International peace missions have increased in number and frequency since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The scope and complexity of their mandates have grown too. Their composition has changed, including the frequency with which one mission is present or operates alongside another.¹

The situations in which peace missions become involved have expanded from inter-state conflicts to include civil wars. The implications that the internal situation in one state can have for others, especially close neighbours, in relation to smuggling, money-laundering and the presence, activities and transit of third-country nationals (including illegal migrants, criminals and potential terrorists) means that the trend towards the deployment of international peace missions in countries experiencing or emerging from internal conflicts is likely to continue, and grow. This is already evident in the Pacific islands region in regional (and other) responses to conflicts and other crises in Papua New Guinea’s Autonomous Region of Bougainville (formerly known as the ‘North Solomons Province’ and often simply called ‘Bougainville’), Solomon Islands, and Nauru. The character of the threats to which the Global War on Terror is a response suggests that the trend will continue on a much broader, global scale. The establishment and mandate of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the United States of America’s (USA) Department of State as explained by senior officials underlines the high place the internal affairs of other states now occupy on the foreign policy and security agendas of other powers.²

The term ‘international peace mission’ is used quite deliberately in this paper. It avoids the confusion which arises when the term ‘peacekeeping’ is applied, as it frequently is, to missions engaged in fulfilling such different mandates – requiring quite distinct training, equipment, and operational protocols – as peace enforcement; traditional peace-keeping (in which peace-keepers are inserted between – and separate – previously combatant armed forces); observing or monitoring peace; and increasingly complex forms of post-conflict peace-building, including providing transitional governance pending the reconstruction or construction of a successor state.

* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations or its Member States.


² According to Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, ‘Addressing State Failure’, Foreign Affairs, 84 (4), July / August 2005, pages 153-62, if efforts to overcome state weaknesses and prevent civil wars fail, then ‘the fundamental challenge’ for the new office, which the authors say the Governments of other advanced industrial countries recognize too, is to ensure readiness to manage the processes necessary to build a strong state and international security (page 160). They characterize these processes as stabilization, addressing root causes, establishing a market democracy, and promoting a civil society capable of ensuring government accountability (pages 158-160).
Contrary to arguments advanced elsewhere, neither popular usage nor simplicity justify using the term ‘peacekeeping’ to refer to different kinds of peace missions in contexts where distinctions between peacekeeping and other kinds of peace missions can be of critical importance to decisions made by both potential inviting / host and contributing states alike.

Most of the available literature on the subject is written from perspectives in advanced industrial / metropolitan countries, contributing states, and sponsoring international organizations (the ‘lessons learned’ and other assessments prepared by the Best Practices Unit in the United Nations’ Department of Peace-keeping Operations are cases in point).

Papua New Guinea is unusual in having hosted a number of different peace missions, some simultaneously, and for having invited them, not having them imposed (the invitations were generally issued following negotiations with dissident groups with and among whom the National Government was trying to make peace; the South Pacific Regional Peace Keeping Force set up to provide security for the Peace Conference in Arawa, Bougainville, in October 1994 was unique among peace missions in Papua New Guinea in being almost fully planned by the National Government prior to any negotiation with other participants in the conference). Reviewing the Papua New Guinea experience might, therefore, be expected to add a fresh dimension to understanding the issues involved in inviting, hosting and managing international peace missions from a host country perspective.

This paper focuses on Papua New Guinea’s experience of a series of peace missions which have been invited to support efforts to make, maintain and consolidate, and build peace in Bougainville. It is written from what might be described as a host Government perspective (one such perspective, not the only one).

While the peace missions which have operated in Bougainville have been present and worked among, or at least alongside, people there – sometimes, for quite long periods of time - the source of the official invitation to come, and their official host, has been the Papua New Guinea Government. The experience and perspective of the National Government is accordingly important - though frequently overlooked even by staff of peace missions who have interacted with their immediate neighbours, people in Bougainville, or, at least, seen them more, more frequently, and are accordingly prone to being accused of much the same symptoms of ‘localitis’ as resident diplomats (for example, when they say how much they enjoy being in ‘your country’ and, obviously, mean Bougainville, not Papua New Guinea as a whole).

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3 See, for example, Peter Londey, Other People’s Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest (NSW, Australia), 2004, pages xx-xxi.


**Background**

The conflict which engulfed Bougainville between 1989 and the cessation of armed hostilities in late 1997 is best understood as a civil war. While some accounts tend to portray this conflict as one between armed secessionists and the National Government, the reality was that, as it evolved, it acquired multiple layers or dimensions. Originating in tensions within communities around the Panguna copper, silver and gold-mine in Central Bougainville, the conflict began in 1988-89 with efforts to disrupt mining by ‘militants’, so-called, opposed to the project (at least, as it was operating then). These activities led to conflict with Police ‘normally’ present in the area to help maintain law and order. Police Mobile Units were then deployed, and subsequently set to work as elements of combined state security forces following the call-out of Defence Force personnel in aid to the civil power, and then the declaration of a state of emergency. Armed activists declaring they were fighting for Bougainville’s secession from Papua New Guinea came out against the security forces. As the conflict spiralled and disorder grew, so the multiple fronts on which confrontations occurred saw the security forces supported by pro-Government Bougainvilleans (the Bougainville Resistance Forces [BRF]) pitched against those fighting for a separate independence for Bougainville (known collectively as the ‘Bougainville Revolutionary Army’ [BRA]) - with various adventurers, criminals and others involved at each stage.

Although much of the early opposition was essentially local and not directly connected with subsequent activities at other places and times, Bougainville has a long history of active resistance to imposed government structures and taxes, dating back to the early 1960s, and of demands for secession from Papua New Guinea for almost as long. These activities culminated in a period of proclaimed secession from two weeks before Papua New Guinea became independent in September 1975 until the *Bougainville Agreement* was signed in August 1976. While there were other underlying issues, the immediate trigger for the attempted secession was frustration at the Government’s (and parliament’s) failure to provide for the establishment of a system of provincial government in the *Papua New Guinea Constitution* as recommended by the Constitutional Planning Committee (whose Deputy Chairman and *de facto* leader was the then-Member for Bougainville, John Momis).

Opposition to activities associated with the development, conduct and impacts of the large copper, silver and gold mine at Panguna, Central Bougainville, together with efforts to increase or change the distribution of compensation and other revenues from mining, have a long history too - dating back to attempts to prevent surveyors from entering traditionally owned lands in the mid-1960s, opposition to the compulsory acquisition of land for developments associated with the mining project (broadly defined), and pressure which culminated in the renegotiation of the *Bougainville Copper Agreement* in 1974, through to the blowing-up of pylons carrying electricity transmission

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6 Anthony J. Regan and Helga M. Griffin, eds, *Bougainville before the conflict*, Pandanus Books, Canberra, 2005 contains a detailed account of the anthropology, physical and natural environment, pre-history and history of Bougainville.

Donald Denoon, *Getting Under the Skin: The Bougainville Copper Agreement and the Creation of the Panguna Mine*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2000 relates the history of the establishment of the mine at Panguna, including the confrontations which occurred during the exploration and development phases.

Douglas Oliver, *Black Islanders: A Personal Perspective of Bougainville 1937-1991*, Hyland House, Melbourne, 1991, is an anthropologist’s account, much of its based on firsthand experience and more than fifty years of close observation, of change in Bougainville.

7 While the outcome they sought was not quite the same, a number of Nasioi-speakers who addressed the United Nations Visiting Mission to the then-trust Territory of New Guinea in 1962 called for the administration of Bougainville to be taken from Australia and transferred to the USA (Douglas Oliver, *op. cit.*, page 90).
lines up to the minesite from November 1988 into 1989, eventually forcing the mine to be closed permanently in September 1989. These activities were, again, increasingly accompanied by demands for Bougainville to be allowed to secede from Papua New Guinea.

