudie and Stasavage 1998, LaPalombara 1994) often due to information asymmetries between the top decision-makers and the rest of those involved in policy-making (Ogus 2004: 331). He suggests that institutional arrangements may be organized so as to limit the opportunities for corruption or to render such opportunities less profitable rather than attempting to suppress corruption directly (Ibid.: 338).

18 There are also several contextual factors that are correlates of corruption such as poverty, large populations, earlier historical experiences with autocratic rule versus democracy, colonial heritage, decentralization, ethnic heterogeneity, gender composition in the population and in key institutions, which can affect the likelihood of corruption before it occurs. However, these macro-variables are more associated with the “necessary conditions” than vulnerabilities, which refer to more immediate micro- and meso-level variables, mostly in relation to transparency and accountability.
Figure 2: A global and sectoral perspective on corruption

Source: Global Corruption Barometer (2010)\textsuperscript{19}

Ogus’ focus on deregulation as one solution for dismantling regulatory opportunities for corruption includes the simplification of registration and licensing requirements in business as these areas are particularly prone to corrupt transactions (340). Like Ogus, McFerson (2009), studying hyper-corruption in resource-rich African countries, examines and compares the number of days it takes to (i) start a business, (ii) deal with licenses; (iii) employ workers, (iv) register property, (v) get credit, (vi) protect investors, (vii) pay taxes, (viii) cross-border trade, (ix) enforce contracts, and (x) close a business, specifically in Angola, Botswana, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria to assess corruption there.

Following Ogus and McFerson, Schopf (2011) focuses on outflows of rents and related personal receipts for favours by relevant officials as an objective measurement of elite corruption in South Korea. Johnston (2010) also proposes to assess the areas and factors that constitute risk points for corruption to thrive as opposed to a direct measure of corruption such as the overall perceived levels or the magnitude and prevalence of bribes/bribery. His proposed solution are “government performance indicators,” particularly bureaucratic delay and price patterns in procurement, including the aforementioned variables of how long it takes to get a license and prices paid in procurement for basic commodities such as fuel. His description for a comprehensive risk panorama of corruption is telling:

\textsuperscript{19} GCB is another expert opinion-based corruption survey created by Transparency International to complement its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) particularly through its assessment of corruption in key governance sectors and institutions. See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010/results
If an agency pays 50 percent more for gasoline than others, needs ten employees to accomplish tasks performed elsewhere by four, publishes budgets that are routinely off the mark in terms of actual outcomes, has high rates of zoning and assessment variances, or conducts far more (or many fewer) regulatory inspections than other comparable units of government, those are specific indications of where to look for corruption (131).

A first analysis of the current corruption metrics shows that while some of these prior conditions of corruption are assessed, they are not systematically incorporated into the corruption indices. The few that exists are mixed with other and more conventional types of corruption metrics such as whether corruption exists or not, and how much. The result is conceptually hazy metrics and the lack of actionability, i.e., weak linkages between indicators and effective policy responses for corruption prevention. This result should not come as a surprise since it has already been established that

Corruption prevention does not receive the priority it deserves even though, properly resourced and focused, it can close loopholes and tighten processes and make a significant impact on reducing corruption, particularly in relation to wider reform objectives (Doig, Watt and Williams 2005: 51).

**PES—corruption prone structures and tendencies in state, markets and the media**

The focus is on transparency, accountability and integrity correlates of corruption in state, markets and the media.

We see that the Global Integrity Report (GIR) is the most detailed in terms of assessing the political and social vulnerability metrics. We also see that its comparative advantage in the political and social realms is less well matched in the markets: not as many vulnerability metrics are found vis-à-vis economics in GIR.

FH and BTI step in in this regard. They assess the role of government in the economy and the distribution of wealth and income, respectively. GRR focuses more specifically on economic disparities and low wages, and CPIA links economic vulnerabilities with the political and the social when it probes whether the media is independent of government or powerful business interests.

WCR has an innovative metric about the place and interference of black markets and informal economy vis-à-vis economic development, which might also signal danger zones for corruption.

For a detailed listing of PES vulnerability metrics in the prevention stage, please see **Appendix Table 1: PES—corruption prone structures and tendencies in state, markets and the media.**

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20 Johnston (2010) goes one step further to propose benchmarks of performance to be determined with citizen involvement and emphasizing the positive accomplishments of integrity instead of stigmatizing agencies or jurisdictions with the label “corrupt” (127).
PA—Transparency and accountability laws, rules, institutions, coordination mechanisms in the public sector

The focus is on the existence, appropriateness and the effectiveness of guidelines, policies, laws, regulations, institutions and coordination mechanisms on information, communication, transparency, accountability in the public sector, among civil servants and between them and the entities with which they interact, including the business sector.

The first legal-institutional sub-section focusing specifically on the rules governing public administration and public administrators is usually extensively covered by all surveys even though the metrics contained herein spill to the control stage and assess enforcement questions such as if civil servants’ assets are audited or what happens to them once they are indicted of corruption. Likewise, what can be categorized as the present time detection metrics, such as the existence of nepotism, cronyism and patronage are treated within the same indicator category that includes simple and factual vulnerability questions about the degree of clarity in public employment job descriptions (Global Integrity Report).

In administrative-organizational sub-category, administrative and bureaucratic quality are assessed by FH and BTI, while more specific issues, such as the details of public employment, mechanisms of accountability are covered by CPIA, which is also offering one of the most comprehensive resource management assessment both in terms of the quantity of metrics and the comprehensiveness of questions asked—on the areas of taxes, customs, procurement, budget, etc.

Specifically on business, we see that in addition to the variables related to business licensing and registration effectiveness, privatizations and state-owned enterprises receive separate attention as they are again vulnerability points by their pro-corruption affinities. The most thorough survey metrics in this sub-category come from the DB and WCR.

For a detailed listing of PA vulnerability metrics in the prevention stage, please see Appendix Table 2: PA—Transparency and accountability laws, rules, institutions, coordination mechanisms in the public sector.

CE—citizen engagement in government/market/social/public processes

The focus is on the participation of citizens in various government, market, social systems and public administration. We see once again that the Global Integrity Report (GIR) is the most detailed in terms of assessing citizen engagement in detecting vulnerabilities to corruption even though it does not offer such a separate substantive indicator or category. Instead, the citizen engagement variables are dispersed among its six categories.
Table 5: Categories and Sub-categories of the Global Integrity Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Integrity Index Categories and Subcategories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Civil Society, Public Information, and Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil-society organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Access to information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Freedom of the media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Electoral and Political Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Election-monitoring agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political-party finances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Branches of Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legislative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Judicial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Administration and Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil-service regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Measures to protect whistle-blowers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Privatization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Oversight and Regulatory Mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National ombudsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supreme auditing agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Taxes and customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial-sector regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Anticorruption Mechanisms and Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anticorruption law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Corruption-fighting agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rule of law and access to justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Law enforcement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While some sub-categorizations of GIR are not straightforward conceptually, such as the metric “Can citizens organize into trade unions?” being categorized under Anticorruption non-governmental organizations, and this under Non-governmental organizations, public information and media, while trade unions-anticorruption relationship is highly debatable as is the relationship between media and non-governmental organizations, many citizen engagement metrics in general, particularly those regarding citizens’ access to financial records and assets can very well be placed in the prevention, detection and/or control stages depending on the circumstances and the motivations of involved citizens in each given case, hence the reminder about the glaring issue of endogeneity.

Besides the GIR, only CPIA and GRR offer metrics on citizen engagement to prevent corruption. They are more general compared to those used by GIR but very useful nonetheless since they combine several components together such as secrecy, decision-making, citizen engagement and civil society; and assess capacity of citizen engagement in terms of literacy, education and awareness, respectively.

