The Parliament's (or Jatiyo Sangsad's) most important function is its legislative or law making function. In enacting laws, it is ratifying the results of policy making and providing the means through which policy may be implemented. On average, in every session, between 10 to 12 bills are passed. At present, most of the bills are either amending bills or the regularizing of previously promulgated ordinances. In support of its legislative function, it has the power to appropriate funds, censure, and investigate. Its censuring function (defined as criticizing the government on various issues of importance) is important to public administration and is accomplished through legislative debates, question time, questions without notice, censure motions, etc. Its investigating function is also of parliamentary inquiry through standing committees constituted to deal with specific ministries or other public organizations. A major achievement of parliament has been to activate its committee structure. One way to improve the effectiveness of the parliament is by increasing its capability to provide information to its members. This may be done by improving the capability of the parliament Secretariat.

Since the British colonial days, the Secretariat has been the pivot around which the entire public administration process works. It may be described as the nerve center of all government activities, where policies are conceived, designed, initiated and apportioned to field agencies for implementation. In more simple terms, the Secretariat refers to a conglomerate of all ministries/divisions. The principal purpose of the Secretariat is to establish among discrete self-contained hierarchical units a formal network of authority relationships, control, command and communication to maximize coordination and to achieve an integrative approach to governance. In shaping public policies, the Secretariat collects, collates, analyzes, evaluates and synthesizes data, facts, figures and other information/evidence. Empirically, however, it has been observed that the ministries in the Secretariat are often busy with minute issues--the issuance of a license or the posting and transfer of a clerk or peon. As a result, less time is spent on policy formulation and planning. Policy coordination, a major role of the Secretariat, is not always carried out as illustrated in the following case.

The gender conflict in Bangladesh is acute. The ownership pattern, man's dominance in production practices have made it more complex. This conflict influences government decision producing unevenness. Inequality in society, economic exploitation and uneven development processes created different with limited resources and traditional management techniques are unable to act as an effective agent of change and development.

Due to initiatory rule and an undemocratic culture, the local government system could not develop as a participative system of government. Factional cliques and parochial group interests determines the foundation and behavior of local government system. Local level needs and demands cannot be expressed properly.

In Bangladesh, the development, social, and political needs influence government decisions. To fulfil these needs the government has to increase its efforts, and with those expanded efforts national and local level budgets also increases.

The civil service grows in size and in number. The demographic enlargement influences the government because it generates a new contextual environment. Moreover the existing policy process with its structure and instrumentalities is not adequate enough to provide the required result. So, for national policy-making and its effective implementation, reform measures should be taken to revitalize the process and to ensure proper project implementation and monitoring. As Bangladesh is logging behind in many respects there is an urgent need for reform of the administrative and political environment.

The need for economic growth works as a genuine pressure on government.

The recent political change and the new wind of democracy has greatly influenced the behavior of the government and government decisions regarding development.

Environmental issues are influencing the government decision. At first no one was concerned and due to lack of appropriate planning everything developed at their own will. So there is hazard everywhere. However, only recently, due to pressures from international agencies some decisions regarding environment, population control and greenhouse effect etc. are taken. Without fulfilling the basic needs of the people these decisions seem luxuriant, though these are essential for future generation.

In the last decade there has been a paradigm shift in macro-economic policy areas government introduced a private sector oriented economic package instead of public sector dominated model. Ownership pattern has been changed, privatization has been encouraged, trade sector has been deregulated. Measures have been taken to encourage market forces, new institutions have been created to activate economic growth activities by private means. Incentive package like export-performance license, low-interest rate for under-developed areas, zero-value added tax for the raw materials used in export oriented industries etc, have been introduced with a view to create conditions for a new form of capital accumulation so that a system of extend reproduction gets underway to support the growth model. Private sector financial institutions were given authority to choose sectors for investment. Government's role has been reduced to a possible limit for the interplay of market forces so that entrepreneurial capacity increases to suspend to new economic conditions. Foreign private investment is encouraged to come forward with capital and technology. Various financial incentives were offered. The response is not very good.