Part of the National Government’s response to the situation in 1988-89 was to deploy Police Mobile Units and then elements of the Defence Force to Bougainville - initially, in aid to the civil power (that is, effectively, as support for the Police) in March 1989, and then under the state of emergency declared in June. Key Bougainville leaders, including some who subsequently identified themselves as ‘rebels’, requested or participated in these decisions. Meanwhile, tensions within and between communities in the vicinity of the mine, sabotage of equipment and infrastructure associated with mining, and violence continued to grow.8

A decisive turning-point came in March 1990, after the BRA and the National Government had signed an Agreement to End Hostilities on Bougainville. The Agreement provided for ‘the withdrawal of Security Forces’ and ‘the handing in of arms by the BRA … under the supervision of International Observers’. The Commonwealth provided a small team of five observers.9 However, the BRA retrieved its guns.10 The Police Commissioner ordered the withdrawal of all Police (including those normally available to enforce law and order in Bougainville before the crisis). Uncertainty, fear and tensions grew on the ground. Employees of other Government agencies fled from their jobs, and, in many cases (including Bougainvilleans) from Bougainville to other parts of Papua New Guinea, across the border to Solomon Islands, and, in a few cases, eventually to Australia or other countries. The resulting collapse of government services and authority on the ground meant that the situation bore an increasing resemblance to that described by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes as ‘war of every one against every one’ – or, at least, of very small groups against others, initially, at least, without the redeeming feature Hobbes foresaw that participants in such conflicts would come to recognize the need ‘to seek peace, and follow it’.11

Fear of others, together with longstanding enmities, rivalries and other sources of tension, meant that individuals and small groups (including local alliances, villages, clans and even families) became engaged in increasingly violent conflict against other individuals and small groups. Bougainvilleans fought, injured and killed one another, and damaged or destroyed both public and private property - with some travelling quite long distances in order to do so. Many other, unnecessary, additional deaths (probably the majority) were caused as a result of the absence of health and other essential services following the departure of most public servants, and the security services’ imposition of a ‘quarantine zone’ which effectively cut off all contact between Bougainville and the outside world (including the rest of Papua New Guinea), following the

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8 The origins and development of the crisis are analysed in Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Crisis in the North Solomons Province, the Report of the Special Committee on the Crisis in the North Solomons Province, chaired by Sir John Kaputin and tabled in the National Parliament in late 1990, which was strongly in favour of a negotiated, political settlement, and against the deployment of Police Mobile Units and Defence Force personnel to deal with the crisis.

9 Yauka Aluambo Liria, Bougainville Campaign Diary, Indra Publishing, Melbourne, 1993, page 189. A curious aspect of the episode is that the Commonwealth Secretariat appears to have no relevant publicly available records, or has, at least, been unable to provide them in response to the author’s enquiries.

10 Douglas Oliver, op.cit., page 236.

The incident has also been briefly described by an expert brought in to advise on how to make peace: Peter Wallensteen, ‘Conflict Prevention and the South Pacific’, paper delivered to the Conference on Securing a Peaceful Pacific, Christchurch, 2004, page 1.

formation of the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG), the ‘political arm’ of the BRA, and a unilateral declaration of Bougainville’s independence in May 1990.

There were, undoubtedly, Bougainvilleans whose actions were motivated by a firm commitment to separate, independent statehood for Bougainville. There were also Bougainvilleans who were at least as strongly committed to Bougainville remaining part of a united Papua New Guinea (sometimes out of principle, or perceived advantage for Bougainville, and sometimes motivated by concern at the likely attitudes and actions of other Bougainvilleans, or a combination of considerations). It is also relevant to record that the initial decisions to deploy Police Mobile Units and Defence Force personnel to Bougainville, and the subsequent declaration of a state of emergency, were made at the request or with the agreement of prominent leaders, including some who were subsequently identified with the BIG / BRA. Adventurers, criminals, together with strongly motivated pro- and anti-secessionist groups, both Bougainvilleans and people from other parts of Papua New Guinea, as well as a small number of foreigners, joined in the fray.12 Thus can the conflict be described as a multidimensional civil war – with neighbours (and even close kin) pitted against one another in alliance with, or opposition to, the Papua New Guinea security forces.

In this situation, both differences and alliances were often at least as strongly influenced by local factors – kinship, traditional antipathy, or fear of close neighbours13 – as by the broader principles of a separate independence for Bougainville for which the BIG and, its fighting arm, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), claimed to be fighting, or of maintaining Bougainville as an integral part of Papua New Guinea (albeit with considerable decentralisation of control over government functions, powers and resources) for which others said they were fighting on what might be loosely described as ‘the other side’. In September 1990, the Defence Force returned to Bougainville, fighting with the support of the Buka Liberation Front and other Bougainvillean ‘Resistance Fighters’, who formed the Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF). Many thousands of people fled to Government ‘care centres’ to avoid the fighting, or because their homes or livelihoods were threatened or destroyed.

The BIG / BRA created a formal structure of government – with a President (Francis Ona), Vice-President (Joseph Kabui), Ministers, and a Military Arm led by a former Papua New Guinea Defence Force officer, now styled ‘General’ Sam Kauona, and a number of local commanders. The BRF was led by a Chairman and commanders, who worked closely with persons identified as their civilian, political leaders. In practice, both the BIG / BRA and the BRF were, in many respects, loose alliances of localized fighting-groups – often identified with one or other faction on the basis of local factors and actors. Despite the governmental and military titles used, neither actually functioned like an effective government or modern military organization (leadership in many cases appears to have been largely situational). Thus it was that, when the weapons disposal plan was being finalized in early 2001, and the two armed factions were asked to outline their

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12 The Report, Crisis in the North Solomons Province, described how the worsening situation there was opening up ‘new opportunities for wrongdoing, and for seeking – unscrupulous – economic and political advantage. Raskols, criminals, thrill- and adventure-seekers have, therefore, been tempted – and some have actually managed – to join in’ (Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Crisis in the North Solomons Province, op. cit., page 56). Cf. the reference to ‘a major catalyst of organized violence everywhere – plain old thuggery’ in Charles King, ‘The Myth of Ethnic Warfare’, Foreign Affairs, 80 (6), November – December 2001, page 166.

structures in order to clarify how it would actually work, they each took quite some time to produce even the simple diagrams attached to the final, agreed plan.\(^\text{14}\)

Acknowledging these realities is critical to understanding how peace has been made and then built (though it would be misleading to suggest they were always properly understood by everyone involved at the relevant time; in actual practice, the intuitive understanding other Papua New Guineans, including National Government Ministers and senior officials, have for the way in which Melanesian societies are organized and operate have often been critical to the positive outcomes achieved). The conflict’s true character as a multi-dimensional civil war, not simply a secessionist struggle between two opposing armies, helps to explain why reconciliation among Bougainvilleans was a necessary part of any attempt to make and keep peace. Thus it was that some of the most important meetings in the Bougainville peace process (at Burnham and Lincoln, New Zealand, and Townsville, Australia) required the movement and attendance of 150+ Bougainvilleans on each occasion – political, church, women’s and other leaders, and, most numerous of all (by far, the majority), BRA and BRF commanders. Thus it was, too, that the Bougainvillean participants devoted a great deal of their time and energy at these negotiations (often more than they spent in direct negotiations with the National Government) in trying to reconcile with one another, and developing common positions.