For a detailed listing of CE vulnerability metrics in the prevention stage, please see *Appendix Table 3: CE—Citizen engagement in government/market/social/public administration processes*
CU—cultural tendencies towards corruption in general

The focus of cultural indicators of corruption is on whether there is a service-oriented culture, a professional civil service and public trust in institutions. Conceptually, there is no difference between these general questions and the temporal stages of vulnerabilities to corruption and eruptions of corruption as culture is a constant, at least in the foreseeable future. As we will see later, this study detects one cultural metric of corruption that might be interpreted to be ex-post and that metric assesses whether people trust in the ability of the government to fight corruption. Overall, cultural indicators of corruption are very few and stay only at the surface in terms of assessing the relationship between culture and corruption—do not delve deep into the possible causes or historical determinants.

For a detailed listing of CU vulnerability metrics in the prevention stage, please see Appendix Table 4: CU—Cultural tendencies towards corruption in general (same for Prevention/Vulnerabilities & Detection/Eruptions—Appendix Table 8)
The Eruption Stage—Corrupt Transactions, Detection, Reporting

The detection of corruption is an understudied area in the corruption literature. Detection strategies can be found specifically in the technical research on collusion and bid rigging in procurement. The U4 Anticorruption Resource Centre\(^\text{21}\) enumerates the following techniques that are instrumental in detecting the specific types of corrupt acts and transactions listed below.\(^\text{22}\)

**Table 6: Detection techniques and strategies for given corrupt acts and transactions\(^\text{23}\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRIBES</th>
<th>Most readily detected by complaints and by inference from bid rigging schemes.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A bribe</td>
<td>can be defined as an illegal payment from one party to another, usually in return for a legal or financial favour. Bribes are often made to public officials or heads of other regulatory agencies in order to escape legal convictions or unfavourable rulings, or as an incentive for the payee to bend or overlook pertinent regulations that would otherwise restrict the payer.(^\text{24})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BID RIGGING</th>
<th>Best be detected by complaints from losing bidders and careful examination of bidding documents.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bid rigging</td>
<td>can be defined as a scheme in which businesses collude so that a competing business can secure a contract for goods or services at a pre-determined price.(^\text{25})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLLUSIVE BIDDING</th>
<th>Most easily be detected by close examination of bids and bid patterns, the use of fraud detection software and complaints from excluded bidders.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collusive bidding</td>
<td>can be defined as attempts by conspiring bidders to circumvent rules and laws laid down to ensure free and competitive bidding.(^\text{26})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRAUD</th>
<th>Can best be detected by complaints from beneficiaries, close inspection of goods and works and by scrutinizing claims and supporting documents for discrepancies.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>can best be defined as economic crime involving deceit, trickery or false pretences, by which someone gains advantages or funds unlawfully.(^\text{27})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis by U4 adds that most serious corruption and fraud cases are detected by complaints and reports, so they should be treated seriously. This is where detection and reporting merge. U4 then enumerates simple strategies to facilitate reporting:

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\(^{21}\) Operated by the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Bergen, Norway, U4 is a private social science research foundation working on issues of development and human rights.


\(^{23}\) In procurement some of the recommendations to detect corruption include checking the list of debarred or suspended firms, results of prior audits and investigations, general information sources on the internet, media reports, and compliance sites. *Ibid.*

\(^{24}\) Investopedia, [http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bribe.asp#axzz1aLQKCo1e](http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bribe.asp#axzz1aLQKCo1e)

\(^{25}\) Investopedia, [http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bid-rigging.asp#axzz1aLQKCo1e](http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bid-rigging.asp#axzz1aLQKCo1e)

\(^{26}\) Business Dictionary, [http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/collusive-bidding.html](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/collusive-bidding.html)

\(^{27}\) Danchurchaid (2011).
Table 7: Reporting techniques and strategies for corrupt acts and transactions

- Encourage and facilitate complaints by:
  - Setting up confidential hotlines
  - Making “fraud awareness” presentations that explain how to report
  - Circulating confidential questionnaires to contractors

- Overcome the powerful disincentives to report (fear of reprisals, sense of futility, distrust of authorities) by promptly acknowledging and following up on reports and taking appropriate action

UNODC goes a step further to take detection to the level of surveillance, i.e., getting closer to the ex-post corruption control/anticorruption stage. Its anticorruption toolkit recommends the following detection strategies in addition to reporting.\(^\text{28}\)

Table 8: UNODC Anticorruption Toolkit—Detection Strategies

| General surveillance methods—usually employed by auditors, inspectors or ombudsmen |
| Requiring public officials to make periodic disclosure of their assets—both as a deterrent and a control tool by investigators and auditors to detect corruption by detecting the existence of unexplained wealth. |
| Checking compliance with requirements to disclose actual or potential conflicts of interest—as an alert to the auditors or investigators that the official intends to corruptly exploit undetected or undisclosed conflicts. |
| Conducting regular or random audits to ensure overall deterrence and surveillance, as well as specific targeted audits directed at individuals or agencies suspected of malfeasance\(^\text{29}\). |

| Intrusive investigative methods—usually restricted to criminal law and enforcement agencies |
| Using decoys or other integrity-testing tactics including undercover agents who offer officials opportunities to engage in corruption in circumstances where evidence of their reaction can be easily and credibly gathered—controversial and criticized on the grounds that even the most honest official might yield to temptation if the offer is sufficiently convincing. |
| Electronic surveillance, search and seizure and other investigative methods including wiretapping or the monitoring of electronic communications—although limited use in the initial detection of corruption in many countries because human rights safeguards usually prohibit their use unless there is already substantial evidence that a crime has been, or is about to be, committed. |

\(^\text{29}\) To effectively detect corruption, it is a good idea to support auditors by legal powers so that they can compel individuals or agencies being audited to cooperate, but distinction should be maintained between auditors and the criminal investigators—to ensure that the former retains the legal powers needed to monitor relatively broad areas of public administration, while the latter conducts criminal investigations and prosecutions once individual malfeasance is uncovered. *Ibid.*
The time $x$ detection of corruption therefore overlaps with the time $x+1$ of control of corruption particularly through the links of reporting and surveillance, this pointing once more to the endogeneous linkages inherent amongst the stages of corruption. Nonetheless, the endogeneity challenge should not preclude one from attempting to unbundle corruption to better understand it conceptually. One propitious area to do that vis-à-vis detection might be that of whistleblowing. If whistle-blowers are offered adequate protection, for instance, reporting could become much more straightforward and common. Voluntary Disclosure Programs, in this regard, could be used and assessed as parameters of corruption detection across countries. These programs promise their participants immunity from administrative, civil and criminal sanctions if they voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and implement a compliance program, among other things.

A first analysis of the current corruption metrics shows that detection gets insufficient attention per se. Instead, the focus is skewed towards surveillance and control more specifically as it will also become clear the next part of this study on the ex post corruption stage of control/enforcement mechanisms. A separate focus on detection, in addition to and separate from the technical enclave of procurement, can inform and educate citizens on several processes, institutions and tools of detection to enable then the reporting of corrupt behaviour and acts. The innovative use of ICT can particularly be crucial in this regard, and therefore should be mainstreamed into both corruption literature in general and corruption measurements in particular. It would also be useful to concentrate on how citizen engagement can specifically assist in detecting corruption through the institutions, tools and mechanisms of social accountability/citizen engagement.

**PES—extent of corruption in government, markets and the media’s handling of allegations**

The focus is on the perceived and currently existing corruption levels in government, among top politicians and officials, and the ability of the media to report on corruption. At a first glance, reporting mechanisms and strategies to detect corruption are not assessed by the current corruption indices. Instead, the metrics ask: *Do you think there is corruption or not?*

The detection stage is the area where the least amount of indicators can be found. While it is true that detection of an intrinsically secretive phenomenon might be an oxymoron, it is still possible to transfer applicable detection strategies of corruption from procurement to the larger realm of public administration and political, economic and social spheres in general.