The overall economic performance is bad. The government could not create any growth momentum. There are some sporadic development in some areas that could not influence the processes so much.

In Bangladesh, population is dangerously big. Due to the extended medical facilities the mortality rate has come down, but the percentage of aging population is increasingly putting more pressure on the already explosive population size. As a result, its social costs and economic burden is too much for Bangladesh.

The economic dynamics could not generate any big jump. All the growth conditions are attempted in an ascriptive and procapitalist society. The social structure is not well defined. It is confused and not differentiated as it should be. Measures to alleviate poverty are half hearted and are full of wishes. The Government of Bangladesh needs to address issues adequately. Labor movement, role of judiciary, mass media and elective media influence the government administration. The non-availability of funds for capital investment influences the government decisions.

There is a strong trend of internal migration from village to towns, from small towns to big cities. The population distribution is not proper. The economic activities and their diversity do not correspond with the migration pattern.

At present, there are 34 ministries and 21 divisions. Twelve of the 21 divisions are directly under the jurisdiction of ministries, three are attached and six are not under the control of any ministry. There are approximately 200 departments, directorates or equivalent operating units, most of who are located in the divisions. The organization of government is dynamic and not static. Since the Martial Law Committee on Organizational Set up (chaired by the late Brigadier Enamul Hug Khan) completed its work in the early 1980s, the number of departments and directorates have increased by a little more than 10 percent. Likewise, when new ministries or divisions have been established, departments have been shifted from one ministry of division to new organizational homes and new departments and divisions created. For example, when the Ministry of environment and Forest was established, a new Department of Environment was created and the Forest Department was moved from the Agriculture and Forest Division (under the Ministry of Agriculture) to the new Ministry of Environment and Forest. No established principles are followed in specifying the role of a ministry/division. Functions are allocated largely on the basis of the broad goals of a ministry and, thus at times, two ministries may duplicate one another's functions. Differences among ministries are perceptible insofar as the volume and complexity of their work determine their size, nature of personnel and the extent of functional decentralization.

Due to lack of political/democratic culture and weak political structure, the relationship between civil service and political heads is not that supportive to prepare and conduct good and appropriate policy decisions. As a result the politicians and administrators in Bangladesh fail to engineer any social differentiation interaction that is mostly needed.

The changed international economic order, the new political order, the restructured trade market and the eve of one European economy have added a new dimension in the external control that influences government decision. This new order affected the size and availability of foreign investment. The private foreign investors have become cautious, they are looking for more lucrative, certain and worthy regions. They have a long projection that determines that decision. Bangladesh does not offer or could not offer any 'safe nest condition' that affects private foreign investment (PFI).

Technology-- its type and variety come with the nature of investment. In the absence of substantive investment package, Bangladesh cannot afford to or attract any high quality technology to add a phenomenon in its course of private sector dominated action.

Bangladesh's accountability to international markets depends on the quality of goods it produces. The present state of relationship between the state and market and between economy and entrepreneurs suggests that Bangladesh could not yet make any real go in getting a good stake in the international trade market.

The structural adjustment policies could not be implemented properly. There are political, institutional manpower and value problems. Political and social resistance to any such change is build in the Benali "psyche'. As the aid inflow needs more structural adjustment, policy implementation is slow and non-utilization of aid has become a common phenomenon in Bangladesh.

The government of Bangladesh has taken up the issue of disaster management/crisis management. Almost every year Bangladesh faces acute problems arising from natural disaster. It needs management and manpower strength to tackle these situations, strategies to mobilize and utilize resources.

There is priority of government need to be recognized and adequately equipped to face any such crisis. Sectors involved in most important areas needs to be well designed and made capable for rendering services. Bangladesh is trying to develop sectoral plans and initiating sector reforms to manage strategic micro policies.

The new policy of privatization is a good start. But the private sector could not come out of the shell. So government is largely responsible to administer public enterprise and make them efficient and at the same time working as an agent of private sector development. The government of Bangladesh is not capable (politically and administratively) to make a balance between these two approaches.