Reconciliation and negotiation among Bougainvillean leaders and factions have been critical to progress on weapons disposal and ‘the political issue’ (as it was called at the time). At peace process meetings held up to the Townsville meeting on weapons disposal in early 2001, former combatants, in particular, spent much of their time participating in sessions where the aim and the prevailing activity was described as being to ‘\textit{taraut}’ (literally, ‘vomit’ in Tok Pisin) the accumulated and often pent-up frustrations, anger and related emotions built up during the conflict. Meaningful discussion with the National Government – and agreement, even more so - was possible only later.\(^\text{15}\)

For its part, the National Government was not, and (because of their frequently localized and shifting character), perhaps could not be, fully aware of the differences and alliances among Bougainvilleans – hence the surprise in some quarters when representatives of the Leitana Council of Elders in Buka came to Port Moresby in late 1998 to protest against the planned extension of the suspension of the Bougainville Provincial Government which would otherwise have been established by automatic operation of law in order to clear the way for the (somewhat delayed) formation of the Bougainville Reconciliation Government as provided in the \textit{Lincoln Peace Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville}, Paragraph 8, signed in January 1998. The Leitana leaders had not previously been identified as a separate element in the peace process; they were subsequently invited to attend the talks between the National Government and Bougainville leaders at Lake Okataina in April-May 1999, and continued to participate in the peace process from then on.

Moreover, both alignments and differences have continued to evolve within and between the various Bougainvillean factions. Thus, the meeting at Lake Okataina helped to bring leaders of the Leitana Council of Elders together with other Bougainville leaders, thereby facilitating the process of defining and developing a common Bougainvillean position on critical issues for negotiation with the National Government. The Meekamui Defence Force (MDF) as such played no part in


\(^{15}\) The process through which the Bougainville parties developed common positions on what was euphemistically called ‘the political issue’, in particular, is described in Anthony J. Regan, ‘Resolving two dimensions of conflict: the dynamics of consent, consensus and compromise, in Andy Carl and Sr Lorraine Garasu, eds, ‘Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea - Bougainville peace process, 2002’, \textit{Accord}, 12, 2002.
negotiating the agreed weapons disposal plan (it was, in fact, not even mentioned by name at the time). But, having broken away from the BRA, some MDF members have since participated in practical weapons disposal; while a number have remained outside the peace process, some have been accommodated within the main factional framework as the BRA’s A Company; and the MDF is named in the Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (‘Bougainville Constitution’) s 58 (1), (2), which came into force in December 2004, as one of the three groups from whom prospective candidates for the three seats reserved for former combatants in the Bougainville House of Representatives could seek support when nominating for the election which was held in May-June 2005. When former Governor John Momis won a Supreme Court appeal in November 1999 against the National Government’s attempted suspension of the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government (intended to open the way for the Bougainville Reconciliation Government foreseen in the Lincoln Agreement), he and his supporters agreed to exercise their formal powers in consultation with the factions which had previously come together in the Bougainville People’s Congress (including the BTG and the BIG). The arrangements involved agreement to establish the Bougainville Transitional Consultative Council - which exercised the de facto powers of a provincial government until the Autonomous Bougainville Government took office in June 2005 (the arrangement meant that the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government formally ratified decisions actually made in the Bougainville Transitional Consultative Council).

The fluid and evolving character of the Bougainvillean factions is pertinent to explaining the impatience, amounting at times to frustration, displayed by foreigners (including members of peace missions) not familiar with Melanesian forms of social organization and mobilization when they could not discern what was happening at key points, pressed for greater activity, and expressed fear that the entire peace process might break down. What they did not always appreciate was that the communities and the organizations involved in the Bougainville peace process were not command systems (the names applied to and by the BRA, the BRF and the MDF and the titles worn by some of their leaders – ‘General’, ‘Commander’, etc. - were especially prone to mislead). In practice, almost everything had to be negotiated, especially if more than one local community were involved. For this to happen, mutual confidence and sufficient trust to co-operate had to be built, even among leaders and commanders identified as members of the same faction.

The Bougainville conflict’s real character as a multi-dimensional civil war, together with the localized nature and leadership systems of the societies involved, has meant that the prospects for reaching a lasting and meaningful political settlement have depended on coalition- and alliance-building by those wanting to achieve lasting peace. Reconciliation and trust-building have been necessary. These have required time, especially in areas where movement and communications are difficult, as is the case in most of Bougainville, both in areas where no facilitating physical infrastructure has ever been built, and in areas where roads, bridges and wharves were destroyed during the conflict. They have also required resources for customary and other compensatory presentations and exchanges.

The Bougainville peace process has been slow, much slower, and taken more time to move ahead than many of the closest observers expected when they first began watching or became actively involved. The reason has not been widespread laziness or indifference on the part of participants. Rather, it has been the structure of the societies – hence of the political and combatant factions involved - together with the reluctance of former combatants, in particular, to play themselves out of the main power games even after they had agreed to disarm (for example, when former combatants offered to provide security for weapons put away in containers, and then sought to be paid).

\[16\] Each nomination is required to be accompanied by a letter signed by 20 members of the former combatant group to which the candidate belonged, and 10 members of one of the other former combatant groups – the BRA, BRF or MDF.
Peace-making has been incremental, and, in certain respects, disjointed, as new groups have joined in, while others have remained outside. Mutual confidence-building, reconciliation and trust have had to be built from the bottom-up. Together, these factors have determined how the Burnham Truce evolved through a series of other agreements – among Bougainvillian leaders and factions, and with the National Government; how the agreed weapons disposal plan was implemented; and how other aspects of practical peace-building have moved ahead. The requirement that former combatants give up weapons and make way for democratically elected political representatives has been a slow, time-consuming and (so far) successful aspect of the over-all process too.

Thus it is, too, that different (groups of) participants give different-starting-dates in response to questions about when the peace process began. Though the greatest progress towards the peace which currently prevails has, arguably, been made since the meetings at Burnham, New Zealand, in 1997, some see the initial contacts between BIG / BRA leaders and the National Government in 1990, especially those onboard the New Zealand naval vessel, ‘Endeavour’ in August, as laying the groundwork for future negotiations. Others, especially those involved in the negotiations which led to the subsequent establishment of the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG), see the Arawa Peace Conference in October 1994 or the signing of the Mirigini Charter in November, leading to the establishment of the BTG under Papua New Guinea law in April 1995, as important turning-points. Yet others, probably the majority regard 1997-98 as the critical period – when the Burnham meetings were held (in July 1997, for Bougainvillians, and with the National Government in October), the Burnham Truce came into effect, agreement was reached on the outlines of an ambitious peace-building agenda in the Lincoln Agreement in January 1998, and the ‘permanent and irrevocable ceasefire came into effect’ on 30 April.

For a number of Bougainville leaders, including those from the Leitana Council of Elders and those with whom they reconciled, the meeting at Lake Okataina in 1999 was a very important turning-point on the way to peace. For the National Government, the agreement by Bougainville leaders to include a reference to the ‘National Government’, not simply the more separate-sounding ‘Papua New Guinea’ in the Loloata Understanding in March 2000 represented a breakthrough. Then there were the successive agreements reached on the question of a referendum on Bougainville’s political future following intervention by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer; weapons disposal; and eventually autonomy; which were ultimately brought together as the three pillars of the Bougainville Peace Agreement signed on 30 August 2001. The Agreement was followed by passage of the Constitutional Amendment and the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville, which linked them together by providing for the legal arrangements to take effect on completion of stage 2 of the agreed 3-stage weapons disposal plan; making the holding of the first general election for the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) dependent on completion of stage 3 of weapons disposal; and including both weapons disposal and good governance among the conditions which have to be met before the guaranteed referendum on Bougainville’s political future is held between 10 and 15 years after the election of the ABG. Then came implementation of the Bougainville Constitution in December 2004, the first general election for the ABG, and the swearing-in of the newly-elected President, Ministers and Members of the Bougainville House of Representatives in June 2005.

All of these milestones (and others) have contributed to mutual confidence-building in various ways.

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17 Edward P. Wolfers, “‘Joint creation’: The Bougainville Peace Agreement – and beyond”, Accord, 12, ibid., outlines the main stages in the negotiations between the National Government and the Bougainville parties.