For a detailed listing of PES eruption metrics in the detection stage, please see *Appendix Table 5: PES—extent of corruption in government, markets and the media’s handling of allegations.*
PA—extent of corruption in public service –among public servants, with citizens and the private sector

The focus is on the perceived/proxy corruption levels in the public sector, among public officials and between them and other governance actors, such as citizens and businesses. At a first glance, reporting mechanisms and strategies to detect corruption in the public sector are not assessed by the current corruption indices, which delegate this to anticorruption activities in the ex-post control stage of corruption once it occurs.

It is true that the investigative and the sanctioning powers of various anticorruption authorities active in the public sector are often combined in practice. However, the gray areas between the two, and particularly the lack of necessary sanctioning power of institutions and the less than satisfactory coordination and cooperation among the different related entities like audit bodies, parliamentary investigative committees, etc. have been a common concern for both scholars and practitioners. Such linkages can be transmitted to the corruption measurement literature through careful formulation of corruption metrics specifically on detecting and reporting corruption in public administration.

Whistle-blowing emerges as one propitious niche to probe corruption detection. Some indicators are used by GIR and one by BTI. More attention to whistle-blowing as a process in itself can benefit corruption literature and policy-making.

For a detailed listing of PA eruption metrics in the detection stage, please see Appendix Table 6: PA—extent of corruption in public service –among public servants, with citizens, with private sector.

CE—Citizens’ involvement in detecting/reporting corruption

The focus is mostly on non-governmental organizations and activists to operate freely rather than citizen engagement per se. Citizen engagement institutions, processes and tools to detect or to facilitate the detection of corruption seem to be untouched territory in corruption metrics.

One reason might be endogeneity among prevention and detection: All the citizen engagement metrics classified as prevention stage vulnerabilities to corruption (access metrics gauging the ability of citizens to get ahold of information, asset disclosures of key figures and institutions and their ability to access internet and form associations) could well be placed under detection with no major conceptual setbacks. Nonetheless, with targeted research on reporting and citizens’ role in it, more relevant and substantive CE indicators/metrics can be formed to explore, understand and assess this apparently underdeveloped niche.

For a detailed listing of CE eruption metrics in the detection stage, please see Appendix Table 7: CE—Citizens’ involvement in detecting/reporting corruption.
CU—Cultural tendencies towards corruption in general

The culture-oriented metrics that can be assigned to the detection stage are the same as those pertaining to the prevention stage assessing vulnerabilities and risk points to corruption. They probe the current levels of public trust in the system overall, the levels of tolerance/intolerance displayed vis-à-vis corruption by the society and more specifically if a professional civil service or customer-oriented culture. Conceptually, there is no difference between these general questions and the temporal stages of vulnerabilities to corruption and eruptions of corruption.

For a detailed listing of CU eruption metrics in the detection stage, please see Appendix Table 8: CU—Cultural tendencies towards corruption in general (same for Prevention/Vulnerabilities & Detection/Eruptions—Appendix Table 4)

The Control Stage—Corruption Monitoring and Anticorruption laws, institutions, tools

The control of corruption is one of the richest areas in the corruption literature. Research ranges from a general perspective on judicial efficiency and prosecution of illegal corrupt acts versus social control mechanisms (Kaufman and Vicente 2005) to the analysis of anticorruption agencies, their rules and regulations, effectiveness (Huther and Shah 2000) of their tools and methods including auditing, surveillance, investigative powers, etc.

On the question of whether corruption must be considered as illegal and thus a crime, or if legal but illegitimate acts can also be considered corrupt, the wide consensus has sided with the latter approach. Hetzer (2004), for instance, while pushing for the strengthening of the European criminal law and procedures to combat corruption, he has also recognized the socioeconomic dimension of corruption within the context of such concepts as “‘integrity,’ ‘transparency,’ ‘accountability,’ and ‘good governance.’” (310).

Evaluations of corruption have focused, inter alia, on the following parameters:

(i) independence, specialization and means of bodies engaged in the prevention and fight against corruption,
(ii) extent and scope of immunities,
(iii) identification, seizure and confiscation of corruption proceeds,
(iv) role of the public administration, including its efficiency and transparency,
(v) tax and financial legislation to counter corruption,
(vi) prevention of legal persons being used as shields for corruption, and the
(vii) links between corruption, organized crime and money laundering.

Controls of corruption have included the following dimensions (Hetzer 2004: 311):

(i) discovery and prosecution of acts of corruption
(ii) recovery of illegal proceeds

30 Council of Europe’s legal monitoring instrument of corruption, GRECO’s (Group of States against Corruption) evaluation standards cited in UNODC (2005: 3).
(iii) limiting the possibilities for corruptive practices
(iv) avoidance of possible conflicts of interest by means of transparent and accountable administrative structures (legislative, executive, judicial and private sector)
(v) decisions designed for the public welfare in the public sector on the basis of strategies aimed at integrity, and which tie in with institutional measures of security.

More specifically on anticorruption programs, Huther and Shah (2000) have enumerated the following: anticorruption agencies, parliamentary oversight bodies, ombudsman, financial accountability institutions, independent media and justice system, citizen participation, rule of law and an ethics office (5). As seen in this list as well as in the two preceding ones on the evaluations and controls of corruption, both the legal and the social dimensions of corruption have merged in the drive to curb it.

Debates about these and other anticorruption programmes have included, inter alia, the issues of whether/how:

Table 9: Some issues in the area of anticorruption programmes

| • social and broader prevention techniques should complement the legal and narrower control/enforcement mechanisms |
| • global and regional anticorruption coalitions, networks and initiatives can be made more effective in curbing corruption at the national and local levels of governance |
| • anticorruption programmes can effectively be used as preconditions for international aid |
| • carrot and stick approaches can be used in tandem such as prosecuting corrupt behaviour while rewarding anticorrupt acts, including whistle-blowing and anticorruptive variables, such as increasing the salaries of public officials or bonding salary payments, like pension entitlements, contingent on non-corrupt behavior |
| • compliance with anticorruption laws should be supplemented by codes of conduct in trade and professional associations |
| • legislative oversight, media watchdogs and civil society activism can be used as anticorruption mechanism when they are themselves prone to corruption |
| • “police patrol—audits and investigations” or “fire alarm—less centralized interventions” approach of oversight works better in given situations |
| • a special anticorruption agency should exist independent of the police and other non-external anticorruption agencies |
| • anticorruption bodies themselves can become the tools of corruption in the hands of corrupt politicians |
| • too much reliance on anticorruption agencies can render the criminal justice system obsolete, and vice-versa |
| • a single-centralized anticorruption agency compares to a more specialized multi-agency anticorruption approach; and |
| • whether the two approaches can be balanced with a third sectoral one where anticorruption capacity for each organ of the state can be built holistically |
| • ICTs can be mainstreamed into anticorruption programmes and institutions without falling pray to the newly emerging “electronic corruption” |
| • briber/bribee can be punished given the secrecy inherent in the corrupt transactions |
| • contract design can be used as a tool to eliminate corruption vulnerabilities |

31 Compiled from (Ogus 336-337), Andersson and Bergman (2008: 50) and Habtemichael and Cloete (2010: 95-98).
• screening and selection mechanisms can be enforced to recruit the right officials

More specifically on anticorruption institutions, an Anticorruption Commission’s focus on high level versus low level corruption has been debated. If an ACC chose to focus on high level corruption including complex financial crimes, its structure and competences would require significant revision. The enhanced competencies would have to include: powers on: disclosure and explanations of documents; attendance at interviews; financial reporting; restraint of assets; confiscation. The renewed structure would have to consider sections dealing with financial intelligence, criminal intelligence, criminal investigation, criminal prosecution and civil asset recovery. Each section would have to be appropriately resourced and trained (Doig, Watt and Williams 2005: 51-52).