In Bangladesh the partnership within the government is not tightly coupled. It has many fractions because of historical legacy. Privatization was a means to make the private sector more responsive and effective. Its scope is wide. The strategies taken could not generate any decisive mode of operation. The system of evaluation and monitoring is not designed properly. Scope for the development of commerce and trade has been expanded. Non-traditional sector and service sector have been expanded. Most of the trade activities are destined to non-productive sectors. So no real avenues have developed yet for extend reproduction.

Bangladesh does not have any proper evaluation method to monitor the performance of development projects. It is mostly done by the donor agencies. This reliance indicated the weakness of the system at large.

The basis of creating an organization is to collectively pursue a set of goals and objectives. Each ministry/division or department/directorate is provided with a set of functions that it is supposed to undertake. The several ministries/divisions have been allocated such functions keeping in view their actual role in government. These functions have been allocated among the several ministries/divisions not according to the criteria of efficiency and economy but on the basis of political expediency. Thus, different dimensions of a single area have been placed under the purview of two or more ministries /divisions. The result has been duplication and overlapping with consequent burden on public expenditure. More important, this method of allocating functions puts a premium on efficiency and productivity, leads to malcoordination and ultimately to organizational dysfunctions. One area, which deserves particular consideration in this respect, is the administration of officers of several civil service cadres. Most ministries/divisions have been given the responsibility to look after personnel belonging to so-called related cadres. This sort of arrangement goes against the principle of a unified civil service whose single most principal characteristic should be uniform personnel practices. The ministry of establishment being the central personnel agency of the government should have been entrusted with the responsibility of managing the careers of all cadres. This not only would have provided coherence to civil service management but would also serve a significant purpose in avoiding inter-cadre rivalry-- a phenomenon which is increasingly becoming so ominous today.

The relationships between central and local government could not take any definite shape. Various reform measures were taken. Experiments with various models with political motive behind those reforms created a non-transparent and illusive central local relationship. It demotivated the people, and no real cooperative endeavor is seen that shows any sign of positive change.

The government of Bangladesh has been trying to improve its management information system. Monitoring of development activities and development of a better performance appraisal system has been partially successful in some public sector organizations. This system worked as a decision-support system and produced better result.

No serious attempts have been made to assess management. There were no substantive policy guidelines that have been made to evolve administrative procedure streamlining the system to reduce red tape etc. No real development took place in productivity management that could activate growth momentum.

Due to new orientation and shift in policy options the implementation methods have also got to be changed. But in Bangladesh, alternative channels for service delivery could not be established without expanding private sector. However, conditions for facilitating private sector development are not in existence.

Having a unitary form of government, Bangladesh has had different types of regimes during the last 20 years.

1972-1975 Elected political regime

1975-1982 Military and quasi-military regime

1982-1990 Military and quasi-military regime

1990- Elected political regime

The socio-economic and political requirement influenced the size and composition of government. The first political government embarked on public sectors for economic development. However, successive regimes have relied more on private sector than on public sector, resulting in the denationalization of public enterprises.

There is diversity of opinion regarding the extent of government intervention in the rural and urban sectors. A trend analysis suggests urban bias in policy package of the government.

The size of cabinet and the number of ministries and portfolios are dictated by various factors for example, expanding role of the government and political clientelism. The number of ministerial portfolios however increased after 1975. This phenomenal growth took place without any rational basis.

Bangladesh is a unity system of government. In the past, there have been no attempts to decentralize the administrative process and vest greater authority and responsibility to the local level. Reporting lines are vertical not horizontal at the local level. The system largely remains centralized with little scope for deconcentration or devolution of authority. Although there are multiple decision making layers in every ministry/division, there is a tendency among the officers below the Secretary level to "pass the buck'. When a case is placed before an officer for his/her decision, the most usual response is to provide a guarded opinion and forward the file to the next higher officer. Each higher officer takes risks that are involved in taking a decision even if the position he/she is occupying authorizes him/her to do so. There is ample scope for administrative decentralization. Operating agencies such as department/directorates are precluded from taking action because of procedural bottlenecks imposed by formal rules. The Public administration Efficiency study (1989) identified " a lack of adequate delegation of authority over personnel and financial matters" as " the key constraint on effective departmental operations and the major cause of delays". The heads of attached departments have not been empowered to control personnel practices. The Ministry of Establishment and the controlling ministries/divisions are entrusted with the responsibility of making appointments, deciding on promotions, transfers, conduct and discipline, etc. A similar pattern is discernible in financial matters. The departmental purse is prudently controlled by the ministries.