18 This aspect of the process has also been closely related to the few major setbacks, such as the removal in late 2002 of weapons that had previously been put away and contained, and the subsequent reluctance of former combatants who had been paid to provide security to give up their self-assigned duties and return home.
Meanwhile, people who previously identified themselves with the late Francis Ona (who passed away in July 2005) and Meekamui have participated in weapons disposal, the first general election for the ABG, and other peace-building activities. Only a small number of hard-core supporters of Meekamui (most, but not all, of them in the remaining ‘No-Go Zone’ around Panguna) remain outside the peace process. A few individuals and groups in other areas (even in Buka) have moved in the other direction, aligning themselves with Francis Ona and Meekamui as the peace process has progressed. Noah Musingku and others associated with the pyramid fast-money scheme, U-Vistract and the self-proclaimed Royal Kingdom of Papala, have established themselves at Tonu, in Siwai, behind roadblocks which cut off communications with other parts of Bougainville; place them outside the effective authority of the ABG and the Police; and keep them outside the peace process as a whole. On their parts, the National Government and the Bougainville parties involved in the peace process have continued to call on those outside the peace process to join in, even as they have moved ahead, accepting that peace-making, peace-building and peace on the ground are accordingly incomplete. Apart from maintaining roadblocks to control entry into and transit through the remaining ‘No-Go Zone’ at Panguna and around Tonu, leaders and groups who have chosen to be outside have generally not disrupted the peace process. They are ‘spoilers’ only in the sense that they refuse to be part of the peace process, not in disrupting it.

The background just sketched is critical to understanding how peace and agreements on Bougainville’s political future, governance, and other aspects of building and sustaining peace have been made.

The following brief discussion of some of the main issues raised for the host government in relation to inviting international peace missions, defining their mandate, and managing their role through to the end follows roughly the sequence in which issues arose. Key characteristics of the missions discussed are outlined in the Annex to this paper.

The missions discussed in this paper were preceded by the small team of international observers sent by the Commonwealth to monitor the early stages of the truce negotiated in March 1990, as mentioned above. Other international missions have since played a part in aspects of post-conflict peace-building, including the 15–person international election observer team which observed the first general election for the ABG in May-June 2005, and the 19-member contingent of Australian Federal Police sent to work with the Bougainville Police as part of the Enhanced Co-operation Programme (ECP) between Australia and Papua New Guinea in 2004 until their withdrawal in early 2005 (as a result of a court case which found the terms of the ECP to be unconstitutional), pending possible renegotiation of the relevant agreement. However, the focus of this paper is on the peace missions established and mandated to support and promote the Bougainville peace process, not with other pro-active functions (like the Australian Assisting Police provided as part of the ECP), or other peace-building activities. The latter include the New Zealand community Police advisers and trainers in Bougainville, whose activities and legal immunities tend to resemble more conventional forms of technical and other development co-operation.

The Decision to Invite an International Peace Mission


It is hard to describe how difficult it can be for politicians and officials proud of their country’s sovereignty and independence and sensitive to criticism and perceptions of failure to recognize the necessity (or, at least, the possible advantages) and agree to an external, third-party presence and role in the resolution or aftermath of an internal conflict.\textsuperscript{21} The decision is all the harder for people who were active participants in the transition to national independence (as is still the case with a number of prominent Papua New Guinean political leaders and senior officials). Acknowledging the need for a third-party is, in certain respects, both an unwelcome intrusion into a vision, even a dream, and an unwelcome, discomforting admission of failure in practice. This was true not only before the first international peace missions were invited to Bougainville, but continued to be so subsequently too. Similar considerations appear to have been factors in the negative way in which some Papua New Guinean leaders viewed the offer and subsequent deployment of Australian Federal Police under the ECP in 2003-2005.

Even so, there was a small number of Papua New Guineans (and others) in official positions who favoured inviting a neutral third-party to provide a peace mission from quite early in the Bougainville crisis. Foreigners – individuals, non-governmental organizations, Governments and international organizations – have encouraged, facilitated and/or hosted contacts between the National Government and Bougainvillean leaders since early on too. Others, especially churches and other non-governmental organizations, have worked to bring about reconciliation and peace at the grassroots (whether or not their methods always stand up to rigorous scientific testing, many Bougainvilleans attest to their effectiveness, at least for themselves).

According to a close observer, the Chairman of the bipartisan (really, non- or trans-party) Special Committee on the Crisis in the North Solomons Province, Sir John Kaputin, the decision to involve the Commonwealth observer team in March 1990 appeared to have been made ‘almost unthinkingly’. It was followed by a decision to accept an offer from the New Zealand Government to send three navy ships to Bougainville – two to provide secure and separate accommodation for BRA and National Government participants, and one as a neutral venue for the meetings which led to the \textit{Endeavour Accord}. Perhaps, the limited scope, size and duration of the observer mission might have made the decision easier to make than previously expected.

In any event, Sir John Kaputin observed:

\begin{quote}
Those Papua New Guineans who believe that we, as citizens of an independent nation, should try to solve our country’s internal problems ourselves might once have found such a proposal difficult – or, at least, embarrassing to accept. But now that foreign observers have, almost unthinkingly, been used to monitor withdrawal of the security forces from the North Solomons Province and to sit in on the negotiations which led to the \textit{Endeavour Accord}\textsuperscript{22}, such reservations are probably not as powerful as they once were. There may, moreover, be no other practical alternative.
\end{quote}

Sir John Kaputin was a politician who had been actively involved in mobilizing opposition before independence to the introduction of multiracial local government councils in his home area, the Gazelle Peninsula of East New Britain – eventually in the face of large numbers of Police, and, on one occasion a standby order to the Pacific Islands Regiment (during a visit in 1970 by Australian Prime Minister John Gorton – who was carrying a gun under his shirt), and then in the making of the \textit{Papua New Guinea Constitution}. He now argued:

\textsuperscript{21} Though peace missions are widely referred to as ‘interventions’, the term does not seem wholly appropriate to bodies which are genuinely invited, and often play a rather passive part in events while they are on the ground.

\textsuperscript{22} The observers who sat in on the ‘Endeavour’ talks were from Canada, New Zealand and Vanuatu.
The costs involved in bringing foreign forces to help maintain peace in Papua New Guinea would probably be very high. But they would scarcely be higher than the human and financial costs of not doing so …. 23

He, therefore, favoured an invitation to the United Nations, the Commonwealth or the Pacific Islands Forum (then still known as the ‘South Pacific Forum’) to assemble and send a peace-keeping mission. But, even then, consistent with his deepest convictions, he still preferred negotiating with Bougainville leaders to find a way of restoring police and other Government services to Bougainville.

More than three years later, when the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Julius Chan, was exploring options for a peace initiative in Bougainville, the possibility of seeking the support of international peace-keepers was regarded as so sensitive that probably as few as three people in the Government were aware it was under active examination, and they were all sworn to secrecy.

The initiator’s preferred option was to seek Tongan leadership of the proposed mission. He, therefore, raised the matter with the Tongan Minister for Foreign Affairs.

However, the Tongan Government had no relevant, previous experience, and seemed not to appreciate fully the need to maintain confidentiality because of the sensitivities involved in even making the request. Thus it was that Radio Australia broadcast news of the plan. When one of the three officials in Papua New Guinea saw this reported in a local newspaper, he offered to resign, fearing he might be suspected of being involved in the apparent breach of secrecy and likely public embarrassment – which he had not. His colleagues simply laughed. By then, they knew (though he did not) that news of the proposal had made its way to the King, who had announced it to the Tongan Parliament, where it had been picked up and widely reported in media around the region.

In the event, the South Pacific Regional Peace Keeping Force (SPRKF) was set up under Tongan leadership, supported by personnel from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Vanuatu (Solomon Islands provided ‘good offices’). The SPRKF provided security and other support for Bougainvillians travelling to and attending the Arawa peace conference in October 1994.