Some innovative initiatives of data accumulation and organization concerning specifically the ex-post corruption control have been on the rise recently. StAR Asset Recovery Watch is a project of the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative, a partnership between the World Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) launched in September 2011. The objective of the StAR Asset Recovery Watch is to collect and systematize information about completed and ongoing (active) asset recovery cases that have an international dimension.

PES—control of corruption/ anti-corruption in the political, economic and social system

The focus is on general assessments such as governments’ performance in fighting corruption, judicial independence and efficacy, and more specific evaluations of the existence and performance of anticorruption bodies, including auditing bodies of public funds and public finance management, parliamentary or external / independent commissions of inquiry, fraud and organized crime bodies in the Ministries, specialized bodies for fighting corruption including the police force, election monitoring agencies, and other oversight institutions such as the inspector-general, ombudsman, independent audit institutions, etc.

32 Electronic corruption can be defined as the misconduct of information experts empowered by their knowledge over the use of these new technologies (George 2004).
33 ACCs work alongside other agencies such as Ombudsmen or state audit to act as a deterrent to corruption. It offers educative and investigative roles at local level through “promoting the rights of the citizen; simplifying administrative procedures and oversight controls; quick and effective complaints and redress; community awareness and education; the training of public officials in service delivery; the integration of other agencies which have oversight or investigative powers” (Doig, Watt and Williams 2005: 51).
34 ACCs would also need strong substantive laws; The supporting laws would have to cover “corruption/bribery; misuse of public office by public officials; conflict of interest by public officials where undue influence is identified; failure to pay to the state revenue; misappropriation of state assets”
35 For more, see http://assetrecoverywatch.worldbank.org/ or http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/documents/Guide_to_StAR_Asset_Recovery_Watch.pdf
The PES metrics of corruption in the ex-post stage of control assess both the quantifiable existence and the more qualitative performance and implementation issues, hence GIR’s differentiation, for instance, between the “in law” and “in practice” dimensions for each anticorruption body or rule under scrutiny or CPIA’s metric on the implementation—as opposed to the mere existence, of sanctions. While this is immense progress for corruption measurements, which hitherto mostly relied on what was “on the paper,” the path-driven taxonomy finds two visible areas where corruption metrics in the control stage can further be strengthened:

One area where further progress can be made is that of anticorruption bodies and institutions, which can be broken into their different attributes according to their

- most specific or dominant purposes (which type of corruption they are targeting or most effectively tackling, for instance),
- sectoral areas of operation (public, private, public-private, civil society, public-private-people, education, health and other sectors covered by the MDGs, and more specific public service delivery areas such as energy, water, communications, etc.)
- levels of governance (local, national, regional, parts of a global network, cross-level, for instance).

Some initial steps to associate different corruption degrees in a given system with different governance qualities and priorities for the respective anticorruption reforms were undertaken by UNODC.

**Table 9: Matching corruption degrees, governance qualities and anticorruption reform priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidences of Corruption</th>
<th>Quality of Governance</th>
<th>Priorities for Anti-Corruption Reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Rule of Law, institutions of participation and accountability, limit government intervention, focus on core mandates of government and public sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Decentralisation, economic policy reforms, result oriented management, incentives for competitive service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Specialized anti-corruption bodies, strengthen financial management, raising public awareness, no-bribery pledges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While such “pecking order” of anticorruption reforms is useful, it is only the first steps in the right direction. The corruption current metrics still rarely differentiate among these crucial attributes of anticorruption institutions, instead lumping them all together in several instances. For instance, ombudsman, supreme audit institutions, auditor generals, and “equivalent agencies” are all assessed in one metric by GIR and CPIA. While GIR has more specific metrics evaluating the oversight of public funds, for instance, even such corruption oversight bodies can further be disaggregated into their several types and kinds. The same applies to EIU’s metric on auditing institutions of public finance management.

Second area in which metrics of control of corruption can further be strengthened is through a separate and strong focus on coordination among the various kinds of
anticorruption bodies acting at different levels of governance. Often times, corruption control and/or anticorruption bodies are not able to effectively control corruption due to coordination and cooperation problems with each other. The incorporation of this crucial dimension of anticorruption coordination can be another venue for furthering research on corruption and corruption measurements.

A niche of specialized metrics on the detailed attributes of anticorruption institutions could be a very useful tool in offering a comprehensive and comparative panorama of what countries are doing in terms of fighting corruption at specific levels of governance and given sectors. It would also answer the policy needs of the Member States regarding what (combinations of) anticorruption institutions/tools work best against which specific corruption-related challenges as well as in what given situations and context.

For a detailed listing of PES metrics in the ex-post assessment stage, please see Appendix Table 10: PES—control of corruption/ anti-corruption the political, economic and social system.

PA—corruption proceedings, public service integrity and ethics as reinforced by auditing, anticorruption business principles in the public sector

The focus of PA metrics of control of corruption do not assess the existence or the effectiveness of anticorruption bodies specifically in the public sector or as separate from the larger political/economic/social systems, hence the corroboration of the already stated needs by scholars of differentiating the political from the bureaucratic corruption, among other things. In other words, there is a dearth of corruption metrics gauging anticorruption institutions and processes specifically against the public servants and public administration organizations including in the more technical areas of procurement, budget, tax, customs, etc. In this sense, the administrative-organizational sub-dimension of PA corruption metrics in the control stage merge with the PES category of the same stage. Further research can look into the different options for meaningfully separating them and assessing anticorruption activities specifically directed at the public sector and public administration from those at the political system, including the elected government.

Specifically, the legal-institutional dimension of anticorruption metrics encompasses assessments on the existence and the effectiveness of anticorruption laws and criminal proceedings against corrupt acts. Criminalization of corruption both through laws and court proceedings are assessed by GIR, BTI, CPIA. CPIA goes a step further to assess if public service ethic rules are reinforced by audit, inspection, adverse publicity for performance failures and illegal/unmoral activities. More metrics along these lines can benefit the research on corruption measurements and indicators.

For a detailed listing of PA metrics in the ex-post assessment stage, please see Appendix Table 11: PA—corruption proceedings, public service integrity and ethics as reinforced by auditing, anticorruption business principles in the public sector

CE-- citizen participation in corruption control, including anticorruption processes and institutions in formal and informal ways

Only a few and very general assessment metrics exist regarding citizen engagement in the control of corruption in the ex-post stage. This is, as the overall citizen engagement in all stages of corruption through both grassroots and civil society organizations and activities, and not only to obtain information but to actively participate in anticorruption processes, a niche ripe for further development of relevant and innovative corruption metrics.

Recently, innovative capacity-building reforms towards enhanced social accountability have taken place in the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) worldwide. These reforms have included (i) public speaking by auditors in their former universities and the effective use of the new social media; and (ii) citizen participation in audit planning and implementation—The Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) of Korea recently introduced the Citizen Audit Request System, which allows citizens to group and request certain public services to be audited.37 The BAI also has a policy advisory committee, which serves as an advisory body for its chairman. The committee comprises experts drawn from civic groups, among others. The example of participation of citizens in supreme audit institutions is an important development, which can be translated into corruption metrics and indicators.38

For a detailed listing of CE corruption metrics in the ex-post control stage, see Appendix Table 12: CE-- citizen participation in anticorruption processes and institutions in formal and informal ways.

CU-- public trust in government’s ability to fight corruption

As culture is a constant at least in the foreseeable future, culture-driven corruption metrics are hardly distinguishable along temporality. That is also why the Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics has found that the prevention and the detection stages metrics of corruption that are culturally based are the same. Our sample of indices includes one metric (Whom do people trust the most to fight corruption? GCB) that can be categorized as ex-post--not because the culture changes, but because the metric assesses people’s trust in given institutions’ capacity to fight corruption ex post. This GCB metric is open to interpretation since fighting corruption does not only mean controlling and sanctioning it once it occurs but also preventing it ex ante and detecting it when it occurs.