The analyses of the allocation of business among the different ministries and divisions show that in several ways the allocations were made without considering in detail the probable impact of the objectives on the problems to be addressed. The allocated functions must be related to the expected outcomes of the activities of the organization. Goals that are ambiguous and conflicting should be avoided; rather, they should be placed in the appropriate organization. The goals and objectives as set out in government documents are not clearly spelled out. Each ministry/division has been allocated a number of items that it is supposed to manage. Some items are so broadly or vaguely listed that it is not possible for anyone to discern what it is supposed to mean.

There have been two other promising institutional developments in the domain of poverty alleviation. The first one is the emergence of collaborative ventures between large NGOs and GOB line agencies. The second development is a new tendency on the part of some donors, line-agencies and large NGOs to strengthen and support small local NGOs for the purpose of creating a more extensive system of development service delivery to the rural poor. The preliminary general findings of the study suggest that, while the chief problem of the sustainability of target group institutional and organizational arrangements for poverty alleviation, the large national NGOs so far represent the least problematic and most efficient institutional channel. The two more recent collaborative constellations of the large national NGOs and line-ministries, on the one hand, and of large development partners with small local NGOs, on the other, may well turn out to be effective supplementary approaches. The systematic strengthening of local institutions (local government bodies as well as non-government informal organizations) for the purpose of nation-wide bottom-up development and poverty alleviation would seem to be the most promising undertaking in the long run from the point of view of democratic development and sustainability of popular institutions. ("Position Paper of SIFAD (Strengthening the Institutions for Food Assisted Development) Project, June 1993,pp.12-14.)

Decentralization measures so far taken in Bangladesh at different phases involve both deconcentration and devolution, although the extent of deconcentration is more prevalent than devolution. There is no attempt to debureaucratize the system. Rather very consciously an authoritarian bureaucratic structure has been super-imposed on local society. There is no attempt to give sustainability to local government units. Neither these have constitutional and jurisdictional guarantee of their operation.

The local Government Ordinance of 1976 recommends a three-tier system of local government. But the lowest tier the Union Parishad was a representative body, although it could not enjoy full autonomy. The Carr (Committee for Administrative Reorganization and Reform) of 1982 recommended a three tier system. The most innovative measure was the revitalization of the Thana administration, whereby the old than as were upgraded and renamed as Upazilas. The middle unit (Upazila Parishad) was a representative body having a substantial amount of authority over transferred subjects (development activities). The lowest unit the Union Parishad remained as before.

The elected government of Begum Khaleda Zia has abolished the previous system of Upazila Parishad and a two-tier system of local government is likely to be introduced very soon.

Only a small fraction of service delivery is being shared by the local government. Since substantial measures cannot be generate at the local level, local level government unit is fully dependent on central government grants which include mainly block grant and FFWP (Food For Works Programmed). In terms of total development expenditure very little is given to local government unity.

Although field administration plays the most important role in state-sponsored project management the involvement of the peoples' representatives is minimum. At present a new trend is emerging to privatize development inputs distribution system.

The structure of authority is highly centralized. The district administration under the overall guidance of the central administration has monopolized the authority structure. There is no attempt to promote local democracy in terms of exercise of "governmental authority"

Very little has been done to decentralize personnel management and financial management. The central administration plays the most decisive role. Although the Union Parishad has its own financial and planning system these are subject to the control of the central administration.