While the Arawa conference provided an opportunity for a number of key Bougainvillian leaders to come together and make contact with the National Government – thereby paving the way for the formation of the BTG – it did not produce immediate results, let alone Bougainville-wide peace. The outcome might, again, have added to the reluctance with which National Government leaders and officials subsequently viewed the question of a possible international presence in Bougainville in support of efforts to make and build peace.

Officials from the Commonwealth and the United Nations attended the Cairns meetings between leaders of the BIG / BRA, the BRF and the BTG in September and December 1995. Another United Nations official was invited to Lincoln in January 1998. Thus, it was that the foundations for future United Nations involvement might well have been laid, though this was not widely recognized at the time.

When preparations were being made for the National Government delegation to participate in the meeting with Bougainville political leaders and former combatant commanders at Lincoln University, New Zealand, in January 1998, the question of inviting the United Nations to send a peace mission to Bougainville was considered so sensitive that officials canvassed it privately but

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without writing anything down. In the event, the decision was addressed – and quite quickly resolved – in an informal discussion among National Government leaders while they were in the aircraft flying them to New Zealand. It was clearly an option whose time had come. When Bougainvilleans raised the matter at Lincoln, the National Government undertook to seek the United Nations Security Council’s endorsement of the Lincoln Agreement and the appointment of a special observer mission to monitor the arrangements. By then, the neutral regional Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) was already on the ground.

The formation of the TMG followed directly from a provision in the Burnham Declaration in which the Bougainville factions, meeting on their own in July 1997, requested a ‘neutral Peacekeeping Force’ be invited to Bougainville ‘for a period of not more than three years under the auspices of the United Nations.’

The Burnham Truce, to which the National Government was party, contained an agreement to recommend the invitation be made.

The Cairns Commitment, signed at a follow-up meeting in November, provided the assurances needed, and set out arrangements (such as the Peace Process Consultative Committee [PPCC]) for implementation.

By then, it seemed clear that the United Nations would not respond as quickly – and, almost certainly, not on the scale or in the manner – the Bougainville parties had hoped. However, the Australian and New Zealand Governments had already indicated their willingness to help. A team of four officials from these two countries visited Papua New Guinea (including Bougainville) in early November, and prepared a report on what would be required. Although senior Papua New Guinean officials suggested the TMG should assist in the transition from keeping to building peace by including a small unit to facilitate the restoration of civil authority by training Police, the visiting officials preferred to follow a purer, more conventional peacekeeping model, as did the sponsoring Governments. New Zealand ensured the TMG’s regional character by paying for personnel from Fiji and Vanuatu to participate.24 In the event, the TMG actually began to deploy in Bougainville even before the final legal arrangements were in place. The United Nations’ presence came later, after the TMG had been replaced by the PMG, as the Lincoln and Ceasefire Agreements provided.

**Securing Peace Missions**

The process of securing the TMG seemed to follow more or less naturally from Australia’s and New Zealand’s previous involvement in efforts to promote peace in Bougainville. The transition to the PMG, which was, in most respects, a similar body, was also remarkably smooth.

Even so, the Protocol to establish the TMG as an entity in international law went through more than 20 drafts. There were differences, more matters of detail than substance, between Governments, and even between various agencies of the same Government. A subsequent account of the steps leading up to the formation of TMG has suggested that one of the reasons for the complexity of the negotiations over the Protocol was that Australian military officers, in particular, were unprepared or reluctant to operate with and under the command of New Zealand.25 National sensitivities and rivalries were certainly evident and relevant to the negotiations over the transition

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24 A similar commitment to regionalism and multilateralism led the New Zealand Government to pay for the Commonwealth and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariats’ participation in the international election observer team which observed and reported on the first general election for the ABG in May-June 2005.

from the TMG to the PMG when questions of command and the quality of logistical support were being discussed.  

However, while peace might often be widely described as an ideal ‘beyond price’, peace missions come at some cost. Concern with the financial and other resource implications (including the personnel and equipment required to support successive peace missions, together with progress in peace-building, and a strong desire to avoid becoming ‘bogged down’ in open-ended commitments, help to explain why and how the PMG was gradually reduced in size between 2000 and its eventual withdrawal in mid-2003.

Improved conditions on the ground were primarily responsible. But cost reduction - achieved by a combination of cutting both the number and size of teams deployed around Bougainville, and outsourcing transport and other supports - was relevant too. While the Papua New Guinea Government was consulted, the Governments of the main contributing countries, Australia and New Zealand, made the main decisions.

When the Papua New Guinea Government expressed concern at the vacuum that might follow the PMG leaving while implementation of the agreed weapons disposal plan was still proceeding (and before the stage 3 decision on the final fate of the weapons had been agreed), the outcome was a face-saving formula in which the PMG left on schedule at the end of June 2003 – to be replaced by the smaller, less activist Bougainville Transition Team (BTT); a similar face-saving formula – changing the name, but maintaining a reduced presence – was employed by the United Nations in respect of its peace mission in Bougainville as from early 2004.

The costs of the Australian component of the BTT were no longer met from the Australian defence budget but from unallocated funds in the development assistance programme for Papua New Guinea - thereby underlining the opportunity costs of at least part of the mission) The BTT numbered 17 personnel (down from the PMG’s previous 75, and a maximum of about 300 at the start). Instead of moving out on patrol, they tended to remain at their posts.

The challenges involved in securing a United Nations presence in Bougainville were greater than with the regional bodies, even with the active diplomatic support of the Governments which participated in the TMG / PMG / BTT. As previously observed, it is also unusual for a country to host both a regional peace mission and one from the United Nations at the same time (in the Papua New Guinea case, there was no suggestion that the United Nations mission was, in some way, meant to balance, monitor or operate as a check on the regional body).

Part of the problem in mobilizing support for a United Nations peace mission for Bougainville was that the conflict was far from areas of significant, pressing concern to major powers, especially the largest financial contributors to the United Nations. The retiring United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Danilo Turk, made much the same point in the final briefing to the United Nations Security Council at the conclusion of the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB), when he described the Bougainville conflict as ‘little noticed, but brutal.’ While ‘[t]he conflict had started over the use of natural resources, … it developed

26 Both then and at other times, Australian officials, in particular, were often reluctant to accept, perhaps did not know or understand, the history (including experience both of Australian administration before Papua New Guinea became independent, and of Australian support for the Papua New Guinea Defence Force in Bougainville) behind the caution with which many Bougainvilleans, especially in the BIG / BRA, viewed an Australian presence on the ground, and the Papua New Guinea Government’s consequent concern to ensure that the composition and leadership of peace missions not become an issue which might jeopardize their presence or effectiveness.

It is very much to the credit of everyone involved that the manner in which the TMG / PMG / BTT actually operated meant that, as the peace process progressed, Australian participation ceased to be an issue.
features seen in conflicts in many parts of the world, including a mixture of military and criminal objectives and the suffering of innocent people.  

On the one hand, the Bougainville conflict has been widely described as – by far - the most deadly and destructive in the South Pacific since World War II. The deaths are widely estimated to have been 15-20,000 in a population of 150-200,000 over a period of eight years. The injuries, destruction and damage were enormous too. However, on the other hand, the conflict and the damage, destruction and suffering it caused were relatively small by global standards (the Bougainville conflict was, in contemporary terms, such a ‘low-intensity conflict’ that it did not, for example, make most lists of the 40 or even 70 most significant conflicts around the world during the 1990s).

Thus, it was only after the Special State Negotiator for Bougainville, again Sir John Kaputin, had traveled to New York in April 1998 to lobby for a United Nations presence in support of the peace process that the United Nations Security Council agreed that the United Nations Secretary-General should set up a small peace mission in Bougainville. Member-states’ reluctance to allow the peace-keeping budget to grow meant that the new mission was funded through the Department of Political Affairs, not the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.