37 Matters related to state secrets, national security, criminal investigations, court trials, administration of punishment and private legal relationships are excluded.
38 For more on citizen engagement in SAIs, see UNDESA (2011).
The Preliminary *Path-Driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics* in summary

Table 10: The findings of the Path-Driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PREVENTION</th>
<th>DETECTION</th>
<th>CONTROL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 1</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 5</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal-institutional</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 2</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 6</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative -organizational (incl. Resource Management)</td>
<td>(no substantive sub-categories)</td>
<td>(no A-O, incl. RM, metrics)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business-related</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 3</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 7</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 4</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 8</td>
<td>See Appendix Table 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *PES indicators of corruption* look at the general conditions and correlates which make corruption more likely to occur in the prevention stage; the existence or the perception of existence of corruption in government, its different entities and partners in the detection stage; and the existent or the perceived actions to fight corruption by the government and its various entities, including corruption oversight and monitoring bodies and anticorruption institutions, in the control stage. Overall, corruption metrics are the most thorough assessing corruption generally in political, economic and social terms in all three stages.

The *PA indicators of corruption* have three sub-variants: legal-institutional; administrative-organizational; and business, except in the detection stage since laws, rules and institutions are either to prevent or to control and punish corruption. Instead the detection stage PA metrics generally assess the existence and (perceived) extent of corruption in the public sector and civil service, particularly with respect to the interactions with the private sector and citizens. This finding points to the possible need to research and examine the strategies to detect corruption and the linkages between detection, reporting and sanctioning—time laps, transitional procedures between the time corrupt activities or behaviour is suspected, detected and reported, and from there how they are controlled and sanctioned in the control stage. Such focus could lead the way to the formulation of adequate corruption detection and reporting metrics that are more thorough than whistle-blowing alone.

There are some specific corruption detection strategies that have been compiled in the more specific and technical areas of public administration, particularly procurement. Transferability and adaptability of these strategies and the formulation of relevant indicators based on them are some points of consideration for further research on corruption and corruption measurements alike.
The PA legal-institutional sub-category includes indicators/metrics on information, transparency and accountability laws, rules and regulations in the prevention stage, and corruption oversight, monitoring and anticorruption laws, rules, regulations in the control stage. Both the existence of rules and institutions and their effectiveness are assessed, particularly by the GIR.

The PA/administrative-organizational\textsuperscript{39} sub-category includes indicators/metrics on bureaucratic quality, existence and effectiveness of coordination mechanisms, etc. in the prevention stage. In the control stage, the analysis was unable to determine any specific metrics that directly target the corruption control and anticorruption institutions in the public sector. It found instead that the public sector was assessed mostly as part and parcel of the larger PES category, hence the corroboration of the already voiced concerns by corruption scholars about the need to distinguish better the political/grand corruption from the bureaucratic/petty corruption.

The PA/business sub-category includes indicators/metrics on the procedures to start a business in the prevention stage; and the existence and (perceived) success of business programmes in fighting corruption in the control stage.

The Citizen Engagement indicators of corruption are at their infancy. The Path-driven Taxonomy detects only a handful of corruption metrics on citizen engagement particularly when compared with the rest of the substantive categories. In the prevention stage, indicators assess the participation of citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) in government decision-making processes in general; in the detection stage, they assess whether citizens are able to freely report corruption; and in the control stage, they focus on the access of citizens to the justice system and the anticorruption agencies and other related institutions. Overall, most of the CE metrics are passive in terms of assessing citizens’ access to information rather than assessing their (pro)active participation in the corruption prevention, corruption detection and corruption control, including anticorruption processes, hence the preliminary proposition of this study to formulate citizen-centric corruption indicators (3CI).

The Cultural indicators of corruption are also a few and focus on the presence and ratings of a customer-oriented service culture, trust in society and tolerance for corruption in the prevention and detection stages—as conceptually these cultural phenomena apply to both stages. In the control stage, they assess the public trust for given institutions to “fight” corruption, which might or might not be interpreted to denote the ex-post control stage.

\textsuperscript{39} This component also has the Resource Management enclave where the same questions are asked for the public administration areas of tax administration and budget, among others.
Conclusion:

This paper does not profess to offer a solution to the intrinsic and important problem of corruption measurements about generalizability, validity or coherency. Nor does it attempt to juxtapose and compare the current corruption indices in terms of the strengths and weaknesses of their associated corruption metrics. Instead, it undertakes an in-depth analysis of the substance of the micro-level survey metrics to see what areas are covered better than others and to have a sense if the preliminary exercise of disaggregating corruption into its constituting stages can yield useful insights into both the measurement and understanding of corruption.

While the temporal (prevention-detection-control) stages and the substantive (PES-PA-CE-CU) categories of corruption merge and are often assessed in groups through a single metric, the Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics finds that overall corruption is treated as a disparate, transactional, distributional, organizational or cultural phenomenon, without structured linkages among these different facets. This results in indicator formulation, which either pays insufficient attention to the multifaceted nature of corruption, picturing it instead and erroneously so, as uni-dimensional; or haphazardly lumps parts of its different facets together, this resulting in conceptually hazy indicators and metrics.

In this regard, the proposed Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption and its view of corruption as a cumulative effect of a continuous process of deficiencies in transparency and accountability can yield productive venues for the formulation of stronger corruption metrics, i.e., metrics that are more actionable, better targeted and hopefully more relevant for the policy-makers facing specific types and degrees of corruption in unique contexts. Such perspective can also stimulate the needed efforts to focus on the prevention of corruption often voiced by scholars and practitioners as the missing link in anticorruption programmes.

The proposed Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Indicators has also shown that there might be a need to strengthen the citizen-centric corruption Indicators with a specific focus on the emerging and established modalities of citizen engagement to prevent, detect and control corruption. If valid and replicable evidence can be gathered and assessed on how civil society and citizens deal with (i) pre-corruption (vulnerabilities to corruption), (ii) corruption (corrupt acts and transactions), and (iii) post-corruption (its investigation, prosecution and enforcement of anticorruption rules), then both the conceptual and methodological analysis of corruption would benefit. This would also lead to the formulation and the implementation of more effective, relevant and legitimate prevention and corruption fighting policies, mechanisms and institutions in the long-run.

Towards this aim, the vibrant field of social accountability can be mainstreamed into the corruption literature while relevant indicators of lack of social accountability and vulnerabilities to corruption can be bridged together towards the creation of effective corruption policies, mechanisms and tools. The outputs of citizen report cards and other formal citizen assessment tools can be compiled, analyzed and compared to create new and relevant indicators of corruption vulnerabilities, both factual regarding the quantity and quality of received public services, and perception-based indicators regarding the
shifting degrees of satisfaction with public services and service-delivery. A tentative name for such corruption indicators could be 3CI: citizen-centric corruption indicators.

In addition to this twofold conclusion on the (i) needed due focus on the prevention phase of anticorruption efforts altogether taken as a process rather than piecemeal solutions, and (ii) the potentials implied by the formulation and the enhancement of 3CI, the Proposed Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics has also yielded some more specific findings regarding the avenues where further research can be advanced, including through:

- concentrating on how the input, output and result variables of corruption interact with each other and with the control variables of ex post corruption rather than combining them altogether or seeing them as separate boxes in situ, in both corruption and corruption measurement literatures and indexes,
- examining the strategies to detect corruption and the linkages between detection and reporting—time lags, transitional procedures between the time corrupt activities or behaviour is suspected, detected and reported,
- formulating and strengthening the corruption metrics that specifically assess the anticorruption institutions and processes in public administration and against the corrupt public servants,
- strengthening the corruption metrics specifically dealing with anticorruption institutions and processes, possibly by (a) disaggregating them, and by (b) giving specific attention to the variable of anticorruption interagency interaction and cooperation
- pondering new ways to gauge whistle-blowing, including Voluntary Disclosure Programs, in corruption detection and reporting
- mainstreaming ICT into corruption metrics, and particularly with linkages to citizen engagement through ICT to prevent, detect and control corruption

As early as 1998, World Bank recommended that diagnostic surveys unbundle corruption identifying its specific correlates, its costs, and problem areas. Although a sea change happened in the area of corruption diagnostic surveys since 1998, ground-breaking cross-country corruption level comparisons having been made possible by the perception-based index of Transparency International in 2005, and in 2006, the Global Integrity’s innovative approach to corruption measurement through the positive perspective of integrity and with particular focus on citizens’ access to relevant material, disaggregation of corruption still remains a work in progress.