An increase budgetary allocation in both development and tertiary sector is visible over the years without any substantial impact on economic transformation. Internal resource mobilization has been at a very minimum. The newly introduce VAT system is likely to generate more revenues. At present receipts generated internally can only meet revenue expenditure. However, the government is thinking to develop new strategies to mobilize more internal resources to finance economic development.

Reliance on foreign aid for financing ecumenical development has been a systematic phenomenon since independence. Even foreign aided development projects have failed to generate re-investible surpluses. Lack of local resources and low-level of economic growth have increased the dependence of Bangladesh on foreign aid.

On the research conducted on policy making and analytic capacity, a major fact uncovered is the absence of units within government with individuals skilled in policy analysis and responsible for developing and analyzing specific information bases in support of policy making. When the 232 respondents mentioned above were asked whether or not policy staff should be incorporated into government organizations who have policy making responsibilities, 75.9 percent answered "yes", 15.2 percent answered "no" and 8.8 percent were undecided.

Service associations are permitted under civil service conduct rules about political activity by these associations is prohibited. All civil service cadres have their associations. The clerical staff has its association. The peons have their own association (MLSS).

Trade Unions are permitted under labor law and are active in pressing the demands of their membership.

Both service associations and trade unions have exerted influence on such government policies as pay scales, civil service management and the privatization of the public enterprise sector. There are a few professional bodies in Bangladesh such as the Economics Association, the Political Science Association and the Institute of engineers. Through seminars and symposia, they provide forums for analysis and discussion of public policy and these activities influence policy making in government. For example, the views (based on fact) by members of the Economics Association were considered in the preparation of the Fourth Five Year Plan.

Advisory Boards: From time to time, government creates advisory boards to consider issues involved in policy making. However, the contributions that these boards make to the policy making process is mixed.

Clientele Groups: In the past, public policy was formulated by government at the highest level without consultation of those who be most directly affected by the policies. There has been some change in this situation with the establishment of a democratically-based government. Commercial and industrial policies have been discussed with such organizations as the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries. However, the extent and frequency of these discussions caused one business leader to remark. " No real business consultation has been done. There is a media for consultation. These are (the) Consultative Committees for various Ministries (Commerce, Industry, Finance). These Committees meet once in a year where 100 to 200 persons get together for a whole day and discuss (an) equal number of items. Interaction and consultation should be across the table on a regular and continual basis. Every month there should be a meeting, as in Malaysia. In Sri Lanka, The Federation meets with Ministers every week and with the President once a month. (Interview with a business executive, March 1993.)" In some areas where clientele have been involved in government operations, there have been positive results. The outstanding example of interaction between government and clientele groups involves government efforts to expand the availability of electrical power. The societies under the Rural Electrification Board, the Riddutayan Samitees, have been formed in different areas of the country and each society decides where to provide electrical connections. Similarly, in the field of agriculture, deep tube-well (DTW) management committees have been formed and they decide on channels and connections. When the 232 respondents were asked whether or not clientele groups should be involved in the planning process (which has implications for policy making), 91.4 percent responded in the affirmative, 6.3 percent in the negative and 2.3 percent were undecided.

The final comment on policy making and analytic capacity. In some countries, policy analysis is conducted by such organizations as universities and private or non-profit "think tanks". There appears to be some activity in this area in the universities in Bangladesh and some private or non-profit "think tanks" are or have been established. Given government's needs in this area, encouragement of universities and non-government organizations to develop capabilities and increased capacity in policy analysis could have a very positive impact on policy making.