In New York, the mission was officially known as the ‘United Nations Political Office in Bougainville’ (UNPOB) - with a comma and ‘Papua New Guinea’ added in official National Government statements and correspondence because of the sensitivity of Papua New Guinean officials whose nationalism meant they did not like to see ‘Bougainville’ on its own. However, in deference to the language of the Lincoln and Ceasefire Agreements and national(ist) sensitivities about the connotations of ‘political’ in the Office’s name, the mission was known on the ground as the ‘United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville’ (UNOMB). The compromise employed in some official correspondence was to call it ‘UNPOB / UNOMB’ until it was officially replaced and redesignated as the ‘United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville’ (UNOMB), still staffed by some of the same people, at the end of 2003.

Peace, as previously observed, is a common ideal, widely described as ‘priceless’. But peace processes and peace missions come at a cost – the social and economic costs of the death, injury, destruction, damage and disruption of services caused by the violent conflicts which make peace missions necessary, and the actual costs of the missions themselves (not to mention the opportunity costs that conflict and peace processes necessarily entail). At the United Nations, the costs of peace missions are of special concern to the representatives of the major contributors to the organisation’s budget. As the largest contributor of all, the USA is especially prominent among their ranks.

In April 1998, the United Nations Security Council approved a Presidential Statement (not a formal Resolution) welcoming the Lincoln Agreement and requesting the United Nations Secretary-General ‘to consider the composition and financial modalities of … involvement’ in an observer mission. A senior official visited Papua New Guinea, attending the ceasefire signing ceremony, in Arawa on 30 April, to prepare a report. This formed the basis of a letter by the


28  Cf. the remark already quoted above that, from a global perspective, the Bougainville conflict could be accurately described as ‘little noticed but brutal’ (United Nations Press Release No. SC/8437, 6 July 2005, page 2).

Secretary-General to the President, advising that, ‘if the Security Council has no objection’, he would establish a Political Office in Arawa.\textsuperscript{30} The United Nations Security Council did not object. So UNPOB was established. Thus was the mission secured by silence and a combination of bureaucratic and parliamentary manoeuvres.

In 1999, the mission was extended by a further 12 months, with the Security Council merely officially noting the Secretary-General’s intention to allow UNPOB / UNOMB to proceed.

Similarly indirect parliamentary manoeuvres, based on passive rather than active expressions of consent, continued annually until the end of 2001.

Earlier in 2001, when the negotiations over the Bougainville Peace Agreement were almost concluded, the parties – aware of pressure for an exit-strategy to meet some United Nations members’ and PMG contributing states’ concern at cost, and possibly open-ended commitments – discussed the need to provide an indication of when they expected the two missions to end. The date on which they settled was the end of 2002. They agreed to include it in the Bougainville Peace Agreement. It was a prediction, not a target-date. It represented the outer, reasonable limits of what the parties thought necessary.

As 2002 progressed, it became increasingly clear that the preparations required for orderly withdrawal by the previously anticipated date, especially completion of the agreed weapons disposal plan, would not be in place. It was then that the PMG Governments and the United Nations Security Council moved on to 6-monthly reviews and extensions – only one in the case of the PMG, although it was succeeded for a further six months by the much smaller and limited capability of the BTT, and two for UNPOB / UNOMB.

In the case of the United Nations, the Security Council responded to the Secretary-General’s letter proposing a further 12 months extension by expressing concern over the delays it saw occurring, and urging the parties to fulfil the obligations previously agreed. In agreeing to ‘a final extension’, it, therefore, requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the progress of the mission and ‘a clear exit strategy for … completion and withdrawal, with a timetable and benchmarks that incorporates the holding of elections, as well as details on what specific steps UNPOB intends to take to meet each objective in its exit strategy on time.’\textsuperscript{31}

Of course, neither the process of finalising a constitution for Bougainville nor preparing for election, let alone weapons disposal, were within the United Nations\textsuperscript{5} – or, for that matter, the National Government’s – control.

Twelve months later, in December 2003, with the Bougainville peace process reported to be making ‘slow but steady progress’, the United Nations was reluctant to walk away from one of its most likely (and economical) successes.\textsuperscript{32} The Secretary-General, therefore, employed another procedural device, announcing his intention to let UNPOB expire, and set up ‘a small, follow-on mission’ to be known as the ‘United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville’ (UNOMB). Back to square one. The Security Council ‘took note’.


In June 2004, the United Nations Security Council agreed to ‘a final extension’, and requested a report containing ‘an assessment of the ground situation and … a mission closure-plan’. Officials from New York traveled to Papua New Guinea again to prepare the report. When this deadline, too, could not be met, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention to allow UNOMB to continue for a further six months to the middle of 2005 – unless he received an objection within the next 24 hours, which he did not.

Thus was a series of compromises found between United Nations members’ concerns and allowing the Bougainville peace process to consolidate and move ahead at its own pace. Predictions became target-dates, and sources of pressure. Setting a date for UNPOB / UNOMB to complete its mission and leave had the advantage, so far as the Papua New Guinea Government was concerned, of encouraging all parties to maintain momentum; in a ‘bottom up process, in which weapons disposal, in particular, depended on initiatives by local commanders and fighters, this underlined the need for them to get on with the job – and that it was the United Nations driving the pace. The downside for the National Government was that it did not control what was happening on the ground, while it alone was responsible for making the effort and finding the resources required to secure the successive extensions, and facing the diplomatic embarrassment of waiting for the international community to come up with ever-more subtle and indirect procedural manoeuvres so the mission would continue.

Each and every extension required the National Government to brief and lobby United Nations members, both through their missions in Port Moresby and in New York. But, instead of open debate and decision, the matter tended to be decided by silence and indirection (most of the United Nations Security Council’s deliberations on Bougainville over the years have been closed to states other than Security Council members; Papua New Guinea’s diplomatic representatives in New York were usually unable to participate directly in the final stages of consultations or debate). The outcome – with the election for the ABG completed, and UNOMB withdrawn from active duty at the end of June 2005 (some of its personnel stayed on to pack up for a further six weeks) – can be, and has been, claimed as a success by everyone involved.

The Peace Missions in Practice – Activities, Impacts and Legacies

The successive neutral regional peace missions known as the TMG, the PMG and the BTT made a widely acknowledged contribution to the process by which peace has been made and built in Bougainville. So did UNPOB / UNOMB and their successor, UNOMB. But what did they do? What impacts did they have? How important were they, in fact, to a peace process which is generally regarded as a success (at least, so far)?


34 See, for example, the reports of statements by all 15 United Nations Security Council members, as well as Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, in United Nations Press Release SC/8437, op. cit.

Though the Bougainville peace process is cited in the index to a book on peace-keeping fiascoes of the 1990s, peace-keeping in Bougainville is described in the body of the work as a success (Frederick H. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U. S. Interests, Praeger, Westport (Conn.), 2003).

Truce and Peace Monitors, including BTT members, appeared to take many risks simply by being in Bougainville, making themselves visible (their bright yellow T-shirts stood out in any crowd), and moving around – the more so because they were unarmed, and did not have weapons available for use in the event of an unfortunate contingency; this not only set an inspiring example but inspired moral authority and great public regard. The same was true of UNPOB / UNOMB.

There were some negative incidents – formally called ‘ceasefire violations’, including a number in which shots were fired at monitoring teamsites. A senior United Nations official had his vehicle attacked while he was in it. But the only serious injury or fatality involved the accidental death by drowning of an off-duty PMG monitor.