Although there is more work for everybody on the horizon, some countries are relatively ahead of the game: the Government of Morocco, for instance, recognized the need to separately yet equally focus on the prevention, detection and control of corruption as early as in 1999 with the adoption of its Action Plan of Combatting Corruption. This document stated that “multiple therapies embedded both in time and space in terms of

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40 A niche of specialized metrics on the detailed attributes of anticorruption institutions could be a very useful tool in offering a comprehensive and comparative panorama of what countries are doing in terms of fighting corruption at specific levels of governance and given sectors. It would also answer the policy needs of the Member States regarding what (combinations of) anticorruption institutions/tools work best against which specific corruption-related challenges as well as in what given situations and context.

41 For more, see Camerer (2006).
causality” must be applied in order to detect and sanction corruption as well as to reinforce the national integrity system (Government of Morocco 1999: 5).

In assessing the comparative advances of all Member States in the process of combating corruption, the recently launched central platform of “Tools and Resources for Anti-Corruption Knowledge” (TRACK) by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including particularly the standardized enforcement guidelines of the only global anticorruption initiative, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), provides one of the most thorough and innovative portals of analysis.\(^{42}\) It could also very well constitute the stepping stone to the further development and refinement of corruption metrics.

\(^{42}\) For more, see [http://www.track.unodc.org/Pages/home.aspx](http://www.track.unodc.org/Pages/home.aspx)
APPENDIX*

* To obtain the source document for coding and for questions on the methodology of the Path-driven Taxonomy, you may contact the author at blind@un.org

* Arbitrariness in the selection of metrics assigned to the substantive categorizations of PES, PA, CE and CU is an issue but is ubiquitous to all categorization endeavour in all indexes. For instance, in GIR, conflict of interest section includes the legislative, the executive, the judiciary and the budget process indicators as different from the public administration section which also includes an indicator on conflict of interest, this time in civil service.

* The * sign by the abbreviations of the names of indexes denotes that they are part of the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI).
Appendix Table 1: PES—corruption prone structures and tendencies in state, markets and the media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections: Election Integrity:</strong> Are election systems transparent and effective? In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections: Political Financing Transparency:</strong> Are there regulations governing the financing of political parties? GIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there are limits on individual donations to political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there are limits on corporate donations to political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances and expenditures of political parties when financial irregularities are uncovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections: Political Financing Transparency:</strong> Are there regulations governing the financing of individual political candidates?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there are limits on individual donations to political candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there are limits on corporate donations to individual political candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the campaign finances of individual political candidates when irregularities are uncovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of individual political candidates’ campaigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections: Political Financing Transparency:</strong> Are the regulations governing the political financing of parties effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the limits on individual donations to political parties are effective in regulating an individual’s ability to financially support a political party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the limits on corporate donations to political parties are effective in regulating a company’s ability to financially support a political party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party’s ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties independently initiates investigations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties imposes penalties on offenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, contributions to political parties are audited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections: Political Financing Transparency:</strong> Are the regulations governing the political financing of individual candidates effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the limits on individual donations to political candidates are effective in regulating an individual’s ability to financially support a particular candidate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the limits on corporate donations to individual candidates are effective in regulating a company’s ability to financially support a candidate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates’ campaigns independently initiates investigations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates’ campaigns imposes penalties on offenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the finances of individual candidates’ campaigns are audited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 Other metrics that can be relevant here but are more contextual and therefore can be better classified as “necessary background conditions” than “vulnerability risk points” are those that assess judicial independence more generally, which can be found specifically both in GIR and BTI in the sample of corruption indices examined for this study.
of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:

Executive Branch: Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?
- In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.
- In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.
- In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.
- In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:

Executive Branch: In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party?
- In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:

Executive Branch: Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?
- In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.
- In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.
- In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.
- In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).
- In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.
- In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.
- In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.
- In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.\(^{44}\)

Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:

Legislative Branch: Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?
- In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.
- In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.
- In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:

Legislative Branch: Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the legislative branch?
- In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.
- In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.
- In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.
- In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.
- In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.
- In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.
- In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

\(^{44}\) The ‘audit’ query here would be better suited to the ex post control stage of corruption according to the rationale of the Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics.
Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:

Judicial Branch: Are judges appointed fairly?
• In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.
• In practice, professional criteria are followed in selecting national-level judges.
• In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:

Judicial Branch: Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?
• In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.
• In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.
• In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.
• In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.
• In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.
• In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:

Judicial Branch: Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?
• In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.
• In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.
• In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.
• In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.
• In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.
• In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.
• In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media: Media's Ability to Report on Corruption: Are the media a credible source of information?
• In law, print media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.
• In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.
• In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.
• In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.
• In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media: Media's Ability to Report on Corruption: Are media and free speech protected?
• In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.
• In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media: Media's Ability to Report on Corruption: Are citizens able to form print media entities?
• In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and
TV) media entity.

- In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeals mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.
- In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.
- In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic disparity and low wages</th>
<th><strong>GRR</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional weakness in fragile state</td>
<td><strong>CPIA</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Is the media independent of government or powerful business interests?

Government decisions are effectively implemented?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do political parties receive direct or indirect funding?</th>
<th><strong>ACE</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are political parties entitled to political funding?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How involved is the government in the economy? **FH**

What is the distribution of wealth and income? **BTI**

Does parallel (black-market, unrecorded) economy impair economic development? **WCR**
### Appendix Table 2: PA—Transparency and accountability laws, rules, institutions, coordination mechanisms in the public sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GIR</th>
<th>Public Administration and Professionalism: Civil Service: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards and Political Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|     | Public Administration and Professionalism: Civil Service: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards and Political Independence: Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective? |
|     | • In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference. |
|     | • In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria. |
|     | • In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage. |
|     | • In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions. |
|     | • In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay. |
|     | • In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled. |
|     | • In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective. |
|     | • In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time. |
|     | • In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment. |

|     | Public Administration and Professionalism: Civil Service: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards and Political Independence: Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants? |
|     | • In law, senior members of the civil service are required to file an asset disclosure form. |
|     | • In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected. |
|     | • In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government. |
|     | • In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants. |
|     | • In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of senior members of the civil service. |
|     | • In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective. |
|     | • In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective. |
|     | • In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective. |
|     | • In practice, civil service asset disclosures are audited. |

|     | Law Enforcement: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards and Professionalism: Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? |

---

45 Other metrics that can be relevant here but are more contextual and therefore can better be characterized as “necessary background conditions” rather than “vulnerability or risk points” are those that probe the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies such as the police in a general sense rather than directly related to corruption.
The ‘audit’ query here would be better suited to the ex post control stage of corruption according to the rationale of the Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics.

The ‘anticorruption’ query here would be better suited to the ex post control stage of corruption according to the rationale of the Path-driven Taxonomy of Corruption Metrics.

This is one example of a metric where the public and the political dimensions of corruption are enmeshed together.

This is one example of a metric where the public and the political dimensions of corruption are enmeshed together.

Same as footnote 49.

By its dual focus on competition and citizens, this metric could also be and is categorized under CE.