Over the past several years, there has been a substantial expansion of government activities. New development enterprises have been launched. Although each ministry/division or department/directorate performs more or less self-contained tasks, they cannot work in isolation from one another. Coordination becomes necessary if only because many activities cross-organizational boundaries. Although inter-ministerial consultations have been prescribed by rules, there is a tendency to by-pass them or to ignore them altogether. Those who represent different ministries do not always come prepared and therefore the consultation meeting fails to produce any positive results. (Zafar cites " interview " as source of this comment). Certain ministries/divisions or bodies can be identified as coordinating agencies. Some have been created to achieve that purpose while others have acquired the responsibility over time. The most effective coordinating mechanism at the highest level is, of course, the cabinet. The Cabinet can play a significant role in removing misunderstandings, resolving conflicts and helping to reach consensus on vital issues. However, because of a number of reasons, the cabinet is unable to play its role effectively. Ministers are not knowledgeable or informed enough to understand the technicalities of policy matters nor do they have time to do so. In cabinet meetings, some Ministers are not eager to embark on meaningful deliberations with their colleagues. Some ministers do not prepared for cabinet meetings and remain silent on issues. Cabinet committees, on the other hand, may be able to facilitate coordination to a large measure. These committees, being smaller in size than the full Cabinet, can get into the details of a case and come up with concrete proposals. However, the problem with committee meetings without the Prime Minister is that often no consensus can be reached because of personality clashes between Ministers. At the same time, the presence of Prime Minister may inhibit frank discussion among Ministers. There are other central coordinating agencies. These include the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of establishment, the Cabinet Division and the Public Service Commission. Each of these agencies is responsible for the coordination of specific functions but an examination and evaluation of their roles was not undertaken.

It is argue that Bangladesh society does not fulfil the pre-conditions for democracy and accountability. Socio-economic and political processes have led to the fragmentation of the state and concentration of power in the hands of the bureaucracy. We find crisis within the whole state apparatus culminating a conflict between back ward forms and productive forms of capitalism is necessary for generating socio-economic and political processes that can only streamline internal and external structure of accountability.

Improvement of citizen-administration relation is likely to increase accountability and participation, but that relationship is also dependent on a number of factors. The creation of autonomous agencies whose sustainability, expanding jurisdiction and financial viability should be constitutionally guaranteed. The role of administration will merely be to rendering services. Along this, there should be diversification of service delivery system so that competitiveness develops within the society. One important measure will be to instill the credibility of the state in guiding the market, because an unfiltered market can again create problems in overall service delivery system. However, such role of the state should not be a regulatory one, which the Bangladesh society has experienced over the years.

In the research conducted on human resource development and training for this study, over 100 civil servants were surveyed using a questionnaire containing both structured and semi-structured. The results of this survey indicated the following:

1. effectiveness of management training is hindered by lack of clarity of national goals and deterioration of moral values and a resultant increase in corruption;
2. training provided by government training institutions was considered useful but its utilization by those trained was limited because they did not return to their old positions, did not get necessary support from their organizations to apply what they learned and were not provided training in how to introduce changes in their organizations; and
3. foreign training opportunities were provided to those "who could manage it" and the civil service "elites" while domestic training opportunities went to "those who could not avoid " the training;

The survey also revealed training issues such as the preference for training in financial management (24.0%), policy planning (16%), public administration (12%) and economic development (9%). Subjects such as problem solving and computer techniques were given comparatively low priority. The results of the survey also indicated that officers were not usually consulted in determining their training needs. The survey showed that there were deficiencies in the adequate utilization of all types of training, including formal foundation, in-service and on-the-job. The survey revealed that the officers felt that the officers felt that they could not use their expertise and experience in Bangladesh adequately.

According to an earlier administrative report (CARR), the public services lacked appropriate, consistent and uniform personnel policies with regard to recruitment. When asked if promotion is linked to training, 52 percent of those officers survey answered in affirmative. The officers were asked if they thought that the existing system of promotion was fair. Eighty-three percent replied in negative. Forty-seven percent of the 83 percent said that it was not just because of the absence of scientific criteria for evaluation of performance. In contrast, 19 percent said that it was mainly due to patronage and 5 percent said that it was due to corruption while another 7 percent said that it was due to all the three reasons (absence attributed it to other reasons including various combinations of the factors mentioned above. There was support for a comprehensive examination for promotion at all levels.

The recruitment policy of 1980 was the first systematic attempt in post liberation Bangladesh. Since then, recruitment of civil employees to 29 cadres based on open competition has been a systematic practice in Bangladesh. To make the public bureaucracy a representative one " quota " system has been introduced. The system includes representation of backward districts, women, freedom fighters and hill-tracts. However, there is a lot to be done in respect to recruitment, selection and promotion of public servants in Bangladesh, which is urgently needed to increase the efficiency of the public servants.