Both sets of peace missions seem to have avoided the kinds of errors of judgment which have given rise to criticism of United Nations and other responses to needs, as well as the kinds of misconduct condemned in the case of peace missions elsewhere.36

In Bougainville, the Director of UNPOB / UNOMB chaired the Peace Process Consultative Committee (PPCC), through which the parties co-operated in managing the peace process, including weapons disposal. TMG / PMG / BTT officials also attended. UNOMB was responsible for supervising and holding one of two keys to each of the containers in which weapons were stored at stage 2 of the weapons disposal plan, and for verifying and certifying both stage 2 and stage 3 (the destruction of the guns previously contained). The regional peace missions supported these efforts, with the PMG, in particular, providing trunks at stage 1, containers at stage 2, and, with the assistance of a small team of specialists, expertise in weapons disposal, including the defusing / removal of booby-traps. The United Nations and regional peace missions co-operated closely in promoting public awareness, understanding and support of the agreed weapons disposal plan, and in facilitating the activities of Joint Awareness Teams consisting of officials and representatives of the parties.

The leaders of the peace missions sought to build mutual confidence at the national level (and overcome, especially initial reluctance concerning their presence) by providing regular, written reports on their activities and the over-all situation on the ground, and traveling to Port Moresby to brief key National Government officials and diplomatic missions in Port Moresby. In the early stages, the TMG / PMG Commanders’ came at the beginning and end of their (average: six months) terms, and at monthly intervals in-between, but less often as mutual confidence and understanding grew. The frequency of visits by UNPOB / UNOMB officials seemed to be influenced by additional factors, apart from the need to prepare for PPCC or other meetings, such as United Nations requirements for personnel to take periodic leave away from the field, and the state of diplomatic play in New York over forthcoming reviews of the mission’s future.

Officials of both the United Nations and regional peace missions attended many meetings in Bougainville and, when leaders met, in other centres in Papua New Guinea. They facilitated progress simply by being there, by providing encouragement and support for meetings and other activities to promote reconciliation among former combatants and in the wider community, and by assisting with communications and transport before and after. Being neutral, they were sometimes criticized for not taking sides; for appearing to favour a particular party by being impartial on an issue where one believed another to be in the wrong; or for being innocently misled by one group into situations which were embarrassing to others (the meeting at Hutjena in June 1999, at which members of the National Government delegation led by then Prime Minister Sir William Skate felt ‘ambushed’ by Bougainville leaders at a meeting at which both PMG and UNOMB officials were prominent, is a case in point).

The Bougainville peace process is still too fragile and the ongoing understanding and assistance of key supporters too important for it to be appropriate to dwell at any length on criticisms levelled at the various peace missions or errors for which they have been alleged to be responsible. But it seems fair to say that there were times when pressure was resented, for example to proceed with the disposal of guns faster than former combatants were prepared to go. Certain enthusiasms were regarded as misplaced, for example when participants in the PPCC were being urged to get together informally – at the precise time they were staying in the same small guest-house in Arawa for the first time.

For the National Government, there were the particular sensitivities which came from its ambiguous position as the formal originator of the invitations and host for both sets of missions, while being, in certain respects, merely one of the ‘parties’ to the peace process – as recognized in the composition of the PPCC and successive agreements. For officials who felt deeply about national sovereignty, independence and the National Government’s role and responsibilities as the legitimate representative of the state as a whole, this did, at times, raise difficult issues.

Both at the team-sites where they stayed and as they moved out around Bougainville, TMG / PMG / BTT personnel played sport, shared food, and made music. They helped to promote peace simply by being in Bougainville, making themselves publicly visible, talking to people there, calling communities together to talk about peace, being friendly to people they met, and showing they cared.

Other activities in which TMG / PMG / BTT personnel participated included such obviously worthwhile, practical contributions as providing medical services. Together with UNOMB, they provided or paid for helicopter and other transport for leaders, in particular, to attend important peace process-related meetings, including the PPCC, to take part in activities to promote awareness or facilitate implementation of practical weapons disposal, and to get to the political talks or make connections for peace process-related meetings abroad. In addition to broadcasting programmes to promote public awareness about the peace process on Radio Bougainville and producing and playing cassettes about peace, the TMG / PMG / BTT also prepared and distributed numerous posters and a newsletter, Nius Bilong Peace (Tok Pisin for ‘news about peace’), which – in regrettable reflection of the sustainability of some of their efforts – barely survived their departure (an outcome which is familiar in areas of development co-operation where, as in this case, the technology employed in production and the resources required for distribution are beyond the means of the Bougainville Administration and the other parties, and sustainability is not achieved).

While the truce and peace monitors and UNOMB personnel were generally very well-liked and admired, their relative affluence was nonetheless evident in their access to transport (helicopters and four-wheel-drive vehicles), imported food, and other resources.

In the case of the United Nations, the Director, Ambassador Noel Sinclair, not only chaired meetings but came to act as an occasional mediator – and goad - to both the National Government and the combined delegations at various points in the political talks which led to the Bougainville Peace Agreement. UNOMB was also both an actor and an adjudicator in implementation of the agreed weapons disposal plan. Like their counterparts in the PMG, UNOMB’s officials, were

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sometimes made uncomfortably aware of the caution, even suspicion, with which some of the participants in the peace process viewed their presence and activities.38

On some occasions, senior PMG officers were observed to become very frustrated, even angry, at the pace at which events such as weapons disposal moved ahead (perhaps not appreciating the degree to which reconciliation, trust-building, and practical co-operation on the ground all depended on processes of negotiation, not orders or commitments by leaders taking initiatives on their own). While UN personnel generally seemed to serve for periods of years, TMG / PMG / BTT commanders were usually on the ground for about six months. Concern, even pressure, to achieve significant benchmarks in critical activities such as weapons disposal seemed to increase towards the end of each term.

However, respect, trust and gratitude in both the UN and regional missions generally continued to grow throughout the period of their presence in Bougainville. Though differences sometimes became evident, relations between the regional and United Nations missions themselves appeared to be generally cordial and co-operative (the positions that regional states took in regard to UNOMB-related issues at United Nations headquarters in New York tended to be kept separate). Internal differences within the various peace missions were not readily observed from the outside (though not all were well hidden).

An incident which aroused quite strong criticism of the UNOMB official involved concerned the construction of a monument in Peace Park, Arawa, in 2003, both because of the way in which guns were displayed, and, especially, when the guns were removed by unauthorized persons: while the weapons had been rendered unserviceable and, almost certainly, beyond repair, they could still be used to intimidate the unknowing by anyone skilled and unscrupulous enough to try.

Other criticisms were voiced, privately rather than publicly, for example if an official of a third-party peace mission submitted a draft document to speed up progress on an issue in the political talks on which the parties had not yet agreed. And so on.

Beyond the parties involved at the heart of the peace process, in the business community and among local food producers, the truce and peace monitoring missions, in particular, were criticized for being so self-contained (a characteristic of military organizations, and undoubtedly necessary in other situations) - with food and other supplies flown in regularly from overseas - that they bought relatively little locally, and the economic ‘spin-offs’ into the neighbouring community were few. Even so, the impact on business in the main centres where they had been based was quite visible after they left – as businesses closed, and the range of goods on store shelves appeared to decline.

However, none of the actions taken by an official of a peace mission and none of the occasional, usually very quiet criticisms made of their conduct ever posed a serious risk to the integrity or future of the peace process. All of the parties have publicly expressed appreciation for the roles the peace missions have played, and regard their contributions as integral to the success achieved to date. But, like the unthinking references that senior peace mission officials were heard to utter in public when they referred to Bougainville as ‘this country’, the occasional incidents which gave

38 See, for example, the comments by a UNPOB/UNOMB official on the way in which he believed National Government officials initially viewed the mission, and the way he believes the parties ‘ultimately … came to rely on the UN but not to depend on it’, in Scott S. Smith, ‘The role of the United Nations Observer Mission’, in Accord, 12, op. cit.

Comments like these were themselves a potential issue for at least some of the participants in the peace process. Care was accordingly taken by people who were aware of them not to give them undue publicity.
rise to criticism by Papua New Guineans convey lessons about the need for personnel in peace missions to be sensitive about the situations in which they might find themselves.