---

Business

Privatization of Public Administrative Functions: Transparency, Fairness, and Conflicts of Interest Safeguards: Is the privatization process effective?
- In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.
- In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.
- In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

Government Oversight and Controls: Business Licensing and Regulation:
Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?
- In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.
- In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.
- In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

Resource Management

Government Oversight and Controls: Taxes and Customs: Fairness and Capacity: In law, is there a national tax collection agency?
- In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

Is the tax collection agency effective?
- In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.
- In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?
- In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?
- In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

Is the customs and excise agency effective?
In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.
In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

**Government Procurement: Transparency, Fairness, and Conflicts of Interest**

**Safeguards:** Is the public procurement process effective?
- In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.
- In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.
- In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.
- In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.
- In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.
- In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.
- In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.
- In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.
- In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.
- In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

**Legal-institutional**

Are there appropriate guidelines, policies, laws, regulations and institutions of Information, Communications, Transparency, Accountability and Anticorruption? Are they being implemented effectively (delays, red tapes, etc.)?

Are there immunity laws for political leaders and officials for alleged corruption?

**Administrative-organizational**

Where does administrative and bureaucratic quality lie, including remuneration of civil servants for FH*,BTI*.

**Legal-institutional**

Are there clear procedures governing allocation of public funds, appropriation by and assets of ministers and officials?

Do the basic rights and freedoms, access to information and transparency laws exist, de jure and de facto? —e.g. does the government advertise jobs and contracts?

Are there effectively implemented financial disclosure laws?

**CPIA**

Legal-institutional
| Are there workable and established rules on hiring and promotion based on merits? |
| Are staffing rules in public service based on bribes, personal ties, ethnic affiliation or do they emphasize seniority unduly? |
| Is the transparency of government policy satisfactory? |
| Do conflict of interest and ethics rules exist and are they applied? |

### Resource Management

**CPIA**

Is the tax administration system strong, i.e., well-designed with a large base, high collection rates, and few open-ended exemptions based on simple laws and proven information systems, i.e., computerized and with unique taxpayer id numbers??

Are taxpayers often pay personal visits to tax offices because tax obligations are not rule-based but negotiable? The bulk of taxes is collected through distortionary taxes like turnover taxes or off foreign trade or low-distortionary taxes such as income, VAT, property taxes, etc.? Are there high, multiple, and widely ranged import tariffs, which change frequently or are applied in a highly discretionary manner?

Are there a taxpayer service and information program, and an efficient and effective appeals mechanism?

Are policies and projects of government linked to the budget? Is the budget formulated as result of systematic consultations with all stakeholders (relevant ministries, legislature, public)?

Are off-budget expenditures minimal? Is there regular and effective budget monitoring based on effective information management systems?

What is the ratio of extra-budgetary expenditures and donor-funded projects to the total expenditures?

Are payment arrears negligible or significant when compared to the total expenditures?

Are public accounts prepared regularly and in a timely fashion? Are they audited and submitted to the legislature?

Are there regular in-year fiscal reports? Do they provide accurate data on all budget items?

Is appropriate action taken on budget reports and audit findings?

Are funds that are available to spending agencies or ministries predictable within the budget year?

Are In-year adjustments frequent, follow pre-specified guidelines, and are consistent with stated priorities?

Is reconciliation of banking and fiscal records practiced comprehensively, properly, and in a timely way?

### Administrative-organizational

Do most public employees, even at the lower levels of hierarchy, lose their jobs with
changes of the central government?

Are there mechanisms for accountability of public servants for their use of resources, administrative decisions and results obtained?

Are seats in the **legislature and positions in the civil service**\(^{49}\) sold often?

Is public employment as a share of total employment excessive with wage bills representing a large proportion of the total government expenditures, thereby crowding out quality public services?

Are the **top government and public officials**\(^{50}\) required to disclose income, assets?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WCR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Legal-institutional**

The legal and regulatory framework encourages the competitiveness of enterprises?

**Business**

Is the social responsibility of business leaders high?

Does bureaucracy hinder business activity?

Is state ownership of enterprises a threat to business activities?

Is competition legislation efficient in preventing unfair competition?

**Are business licenses available to all citizens?**\(^{51}\)

Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards? **WCR, GIR**

Increased transparency of global financial flows **GRR**

**Public Institutions-Government inefficiency**: a) wastefulness of govt spending  
b) burden of govt regulation  
c) efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes  
d) transparency of government policy-making **GCI**

How many days/procedures does it take to: start a business, getting a license/permit, employing staff, registering property, getting credit, closing a business, pay vendors’ invoices in procurement? **DB**
## Appendix Table 3: CE—citizen engagement in government/market/social/public administration processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Oversight and Controls: Oversight of State-Owned Enterprises:</strong> Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media: Media’s Ability to Report on Corruption:</strong> Can citizens freely use the Internet?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published on-line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content on-line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media: Anti-Corruption Non-Governmental Organizations:</strong> Can citizens organize into trade unions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media: Public Requests for Government Information:</strong> Do citizens have a legal right to request information?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, citizens have a right to request government information and basic government records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, citizens have a right of appeal if a request for a basic government record is denied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media: Public Requests for Government Information:</strong> Is the right to information request effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens receive responses to information requests within a reasonable time period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens can use the information request mechanism at a reasonable cost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, responses to information requests are of high quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests within a reasonable time period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections: Political Financing Transparency:</strong> Can citizens access records related to the financing of political parties?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, political parties disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties within a reasonable time period.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties at a reasonable cost.
In practice, the publicly available records of political parties' finances are of high quality.

**Elections: Political Financing Transparency:** Can citizens access records related to the financing of individual candidates' campaigns?
- In practice, individual political candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.
- In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) within a reasonable time period.
- In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) at a reasonable cost.
- In practice, the publicly available records of political candidates' campaign finances are of high quality.

**Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:** Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?
- In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.
- In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.
- In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.
- In practice, the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government are of high quality.

**Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:** Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?
- In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.
- In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.
- In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.
- In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature are of high quality.

**Public Administration and Professionalism:** Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?
- In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.
- In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.
- In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.
- In practice, the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants are of high quality.
Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:
Legislative Branch: Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?
• In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.
• In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.
• In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:
Judicial Branch: Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?
• In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.
• In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.
• In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.
• In practice, the asset disclosure records of the national-level judiciary are of high quality.

Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:
Budget Process Oversight & Transparency: Can citizens access the national budgetary process?
• In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval)
• In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.
• In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

Public Administration and Professionalism: Government Procurement: Transparency, Fairness, and Conflicts of Interest Safeguards: Can citizens access the public procurement process?
• In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.
• In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.
• In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.
• In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.
• In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.
• In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

Public Administration and Professionalism: Privatization of Public Administrative Functions: Transparency, Fairness, and Conflicts of Interest Safeguards: Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?
• In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.
• In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.
• In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.
• In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.
• In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

Is the government decision-making secretive with no citizen/CSO participation or access to information? **CPIA**

Citizen education and information, including literacy, which increase opportunities for legitimate activities and raise awareness on the impacts of corruption **GRR**

Are business licenses available to all citizens? **WCR**
Appendix Table 4: CU—cultural tendencies towards corruption in general  
(same for Prevention/Vulnerabilities & Detection/Eruptions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS—Ethics and Corruption: What is the degree of public trust in politicians?</th>
<th>GCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is there a customer-oriented service culture</td>
<td>BTI*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a professional civil service</td>
<td>EIU*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there general abuse of public resources</td>
<td>EIU*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there high societal (in) tolerance for (official) corruption?</td>
<td>FH*, PERC*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### GIR

**Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media: Media’s Ability to Report on Corruption:** Are the media able to report on corruption?

- In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.
- In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.
- In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

### BTI*,

Is there visible and systematic enrichment by politicians and officials\(^{52}\)?

Are election-related gifts, diversion of funds, inappropriate budget allocations, special funds, discretionary spending prevalent?