The anomalies in the structural and functional management of the government also attracted the attention of the new military regime of 1982. The MLC (Martial Law Committee) on Organizational set up had a comprehensive study. The committee, among other things found problems in the staffing pattern and structural arrangement of different units of administration. Accordingly, the Committee suggested some remedial measures such as well-defined job description, organization chart, reduction of excess employees. Still now the recommendations have not been implemented properly. Particularly, the retrenchment issue is politically sensitive. Clientelist lobbies nurtured by vested group is building constraints in the implementation process.

The Pay and Services Commission of 1977 recommended a comprehensive plan of rationalization of pay and services. The outcomes of the report were more the pay differences between different categories of civil employees of the government. The existing pay structure consists of 20 grades. The introduction of cadre system in 1979 tended to ensure that incumbents belonging to a particular cadre would not dominate members belonging to other cadres. The most important attempt was to nationalize the promotion system in the higher civil service. The system embodied in the concept of SSP (Senior Services Pool) opened the avenues for all categories of civil bureaucrats to move to policy-making level in the central secretariat. However, as per the recommendations of PSC (Pay and Services Commission) of 1977, this positive move (SSP) could not be implemented due to intra bureaucratic politics and feud. As such, the SSP was demolished in 1989. Some ad-hoc measures have been taken for the promotion system, but the objective of rationalization is from the exception.

In some government units, Job descriptions exist--a result of the efforts of the Martial Law Committee on Organizational set-up (the Enam Committee) which was chaired by Brigadier Enamul Huq Khan and functioned between 1982 and 1984. However, for most government units, what is commonly referred to as a "job description" is a "work distribution." the distribution of work for each ministry is found in the ministry's printed booklet entitled List of work Distribution. The booklet lists the distribution of work among the various units and subunits in the ministry. For example, in the Cabinet Division, the List of work Distribution contains the work distribution for the Secretary, the additional secretary, four joint Secretaries, nine Deputy Secretaries, 24 Assistant Secretaries, one Assistant in charge of unit, and one Accounts Officer.

A tentative conclusion that may be drawn from the data collected for this study which is presented above is that individuals are not accountable for performance. However, an argument might be made that individual performance is evaluated through the Annual Confidential Report and is used in personnel transactions such as promotion. Those government officials interviewed with regard to performance and accountability referred to the Annual Confidential report and how officers are evaluated. Several civil servants provided the description of the ACR process: The ACR is too subjective and does not reflect the true performance of an officer. Marking is too generous. Normally, it is expected that the top 5 percent of performers would get above 90 percent marks, but in practice it has been found that 15-20 percent of the officers (evaluated) get above 90 percent marks. Marks given and remarks made by superior officers are not kept secret and on coming to know (the results), the assessee complains to the superior why he has been given so low marks or (that the superior officer) made such remarks. To avoid such embarrassment, superior are generous. Moreover, various affinities also influence assessment, such as belonging to the same district. (Interviews with senior civil servants, March 16,1993, in Dhaka.)

In one of the areas researched by the local consultants on the study, respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of government and to provide examples of the effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery of government services. Of the total number interviewed, few provided examples of effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of government services. However, those in the private sector were more negative in their assessment. Some business leaders content that policy formulated by elected political leadership is not being implemented: Policy of political leadership is being jeopardized at the bureaucratic level. Political leadership is committed towards development, but coolness, apathy, ill-motivation and inefficiency in the bureaucracy mar the prospects leadership are not permeating downwards. The reasons given for poor performance included "apathy" (on the part of civil servants)," narrow vision" (of civil servants), "lack of commitment" (again, on the part of bureaucrats) , and inexperience in democratically-based governance the ministers and members of parliament. Some of those interviewed maintained that the problem of poor performance was the result of the civil service being unwilling to give up power.