What was, perhaps, the greatest source of anger and frustration at officials of both sets of peace missions was, in certain respects, both inevitable and misplaced; this was when officials who had been generous in providing helicopter and other transport to facilitate the movement of political leaders and officials for activities in support of the peace process declined to do so on other occasions, especially as their respective missions were winding down. The displays of mixed anger and frustration with which they were met were sequels to generosity and help on a scale that would simply not be sustainable if the National Government or the Bougainville Administration were to be responsible for payment; it was also not affordable by anyone but the very richest individuals or families.

A further source of tension became evident when the missions departed – and the vehicles and equipment they had brought were distributed, or, in a number of cases, simply commandeered and stolen.

Generally the conduct of all members of TMG / PMG / BTT and UNPOB / UNOMB was exemplary – unfailingly friendly, helpful, and supportive; a true credit to the individuals and missions involved, their sponsoring governments and organizations. One of the spin-offs of the generally appreciative way they were, in turn, received can be seen in the growing number of former TMG / PMG / BTT personnel who have returned to Papua New Guinea of their own accord as diplomats, in other official capacities, or as researchers, etc.

The personnel of all of the peace missions mentioned contributed very positively to the Bougainville peace process both through the activities in which they engaged and through the examples they set, including the way in which they went about, civilians and military, women and men, at all times unarmed (and without guns in reserve).

**Conclusion**

However, positive and, at times, critical as the roles of the international peace missions in Bougainville have been, it is important not to over-estimate the contributions the various peace missions made to the Bougainville peace process. The foundations of peace have been twofold: (1) the beliefs and actions of thousands of people, women, children and men, on the ground, praying, reconciling and taking practical steps to promote peace, including by putting pressure on others; and (2) the determination ‘to secure lasting peace by peaceful means’ at the national level on a bipartisan – in reality, a truly national – basis. While the regional and United Nations peace missions provided valuable and very widely appreciated support, they did not – and could not – make, and, being unarmed and including civilians, were in no position to enforce, peace. Peace came from the parties and people involved. As Papua New Guinea’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations told the United Nations Security Council at the conclusion of UNOMB’s mandate, the two main elements of the peace process:

- Have been well matched: the people at the grassroots, and the national leadership.
- Having experienced the losses, suffering and pains of violent conflict, they have co-operated for the sake of peace.
- The goal and the means have been inseparable. Both have been based on their shared commitment to peace – the achievement of lasting peace by peaceful means.
- This has not just been a matter of words.
The commitment has been deep in the hearts of people on all sides.\textsuperscript{39}

In each of the Governments led by Sir William Skate (1997-1999), Sir Mekere Morauta (1999-2002), and Sir Michael Somare (2002-), the commitment to peace as both means and end has been consistent; there have been no secret contingency plans or fallback positions (except in respect of issues on the table during negotiations): what you saw was very much what you got. There has, in fact, been a remarkable willingness to turn the other cheek – and not respond even to perceived insults and slights.

At critical moments, successive Prime Ministers, together with the responsible Ministers - Sam Akoitai, Sir Moi Avei, and Sir Peter Barter – have remained focused on the main issue in peace-making and peace-building, which is peace. This was critical to the success they achieved in mobilizing support for the \textit{Bougainville Peace Agreement}, the Bills to give it legal effect, and then with such practical aspects of implementation as securing the funds required for the transition to Bougainville autonomy. As the National Government’s basic position made clear, means and ends were inseparable: the goal has been to ‘secure lasting peace by peaceful means’.

Thus, it has been that successive Governments have managed to gain the support of some of the strongest, potentially most influential sceptics and domestic critics of the kind of autonomy and the referendum on a separate independence guaranteed for Bougainville by making clear that the main issue was not either of these two proposals, but peace. It is accordingly no accident that the part of the \textit{Papua New Guinea Constitution} and the Organic Law giving legal effect to the autonomy and referendum provisions in the \textit{Bougainville Peace Agreement} are clearly named ‘Peace-Building in Bougainville’. This was critical to mobilizing the parliamentary support which resulted in the Bills’ passage by overwhelming majorities – much more than the two-thirds absolute majorities required – without any votes against, and with only a single amendment (retaining the power to regulate arms for the National Government). Members of Parliament were asked to vote for peace, and, therefore, for the basis on which peace had been agreed – autonomy, and a guaranteed referendum on Bougainville’s political future – not for the arrangements specifically agreed (though they were, of course, part of the \textit{Bougainville Peace Agreement} and included in the Bills intended to give them effect). Their commitment to peace was critical, too, to the Government’s ability to achieve mutually acceptable outcomes in negotiations over the draft \textit{Bougainville Constitution}, and in securing the National Executive Council’s final endorsement of its consistency with the National \textit{Constitution} (as amended to give legal effect to the \textit{Bougainville Peace Agreement}) in late 2004. So strong and persistent has the National Government’s declared goal of securing ‘lasting peace by peaceful means’ been that it was incorporated into the landmark \textit{Lincoln Agreement}; and there are Bougainville leaders who speak publicly as if they had coined the expression themselves.

In this context, with the ABG still settling in and the last of the international peace missions in Bougainville, UNOMB, having completed its assignment and left in the middle of 2005, it is, almost certainly, premature to claim the Bougainville peace process as having achieved success. There is still a great deal of unfinished work to be done – in the ‘No-Go Zone’ around Panguna, by way of reconciliation elsewhere, to restore services and to repair, reconstruct, replace or build the infrastructure required for development to proceed.

However, it is fair to say that the peace process has kept and continues to keep moving ahead – and that, despite the challenges involved in getting and retaining them, as well as the difficulties that come with working and living together, the international peace missions on which this paper has focused, the truce and peace monitors and the United Nations, have generally worked well

together, and provided solid support, both moral and practical, in building peace in Bougainville
and, by extension, Papua New Guinea as a whole.

The Papua New Guinea Government has already begun to draw lessons from the Bougainville
experience both in respect of the commitment of Police and Defence Force personnel to the
Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI), and in the development of a national
policy on possible future Papua New Guinean participation in future United Nations peace
missions abroad. The challenges and difficulties experienced – and generally quite smoothly
overcome – in Bougainville provide opportunities to draw lessons from which other hosts,
sponsors and members of international peace missions, both actual and potential, might usefully
learn, too, including the possible benefits to be gained by overcoming nationalist and other
sensitivities and requesting or, at least, agreeing to such missions.

In the context of the Global War on Terror, where the internal affairs of some states are of major
concern to others (including, but not only, neighbours), lessons drawn from experience with peace
missions in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, between 1990 and 2005 are worthy of consideration
by anyone concerned with challenges to and the maintenance of national, regional and global
security. This includes Governments and people in countries which are potential sources of
international concern / hosts of peace missions, as well as countries whose Governments already
contribute to peace missions or are considering doing so, and the regional and other international
organizations which sponsor them. Although each conflict and peace process has its own unique
characteristics, greater awareness of relevant experience in addressing and overcoming the issues
and sensitivities involved in requesting, managing and accepting international peace missions is
likely to be beneficial on all sides (including groups which are otherwise indifferent to a particular
Government’s concerns). Thus will the investments the international community makes in peace
missions be more likely to achieve the shared goal of sustained – and, where possible, self-
sustaining – peace, or, in the phrase which has characterized successive Papua New Guinea
Governments’ basic approach towards resolving the Bougainville conflict since it was first
publicly used in early 1998, ‘to secure lasting peace by peaceful means.’

40 Although the expression resembles an expression which has been quite widely employed elsewhere (for example,
by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, in 1996, and in the motto of Transcend, an institute closely
associated with his thinking and work), the objective and policy of working ‘to secure lasting peace by peaceful
means’ in Bougainville was formulated quite independently in Papua New Guinea, without knowledge of the
other uses – which are, almost certainly, not widely known in the country even now.