To what extent do bribery and corruption exist? **WCR*; GCI**

How much corruption exists? **PERC*; GCI**

PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS—Ethics and Corruption: What is the degree of favoritism in decisions by government officials? **GCI**

How common is it to bribe public servants or officials? **GCR***

How has the level of corruption changed in the last three years? **GCB**;

Is the State captured by narrow vested interests? **AFDB***

Are allegations of corruption given wide coverage in the media? **FH***

---

\(^{52}\) This is one example of a metric where the public and the political dimensions of corruption are enmeshed together.
Appendix Table 6: PA—corruption in public service –among public servants, with citizens and the private sector

**GIR**

Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

- In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
- In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
- In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
- In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

- In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

- In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.
- In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.
- In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.
- In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

**BTI**

Do whistle-blower acts, witness protection clauses exist?

**CPIA**

Does corruption occur in public agencies even if it is not general practice?

Is bribe-seeking endemic in public service employment and functions?

Do bribe payments represent a large share of the income of many public officials?

**GCI**

PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS—Ethics and Corruption: What is the degree of diversion of public funds in public institutions?

In your country, how common is it for firms to pay bribes to public servants or public officials; to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with imports/exports, public utilities, annual tax payments, awarding of public contracts, obtaining favorable judicial decisions, etc.?

To what extent does corruption hurt business? **PERC**

What sectors of the industry are least/most prone to bribery by foreign firms of industrialized countries operating in the developing world? **BPI**

Are there unofficial payments, gifts, bribes paid to obtain services or favors to obtain public services such as electricity, phone, water or health services, government contracts, business licenses, to deal with government inspections, tax collection, customs, imports, courts, etc., to influence legislation and/or to secure contracts **BEEPS, EIU**
Resource Management

**CPIA**

Is there corruption detected or perceived among tax and customs officials? If there is, are there also efforts to improve the integrity of the system along with capacity-building? *CPIA*

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Appendix Table 7: CE—Citizens’ involvement in detecting/reporting corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GIR</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Corruption Non-Governmental Organizations:</strong> Are anti-corruption/good governance NGOs able to operate freely?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, anti-corruption/good governance NGOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance NGOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Corruption Non-Governmental Organizations:</strong> Are anti-corruption/good governance NGOs legally protected?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, citizens have a right to form NGOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, anti-corruption/good governance NGOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, anti-corruption/good governance NGOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Corruption Non-Governmental Organizations:</strong> Are anti-corruption/good governance NGO activists safe when working on corruption issues?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, in the past year, no anti-corruption/good governance NGO activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, in the past year, no anti-corruption/good governance NGO activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, in the past year, no anti-corruption/good governance NGO activists working on corruption issues have been killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection payments to prevent violence or property damage by citizens or other societal actors? <em>BEEPS</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Table 9 (same as Appendix Table 4): CU—cultural tendencies towards corruption in general
(same for Prevention/Vulnerabilities & Detection/Eruptions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS—Ethics and Corruption: What is the degree of public trust in politicians? <strong>GCI</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is there a customer-oriented service culture <strong>BTI</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a professional civil service <strong>EIU</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there general abuse of public resources <strong>EIU</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there high societal (in) tolerance for (official) corruption? <strong>FH</strong>*, <strong>PERC</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Table 10: PES—control of corruption/anti-corruption in the political, economic and social system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Oversight and Controls: National Ombudsman: In law, is there a national ombudsman (national SAI, auditor general, equivalent agency), public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Is the national ombudsman effective?**

- In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
- In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
- In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.
- In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.
- In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).
- In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.
- In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.
- In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.
- In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.
- In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).
- In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

**Elections: Election integrity:** In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

- In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

**Elections: Election Integrity:** Is the election monitoring agency effective?

- In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.
- In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.
- In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.
- In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.
- In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

**Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:**

**Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:**

**Executive Branch:** Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

- In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.
- In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

**Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:**

**Budget Process Oversight & Transparency:** In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

- In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

**Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances:**

**Budget Process Oversight & Transparency:** Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?
• In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.
• In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.
• In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

Anti-Corruption Legal Framework, Judicial Impartiality, and Law Enforcement Professionalism: Anti-corruption Agency or Equivalent Mechanism: In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?
• In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

Anti-Corruption Legal Framework, Judicial Impartiality, and Law Enforcement Professionalism: Is the anti-corruption agency effective?
• In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.
• In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.
• In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.
• In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.
• In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.
• In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.
• In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.
• In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.
• In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.


Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?
• In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.
• In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

CPIA

Are sanctions implemented?

Are there effective audits on the executive, external accountability mechanisms like inspector-general, ombudsman, independent audit institutions with adequate resources and authority?

Are there checks and balances on the executive (by legislative, judiciary, citizens, audit)?

BTI*

To what extent can government contain corruption?

Are there specialized bodies (e.g. police agencies) to investigate, prosecute, recover proceeds associated with high-level corruption?

Are there anticorruption, fraud, organized crime bodies in the Ministries, and do they enjoy financial and political autonomy?

Are there Commissions of Inquiry in the Parliament?
What are the perceptions over judicial efficacy and fairness **BEEPS, WCR**;

Are there independent auditing bodies of public finance management **EIU**

How would you assess the current government’s performance in fighting corruption? **GCB**
### GIR

**Legal-institutional**

**Anti-Corruption Legal Framework, Judicial Impartiality, and Law Enforcement Professionalism: Anti-Corruption Law:** Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

- In law, attempted corruption is illegal.
- In law, extortion is illegal.
- In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.
- In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.
- In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.
- In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.
- In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.
- In law, money laundering is illegal.
- In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

Are there effective proceedings against political leaders, legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their power **BTI***

**CPIA**

Are there effective proceedings against political leaders, legal or political penalties for officeholders who fail in service delivery or receive bribes?

Are there strong public service ethic rules reinforced by audit, inspection, adverse publicity for performance failures and illegal or unmoral activities?

### Administrative-organizational including Resource Management merged with PES

**Business**

**GRR**

Increasing private sector engagement and commitment to reduce corruption

National laws containing extraterritorial provisions to hold companies liable for corruption, such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and United Kingdom Anti-Bribery Bill

**GCI**

In law, is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

Is the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

What is the strength of auditing and reporting standards?

Do companies have corporate anticorruption programs and do they disclose information on payments to host governments, revenues and operations? **PRT**

Are there effectively implemented business principles for countering bribery **TRAC**,

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53 PRT is the abbreviation of TI’s 2008 Report called Promoting Revenue Transparency of Oil and Gas Companies. This report and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) are related and include standards that could be used to further develop and improve corruption metrics in the public sector since many of the areas involved include public-private joint initiatives. For more see TI (2008) and EITI’s website at [http://eiti.org/](http://eiti.org/).
**Appendix Table 12: CE-- citizen participation in anticorruption processes and institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GIR</th>
<th>Anti-Corruption Legal Framework, Judicial Impartiality, and Law Enforcement Professionalism: Anti-Corruption Agency or Equivalent Mechanisms: Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency, if exists?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Corruption Legal Framework, Judicial Impartiality, and Law Enforcement Professionalism</th>
<th>Judicial Independence, Fairness, and Citizen Access to Justice: Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.</td>
<td>• In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.</td>
<td>• In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.</td>
<td>• In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.</td>
<td>• In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.</td>
<td>• In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.</td>
<td>• In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Oversight and Controls: National ombudsman: Can citizens access the report of ombudsman?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WORKS CITED:


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BPI—Bribe Payers’ Index. Found at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/bpi


CPI—Corruption Perceptions Index. Found at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/in_detail#4

CPIA—Country Policy and Institutional Assessments. Found at


GCI—Global Competitiveness Index. Found at http://gcr.weforum.org/gcr2011/


TRAC—Transparency in Reporting on Anti-Corruption. Found at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/trac